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Asymmetric Structure of Mutual Distrust and the “Locked” Sino-Japanese 
Relations 
 
Material Abstract 
The thesis presents a way of interpreting problems and disputes between China and Japan 
through identifying distrust in Sino-Japanese relations. It is abnormal that the two former 
rivals still could not move forward from the legacies of history while the status quo of the 
rise of China brings more problems. One explanation would be that the continuous 
mutual distrust with an asymmetric structure on different core concerns of strategic and 
moral issues leads to the locked Sino-Japanese relations. 
 
The thesis argues that both of the two countries distrust each other while the priori 
concerns are different. Japan concentrates on the strategic issues and China currently 
pays more attention on the moral issues. The different priorities lead to a lack of 
motivation of the two countries to make compromises to solve the problems from the 
other’s perspective. Hence, the thesis will try to verify the existence of mutual distrust 
and the asymmetric structure and examine the impacts of distrust on interstate relations. 
The analysis on the governmental discourse and existing policies and activities of the two 
countries will be the main method. The qualitative analysis on the essence of discourse 
and the quantitative verification of the reliability will be used in the case studies for the 
empirical materials collected. Besides, to collect information from the academic and 
public levels, the thesis will use the secondary data from the existing public opinion polls 
and conduct a small scale interview on both Chinese and Japanese scholars. 
 
In general, the results show that the asymmetric mutual distrust greatly contributes to the 
current Sino-Japanese contradictions. The two countries might keep suffering from it in a 
long term before the potential recommendations on trust-building and distrust-eliminating 
processes could effectively work. 
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Chapter 1: Introduction 
 
1.1 Background  
If someone asked the question, “How would you describe current Sino-Japanese relations 
using the words ‘positive/negative’ or ‘trust/distrust’”, scholars, government officials or 
normal citizens might answer “negative” and “distrust”. That is to say, current 
Sino-Japanese relations are suffering from evident difficulties, which leave a strong 
impression on most people that the two countries are not interacting well at the present 
time. The question is why this could happen between two modern states with strong 
interdependence, especially in the 21st Century.  
 
For most of their shared history, bilateral relations between China and Japan have been 
considered positive. Though there has not been a mature international society or 
diplomatic relationship, the two countries are connected to some extent. Cultural 
exchanges and communications are supposed to be the most significant interaction in the 
relations. Since science and technology, and even Chinese culture was comparatively 
advanced long ago, a major pattern of communication between China and Japan was that 
Japan would send students and envoys to China to learn different kinds of knowledge. In 
this way, it is reasonable that two states with close cultural ties—for example, the use of 
Chinese characters in Japanese language, and architectural styles—could help build a 
harmonious relationship.  
 
There are also different discussions on the way in which China and Japan could maintain 
peaceful relations with each other. In the past due to the lack of efficient transportation 
and information, interactions between different states of the region was quite limited, and 
disputes and wars were not easily conducted. This situation changed towards the end of 
the 19th century as the relations between the two countries changed into semi-colonial 
pattern with the invasion of a backward China by a modern Japan. In the beginning of its 
imperial era, Japan achieved many of its national interest goals in China, following the 
example of some Western states. The rise of Japanese militarism was followed by a war 
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between Japan and China, as a part of World War II, which created a series of problems 
affecting bilateral relations even today. The war led to millions of deaths and casualties in 
both countries, and ruined the process of modernization. Moreover, the confrontation 
between the communist and capitalist camps in the Cold War made timely reconciliation 
impossible, as the two countries were involved with different ideological groups. It was 
not until 1972 that China and Japan finally realized the normalization of their official 
relationship—most of which is owed to re-engagement between the US and China.  
 
Even in the era of normalization, in contrast to the situation of deeper trust among 
European states, such as France and Germany, the bilateral relationship between China 
and Japan does not work that smoothly. There was indeed a period, nearly two decades, 
of peace and cooperation between the two states after the 1972 normalization. As soon as 
normalization was achieved, the relationship between China and Japan warmed up 
rapidly. Though the two states did not form an alliance, the political atmosphere was 
overall positive, both on the intergovernmental level and the social level. Both states 
distrusted the Soviet Union during the Cold War era, which brought them together by 
sharing a common strategic goal. 
 
However, the trust context between China and Japan was unstable. After the fall of the 
Soviet Union, increased friction in disputes about issues left unsettled during the 
normalization process were observed. The disputes over historical legacies soon emerged 
as obstacles to the development of bilateral relations. With the growth of China’s 
economic and military power, the Sino-Japanese relationship in the beginning of the 21st 
Century has witnessed a wider array of problems, including both historical legacies and 
strategic confrontations or competition. A series of disputes in Sino-Japanese relations 
occurred leading to limited progress in cooperation. This context led to increased 
awareness of the problem of bilateral trust between China and Japan.  
 
Another important element is that, although both Japan and China acknowledge the 
existence of disputes and wish that they should be controlled within a certain scope 
instead of letting them drive the two countries into direct conflict, they still seem stuck 
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with the problems without appropriate solutions. Hence, the problem might not only be 
distrust based on certain issues, but also a structural dilemma that leads to a “locked” 
Sino-Japanese relationship. This is the primary focus of the current research. It has to be 
emphasized that though historical patterns of course provide much of the context of the 
relationship the research focuses on the contemporary international relations between the 
two countries, which is after the year 2000. The years prior are only discussed as 
supporting evidence in terms of the legacies, and the current status quo is the main focus 
of the research project and its questions. 
 
1.2 Research questions 
We can therefore define the research questions and expected outcomes as follows: 
 
1. How can the problem of trust be identified and understood in terms of International 
Relations (IR)? How will trust – or distrust - affect international relations between 
states? 
2. Why are Sino-Japanese relations ‘locked’ in terms of distrust? What is the nature of 
this structural dilemma and what are the asymmetries in the status of trust? 
3. Is it possible to ‘unlock’ the problem of trust between the two countries and improve 
general relations? If yes, how can this be achieved? If no, why not? 
 
The assumptions of behind these research questions can be set out as follows: 
 
Question 1: How can the problem of trust be identified and understood in terms of 
International Relations (IR)? How will trust – or distrust - affect international relations 
between states? 
  
“Trust” is firstly a sociological term about relationships between human beings. However, 
states are interdependent in international society and they can have social relations with 
one another; as a result we can see that international relations support and benefit from 
the existence of trust. As Rathbun (2009) argues, trust is the belief that one’s interests 
will not be harmed when placed in the hands of another. When adopted in international 
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relations, different types of trust are identified, such as social trust and political trust as 
described by Brewer (2004), or strategic trust and moralistic trust as identified by 
Rathbun (2009). What can be concluded from the facts of international relations is that 
states with deep trust have different types of interactions (more positive) from those who 
do not. 
 
In terms of IR theories, different approaches are involved. For realists, national interests 
or national security are the main goals and concerns of a state. Therefore, cooperation 
between states is contingent and trust does not essentially exist in this approach. In 
general, trust is much closer to the ideas of liberalism. Liberalists argue that international 
cooperation is achievable and that states might trust each other for mutually beneficial 
relations. Moreover, the perspectives of rationalism and constructivism should also be 
included. 
 
However, part of the disputes between the IR approaches as to the existence and function 
of trust in international relations lies in the difficulty of identifying and measuring trust. 
The measurement of trust is to some extent difficult, but it is still possible. Both 
qualitative and quantitative methods are adopted for this research, as discussed in the 
methodology section. The basic standard for methods of measuring trust looks at three 
levels:  
--The political interactions between the two states: both positive interactions and negative 
should be taken into consideration. Positive activities, such as mutual VIP visits, joint 
agreements, integration and other cooperative actions, can be regarded as signs of 
existing mutual trust. Competitive interactions, such as disputes over historical issues, are 
symbols of mutual distrust. 
--Social interactions are also crucial, as political trust might develop from the social level. 
Public opinion towards each other is a measurement of social trust, which could be 
assessed in a comparatively effective way. Moreover, whether public interactions go 
smoothly is also a method for measuring the quality of mutual trust. 
--Analysis of the content of governmental documents, public opinion and interview on 
scholars: the standards of measurements to discover evidence of trust among existing 
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processes is based on analysis of key materials, which is combined with quantitative 
methods.  
 
How could trust shape international relations? 
When defining the notion of trust, a widely accepted general definition is that to trust is 
to believe one’s interests would not be harmed under the control of another actor. There 
are discussions about different types of trust in international relations, such as Rathbun’s 
(2009) categorisation of two broad forms: “strategic trust” and “moralistic trust”. 
According to Rathbun, “strategic trust” is “a belief that potential partners have a 
self-interest in cooperation, generally an incentive in building or sustaining a long-term, 
mutually beneficial relationship” (2009: 349); and “moralistic trust” is a belief “about the 
honesty and integrity of potential partners” (2009: 351). Trust affects the modes of 
actions by shaping decisions as to whether another actor is trustworthy or not. With the 
different actions of other actors on strategic or moralistic issues, a reflection of a state 
could be seen at both governmental and social levels, which seems to conform to Paul R. 
Brewer (2004) definitions of “social trust” and “political trust”. 
 
In the case of Sino-Japanese relations, both strategic and moralistic distrust exist. The 
two states distrust each other based on the other’s strategic goals and national interests, 
which have the potential to harm their own interests. Meanwhile, due to historical 
legacies, China and Japan doubt the other’s honesty and integrity. The influences of 
mutual distrust have negative effects on the process of reconciliation, and both social and 
political interactions. Why distrust is significant is because it weakens attempts by the 
states to conduct or even to consider the necessity of conducting actions to reconcile or 
cooperate, as one state has few positive perceptions of the other. Since the relationship 
itself is deteriorating and the will to change the situation is very low, a vicious cycle can 
be observed. 
 
Question 2: Why are Sino-Japanese relations ‘locked’ in terms of distrust? What is the 
nature of this structural dilemma and what are the asymmetries in the status of trust? 
 
17 
 
As mentioned above, Sino-Japanese relations have become trapped by mutual distrust. 
The research focuses on mutual relations after the normalization in 1972. What can be 
seen is that the relationship has been worsening ever since. Theoretically, China and 
Japan should have settled their historical disputes when World War II ended, more than 
70 years ago, but the opposite is true. The characteristics of different periods and specific 
issues are the problems that leads the two states into mutual distrust. The trust or distrust 
affects the process of forming political attitudes and judgments of foreign policies, which 
in turn have direct influences on bilateral relations. 
 
Moreover, the distrust between the two states has asymmetries from China’s and Japan’s 
different viewpoints. This can be shown by the following figure:  
 
 
                           China                      Japan 
 
 
“Levels” 
 
 
“Main concern” 
 
 
 
“Less important” 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1. 1: Asymmetries in the structure of distrust of Sino-Japanese relations 
 
Moralistic distrust 
(Shown as historical 
issues) 
Strategic distrust 
(China rise) 
Strategic distrust Moralistic distrust 
“Unacceptable”
“Crucial” 
“Normal” for 
themselves 
18 
 
Both states have strategic and moralistic distrust toward the other. However, the main 
concerns of each are on different levels and are driven by different dynamics. For China 
moralistic distrust is stronger than strategic; for Japan the reverse. The asymmetries make 
it difficult to unlock the status quo of mutual distrust. As the two states tend to regard the 
other as unfriendly or threatening in their ‘normal’ demands, such as China’s call for 
apologies about history and Japan’s worry about China’s expansion, the disputes are 
more complicated. 
 
Question3: Is it possible to ‘unlock’ the problem of trust between the two countries and 
improve general relations? If yes, how can this be achieved? If no, why not? 
 
The author would argue that ‘trust’ is not the only determinant of Sino-Japanese relations, 
but is indeed a crucial one. Rebuilding mutual trust is a potential recommendation that 
would help unlock relations. Specific patterns are likely: 
(1). Settling the historical legacies and disputes to achieve basic understandings, since 
these cases remain as obstacles to further steps towards reconciliation. 
(2). Declaring transparency in strategic goals and national interests. Both are dissatisfied 
with the other on this. Japan worries about China’s lack of transparency, and China 
doubts the intentions of the US-Japan alliance. 
(3). Building efficient channels between governments to deal with emergencies and 
disputes. Enhancements in social interactions without political influence should also be 
strengthened for mutual understanding. 
(4). Controlling the risk of nationalism. The two should avoid using nationalism as a tool 
to take advantage of the other.  
(5). China and Japan should have a clear understanding of the asymmetries of the others’ 
core concerns, and the dynamics at different levels (including governmental/civil levels), 
in order to reduce misunderstandings and misreading of intensions.  
 
However, whether these possible recomendations are accepted is a serious problem. The 
mutual distrust has brought about a vicious cycle – that the two states are likely to follow 
a competitive zero-sum approach instead of a cooperative positive-sum approach. With 
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fierce disputes over specific issues, such as the Diaoyu/Senkaku Islands, it is extremely 
difficult to even start rebuilding trust. What methods the two governments take to 
overcome the obstacles is significant. On the other hand, the two states have reasons to 
cooperate. As the most important states in the region, confrontation would only harm the 
interests of both in the long term. Therefore, the situation of distrust and negative 
relationship might remain unstable for a comparatively long period, but should be 
resolved eventually. 
 
1.3 Methodology 
One noted one of the main obstacles for the research is the measurement of trust or 
distrust between China and Japan. Being a more-or-less elusive term in international 
relations, the status of trust between states might not be identifiable directly and easily. 
However, evidence exists in international relations behaviour to measure trust and 
distrust. Beyond the theoretical exploration of trust relationships, mutual trust is endowed 
with certain particulars in Sino-Japanese relations. In general, a combination of both 
qualitative and quantitative methods is adopted in the research. 
 
Qualitative study contributes to the research in the following ways: First, the essence of 
Sino-Japanese relations is far beyond the data, which shows an incredible growth in 
military spending. To understand the shifts in ‘unstable’ bilateral relations and ‘unstable 
trust’, analysis of historical legacies and specific issues of disputes is necessary. The 
development of Sino-Japanese relations could be interpreted in terms of IR theories; 
however, it is also history-based. The research discusses the changes in relations since the 
1972 bilateral normalization, in order to discover how trust and distrust shapes interstate 
relations. Second, with the necessity of defining trust in international relations as a 
framework for the thesis, a theoretical analysis of trust in terms of different approaches is 
constructed. For example, using Rathbun’s framework (2009), identifying strategic trust 
and moralistic trust, how the traditional IR approaches fit the basic claims of these kinds 
of trust needs to be strengthened. Third, a series of approaches to define trust are 
basically qualitative. The mutual trust between the two states could be analysed through 
exploring empirical materials. By studying factors such as commonly-used political terms, 
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the interstate positioning processes, mutual visits and speeches of leaders, and interstate 
treaties or agreements, it could be possible to identify whether the level of trust between 
China and Japan is positive or negative at certain times. Similar methods can be observed 
in the arguments of Aaron M. Hoffman (2002), in which measurements of trust are built 
on the elements of foreign policy decision-making records, oversight indicators, and rule 
indicators. Based on the findings above, selected cases are discussed in detail.  
 
Meanwhile, quantitative methods have been inevitably connected. On one hand, it is 
valuable in defining trust. As Paul R. Brewer (2004) has argued, different kinds of 
trust—both social and political—are to some extent related to public opinion. Public 
opinion surveys reflecting clear attitudes toward each other could serve as empirical 
evidence to verify trust relations. It is also possible because the data is easily accessible, 
due to the surveys being conducted perennially. On the other hand, the qualitative 
research methods could be extended with quantitative methods. By collecting data such 
as the frequency of use of hostile, dispute-strengthening, cooperation-publicising words 
in the most influential media; or by counting the key words of cooperative, competitive, 
or neutral issues and relations in the speeches by governmental leaders on both sides, 
evidence could be discovered from these viewpoints. Politicians’ use of language and the 
media is a form of expressing attitudes towards the other state. The media are crucial 
because they inhabit important positions in Chinese and Japanese politics. The Japanese 
media have strong influence over its people; while some Chinese media is controlled by 
the Communist Party, and is a clear reflection of or guide to the strategies of the party 
and the government. The quality of interstate relations, the status of mutual trust and the 
link between the two could be better understood through quantitative efforts. 
 
1.4 Structure of the research 
The thesis is constructed across eight chapters, including this introduction. Chapter 2 is 
the theoretical framework, and tries to define the notion of trust in the case of 
Sino-Japanese relations. Firstly, there is a task to define trust in international relations, 
because there are debates over its significance in this discipline among different 
international relations theories. The existence of trust/distrust needs to be verified in 
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order to guide the research and avoiding confusion with trust between human beings. 
Secondly, it is crucial to indicate how the general concepts are adopted in this thesis. 
Specifically, this thesis mainly analyses “strategic distrust” and “moral distrust” between 
Japan and China. However, these two terms are not entirely similar to the “strategic trust” 
and “moralistic trust” introduced by Rathbun and Uslaner, which are discussed in detail 
in the chapter. Thirdly, the chapter focuses on the aims and measurements of trust, which 
could help us understand the significance and the reliability of this research. Fourth, the 
chapter tries to provide a theoretical framework, so that later chapters could be supported 
by the theories. 
 
Chapter 3 is a literature review of how effectively the existing literature examines trust 
and distrust in Sino-Japanese relations. The literature review is constructed in the form of 
a chronology of Sino-Japanese relations, from the 1970s until now. Since it has already 
been acknowledged that Sino-Japanese relations have had both positive and negative 
periods, the chapter tries to explore how the literature understands the sources and 
reasons for the changes. To be specific, whether the literature provides explanations for 
how distrust between the two countries affects bilateral relations is a concern of this 
chapter. 
 
Chapter 4 is connects the theoretical structure and the empirical cases. Although the 
theoretical discussions might make sense, whether it has the expected influence on 
Sino-Japanese relations is another matter. Therefore, identifying the particular 
characteristics of the two countries and Sino-Japanese relations, such as domestic politics, 
foreign policy-making process, and historical legacies is crucial. This chapter discusses 
how they lead to and contribute to the influences of trust and distrust in Sino-Japanese 
relations. 
 
Chapter 5 and Chapter 6 are two case studies. Chapter 5 examines Japan’s strategic and 
moral distrust of China. There are three sub-hypotheses in this chapter, including: that 
strategic distrust of China exists; that moral distrust exists; and that, of the two, Japan’s 
strategic distrust of China is currently predominant. In terms of strategic distrust, 
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maritime disputes have been selected as the cases, because they are frequently hotspots in 
the region. For moral distrust, Japan’s distrust of China’s ideology, political system, and 
responsibilities as a country are analysed. After the analysis of each, a comparative study 
is conducted, to verify the final hypothesis. 
 
Chapter 6 is similar in structure to chapter 5, and it focuses on China’s strategic and 
moral distrust of Japan. The three hypotheses are similar, except that for China, the a 
priori concern is moral distrust. The analysis of China’s moral distrust focuses on 
historical issues, especially that of the Yasukuni Shrine. At the same time, China’s 
strategic distrust is based on Japan’s potential revival as a normal state, or as a great 
military power. 
 
Chapter 7 focuses on two main tasks. Firstly, although the cases have answered some of 
the research questions on mutual distrust between Japan and China, it is still necessary to 
explain why mutual distrust can lead to a locked status in bilateral relations. With the 
supportive theoretical framework and the case studies as empirical evidence, the 
asymmetric structure of mutual distrust can be tested as another hypothesis. This chapter 
also tries to provide academic sources of interviews with scholars to support verification 
and discuss the final research question about possible recommendations for unlocking 
Sino-Japanese relations. Although there are more pessimistic views of the future of 
mutual trust, solving the structural problem and enhancing trust is the inevitable choice 
for the two countries. 
 
Chapter 8 is a conclusion, reviewing the soundness and completeness of the thesis. It also 
identifies the limitations of and potential for continuing the research in the future. 
 
1.5 Conclusion: why the research is significant 
The existing literature indeed discusses the important elements affecting the bilateral 
relationship, and frequently mentions the word “distrust” in different cases. However, 
differing from the relationship-based arguments, this research pays more attention to the 
situation of bilateral trust/distrust, based on how events move the relationship between 
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trust and distrust. The status of trust greatly affects the interactions between and reactions 
of China and Japan, which are based on each’s anticipations and strategies towards the 
other. The research focuses on the quantitative interpretation of how good or bad the 
status of trust/distrust is in bilateral relations and the qualitative study of how the notion 
of trust plays a role in Sino-Japanese relations, and if there are recommendations. 
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Chapter 2: A theoretical framework 
 
During the China-Japan 21st Century Friendship Committee in 2011, former Chinese 
foreign minister and state councillor Tang Jiaxuan told the media that the lack of mutual 
political trust between China and Japan, as well as instability in the civil friendship 
between the two countries were problematic. The deep roots of these problems between 
the two East Asian giants could be identified as the absence of mutual trust at both the 
governmental and civil society levels. Tang Jiaxuan also argued that the mutual distrust 
between China and Japan should be understood as originating from a variety of sources. 
Historical and growing nationalism in both countries could be the first impression people 
have of Sino-Japanese relations, while the rapid growth of Chinese national power, and 
the emergence of the so called ‘China threat’ connected to the rise of China, might 
enhance mutual distrust as well.1  From a similar perspective, in February 2013, former 
Japanese Ambassador to China Niwa Uichirō has also suggested that the crisis 
surrounding the Diaoyu/Senkaku islands is a consequence of the distrust between the two 
countries’ leaders.2  
 
Originally, ‘trust’ was not considered a political term. It was a sociological concern, such 
as the basic methodology of developing trust “in order to face the future actively and 
constructively” (Sztompka, 1999, p.11); and thus trust could be interpreted as an 
alternative choice “in situations when we have to act in spite of uncertainty and risk” 
(Sztompka, 1999, p. 25). In other cases, one could describe trust as being “a simplifying 
strategy that enables individuals to adapt to complex social environment, and thereby 
benefit from increased opportunities” (Earle & Cvetkovich, 1995, p.38), and “particularly 
relevant in conditions of ignorance or uncertainty with respect to unknown or 
unknowable actions of others” (Gambetta, 1988, p.218). However, more governmental 
officials and scholars are discussing trust and its significance in politics and international 
relations. Michael P. Jasinski argues, 
                                                 
1 See http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_chn/wjdt_611265/gjldrhd_611267/t870569.shtml 
2 See http://mil.huanqiu.com/observation/2013-02/3644634.html 
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“It would be a mistake to treat social trust as merely an aspect of interpersonal 
interactions. It is a concept that has considerable influence on a variety of political 
phenomena, ranging from economic development to violent crime, trust in 
government, governmental performance, and… international conflict behaviour.” 
(Jasinski, c2011, p. 51) 
 
It can therefore be seen that relations between states without trust will likely suffer 
difficulties (Yan, 2013). At the same time, we could also expect a number of positive 
effects brought about by mutual trust in international relations. A fundamental question, 
therefore, is how do states find themselves in a state of trust or mistrust, and what they 
can do to change the situation to affect bilateral relations? 
 
In terms of understanding the notion of trust in international relations, there are several 
crucial stages or tasks that should be explored. The initial issue would be the definition of 
trust. As has been mentioned, trust was regarded as a moral or a sociological term, rather 
than a political one to begin with (Sztompka, 1999; Baier, 1995). It cannot be avoided 
that certain challenges or problems might occur when introducing a term that has 
traditionally been regarded as based on the relationships between human beings into the 
fields of International Relations. This chapter will analyse trust in International Relations 
in three stages. First, a definition of trust will be discussed, including the sources of trust 
and how trust changes in international relations. The issue of trust as a changeable factor 
in relations between states and societies also requires discussing the possibility of 
measuring trust. Not only the main IR theories of trust will be discussed, but also the 
related approaches – such as rational choice theory and the security dilemma – which 
should be taken into consideration. Second, the chapter will discuss how trust and distrust 
could directly or indirectly affect mutual relations between China and Japan. Levels of 
trust and distrust in relations between states would vary due to each state’s specific 
circumstances, so these factors need comprehensive analysis. In particular, the critical 
argument about certain asymmetries in the different focuses, which have led to the 
current ‘locked’ relationship between the two countries, need close examination. In 
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general, the sources of trust and distrust between the two states, and the performance and 
impact of levels of trust, are the main concerns of this research. 
 
2.1 Is trust a normative behavior or a rational choice for states in 
international relations? 
 
The logic of exploring the role and meaning of trust in international relations should have 
the following stages. First, it is necessary to view trust as a normative category that 
reflects and shapes behaviour among states. This helps with the analysis of the functions 
of both trust and distrust. At the same time, one should consider whether or not trust is a 
form of incentive or rational choice in interstate relations, and whether this is a helpful 
way of understanding the motivation of states’ activities. Therefore, a discussion of the 
notions of trust in international relations will be conducted in this chapter, focusing on 
normative explanations of trust as well as rational choice assumptions. Finally, how trust 
would be understood and explained within these possible approaches, and how the main 
International Relations Theories view trust will also be examined.  
 
2.1.1 A basic understanding of trust in international relations 
According to the Oxford Dictionary of English, trust is the belief in “the reliability, truth, 
or ability of someone or something.”3 Originally, ‘trust’ was a notion used mostly in 
describing the status of relationships between human beings in a sociological sense. 
Human society relies on the trust between individuals and associations, which then could 
be formed to become an entirety. The notion of trust is closely connected with issues in 
other fields of social enquiry, such as law, economics, psychology and management. In 
fact, ‘trust’ has always been present within international affairs, since the international 
society was formed even without being raised as a clearly defined academic notion or 
subject of study. Trust among different states and societies can be crucial to their 
relationships. The existence of bilateral trust might ensure that friendly and healthy 
interactions between countries can develop. Conversely, a lack of trust might lead to 
                                                 
3 http://www.oxforddictionaries.com/definition/english/trust?q=trust, accessed 25/10/2013 
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suspicion and enmity in international relations, and create a multitude of problems and 
rivalries between countries 
 
Trust in international relations is a state’s belief in or judgement of the interaction among 
states, that the activities of another actor could not damage its interests, values, or 
reputation (Hardin, 2006; Hoffman, 2006; Sztompka, 1999; Kramer, Brewer, & Hanna, 
1996; Larson, 1997). As this suggests, trust has been seen from one perspective as a 
positive or negative normative category. Aaron M. Hoffman defined the notion of trust as, 
“At root, trust refers to an actor’s willingness to place something valued under another’s 
control.” (Hoffman, 2006, p. 4) Russell Hardin described trust concisely: “As a rule, we 
trust only those with whom we have a rich enough relationship to judge them trustworthy, 
and even then we trust only over certain ranges of actions. Hence, trust is a three-part 
relation: A trusts B to do, or with respect to X.” (Hardin, 2006, p.18) Andrew H. Kydd 
offers a slightly different interpretation, stating that “trust is a belief that the other side 
prefers mutual cooperation to exploiting one’s own cooperation, while mistrust is a belief 
that the other side prefers exploiting one’s cooperation to returning it.” (Kydd, 2005), p.6) 
As Kydd explicitly indicates, cooperation should be seen as one component of trust — 
possibly as a rational choice for actors. His notion of trust therefore combines certain 
normative assumptions and also some rational choice ideas, such as that states should 
rationally advance trust since this will maximise gains from cooperation. 
 
In a similar way, J. David Lewis and Andrew Weigert (1985), suggest that there are 
different “types of trust”: “Trusting behaviour may be motivated primarily by strong 
positive affect for the object of trust (emotional trust) or by ‘good rational reasons’ why 
the object of trust merits trust (cognitive trust), or more usually, some combination of 
both.” There could also be other divisions, including “political trust (i.e., generalized trust 
in government) and social trust (i.e., generalized trust in other people)” as argued by 
Brewer, Gross, Aday and Willnat (2004). 
 
Academic debate has suggested that, when viewing trust in international relations, states 
will very often have to take risks, with the expectation that other actors will follow 
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international principles (Tar, 1998) and show sufficient respect for their national interests. 
At the same time, whether a state will trust or distrust another would probably depend, to 
a degree, on its rational choices, which are determined by collective experiences or 
information about their mutual history and making predictions of the future. This thesis 
would accept that trust in international relations is an idea, belief or experience based on 
interstate activities. However, it is crucial to identify differences in interpretations of trust 
despite these similarities. The most important considerations are as follows:  
1) The main carrier of trust would have to be established. Whether the state would be 
the main instrument of trust or whether it is individuals or other social 
formations—public opinion, media, cultural representations—is a critical component 
of this issue. Though trust from the actors of lower levels will be more easily 
identified and measured, countries remain as the primary actors in international 
relations – although, even here there would be debates among different IR theories 
(Hobson, 2000; Arts, 2000). 
2) There would be a variety of contributing factors to the notion of trust which would be 
open to interpretation. These elements include national interests, cooperation 
between states and risk in interstate actions. It is important to understand how these 
contributing factors operate in specific kinds of trusting or distrustful relationships. 
3) Another issue is the need to identify the manifestations of trust in international 
relations, which could indicate whether a state trust or distrust another. 
 
A significant issue in the question of international trust is to establish what the main 
carrier of trust and distrust is between states. It is evident that the basis of trust is 
produced through the ideas of human beings and observed in interpersonal relations. The 
extension of relations between individuals, and then groups of individuals would finally 
form the bonds that establish international society. Russell Hardin (2002) expresses the 
importance of individuals in his description of trust: “the best way to address these issues 
is to begin at the individual level and then to proceed to the societal and governmental 
levels” (Hardin, 2002)). The individual and the state—or to be more exact, the 
government—do not have the same capacity to affect trust, nor to be affected by trust. 
The problem lies in which way this kind of trust, which could have an identifiable impact 
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on international relations, could be formed based on individuals. The fact is that a ‘state’ 
or a ‘country’ is an abstract term, without the ability of independent thought like a human 
being. To be more exact, the executor of the interstate activities of a country is its 
government. One government’s trust and distrust of another is neither the same as the 
trust and distrust between individuals, nor that between individuals and governments. The 
government of a state is assembled from individuals; however, it would have to go 
beyond the beliefs of individuals, since the national interests of the state would 
distinguish it from the individual’s. When the people work in and for the government, 
they would act differently compared to those who only need to care for themselves. In 
this way, the government might have to make rational choices (Reus-Smit, 2009; Snidal, 
2013) —or to be more conservative, the rational actor model can be applied (Rubin , 
1997) — on whether to trust or distrust another, considering standards such as the vital 
national interest, the country’s reputation, and other factors. 
 
It can be concluded that a government formed by individuals would have to gather 
enough information to decide the attitudes and intensions of another actor in international 
affairs. Trust would be linked with the confidence and expectations (Tonkiss & Passey, 
1999; Cook, Lawrence, & Kim, 2010) that another state would not harm the national 
interests, and should follow international principles in both present and future occasions. 
Otherwise, distrust would increase, if a lack of positive information or perceived conflicts 
in national interests were observable between states. There have been many sources of 
trust and distrust among states, which will be discussed in the forthcoming sections. The 
guidance of the strategy of a state, the scientifically-based assessments as well as the 
values-based judgements will all have to be included. 
 
The interaction between trust, cooperation and risk 
There is a crucial question in the relationship between trust and cooperation. A mistake of 
muddling the division of trust and cooperation might occur when studying trust, which is 
to make judgements that trust would no doubt exist if cooperation could be achieved 
between states. The existence of trust and cooperation might be treated as mutually 
exclusive. To be honest, it is reasonable that the evidence of trust and cooperation in 
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many cases could be linked (Kydd, 2000; 2001; Das & Teng, 1998). Put another way, 
“trust is the key to international cooperation” (McGillivray & Smith, 2000). However, as 
Hoffman states, the gap between the two notions could lead to a misinterpretation of the 
inner motivations of trust: 
“Although these studies contribute to our understanding of the circumstances under 
which trust is required, they often conflate trust and cooperation, even though the 
former is not necessary for the later. Cooperation, for example, can be coerced or 
conducted through a third party in addition to being agreed voluntarily, but many 
studies of trust are insensitive to distinctions between cooperation without trust and 
cooperation with trust.” (Hoffman, 2006, p. 6)  
Robert Axelrod also claims that, “there is no need to assume trust between the players: 
the use of reciprocity can be enough to make defection unproductive.” (Axelrod, 1984, 
p.173) 
 
The argument that cooperation could be achieved without the existence of trust (Cook, 
Hardin, & Levi, 2005) actually reveals three points of contention: the inequality between 
trust and cooperation, the relationship between trust and interests, and the existence of 
rational choices. In terms of the national interest, many scholars have mentioned this in 
their statements on defining trust. As in Hoffman’s definition above, Rathbun indicates 
that “trust is the belief that one’s interests will not be harmed when placed in the hands of 
another” (Rathbun, 2009, p.346). Trust would not purely be a moral judgement on the 
‘personality’ or ‘nature’ of another state when the factor of interest is involved. There 
would be two approaches to trust including both the interest-oriented and 
morality-oriented ways of understanding the notion. Both Eric M. Uslaner and Brain C. 
Rathbun have introduced the “strategic trust” and “moralistic trust” (or “generalized 
trust”) to divide the different patterns. This thesis would, to some extent, agree with the 
adoption of these ideas in Sino-Japanese relations—with some modifications and 
exceptions. In terms of the trust between China and Japan, “strategic trust on strategic 
issues” and “moral and political trustworthy” would be the two favoured approaches. 
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Going back to the previous discussion on why cooperation could not be equated to trust, 
it could be argued that cooperation could still be achieved even when one state believes 
another to be untrustworthy, or even potentially dangerous to its own national interests 
(Axelrod, 1984; Cook, Hardin, & Levi, 2005; Raymond, 2006; Yamagishi, Kanazawa, 
Mashima, & Terai, 2005). The door to cooperation would never be completely closed on 
certain issues. Reducing the danger of confrontation by enhancing cooperation is also a 
kind of national interest. States will always try to advance their interests (even the firmest 
liberalists could hardly deny that there is plenty of evidence of states pursuing their 
interests), and then might be conservative on securing their interests in different cases or 
under different circumstances. In this way, it would be more difficult to achieve trust than 
cooperation between countries. Therefore, cooperation would not be a 
sufficient/necessary condition for trust.  
 
Whenever a state trusts another, it would have to accept the risk of being betrayed by the 
other actor (Cook, et al., 2005; Evans & Krueger, 2011; Uslaner, 2005; Fukuyama, 1996). 
This thesis tends to believe that absolute trust between states can hardly be achieved 
while state rationality would drive them to cooperate with others without trust when their 
interests demand it. Similarly, it is also a type of rational choice that states would 
preserve to a certain extent even if they do trust another actor. However, trust between 
states is still significant to the positive development of international relations, without the 
overall optimism and ‘moralistic trust’. The impact of a trusting relationship is that it can 
help reduce the high cost brought about by risk control preparations among states 
(Luhmann, 1988). For example, states with comparatively high levels of military trust 
could spend less resources on deploying forces near a border, than those states with high 
levels of military distrust. Meanwhile, trust itself would be a method to control risk and 
to reduce the potential for crises caused by misinterpretation and misunderstanding, 
especially in emergencies. 
 
According to Uslaner (2013), trust is “an alternative to risk”. In terms of strategic trust, it 
would realise the control of risk based on the forecast of the worst situation and 
possibility. “We may overcome risk by strong institutions such as courts—if you don’t 
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pay me back, I can sue you.” (Uslaner, Trust as an alternative to risk, 2013, p.2) It would 
be similar in interstate activities, when countries would rely on the evidence they have to 
trust one another, while also taking precautions. After being betrayed by another actor, a 
state would use the methods of punishment to seek revenge (McGillivray & Smith, 2000). 
Political, economic and military measures could all be institutionalized as the sanctions.  
 
The approaches to risk control of moralistic trust are comparatively different due to an 
optimistic world view (Uslaner, 2002). If the moralistic trust is popularly accepted by 
most states in the world, the risks of war and conflicts might be significantly reduced, in 
addition to a reduction in potential danger at lower stages. Though this kind of idealistic 
description would not fit the status quo, as it has not been widely adopted by most states, 
the efforts towards the goal of trust could still have positive impacts within a certain 
scope. As mentioned above, trust helps to reduce the cost of risk. For instance, in terms of 
trusting “not to be invaded by other states”, the state of trust between the US and Canada 
would be much stronger than that between North Korea and South Korea. Considering 
the fact that Canada is adjacent to the US, which maintains the strongest military force in 
the world, while not feeling as threatened as South Korea is by North Korea, it could not 
be denied that trust indeed works in international relations. 
 
2.1.2 Normative relations versus rationality in international relations 
The actions of every actor are based on certain standards. Despite exceptional cases (such 
as the actor losing control), both the individuals in human society and states as the main 
actors in the international relations would have their own principles and standards of 
behaviour. Among these actions, the possibility of trusting others would also have certain 
standards, as the states would be less contingent than individual human beings in dealing 
with their affairs. Therefore, the study of norms, especially international norms, would 
help understand the sources and motivations of trust. 
Norms can be defined as certain patterns of rules that are then used to define and shape 
different international behaviours (Hurrell, 2012; Klotz, 1995). The literature may have 
different concentrations due to specific, unique research aims. Finnemore and Sikkink 
(1998) argue that, “The definition of a ‘norm’ is generally stated as ‘a standard of 
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appropriate behaviour for actors with a given identity.’ Sometimes the use of the word 
institution is used interchangeably with norm.” They also provide different types of 
norms, including “regulatory norms (which order and constrain behaviour)”, “constitutive 
norms (which set up new actors, behaviours or interests)”, and “evaluative or prescriptive 
norms”. It is important to note that the notion of “international norm” contains the idea of 
“being ought to do something”, or the “rules” of behaviour. Other academics, such as 
Karl-Dieter Opp (2013), Arie M. Kacowicz (2005) and Janice Thomson (1993), have put 
forward similar theories. For international norms, states will try to follow certain 
expectations of behaviour in their interactions under this circumstance. This extends 
beyond the “behavioural regularities”. (Florini, 1996, p.364) As Kacowicz argues, 
“we should differentiate between ‘moral’ or prescriptive (‘normative’) norms, 
stemming from an international ethics position, and ‘nonnormative’ or ‘non-moral’ 
norms, stemming mainly from  positivist approaches, including international law 
(see Morgenthau 1934).” (Kacowicz, 2005, p. 19)  
 
According to Opp (2013), there has been another crucial debate between the “incentives 
thesis” and “autonomy thesis” on norms. The position of the incentives thesis indicates 
that “norms are incentives and do not differ from other costs and benefits such as material 
rewards.” By contrast, the autonomy thesis denies the similarity between norms and 
incentives: “In short, norm following is ‘irrational’ behaviour in the sense that it cannot 
be explained by RCT (rational choice theory).” (Opp, 2013, p.385) This kind of argument 
has led to opposition between moral norms and rational choice. Otherwise, it might be 
regarded as the opposition between norms and interests in international relations, if 
norm-following activities in international relations are irrational and will lead to higher 
costs, rather than benefiting interests for states. However, there are those who argue that 
norms and rational choice are not irreconcilable: 
“That is, more often than we think, norms and self-interests tend to coincide rather 
than stand in opposition to each other. They usually move in the same direction, and 
they complement each other. Thus, interests might shape norms, but norms also 
shape interests. (Tannenwald, 1992, p.24)” (Kacowicz, 2005, p.27). 
 
34 
 
This thesis will accept the judgement that countries are trying to be rational when 
addressing international affairs. Hence, several steps need to be taken to explain the 
significance of normative-versus-rational choice for trust in international relations. First, 
it is crucial to ascertain if trust can be identified as a type of international norm. Second, 
whether the goal of trusting other actors is beneficial to the interests of states should be 
explored; otherwise, trust would hardly have space to be treated as an international norm, 
leaving only the rational behaviour. 
 
2.1.3 Does trust in international relations conform to norms or reflect a 
rational choice? 
By distinguishing the two terms of “norms” and “rational choice”, the thesis uses 
narrative definitions of each term. Norms would refer to the normative assumptions and 
related behaviour, or what can be called moral norms (Voina-Motoc, 1999). The rational 
choice assumption refers to the rationality of non-moral factors among states (Goldsmith 
& Posner, 2000), which means that countries would act in certain ways (different from 
the outcome of morality) to attain the benefits of cooperation. Exploring if trust complies 
with any characteristics of the two options will identify the way in which trust works in 
international relations. 
 
McElroy (1992, p.31), as cited in Kacowicz (2005, p.18), “a moral norm can be defined 
as a behavioural prescription that is universal in the claims it makes and that involves a 
view of the actors’ own interest, but from the point of view of the others’ interests.” It 
would be a debate of whether countries consider the interests of others as being important 
in conducting international relations. The definition of trust from Hardin and other 
scholars similarly suggests that trust means that countries believe that their national 
interests will not be harmed by others in international relations. Though this is a 
generalized definition, there is this consistency between the two theories. The moral 
norms in international relations represent the good will of interstate behaviour. Trusting 
others is in our/a state’s nature; or, as Uslaner (2002) argues, believing that other states 
should be trusted obeys moral norms and corresponds with the internal quality of 
“oughtness”. (Finnemore & Sikkink, 1998, p.891) Hence, this kind of trust could be 
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regarded as a moral norm. However, the political facts in international relations (or, to be 
more optimistic, in international society) show that no essential institutions actually could 
support a moral requirement, but following these principles might have been accepted as 
a universal value. The competition between national interests highlights the significance 
of the other kind of trust and rationality. 
 
As stated above, the thesis suggests that the rationality of states will play an important 
role in international relations. If the moral norms and moral trust are irrational, it is 
doubtful that trust could exist between states. It would be difficult to argue that trust 
could also be a rational choice for countries. The controversy lies in the gap between the 
sources of trust—moral motivation and information-based motivation, which can 
manifest differently – such as “beliefs about itself, others and the environment; a set of 
desires representing the states it wants to achieve; and intentions corresponding to the 
plans adopted in pursuit of these desires” (Griffiths & Luck, 2003). A country would trust 
another in international affairs according to the information it holds. Trusting others in 
this case would be beneficial due to its characteristics of rationality. This will be 
discussed in the following sections as strategic trust—also mentioned by Uslaner (2001, 
2002) and Hoffman (2002, 2006). One simple example of this kind of trust is when a 
country trusts one of its neighbouring states because it has enough empirical evidence to 
prove the other’s peaceful attitude and goals, and as a result military spending on the 
boundary will be reduced. In this way, trust might also be the result of rationality. 
Therefore, it is important to understand how International Relations theories see the 
sources of trust, in terms of normative behaviours and rationality. 
 
2.2 Trust and International Relations Theory approaches 
There are two aspects to discuss when considering the theories related to trust in 
international relations. The first are the interpretations of trust in the traditional IR 
theories on trust-related issues. The second are the other viewpoints of scholars on the 
factors affecting trust and distrust mentioned above, including the interactions between 
trust, risk, cooperation and national interests. International Relations theory agrees that 
trust is generally a belief that actors will follow the disciplines of not harming the 
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interests of others. Richard Ned Lebow (2013) points out the relationship between trust 
and the role of international “norms”. He argues, “Trust becomes problematic in 
situations where there are no norms or weak norms” (Lebow, 2013, p.18). Therefore, 
different views of the role norms play in the international system must be one of the 
determinants that explain different attitudes of international relations theories towards 
trust. 
 
2.2.1 Realism 
In the Realist tradition, the common understanding of an anarchical international system 
is one of the most significant aspects of this approach’s perception of the possibilities of 
international trust. Or, to be more specific, it could be argued that distrust is one of the 
core arguments of realism. (Rengger, 1997). Scholars might reasonably face doubts as to 
whether there is a Realist acceptance of the role of trust. 
 
In general, the realist tradition is not concerned with the significance of international 
norms and trust in international relations, because of the characteristics of rational 
self-interest (Gralnick, 1988). According to realists, the ultimate goal of states in an 
international system of anarchy would be national security. As no transnational 
institutions could guarantee the security of all states, the self-interested characteristic of 
countries would lead to increasing attention on the military capabilities of potential 
enemies. This traditional judgement indeed tends to deny the moral norms in 
international relations. Hence, one could hardly expect that trust would be high or 
determine the actions of these security-seeking states. Whenever states feel insecure, they 
will not prioritise trust in their foreign policy procedures. 
 
However, to be honest, trust cannot be totally abandoned by realist approaches. There 
have been cases of existing international treaties, agreements and even alliance which 
could be regarded as examples of international norms and international trust. If the realist 
tradition denies the existence of international norms and trust, these interstate agreements 
would be left unexplained, as proposed by Lebow: “Why would leaders negotiate and 
sign agreements they have no intention of following?” (Lebow, 2013, p.19) As Kacowicz 
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(2005, p.21) argues, “At the same time, even realists cannot live without norms, since the 
behaviour they propose is presented and depicted as ‘normative’… In other words, 
international norms and rules provide standards of behaviour that regulate the ‘normal’ 
action of states, in times of peace and war.” At the same time, “reputation and prestige” 
are also the normative components of realist explanations of norms. Therefore, trust 
exists in realism—dependant on strong countermeasures and driven by pure interests as 
an optional choice, rather than being a core guiding strategy of international relations. 
Meanwhile, moral norms will also complement international relations. The characteristics 
of pursuing interests would correspond with rationality in interstate relations. If the 
international norm of strategic trust follows rationality and was based on the information 
held by actors, it would not be in conflict with realist tradition. 
 
Many scholars, including Kydd (2005) and Deborah Welch Larson (1997), have 
discussed distinct understandings of trust through different approaches within realism. 
Indeed, Kydd (2005) has introduced three approaches to different views of anarchy and 
trust: offensive realism, defensive realism, and Bayesian realism. For the defensive 
realists, even though states are still seeking security in the international system, mistrust 
is not an absolute status in international relations, as it is described to be by offensive 
realists or hard realists. “Some states trust each other enough to cooperate… other states, 
unfortunately, develop deep levels of mutual distrust for each other.” (Kydd, 2005, p.16). 
The essential argument is that the universality of seeking for security in anarchy would 
not directly determine whether a country trusts another. Instead, the specific conditions 
between states would be the basic determinants. In terms of Bayesian realism, it would 
depend on the varying motivations of states other than traditional security concerns, and 
the available information regarding the motivations of other states. Whether there would 
be trust or distrust among states would depend on the motivations and the correct 
information about the other’s. Larson describes the issue of trust in the views of “hard 
realists” and “soft realists” thus:. “Hard realists” actually strengthen the status of conflicts 
and distrust among states in anarchy. For “soft realists”, a term of “trust, but verify” 
raised by the former President of the US Ronald Regan is mentioned by both Lebow 
(2013, p.18) and Larson (1997, p.706) as an important way of understanding the 
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possibility of the existence of trust. It could be argued that trust could exist in certain 
interstate relations. There will be gaps between different understandings on trust. If trust 
is identified as a normative approach toward a cooperative international system, realists 
will downgrade it—while it does indeed exist as a component of interstate politics of 
international morality. However, if trust could be treated as a result of the rationality of 
countries, it could be explained by realism as the demand of interests. “Yet normative 
calculations are inferred first of all as a function of the power distribution and the rational 
calculation of national interests. Norms are largely the product of rational utility 
calculations on the part of state actors.” (Kacowicz, 2005, p.23).  
 
2.2.2 Liberalism 
It could hardly be denied that liberal approaches would naturally integrate with the notion 
of trust. As mentioned above, liberalism generally agrees with the possibility of positive 
international norms in international relations. For idealists, trusting other actors in 
international relations might be an understanding between countries, as well as evident in 
their actions in political reality. Liberal institutionalism also believes that international 
norms could offer international relations a better recommendation to deal with conflict in 
worldwide anarchy. Lebow (2013) would argue that, while facing the risks of 
“agreements or institutions already in place” and “the difficulty of creating agreements 
and institutions”, trust would occupy a totally different position among liberals compared 
to that in the realist approaches. “Liberals believe institutions have the potential to 
overcome anarchy and thus institutions are created, expand and become influential when 
states and other international actors consider them useful.” (Lebow, 2013, p.20) The 
neoliberalist approach would recognise a possibility of international cooperation in an 
institutionalised international society rather than a world of anarchy (Milner, 1992). The 
non-power elements, the international mechanisms, and international interdependence 
might make it possible for states to trust each other.   
Kydd also states that: 
“liberal theory can be said to support two basic points related to international trust. 
First, because democracies find war costly and of little intrinsic benefit, democracies 
are more likely to be security seeking states…Second, given that democracy is a 
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readily visible characteristic of a regime, other states will have relatively high 
confidence that a democracy is a security seeker.” (Kydd, c2005, pp.20-21). 
 
The theory of ‘democratic peace’ – that is, democratic states would not wage war against 
each other due to the people’s preference for seeking peace – has been raised for a long 
time, on the basis of the optimistic view of the good nature of human beings, which has 
not been proven wrong until now. What could be challenging is the impact of the 
involvement of non-democratic states such as China. Whether trust or distrust is more 
likely between states of similar or different political systems is a question that needs to be 
addressed.  
 
The basic strategies of a state on development and surviving in a highly interdependent 
modern world could decide the likelihood of trusting others, though political realities 
might bring changes in different cases. States could also be rational about their interests 
in neoliberalism. This we could describe as strategic trust. “According to the neoliberal 
perspective, norms serve the egoistic interests of individual, rational actors.” (Kacowicz, 
2005, p.23) In international relations, it could be realised by forming certain international 
regimes. In terms of moral trust, it falls on the basic belief of liberal approaches of 
potentially achievable international institutions. 
 
2.2.3 Constructivism 
Despite of the confrontational arguments from realist and liberal approaches, there has 
been discussion of the idea of trust from other International Relations theories. 
Constructivism emphasises norms as an important component in political realities (Adler, 
2012). Constructivists argue that international norms will shape the identities of countries 
and thereby explain their interests. “Norms reflect a certain collective identity, while at 
the same time they can affect and change the interests and the consequential behaviour of 
states. In this sense, the interests of states are partly created and changed, by the way of 
the interaction between the social structure and the actors, through the action of norms.” 
(Kacowicz, 2005, p.26) Therefore, constructivism would not reject trust in international 
relations. One interesting example would be, as proposed by Lebow (2013), that within 
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certain international client-based hierarchies supported by honour-based societies, 
“defection is less common and trust is greater, but it is limited to actors within the 
system”. (Lebow, 2013, p.21) There is not such a distinctive gap between the normative 
relations and rationality of countries when discussing trust from a constructivist 
perspective. Realists and liberalists would regard trust—whether a normative or rational 
choice of states—as a restrictive term. However, just as Kacowicz (2005, p.26) argues, 
“The constructivists elevate norms (and identity) to the centre of their research 
programme.”  
 
2.2.4 Other related IR theory approaches or perspectives 
Security dilemma theory 
Thomas J. Christensen has discussed the significance of mistrust in the security dilemma 
theory. “The theory states that, in an uncertain and anarchic international system, mistrust 
between two or more potential adversaries can lead each side to take precautionary and 
defensively motivated measures that are perceived as offensive threats.” (Christensen, 
2003, p.25) The theory of security dilemma, also discussed by John H. Herz (1950), 
Robert Jervis (1978), Ken Booth and Nicholas J. Wheeler (2008), and Wheeler (2012), 
would pair closely with “distrust” rather than “trust”. “In a state of international anarchy, 
according to the security dilemma model, distrust of another state can elicit a hostile 
reaction from the other side even if the two states have had no previous conflict of 
interest.” (Larson, 2004, p.47) In fact, when people study the notion of trust, both the 
“positive” trust and the “negative” distrust are being taken into consideration as separate 
experiences. The difference between the notions of trust (not between trust and distrust) 
will be explored in other sections. It has been mentioned that the term “trust” is disputed 
by different approaches of IR theories, while the notion distrust would have more diverse 
sources, among which the security dilemma would be one crucial example. The dilemma 
is about how to interpret conditions and how to react. Indeed, the core concepts of 
anarchy and uncertainty are connected with the realist approach. The distrust between 
international actors are the core issue of the security dilemma. However, Booth and 
Wheeler (2008) still argue that, “Between political collectives, trust is constituted by four 
linked pairs of attributes, all of which are integral to its existence. (Leap in the 
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dark/uncertainty, empathy/bonding, dependence/vulnerability/, integrity/reliability…)” 
Trust-building processes under the security dilemma are still weak, and few states have 
achieved a high level of mutual trust with others. However, Wheeler argues that, “the key 
question is to understand the conditions under which some forms of interpersonal 
communication which are empathetic can lead actors to take a decision to trust by making 
themselves vulnerable.” (Wheeler, 2012) Just like other approaches concentrating on 
international cooperation, the effort to gain trust under the circumstance of overall 
international distrust is still the aim of reducing conflicts and risks.  
 
Rational choice theory 
Andrew Hindmoor argues that in the rational choice approach, there are two “core 
assumptions of rational choice theory; that individuals are rational and self-interested” 
(Hindmoor, 2006, p.181). Though rational choice theory is normally used in economic 
decisions, it would also be valid in the case of international trust. As Larson (1997, p.709) 
argues: “Just as people should consider the possible consequences should the other party 
take advantage of their trust, so they should assess his incentives to do so… ‘Every man 
has his price’ and even an honest person might lie in certain circumstances.” If countries 
in the international system could be regarded as rational actors pursuing their interests, 
they might make “rational” decisions to achieve their goals and maximize the benefits. 
The result would be based on how the states defined their “national interests”. If 
following the discipline or cooperating with others would benefit one’s own interests, 
states would not act aggressively as they do in a zero-sum game. Therefore, if the belief 
in trust itself is one of the interests of states, they would tend to trust other actors.  
“Rational choice theorists have reformulated the concept of trust, basing it on 
straightforward coordination, supplemented by sanctions, rather than principled 
agreement that may at some point in the future deviate from agents’ assessments of 
their personal best interests. In this view, because it is irrational for any individual to 
go against personal preferences, trust among individuals must always be consistent 
with preferences in order to be a meaningful social category of engagement.” 
(Amadae, 2007, p.789). 
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For a short conclusion, Keith Dowding (2001, p.209) asks: 
“Can rational choice theory explain trust as an institution in these terms? ... Indeed 
rational choice theory does not explain why people trust each other: rather it explains 
why people learn to trust, to varying degrees and in certain contexts, some subsets of 
others; while learning to distrust, to varying degrees and in certain contexts, other 
subsets.”  
 
2.3 The definition of trust in this research 
2.3.1 Strategic trust on strategic issues 
According to Uslaner (2000, p.571), strategic trust “depends upon knowledge and 
experience”, or “trust in people we know”. Although the definition is discussed more at 
the level of individuals, it would be appropriate to adapt this argument to international 
relations. States would judge whether another actor could be trusted or not depending on 
all the information it has; and this is what all states in the world are doing. Hence, the 
information contains the goals and actions of other states in consideration of one’s own 
interests.  
 
The “strategic trust” in this research, also interpreted as “trust on strategic issues”, is 
beyond the particularized “strategic trust” of “trust with information”. In terms of the 
strategic issues mentioned in this thesis, the interactions in international relations on the 
issues of vital national interests would be of top concern. Strategic trust is a kind of 
assessment on the possibility to reduce the worry of others to realize a double-win 
cooperative relationship at the strategic level. On the other hand, strategic distrust reflects 
the worry that strategic interests and other factors could be damaged. It is more likely to 
fit the realist view that every single participant would have to be nervous about others 
with regards to their security in q world of anarchy (Jackson R.H., 2005; Hsiung, 1997; 
Donnelly, 2015; Powell, 1994). “The implication of strategic trust is that even if there is 
an on-going relationship of mutual self-interest in one area, those involved draw no 
general lesson about the moral character of the other into other domains.” (Rathbun, 2009, 
p.350) 
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The detailed ‘strategic issues’ between China and Japan would generally be the 
well-known and traditional type of affairs in international relations. How to face a rising 
China with stronger national power has become Japan’s top concern, as the political 
reality of two huge powers existing in the region at the same time has never before been 
the case (Yahuda, 2013). The disputes over territorial integrity, such as with the 
Diaoyu/Senkaku Islands and the East China Sea, have grown fiercer in the 21st century. 
Therefore, the worry over national security has led to increased nervousness for both of 
China and Japan. China has always been dissatisfied with the US-Japan alliance in the 
East Asian region, which could pose a potential threat (Christensen, 2003; Sasaki, 2010; 
Urayama, 2000; Christensen, 2006; Garrett & Glaser, 1997). Neither China nor Japan 
would ever want to be strategically restricted by the other. The reality between the two 
states is that, according to the information they have, they tend to distrust each other. This 
is just one component of the status of bilateral trust and the relationship between China 
and Japan. 
 
2.3.2 Moral trust and political trustworthiness 
Before moving on to the issue of trustworthiness, another approach to trust raised by 
Uslaner (2000) should be discussed. Other than the ‘strategic trust’ based on information 
collection, ‘moralistic trust’ is different: “This form of trust is based upon a world view 
of optimism and control: the world is a good place, is going to get better and we can 
make it better (Rosenberg 1956; Lane 1959:163~166).” (Uslaner, 2013, p.629) Besides, 
“moralistic trust does not depend upon evidence, but upon the belief that we ought to 
trust others because they are part of our moral community” (Ibid.). According to the 
statements above, moralistic trust would be a kind of stability, which would be decided 
by the subject’s view of world and independent of any changes outside. It is reasonable 
for individuals such as human beings to hold a variety of values, resulting from their 
different personal experiences. However, states are not the same as human beings, who 
have certain personalities. As this thesis regards countries as rational actors in 
international relations, it would be hard to imagine that a state would trust another due to 
the optimistic judgement of “another state should be trusted”, with no other specific 
reasons in the long term. It could not be denied that irrational trust might occur in certain 
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cases, and some examples could be the idealistic approaches in international relations in 
the early 20th century. However, states could hardly be regarded as morally oriented 
actors, as they are more likely to act in pursuit of their interests and information. 
 
“‘The central idea behind moralistic trust is the belief that most people share 
your fundamental moral values. To put it another way, a wide range of people 
belong to your moral community. They need not share your views on policy 
issues or even your ideology. They may have different religious beliefs. Yet, 
despite these differences, we see deeper similarities.’ Fukayama (1995, p.153) 
states the following central idea behind moralistic trust: “trust arises when a 
community shares a set of moral values in such a way as to create regular 
expectations of regular and honest behaviour.” (Uslaner, 2002, p.4).  
 
For China and Japan, the two states hardly have a sense of moral community, nor do they 
share a similar ideology, nor have a shared recognition of identity. In this way, 
Sino-Japanese moralistic trust has not been achieved. 
 
This thesis would like to introduce the idea of ‘political and moral trustworthiness’, or 
‘moral trust’, as a corresponding notion to ‘strategic trust’. The ‘trustworthiness’ of a 
country is also a kind of trust based on the information of other actors on whether or not 
they can be trusted based on their morality and ethics. It would be based on the 
judgements of whether another state tends to follow international laws, principles and 
treaties, as well as on whether it respects the dignity and reputation of others in 
international relations. The definition of political and moral trustworthiness is connected 
with both ‘strategic trust’ and ‘moralistic trust’ by Rathbun and Uslaner to a certain 
extent that, without a belief that other actors have the possibility to be trusted, 
trustworthiness could never be a potential option for a state. On the other hand, states still 
need to collect information to formulate and plan their actions. 
 
Unfortunately, the lack of political and moral trust between China and Japan is a 
continuing, main problem. China’s worry is based on Japanese attitudes towards the 
45 
 
history, which leads to an image of untrustworthiness. With regards to China, Japan has 
not been understanding, nor apologised enough for what the Japanese invasion did to 
China (Lam, 2002; He, 2007; Green & Self, 1996). With this attitude, the history of war 
might be forgotten, due to changes in education for the next generations. Besides, 
negative prospects for future are brought about not only by the new history textbooks, but 
also the on-going rise of conservative politics in Japan – these have become the main 
causes of disputes between the two states (Morris, 1974; Nozaki, 2002). The Japanese 
also have concerns, which can lead them to see China as untrustworthy. Japan treats the 
historical legacies of the war as resolved. In bringing up Japanese historical responsibility, 
China is attempting to build a moral hierarchy with themselves above Japan. For example, 
China “can use the history card more effectively to marginalize Japan than previously 
due to its growing political and economic clout” (Calder, 2006). The two states have 
suffered greatly in their negative evaluations of each other on these issues. 
 
Under these circumstances, it could be concluded that in international relations, states 
will have to face different types of challenges, of trust and distrust. Particular issues 
between certain states should be taken into consideration, including history, culture and 
political system, all of which would affect the actions of countries towards developing a 
trusting relationship.  
 
2.3.3 The manifestations of trust 
Broadly speaking, trust in international relations is observable in many ways. Even 
though cooperation cannot be directly equated with trust, it could be a crucial component 
of trust. In this way, the alliances between states, special interstate relations (such as the 
‘strategic partner relationship’), international organizations and cooperation in certain 
fields or on issues are all potential evidence of trust, which need to be verified. It should 
be noted that these types of manifestation are at different ‘levels’. For example, the trust 
between two states with a military alliance might be more stable than that between states 
which do not even have many economic ties. It is not absolute, but the states which could 
share similar national interests and enjoy different types of positive and institutionalised 
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interactions would likely face lower level risks of distrust, considering the existing 
notions on “high politics” and “low politics” (Jackson & Sørensen, 2013).  
 
On the contrary, states experiencing disputes and conflicts on vital national interests 
would be more likely to distrust each other. For China and Japan, a lack of mutual trust is 
evident in a number of issues from recent years. Even though the two states have 
launched attempts to improve the situation, such as building ‘strategic and mutually 
beneficial relations’,4 not many positive interactions have resulted, but instead fiercer 
disputes have arisen over high-priority issues such as territorial unification and historical 
recognition of responsibilities of aggression. The ‘trusting’ activities generally exist in 
the form of economic communications, rather than the institutionalized interactions or 
treaties for political relations—for example, the description of “cold politics and hot 
economics” (Koo, 2009). The evidence of distrust at “higher levels” is more common in 
Sino-Japanese relations. 
 
2.3.4 Trust, not trust and distrust 
There is a crucial issue that is sometimes easily ignored when defining trust: that “not to 
trust” is the same as “distrust”. Russell Hardin referred to Edna Ullmann-Margalit’s 
conclusion in his book on the subject: “If I trust you, I have specific grounds for the trust. 
In parallel, if I distrust you, I have specific grounds for the distrust. I could be in a state of 
such ignorance about you, however, that I neither trust nor distrust you. I may therefore 
be wary of you until I have better information on you.” (Hardin, 2004 p.3) 
Ullmann-Margalit (2004) has also made a clear argument about “institutional trust” and 
“institutional distrust”, which states that “Institutional distrust embodies one’s belief that 
intentions of the officeholders of the institution are discriminatory and that the institution 
is consequently unfair in ways that work against one’s interests.” (Ullmann-Margalit, 
2004, pp.76-80) 
 
                                                 
4 See “Joint Statement between the Government of Japan and the Government of the People's Republic of China on 
Comprehensive Promotion of a ‘Mutually Beneficial Relationship Based on Common Strategic Interests’”. 
http://www.mofa.go.jp/region/asia-paci/china/joint0805.html, accessed 08/02/16 
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2.4 The measurement of trust 
2.4.1 How to measure trust/distrust in existing literature 
As mentioned above regarding the blurred lines between different manifestations of trust, 
the notion of trust is abstract when placed into international relations. It would be 
extremely difficult to measure. There are two main problems in measuring trust between 
states. The first would be the standards used to define whether a state trusts another or not. 
The second would be the different levels of trust, or how to understand to what extent a 
state trusts or distrusts another, which might not only be interpreted, but also explained 
quantitatively. These two questions cannot be avoided when studying trust between 
states. 
 
Aaron M. Hoffman (2002) has indicated three approaches of measuring trust: 
 
“The first detects trusting relationships by connecting the decision-making record to 
the policy choices of leaders. The second approach examines the types of oversight 
actors employ to monitor each other’s behaviour and the third focuses on the 
restrictiveness of rules actors develop to constrain each other’s activities.” (Hoffman, 
2002, p.376)  
 
It is reasonable that Hoffman would measure trust based on cooperation that IS motivated 
by trust, as it indeed offers evidence that trust could exist in such interactions by 
connecting cooperation and trust. There are two theoretical sources for the argument. 
First, “all efforts to cooperate must involve trust because they all involve risk.” (Ibid, 
p.384) Secondly, “trust involves risk, but cannot be reduced to risk—trust and risk are 
separable constructs” (Ibid). This thesis does not wholly accept this argument, but what 
Hoffman actually argues is that both trust with no specific reasons, and cooperation 
without trust indeed exist. What could be done is to filter those kinds of cooperation that 
could be interpreted as elements of trust from others. It is not guaranteed that cooperation 
inevitably signifies a trusting relationship; however, it is reasonable that states with 
trusting relationships will cooperate on certain issues—that is where the measurement 
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can exist. In order to deal with the challenges of quantitative studies of trust, Guido 
Möllering offers the following point: 
 
“Researchers may focus on trusting behaviours, rather than trusting attitudes, and 
measure the frequency of trusting and trustful interactions. The strength of trust is 
then expressed in terms of how many actors within a population trust how many 
times relative to non-trusting behaviours.” (Möllering, c2006, p.135) 
 
The Chinese scholar Wei Zhijiang has systematically analysed the strategic trusting 
relationship between China, Japan and Korea, and drew the conclusion that the level of 
Sino-Japanese strategic and mutually beneficial relations is at 40% (Wei, 2010). Despite 
of the quantitative methods in Wei’s research, his “affecting factors” in Sino-Japanese 
trust would also require examination and valuation. Criteria used to measure trust in this 
relationship include: “History of traditional communications and identity recognition of 
East Asia”, “the history of Japan invading China”, “political system”, “ideology and 
values”, “rights of territory and sea and the disputes of islands”, “trade and market 
economy”, “transparency in national policies”, “whether to follow international 
principles”, “the US-Japan alliance” and “the rise of China”. The economic ties and trade 
between the two countries have a positive impact on the Sino-Japanese strategic trust (on 
strategic issues). Yet the trust in traditional fields of national security remains at a 
comparatively low level. 
 
2.4.2 The core argument: measuring trust/distrust through analysis at 
different levels 
To draw on the criteria used by Wei, this thesis will argue that the interpretations of 
detailed issues come from empirical evidence. Three categories should be used in the 
measurement of the status of trust. First, the interactions at the governmental level, such 
as alliances/hostility, treaties, VIP mutual visits, and positive and negative speeches by 
the leadership – these all have direct impacts on the trusting relationships. In addition, the 
activities in the civil society, such as civic communications, public opinion, and the news 
media could become reflections of civil trust. Meanwhile, another measurement could be 
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raised from the perspectives of academic discussions. In general, identifying trust 
between states using these elements is an important method for understanding and 
evaluating the issue of trust in Sino-Japanese relations. 
 
In terms of the three categories, they rely on the following factors. The three approaches 
to measure trust in international relations are actually based on interpreting methods for 
seeking evidence of trust in related actions. The significance of intergovernmental 
communications is that the government, as the executor of international relations, 
controls the highest power and tools of a state, including diplomacy and military forces, 
which would be directly connected with national interests such as national security. 
Taking the military as an example, if two states are at war with each other, they could be 
identified as having the ‘lowest’ level of trust. On the other hand, if two states have a 
military alliance, then they will likely appear to have the ‘highest’ level of trust (Jackson 
& Sørensen, 2013). There are also several other levels of trust between these two 
extremes – including hostilities with no war or conflict, no hostilities without any military 
cooperation and communication, interactions such as military exercises without reaching 
the level of an alliance level, and so on. The situation would be similar in diplomatic 
affairs – from strategic competitor, to cooperative partner, or even regional integration. 
These different statuses could reflect the level of trust and distrust in bilateral relations. In 
addition, other patterns of activities between governments could also be interpreted 
through analysis – including treaties, declarations and elite communications.  
 
The communications at the civil level can also be directly and indirectly indicative of a 
level of trust. A direct reflection is the public opinion of one state towards another. 
Different media and research institutions could launch surveys on public opinion to 
understand how positive or negative are the national images of other states in the minds 
of the people. There could be questions such as, “How much do you trust Japan?”, or 
more detailed ones such as “What do you think are the problems which lead to negative 
bilateral relations?” These questions could be the best way to understand how and why 
the people trust each other or not. Both positive and negative elements of trust could be 
identified. The indirect way to understand trust in civil societies is to observe civil 
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activities, such as commercial conferences, investments of enterprises, cultural 
communications, nongovernmental academic forums, and so on. It is reasonable that, 
with a better level of mutual trust between two states, civil activities could be smooth, 
without disturbances and political interventions, while levels of commitments on 
interactions would be much higher. Otherwise, it could promote a vicious cycle, which 
would result in less communication and less cooperative activities, which could in turn 
sour the bilateral relationship. 
 
Academic discussions might offer a different perspective from the previous two 
approaches, as they could be unofficial, and not as emotional as public opinion. It is 
possible that academic opinions provide more information on the existence and levels of 
trust/distrust. 
 
2.5 Reconciliation as the aim of trust 
There is the question of why it is necessary to understand the status of trust and distrust 
between countries. Moreover, the political realities in international relations dictate that it 
would be extremely difficult to realize the ideal of ‘moralistic trust’ between countries. 
The states are not individuals, so the external influencing elements would set up obstacles 
to trust. And yet, the enhancement of trust is achievable, and can improve interstate 
relations. One of the most important and direct effects of trust is the potential for 
reconciliation between states. In general, there is a dilemma for states with distrustful 
relations: better interstate relations need better mutual trust in order to be achieved, while 
better levels of trust are also needed to improve relationships. Hence, reconciliation, 
which could bring an end to existing conflicts and create an environment for enhanced 
relations, is a significant hoped-for outcome of better trust. 
 
2.5.1 Ending conflicts 
Reconciliation is not only desired to put an end to conflicts and wars between states, but 
also to help overcome hostility in national emotions and generate forgiveness for other 
states at both the governmental and civic levels. The relationship between trust and 
reconciliation is complicated. First, as it is difficult to achieve a level of trust between 
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states, the most practical influence of pursuing trust will be the promotion of 
reconciliation and the improvement of international relations. Under conditions of low 
trust between states, it would be a tough task to deal with disputes, and problems might 
move in negative directions. Therefore, ‘trust to reconcile’ is significant for the states 
experiencing strained relations. 
 
2.5.2 Improving interstate relations 
Meanwhile, after attaining a certain level of trust, relations could go beyond 
reconciliation, to include cooperation and even the formation of an official alliance, or 
even integration (it is not be necessary for states to achieve these goals, which are only a 
possible outcome of increased levels of trust). Reconciliation would become the basis of 
trust at higher levels (Lerche, 2000), without which trust could never be stable. The 
Sino-Japanese relationship is a good example for this proposal, because even though 
China and Japan had achieved a normalization of their bilateral relationship in 1972, they 
have been continually keeping a vigilant eye on each other for more than 40 years. It can 
be concluded from the interactions of the two states that positive evaluations and mutual 
support on issues of national interests can hardly be expected from the other without 
reconciliation. For example, when Japan tried to join the UN Security Council as a 
permanent member in 2005, China explicitly opposed any related schemes. 
 
The problem between China and Japan is whether the two states have achieved 
reconciliation or not. The war between the two states ended in 1945, when Japan 
surrendered at the end of World War II. Since then, there has been no military conflict 
between the two. It has also been more than 40 years since China and Japan achieved the 
normalization of bilateral relationship, in 1972, and the Cold War also ended more than 
20 years ago. It is difficult to imagine that the two states have not reached an essential 
reconciliation under these circumstances. However, the two states are still trapped in a 
quagmire of historical recognition of Japanese responsibilities for war in East Asia (or, to 
be exact, the forgiveness issue of reconciliation), territorial and other political and 
security disputes. These historical legacies have their particular components. Due to the 
rapid process of normalization in the 1970s, many of these disputes were left unsettled, 
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with no proposed solutions that are acceptable to both sides. These disputes have 
gradually emerged as the central problems in the Sino-Japanese relations. The difficulties 
of achieving reconciliation lie in the complexity of the issues, and the disagreements over 
and attitudes towards the problems in the two states. China insists that Japan’s apparent 
lack of attention to the disputes is the problem, while Japan thinks that they have made 
enough apologies and that no more attention is needed. Therefore, reconciliation between 
China and Japan remains unachieved. 
 
In conclusion, reconciliation is one crucial component of the process of developing trust, 
even though there may be no serious conflicts between states. Reconciliation is a 
milestone of trust for those states experiencing lower levels of trust, as well as the basis 
for further progress in developing trusting relationships. Different stages exist in 
reconciliation efforts; such as overcoming conflicts, agreements on recognition of 
responsibility for aggression, the realization of forgiveness, and stable political relations. 
As an important reflection of attempts to gain trust in international relations, 
reconciliation a practical trust-building goal. 
 
2.6 A theoretical framework 
2.6.1 A conclusive remark 
One of the realities of current international relations is that ‘trust’ is a subtle quality. It 
often appears in speeches and statements by government officials at the same time that 
interstate relations have been accompanied by both trust and distrust. Even more 
problematic, distrust between states is the mainstream trend in many circumstances, 
including some of the most crucial relationships between great powers. The reason for 
this is complicated. It comes from both the characteristics of the notion of trust, as well as 
the characteristics derived from the interests pursued by governments, a state’s executor 
of trust. Arguments from many of scholars could offer a generally recognized and 
accepted opinion that trust exists on the basis of confidence and positive judgements of 
another actor in its practice of international relations. This belief could arise from the 
information that a state holds – including the national strategies of the other actor, how 
other states follow international laws and principles, and the prediction of potential 
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conflicts over national interests between states. In addition, a source of the willingness to 
trust might also lie in whether or not a state views international society in a positive light. 
These two situations have been defined as the “strategic trust” and “moralistic trust” in 
the existing literature. 
 
One cannot deny that the realist tradition of International Relations has a considerable 
continued impact on international affairs. Facing issues related to national interests, 
especially the core concern of national security, states might be more likely to show their 
conservative aspects, rather than the expectations of liberals to be more open and 
cooperative with other actors to solve problems. However, the existence of trust in 
international relations is not determined by an absolute choice between realist and 
liberalist approaches, but from a combination of a variety of elements. The debate 
between normative relations and the rationality of countries will have a significant impact 
on the discussion of trust. Is trust a normative term to follow in international relations, or 
is it a rational choice for countries that benefits their national interests? Different 
theoretical approaches offer different explanations. This thesis will insist that trust in 
international relations is a research object which needs to be explored in a comprehensive 
way with these theories.  
 
The realist approach has gone beyond the judgements of classic realism—it would not 
completely insist on the absence of cooperation due to self-interest in global anarchy, and 
has turned to flexible arguments which have some similarities to neoliberalism. Just as 
Kydd mentioned (see previous sections), defensive realism and Bayesian realism both, to 
a certain extent, accept the possibility of trust between states. Of all the international 
relations theories, the notion of trust best suits liberalism. The ‘moralistic trust’ and 
liberalism both focus on the good nature of human beings and then international society, 
believing trust would be achievable in the way of moral norms. In addition, the focus on 
international cooperation and institutions would also help realise trust among states. 
Therefore, realism’s focus on national interests, and liberalism’s focus on international 
cooperation and belief in a positive future are the domestic motivations for the notion of 
‘trust’. From the perspectives of states, therefore, the formation of trust is a combination 
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of ‘cooperation’, ‘national interests’, ‘risk’ and so on. Different states would be 
influenced by their specific histories, political traditions, and immediate international 
environments, which would lead to unique judgements and policies. In this way, 
interstate trust actually has specific characteristics. Though some common elements 
might occur in different cases, examples of bilateral trust could not be extended to a 
global generalisation. Neither Japan-US trust nor China-US trust can be applied to the 
China-Japan case as templates. 
 
The main theoretical guide is, in the case of Sino-Japanese relations, that interstate trust 
would mainly be composed of two parts: trust on ‘strategic issues’, which concentrates on 
the regional conflicts of national interests; and ‘moral trustworthiness’, such as following 
international principles. This division is based on the following evidence. First, this thesis 
admits the rationality of the idea of ‘moralistic trust’, but would deny its existence in 
current Sino-Japanese relations. It is not purely a question of both governments following 
a realist or liberal institutionalist approach in foreign policy and national strategy as 
opposed to having confidence in international moral norms. The matter would also 
depend on the characteristics of the bilateral relations. The status quo is determined by 
specific issues between the two states, including leadership, foreign policy-making 
processes, public opinion, and so on. Based on the issues of specific history, these 
determinants would connect with Sino-Japanese relations and trust. Meanwhile, though 
trust is an abstract term, it could be measured to a certain degree. Specifically, the 
interpretations of the crucial factors of trust would be the measurements of that trust and 
distrust between states. Interpretations of leaders’ speeches, treaties and other statements 
could provide the intuitive image, and explain whether a state trusts or distrusts another 
on strategic and moral grounds, based on certain standards.  
 
Despite the definition of trust, the influences it brings to interstate relations and the way it 
works are another research focus of this thesis. According to the descriptions of trust for 
different international relations theories mentioned above, it would not be surprising that 
trust would have a significant impact on international relations; though it may not directly 
determine it. A positive level of bilateral trust would help improve relations. On the other 
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hand, distrust could have a negative influence on relations. Meanwhile, the determinants 
would not only be the manifestations of trust and distrust, but also the approach in which 
trust could affect the interstate relations. For instance, a certain foreign policy could 
reflect to what extent a state trusts or distrusts another actor. If the answer can be 
interpreted as being positive, the foreign strategy might tend to be beneficial to the 
development of the relationship. If the policy shows a negative/low level of trust, it might 
even exacerbate tensions. China’s declaration, in late 2013, of the air defence 
identification zone in the East China Sea area was obviously caused by its distrust of 
Japan, and the policy in turn led to nervousness and protest from Japan. This kind of 
vicious cycle is theoretical evidence of the research. It could be concluded that the 
existence of trust can be perceived, as well as its manifestation in international relations. 
 
To answer the research question of how trust and distrust between China and Japan could 
lead to ‘locked’ Sino-Japanese relations, another theoretical foundation needs to be 
strengthened. If distrust exists in interstate relations, it could be an obstacle. If 
‘asymmetries’ exist between states, the relations could be locked and a vicious cycle 
might arise. The ‘asymmetries’ refer to circumstances in which the two states have issues 
with trust and distrust in different fields. However, the states might have different 
priorities within these fields due to their specific situations. In certain bilateral 
relationships, distrust of one state could be its main concern but does not receive enough 
attention from another actor, while the same demand from the other is also not addressed. 
This would create asymmetries. Therefore, asymmetries would have a greater impact on 
interstate relations than unilateral distrust. One crucial reason for this is that the two 
actors would lose the motivation to communicate and cooperate to solve the problems, 
without satisfying the requirements of their primary concerns, while at the same time 
treating the other’s concerns as offensive and losing patience with lower-priority issues. 
International relations in this vicious cycle would face difficulties, as the two actors 
would have to achieve comparatively high levels of understanding, as well as make 
compromises to solve the problems. On the one hand, essential actions should be taken 
by one country to ease the distrust with other actors in areas of lesser concern to them, 
but great concern to others. On the other hand, the state would have to be confident that 
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another actor would respond to the expectations as well. Specifically, the government 
would have to be responsible for the interests and dignity of the state, and it would 
therefore face both internal and external pressures. Therefore, it would not be easy to take 
the essential steps to solve the trust problems created by ‘asymmetries’ in international 
relations. The two states in this research, China and Japan, are indeed facing this problem 
and it will be discussed in the following chapters. 
 
It could be argued that trust belongs to a certain International Relations theory – either 
realism, liberalism, or another such as constructivism. If this is reasonable, the 
recommendations to the problems of international relations provided by different 
approaches should be focused on how to solve the trust crisis, and then the problem of 
‘unlocking’ relations. The philosophy of realists on solving problems has a strong 
self-interest component, and so would have reservations about releasing the persistence 
of the absolute anarchy of international society. The guidance would still be to seek to 
secure national interests, even when trying to reduce the distrust between states. With 
regards to liberalism, it would be closer to the ‘moralistic trust’ in a traditional way – that 
is, to admit the rationality and feasibility of trust, which is the inner motivation of trust. 
Promoting mutual understanding and trust is what liberalists offer to the trust problem. 
This thesis would argue that any single approach might neither explain nor provide 
appropriate recommendations for the trust issue in interstate relations. Trust is actually a 
complex mixture of multiple elements. As Lebow (2013, p.21) argues, 
 
“In societies where material wellbeing is the dominant motive, co-operation is 
issue-specific and motivated by narrow calculations of self-interest. Trust is not 
diffuse, but limited to situations where actors judge that others have the same 
incentives they do to co-operate or play by the rules. This is why liberals turn to 
institutions in the hope of creating incentives for trust and co-operation to be more 
widely accepted.”  
 
Broadly speaking, there might be two paths to solve the trust crisis between states: to 
enhance trust as well as to reduce distrust in certain norms and customs. The two 
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processes are essentially different. To enhance trust is a constructive action, which tries 
to improve the mutual trust and relations through communication, interaction and 
cooperation. To reduce distrust is the remedial method to remove obstacles in bilateral 
relations through compromise and consultation. It would not be possible to identify 
which one is more important, but the former might be restricted by the process of the 
latter. The reason is that, in practice, the activities of moralistic confidence-building 
would still be based on collection of information. As mentioned above, to deal with the 
vicious cycle caused by distrust, governments have to take very high risks and face great 
pressures. Therefore, both states in a relationship should acquire enough motivation and 
conduct great efforts to solve a trust crisis (including ‘a lack of trust’ and ‘distrust’, which 
correspond with the two processes). In this research, China and Japan face the problem of 
a ‘locked’ bilateral relationship, and whether it is possible to ‘unlock’ the relationship 
through trust. Despite the common characteristics in international relations, the special 
determinants in Sino-Japanese relations would present more difficulties for both 
enhancing trust and reducing distrust. These determinants will have to be analysed to find 
a breakthrough in relations. 
 
In conclusion, the research is conducted with a recognition of the importance of trust in 
international relations; or, to be more exact, a recognition that distrust between states 
could have negative consequences. In terms of exploring the manifestations of trust and 
distrust, an interpretive approach has been chosen. To move forward, the way in which 
trust and distrust influence Sino-Japanese relations are the ‘asymmetries’ in different 
fields. Japan’s top concern lies in the area of strategic issues, such as the rise of China; 
and China does not accept the trustworthiness of Japan on questions of history. The 
asymmetries then lead to a vicious cycle of distrust between the two states and the 
‘locked’ relationship. If the two states try to ‘unlock’ the bilateral relationship, the 
breakthrough point might be unlocking the vicious cycle of bilateral distrust. China and 
Japan, and the two areas of strategic issues and moral issues are the primary focuses of 
this thesis. 
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2.6.2 A description of the structure of the thesis 
Chapter 3: Literature review 
Considering the existing theoretical discussions in this chapter, it will be possible to 
combine the specific background of Sino-Japanese relations with the theoretical base. 
The literature review is presented in the form of a chronology, to examine the status of 
trust and distrust between China and Japan following the normalization of bilateral 
diplomatic relations in 1972. It will attempt to measure and discuss the grand picture to 
evaluate whether the notion of trust has attracted enough attention. Whether there is trust 
and distrust defining them, what are the sources of trust and distrust, and what is the 
impact of each. In general, it is a review of the existing understandings of long-term, 
mutual interactions from the perspective of trust. 
 
Chapter 4: The determinants in Sino-Japanese relations 
It has been mentioned in the theoretical framework that the factors of “trust”, 
“determinants” and “relations” are interconnected. The determinants are significant 
because of the way trust influences relations between countries. As trust is basically an 
abstract notion in international relations, it is necessary to understand it through the 
lenses of specific and detailed issues and case studies. This will help demonstrate that 
these determinants are the most important categories of issues affecting interstate 
relations, and also help to ascertain how trust and distrust work. 
 
Chapter 5&6: The two case study chapters on mutual distrust 
The two case studies have similar structures in order to verify the hypotheses of a mutual 
distrust between Japan and China. The theoretical base would include: 
1) The first question would focus on identifying the existence of trust/distrust in 
bilateral relations. It has been mentioned that measuring trust/distrust would need 
related empirical evidence. In this way, the cases would form the empirical material, 
which are presented in the categories of the determinants in Sino-Japanese relations. 
2) To be detailed, the case studies are based around analysis of materials from multiple 
sources. On the one hand, there will be qualitative analysis judging which of the 
discourse/activities could be regarded as containing the essence of trust/distrust. 
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Considering the theoretical discussions, for example, distrust would exist based on 
information and/or on moral values. Hence, the first task must be to identify the 
evidence of trust/distrust. At the same time, quantitative research will also be 
conducted to verify the level of trust/distrust. Whether or not the problems are 
serious forms another aspect of the question, because only significant evidence 
would be persuasive. 
3) The theoretical framework also pays attention to the question of “asymmetries” in 
Sino-Japanese mutual distrust, in terms of the existing research question. It is the 
problem of an asymmetric structure between the two countries that has led to a 
“locked” bilateral relationship. The two case study chapters would verify one type of 
the asymmetries that both the two countries have internal asymmetries in the areas of 
distrust. It is possible to identify what are the primary concerns of the two countries 
by analysing the determinants of strategic and moral issues. 
 
Chapter 7: The “locked” Sino-Japanese relations and the recommendations for 
unlocking  
 
In order to verify the formation of the “locked” Sino-Japanese relationship, it is not 
enough to focus only on the two countries’ internal asymmetries. A comparison between 
the countries’ asymmetries is also crucial. By analysing the two countries’ different a 
priori concerns of distrust, it could be possible to understand how the asymmetric 
structure affects mutual distrust, and hence affects the bilateral relationship. Theoretically, 
managing the sources and the approaches of how distrust leads to the locked 
Sino-Japanese relations could therefore provide possible recommendations for unlocking 
the relationship. In short, enhancing mutual trust and reducing mutual distrust are the two 
approaches which need to be verified in detail in further discussions. 
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Chapter 3 Literature Review 
 
3.1 Introduction 
3.1.1 How the literature review is constructed 
Although having certain universal characteristics of interstate relations, specific incidents 
and processes between China and Japan have also affected the bilateral relationship. 
Therefore we need to examine the significance of events in explain the developments in 
the Sino-Japanese relationship especially the turbulence experienced by these two 
countries.  
 
It is not the aim of this research to identify and describe particular events or issues. 
Rather, the thesis will try to track the discussions of the status of Sino-Japanese mutual 
trust/distrust and their impact on Sino-Japanese relations. As mentioned above, the 
Sino-Japanese relationship has been dynamically shaped by a series of events. As a result, 
the literature review is constructed in the form of a chronology of Sino-Japanese relations, 
rather than that of the literature. Three periods are discussed, selected on the basis of the 
different characteristics of China and Japan’s political interactions and mutual trust, from 
1972 to the present. Again, it needs to be emphasised that the division into different 
periods is not aimed at summarizing the events, but rather to trace the reasonable 
evidence and oversights in discussion provided by the literature in certain categories of 
issues that affect mutual trust and the bilateral relationship. 
 
3.1.2 The core questions of the literature review 
This chapter will analyse the existing literature to identify the discussions of the 
following elements of the internal and external transformations in bilateral relations 
between China and Japan: whether the two states have a trust crisis in these periods; what 
factors could lead to changes in trust or mistrust, together with the changes in the political 
environment; and what can be observed as the evidence of mistrust in different periods. 
The chapter will try to evaluate the existing literature on their merits and weaknesses for 
examining Sino-Japanese relations in different periods. There are several key issues to be 
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analysed, including whether the literature provides evidence to explain the dynamic 
changes in Sino-Japanese relations; what are the links and differences between this 
research and the literature in interpreting the ups and downs of Sino-Japanese relations; 
and whether the literature could effectively identify the existence and significance of 
trust/distrust in Sino-Japanese relations. 
 
Detailed issues of trust or mistrust, in different eras, are discussed to reflect on the shifts 
of bilateral relations. As some of the disputes between China and Japan are long-lasting, 
stretching across several decades, it is necessary to look at specific cases to analyse how 
they continually affect the trust and relations between the two states. Meanwhile, have 
these cases changed together with time, and why, and what influenced these changes will 
also be included. In general, “whether”, “when” and “how” the trust has been affected in 
these periods and fields are the main concern of the literature review. 
 
It could hardly be denied that researchers widely acknowledge that there were periods of 
both positive and negative bilateral relations between Japan and China. However, there 
might be the possibility that literature would provide very different explanations for the 
asymmetric status. Considering one of the main arguments, that trust/distrust can reflect 
and affect bilateral relations, it is important to search the related evidence in the 
literature—as they might offer different explanations as well. In general, “whether”, 
“when” and “how” the status of trust has been affected, and how the Sino-Japanese 
relations have been shaped in these periods in terms of the strategic and moral/normative 
fields, are the main concerns of the literature review. 
 
3.1.3 The overall bilateral relations and trust in different periods 
Sino-Japan relations have suffered considerably since the fall of Chinese empire and the 
rise of modern Japan. Though the surrender of Japan at the end of the World War Two 
brought an end to the war between China and Japan, a long time passed before the two 
states could restart normal relations. China and Japan were unable to re-establish 
communications for a number of reasons before normalization in 1972. The historical 
background is the first thing to consider. After the end of the World War Two, in 1945, 
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China was soon trapped in a civil war between the Kuomintang (KMT) and the Chinese 
Communist Party (CCP). The chaos in China made it impossible to pay more attention to 
Japan, and maintain a stable strategy. Meanwhile, Japan was also in a difficult situation, 
as it was under military occupation by the US and lacked independence in its diplomatic 
relations with other states. When the Chinese civil war ended in 1949, the People’s 
Republic of China (PRC) was founded by the CCP in mainland China, and the Republic 
of China (ROC) controlled by the KMT withdrew to Taiwan. Japan’s official relations 
with “China” were actually with the ROC in Taiwan, before it finally acknowledged that 
the PRC was the legal representative of “China”, in the 1970s. Due to the fact that 
mainland China and Japan were in different camps during the Cold War, the relationship 
between Japan and the PRC was essentially at a standstill at the governmental level. 
Although there were some civil exchanges and communication, based on humanitarian 
issues such as the return of war orphans, the overall situation did not changed until the 
1970s (Hoadley & Hasegawa, 1971). Due to the extreme lack of positive official 
interactions, there was not a problem of trust or mistrust in the bilateral relations: it was 
total mistrust, because of the differences in ideologies and strategic positions. In this way, 
the research will focus mainly on the issue of trust in Sino-Japanese relations post-1972 
to the present, rather than pre-normalization.  
 
It is generally accepted by the literature that Sino-Japanese relations did indeed once 
enjoy a period of very positive cooperation and engagement. With the changes in the 
international environment, the level of China-Japan friendship cooled over the course of 
occasional disputes. As there was no effective improvement in the situation, issues grew 
fiercer, which led to tensions in the Sino-Japanese relationship. Huang Dahui (2008), in 
his article The 30 Years of Development of Sino-Japanese Relations, claims that, 
“After experiencing the ‘honeymoon’ at the beginning of China’s reforming and 
opening up policy, the period of ‘friction’ after the Cold War, the Sino-Japanese 
relations has gone through. And now the relationship is now stepping into a new 
period constructing ‘Strategically and Mutually Beneficial Relationship’.” (Huang, 
2008) 
63 
 
Huang’s three periods are divided and described thus: the “honeymoon” period started in 
1972, when the two states realized the normalization of bilateral relations, and ended 
after the mutual visit of President Jiang Zemin to Japan and Emperor Akihito to China in 
1992 – this categorisation is also supported by scholars such as Wu Xinbo (2000) and 
Woondo Choi (2003). The “friction” period was between the mid-1990s and the 
retirement of Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi in 2006, the characteristics of which 
were China’s dissatisfaction with Japan’s attitudes on historical issues, and the US-Japan 
alliance against China. Other academics have proposed that this period could be 
described as one of  “structural fluctuation” (Mori, 2007, p.3). Meanwhile, Huang has 
also indicated that, after Prime Minister Shinzo Abe took office in 2006, he (and his 
successors) sought ways of “icebreaking” together with the Chinese leadership. As the 
two states conducted a series of cooperative actions, a “Strategically and Mutually 
Beneficial Relationship” was successfully built, which could label the period after 2006 
as a new era of positive coordination.  
 
In terms of the division of periods, the author would substantially agree with Huang. 
However, though Sino-Japanese relations indeed experienced three such periods of 
ups-and-downs, Huang’s analysis is more based on the political relationship and the 
political environment. In this thesis, the research focus is on the status of mutual trust 
between China and Japan at different times and in different political atmospheres. In this 
way, small differences might exist. To be specific, the “honeymoon” period is from 
normalization in 1972 to the end of the Cold War at the beginning in the 1990s; the 
“friction” period, or the period with the emergence of a trust crisis, started in the 1990s 
and ended in 2001, when the Japanese Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi took office; 
then, from the early 21st century to the present is the period of mutual mistrust. Instead of 
Huang’s description of further cooperation, this author tends to emphasize the negative 
features during the third period. Though both states have tried to take measures to 
eliminate hostility, they have not succeeded yet, as these activities are more likely to be 
temporary in reaction to emergencies rather than long-term constructions, and they do not 
succeed in achieving their goals. The period is filled with both crises and opportunities, 
and yet it seems that “crisis” is the more significant feature.  
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3.2 Mutual trust and “Honeymoon”: 1972 to the end of the Cold War 
3.2.1 An overall assessment: no evidences of a trust crisis  
The existing literature would generally agree that the relationship between China and 
Japan achieved great progress during this period, and significant changes were observed 
in the official Sino-Japanese relationship. (Many scholars would agree with the 
description of this as a “honeymoon” period for the bilateral relationship.) The literature 
has pointed out that there were several significant reasons for the change in situation, 
compared with that in the earlier period of the Cold War. Firstly, the common threat from 
the Soviet Union continually generated strategic pressure for both Japan and China. 
(Yoshihide, 2002, pp.210-213) Under this circumstance, it would be reasonable that the 
two countries would seek to create different ties to each other to deal with the problem. 
Secondly, the changes in the US-China relationship directly placed on the table an urgent 
need for the normalization of Sino-Japanese relations. Actually, the rapprochement of the 
US-China relationship was partly the result of the Soviet threat. Considering the special 
relationship between Japan and the US, it became a diplomatic emergency for Japan 
when the US directly contacted China without informing its most important regional 
partner. Moreover, there was a growing need for both countries for the normalization of 
relations in the face of growing mutual understandings (Qureshi, 1973, p.56). Hence, the 
literature has concluded that Sino-Japanese relations in the 1970s were surprisingly good, 
which can be seen in the empirical evidence of mutual interactions and speeches. 
 
In this way, the literature provides a basic judgement that positive internal and external 
backgrounds and factors led to the improvement of Sino-Japanese relations in the 1970s. 
This is logically correct when examined. However, this is a “point-to-point” pattern of 
describing the Sino-Japanese relationship during a fixed term. In order to review 
Sino-Japanese relations as a dynamic entirety, the logic of the existing literature can 
extended by introducing the status of trust/distrust. Then, the hypothesis becomes: 
positive internal and external backgrounds and factors brought no crisis on trust which 
led to the improvement of Sino-Japanese relations in the 1970s. In this circumstance, the 
positive Sino-Japanese relations in the 1970s could be explained as fundamental and 
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comprehensive improvement. It would be difficult if scholars wanted to use every single 
event/area of positive interactions to explain the changes in the overall relationship 
because, for example, proving the influence of common strategic threats on the 
improving moral relations in civil society would be very difficult—the limited amount of 
interaction presents a problem for fitting the issues in different areas. However, if the 
hypothesis focuses on the strengthening of the role of trust/distrust, the problem can be 
dealt with as trust/distrust, generated in all areas, and could reflect and affect the changes 
in overall interstate relations. 
 
In addition, there are doubts and debates about how improved Sino-Japanese relations 
actually were. Or put another way, was the honeymoon between China and Japan an 
illusion? There are two assumptions: that the improvement of bilateral relations was 
either genuine or a false impression. The former would fit the traditional logic of 
matching the “outcome” with the “incidents as reasons”. However, the reconciliation 
might not have been as successful as public opinion suggested. As argued above, there 
were internal and external requirements for the two states to normalize their relationship 
in the 1970s. However, rapprochement was not based on considerable or frequent 
communication and interaction, but rather through secret discussions between high level 
government officials. Therefore, it is more likely that normalization was created by 
executive orders and political propaganda. The level of trust between the two countries 
improved in the areas of strategic interest, while most other disputes were left unresolved, 
which contributed less to mutual trust. This could explain why the two countries continue 
to have problems when common strategic concerns are not urgent. 
 
In general, mistrust did not appear to be a problem between China and Japan during this 
period. Despite its description as a “honeymoon”, the period of approximately two 
decades after normalization in 1972 was regarded as being very positive by many 
researchers on both political and economic issues (Choudhury, 1983). Vogel, Yuan and 
Tanaka (2002) use the phrase “the golden age” to describe the triangular 
U.S.-China-Japan relationship between 1972-1989, which includes Sino-Japanese 
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relations. Zhang Tuosheng (in Vogel, 2002) speaks highly of the period 1972-1992 in 
Sino-Japanese relations. He indicates that, 
“[W]e have not overestimated the progress in these two decades. On the contrary, the 
problems and the complications that have occurred since the mid-1990s reflect the 
significant progress and the valuable experience achieved earlier.” (Zhang, 2002, 
p.193) 
In short, the two countries seemed to have succeeded in establishing bilateral economic 
ties, positive political interactions, ended bilateral hostility, and improved civil 
communications in the two decades. At the same time, the fact that “these problems had 
basically been resolved, or at least brought under control” (Zhang, 2002, p.192) seems to 
suggest that the bilateral relationship would not be easily shaken by disputes, which 
might in turn suggest that Sino-Japanese relations were much more stable than we can 
observe today. It is important to understand the bilateral interactions between China and 
Japan during these two decades. Whether the two countries addressed the problem of 
mistrust during this honeymoon period needs to be discussed, because China and Japan 
once had different ways of dealing with disputes than the approaches they utilise now. It 
might be that trust affected the methods of interaction between the two countries. 
 
3.2.2 The 1970s:  
 
Time Events Cooperative or 
not 
09/1972 Prime Minister Kakuei Tanaka visited China and the
normalization of Sino-Japanese relations 
Yes 
08/1978 Treaty of Peace and Friendship between Japan and the
People's Republic of China signed 
Yes 
10/1978 Vice Prime Minister Deng Xiaoping visited Japan Yes 
12/1979 Prime Minister Masayoshi Ōhira visited China and
declared the first round of ODA for China 
Yes 
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Table 3. 1: Main interactions in the 1970s. Source: collected and edited by the author, the 
same in the next several sections 
 
What can be observed from the interactions between the two states in the 1970s is that 
China and Japan were quite successful in creating a positive and cooperative atmosphere 
in this era. The emotions of the Japanese government and society towards China, based 
on respect and also guilt towards China (Barnds, 1976, p.34), could have created the 
conditions for new interaction. With high level mutual visits, political links were built 
and new types of communication were conducted. The progress of normalization was 
keenly studied by scholars such as Soeya Yoshihide (2002), because it finally offered 
Japan “a new era: Japanese diplomacy could now develop diversified relations with 
Asian countries that were also compatible with its most important alliance, that with the 
United States” (Yoshihide, 2002, p.216). Moreover, the Treaty of Peace and Friendship 
between China and Japan could be “interpreted as a sign of Japan’s strategic tilt toward 
China… which tilted toward China and away from the Soviet Union” (Yoshihide, 2002, 
p.219). One cannot avoid taking the existence of the Soviet Union into consideration 
when studying the rapprochement between China and Japan during the Cold War. Even 
though the trust between the two countries was enhanced—no matter practically or 
theoretically—it is still necessary to re-examine how crucial the Soviet Union factor was 
in the bilateral relationship. It was reasonable to explain how two states with mutual 
hostility could become “friends” in such a short time—national security was obviously 
the priority under the threat from the Soviet Union. Hence, other issues would be 
considered of minor or lesser importance—just as traditional common sense between the 
two countries would allow for “letting minor difficulties be and agreeing on major 
common interests” (Tanino, 1990, p.30). Under this circumstance, negative opinions and 
actions towards each other were controlled by the two governments (Cheng, 1984-1985) 
with the support from businessmen and civil groups (Qureshi, 1973; Johnson, 1986). 
When the Chinese government turned from the  from the politically oriented ideology to 
economic and social modernisation, Japan was in favour of supporting China (Lee, 1997; 
Eto, 1983), which is a typical symbol of trust during this period. 
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It would be difficult to deny the existence of trust in Sino-Japanese relations during this 
period, as the two states had done enough to show their cooperative attitudes even under 
the risk of failure in a changing strategic environment. Even though it has been argued 
that the trust between China and Japan was actually a result of the two countries’ extreme 
distrust of the Soviet Union, pro-China and pro-Japan politicians and ideas indeed existed. 
This period of golden age was a breakthrough for China and Japan, which for the first 
time ended a long-term unnatural state caused by the war in 1895. The speed and level of 
improvement of bilateral relations was quite impressive in terms of the historical hostility 
and differences in ideology. Trust was a problem in bilateral relations, or it was 
consciously and actively avoided by both governments. However, it has also been widely 
observed that a potential threat in normalization was also created and left unsettled during 
this era. 
 
A potential failure of reconciliation 
There is a fundamental question in the Sino-Japanese relations after 1972: whether the 
“normalization” was actually normalization or merely a political declaration 
(normalization in name only). As Chalmers Johnson (1972) once stated, 
 
“The second problem standing in the way of improved Chinese Japanese relations is 
that China is not likely to accept a ‘normalization’ of relations until Japan has met 
China’s political requirements. In the terms of the Sino-American communiqué of 
February 28, 1972, the Chinese People’s Republic ‘firmly opposes the revival and 
outward expansion of Japanese militarism and firmly supports the Japanese people’s 
desire to build an independent, democratic, peaceful and neutral Japan.’ Japanese 
deeply resent this particular choice of words by the Chinese because, since they 
themselves criticize any signs of a ‘revival and outward expansion of Japanese 
militarism,’ they understand Chinese propaganda on this theme to mean that China 
opposes Japan’s regaining control over Okinawa and objects to Japan’s close 
economic ties with the rimland states of East Asia.” (Johnson, 1972) 
 
69 
 
Though the process could be seen to not be that bad or unreliable in the bilateral 
relationship, what Johnson expresses is consistent with the particulars of Sino-Japanese 
relations. Despite the achievements such as reopening official communications, 
expansion of civil interactions, and forming economic ties, the relationship between the 
two countries still contained grudges. More pessimistic observers could even believe that 
the normalization of Sino-Japanese relations was merely a political action, a strict and 
effective implementation of a political command from top decision-makers as required by 
national strategies, while the overall reconstruction of the relationship itself was much 
weaker than expected. Hidenori Ijiri (1990) doubts the reliability of normalization from 
the perspective of Japan’s policy makers: 
 
“However, in looking at Tanaka's China policy, especially the negotiation for 
normalization under the Tanaka-Ohira leadership, one doubts whether the 
Sino-Japanese normalization was a product of ‘trust and real friendship’ between 
the two countries. A careful examination of the negotiation process suggests that 
there was not an adequate blueprint on hand to attain Sino-Japanese 
normalization when Tanaka assumed power as the new prime minister. Instead, 
as ‘China fever’ heightened, Tanaka had to depend upon the political legacy of 
Eisaku Sato who had laid the foundation for the establishment of Sino-Japanese 
diplomatic rapprochement for whoever would take over his prime minister's 
office.” (Ijiri, 1990, p.641) 
 
The Sino-Japanese relationship had not confronted many difficulties when Ijiri raised 
these points; however, Ijiri’s arguments were quite common among observers of the 
bilateral relationship, concerned about whether trust and friendship had actually been 
attained alongside the normalization of official relations.  
 
The year 2012 was the 40th anniversary of the normalization of the interstate relationship, 
achieved during the visit of former Prime Minister Kakuei Tanaka to China. Though the 
War ended approximately 70 years ago, the reason the two states are still debating the 
issue of Japan’s war legacy is probably that they have not reached reconciliation. As 
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Caroline Rose (2005) argued, “despite the efforts of leaders and citizens alike, 
fundamental problems relating to the war between China and Japan still exist, and appear 
to pose a formidable obstacle to settlement of the past and, therefore, to the smooth 
running of the relationship in the future.” (Rose, 2005, p.15) Actually, Rose to some 
extent has a generally positive view of the efforts (or the potential) of reconciliation 
between the two states. She refers to “the two cycles of Sino-Japanese reconciliation”: 
“seeking truth and justice through trials and/or historical enquiry, reparations 
(compensation), and settling the past through apologies, commemoration and 
communicative history.” (Rose, 2005, p.24) However, though there indeed have been 
moves to push forward with reconciliation, such as joint research on historical issues, 
which seem to have not reached mutually satisfying resolutions, China and Japan are still 
suffering from the legacy of war and other persistent issues. Mistrust could stronger 
without a reconciliation, and the opportunity for reconciliation between China and Japan 
has its own particulars which can present difficulties for the process.  
 
The inevitable confrontation between the two camps made it impossible for China and 
Japan to restart official communications after World War II. Even worse, the overall 
situation of the Cold War enhanced mistrust between the two states. There are different 
interpretations of the evaluation of bilateral interactions between China and Japan during 
the periods from 1949 to normalization in 1972, and then to the present. As Rose (1998) 
mentioned, 
 
“The period between 1945 and 1972 was marked by a lack of diplomatic relations 
between China and Japan which inevitably had an effect on their political, economic 
and cultural interaction. The PRC, intent on that objective, while Japan, restrained by 
US policy dictates, could respond only in a limited fashion. Furthermore, the 
international system of the Cold War period had an enormous influence on the 
relationship, bringing China and Japan into the ‘subsystems’ of the two superpowers 
and placing them as Cold War ‘enemies’.” (Rose, 1998, p.43) 
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Even though there were different types of interaction, which Rose also described – for 
example, the “people’s diplomacy” and other civil communications – it was doubtful 
whether any connections between the people were actually restricted by politics, or even 
used as tools of a political agenda, which would hardly eliminate any existing mistrust. 
Zhang Tuosheng (in Vogel) stresses four points of “the major achievements in 
Sino-Japanese relations during this twenty-year period (1972-1992…)” (Zhang, 2002, 
p.193): 
 
“First, politically, the Sino-Japanese Joint Statement and the Sino-Japanese Treaty of 
Peace and Friendship built a legal framework of major principles for developing 
friendly cooperation between the two countries… Second, economically, imports and 
exports increased rapidly, from a very low level to a comprehensive, large-scale level 
of trade… Third, in security and international affairs, the two countries put an end to 
long-term hostility. The U.S.-Japan security alliance stopped targeting China, and 
China and Japan achieved a measure of indirect strategic cooperation… Fourth, in 
terms of friendly activities such as cultural exchanges and the exchange of visits, 
substantial progress was made through both official and unofficial efforts.” (Wan, 
2006, pp.193-194) 
 
Different to the positive evaluation in the description above, these achievements are 
limited due to the nature of the time—even we have to accept the existence of plenty of 
reasons and activities for the reconciliation between China and Japan. 
 
To a great extent, the success of Sino-Japanese normalization was a contingency measure 
made after the normalization of Sino-US relations. As the US conducted secret contacts 
with China without notifying the Japanese, Japan would be shocked and have to take 
immediate action in order to avoid strategic and political embarrassment. In this way, the 
official Sino-Japanese negotiations and then normalization were achieved in a very short 
time. On February 21st, 1972, President Nixon visited China and started the normalization 
process for Sino-US relations. Then, on September 25th, 1972, Japanese Prime Minister 
Tanaka visited the People’s Republic of China. On the 29th, the PRC and the Japanese 
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government issued the Sino-Japanese Joint Statement, announcing the establishment of 
formal diplomatic relations. However, whether it was possible for both governments and 
their publics to adjust their existing images and opinions of each other to the new, 
fast-changing relationship could pose a problem. For example, due to the political 
cultures of China in the Maoist era, the public had to passively and suddenly accept the 
reality of “reconciliation” with Japan, which was a traditionally top-down political 
activity without enough consideration for public opinion. Moreover, the overtures 
between China and Japan were more likely to be strategically necessary for dealing with 
threats from the former Soviet Union. In this historical instance, China’s position was 
different from that at the beginning of the Cold War. Compared to China, the Soviet 
Union was a direct security threat to Japan and the US. It is important that China seemed 
to be identified as another victim of the shadow of Soviet’s hegemony. The same 
strategic interest brought changes to Chinese and Japanese opinions of each other—and 
yet, it was still doubtful whether the situation could last for long. With the collapse of the 
Soviet Union, the primary cause that brought the two countries together was gone. The 
inadequate reconciliation broke down, through dozens of disputes, which may have 
formed the basis of mistrust.  
 
One could assume that the normalization of the diplomatic relationship between China 
and Japan did not bring essential reconciliation between the two states. The fact is that 
the normalization of 1972, conducted by gifted politicians in secret, was achieved over a 
very short period of time. “However, is it really possible or feasible to ‘settle all’ the 
misery, damage and emotional scars caused by fifteen years of military invasion and 
occupation in a couple of days of negotiations and a resulting Communique?” (Mori, 
2007, p.15) The Sino-Japanese relations in recent years might support the judgement of 
an unsuccessful reconciliation several decades ago. The failure in reconciliation, if it 
exists, would shock the Sino-Japanese trust, which should be based on the settlement of 
bilateral disputes. 
 
3.2.3 The 1980s: 
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Time Events Cooperative or not 
05/1980 Prime Minister Hua Guofeng visited Japan Yes 
05/1982 Prime Minister Zhao Ziyang visited Japan
and claimed the three basic principles of the
bilateral relationship 
Yes 
06/1982 The outbreak of the Textbook Issue No 
09/1982 Prime Minister Suzuki Zenko visited China Yes 
11/1983 General Secretary Hu Yaobang visited Japan
and raised the four principles of
Sino-Japanese relations 
Yes 
03/1984 Prime Minister Nakasone Yasuhiro visited
China and declared the second round of
ODA for China 
Yes 
09/1984 3000 Japanese youth visited China invited by
Hu Yaobang 
Yes 
02/1987 The Kokaryo Case No 
08/1988 Prime Minister Takeshita Noboru visited
China and declared the third round of ODA
for China 
Yes 
04/1989 Prime Minister Li Peng visited Japan Yes 
07/1989 Japan joined the sanction on China due to the
Tiananmen Incident 
No 
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Table 3. 2: Main interactions between China and Japan in the 1980s 
 
The main trend of the 1980s in this region could be described as, “shaped by the 
gravitation of the United States, Japan and China toward nearly identical positions on 
many foreign policy issues” (Nagorski, 1980, p.668). As Soeya Yoshihide (2002) argues, 
the bilateral relationship in the 1980s was more characterised by “complexities” than 
during the 1970s. There were examples of progress on mutual trust. The two states had 
conducted frequent mutual VIP visits during this decade, and essential cooperative and 
systematic principles were achieved. Unobstructed political communication was crucial 
for reducing misunderstanding. During the mutual visits, the principles of mutual 
relations, such as the three basic principles of the bilateral relationship as expressed by 
Zhao Ziyang (peace and friendship, equality and mutual benefit, long-term stability) were 
raised, which could function as guides for future interaction, thereby avoiding of 
disordered actions.  
 
Another symbol of positive bilateral interaction was the implementation of Japan’s ODA 
(Official Development Assistance) for China. According to David Arase (in Lam Peng Er, 
2006), Japan expected a better strategic environment with a stronger China, while China 
could obviously benefit from economic support from Japan. It is hard to imagine that a 
state would provide large scale economic assistance to another state with considerable 
political and economic and no shared trust. Though the Japanese ODA for China could be 
interpreted as a strategic tool aimed at the Soviet Union, and might also be a method of 
sanction against China, it had been implemented as a cooperative action based on 
goodwill. Even when Japan signed on to the joint declaration sanctioning the Tiananmen 
Incident, the negotiations for ODA were not fundamentally nor negatively affected (Choi, 
2003).  
 
Problems the two states met in the 1980s 
In terms of the overall positive atmosphere, three important issues that took place during 
the 1980s presented problems for the Sino-Japanese relationship. The issue regarding 
Japanese textbooks first came to the fore in 1982, and was the first dispute following the 
75 
 
1972 normalization. The dispute arose on the 10-year anniversary of normalization, and 
was soon settled by the two governments. However, potential issues were left unresolved. 
The second problem was the Kokaryo Case, which should have been a simple civil case 
about the ownership of a student dormitory, without great repercussions or much public 
attention. However, the Kokaryo Case was a triangular issue, involving mainland China, 
Taiwan and Japan, and was extremely sensitive for China due to issues of ‘sovereignty’. 
The case to some extent damaged the mutual trust between the two states, as suggested 
by Hidenori Ijiri (in Howe, 1996) who pointed out that the efforts to enhance mutual 
understanding by inviting Japanese youth to China by Hu Yaobang had been criticised 
within China. The mutual trust was apparently harmed in this case. Tomonori Sasaki also 
suggested that, although the issue might not have become predominant, there was a 
mutually-recognised threat of military action (Sasaki, 2010). 
 
The last but crucial issue in the 1980s, which finally brought an end to the honeymoon 
period, was the Tiananmen Incident. Some scholars even believe that the friction period 
was a result of the Tiananmen Incident (Kim, 1990, p.403). When the incident, regarded 
by Western states as an anti-democratic suppression of the students occurred, Japan was 
struggling to decide on how to react to the Chinese government. Many scholars – 
including Hidenori Ijiri (1996), K. V. Kesavan (1990) and Whiting and Xin (1990/1991) 
– would argue that while Japanese was involved in placing sanctions against China, the 
essential Japanese attitude was not as strict as the US’s position. Japan soon reopened 
high level communications and other mutual connections with China, within a year of the 
crackdown in Tiananmen. According to the literature, it was not due to trust between the 
two states, but rather the existing war guilt that decided Japan’s actions. However, the 
collapse of communist factions worldwide, and attitudes on a totally different set of 
political values had led Japan to reconsider its strategy towards China in the post-Cold 
War era. 
 
3.2.4 A sectional conclusion 
Whether the existing literature offers effective discussions on the status of trust/distrust 
between Japan and China, and its implications for Sino-Japanese relations, is a core 
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question. As far as the literature is concerned, a certain level of mutual trust could have 
been built for the first time after World War II. Although, there might have been certain 
conditions during the later years of the Cold War when other countries, including the US 
and Japan, needed China as a partner to deal with the Soviet threat. As they had a shared 
strategic problem to deal with, the literature indicates that China and Japan were 
experiencing mutual trust and positive bilateral relations during this period. At the same 
time, the potential risks had not become the problem of distrust between the two 
countries. Most other disputes were controlled or internally postponed to ensure the 
success of the normalization process. However, this might have led to a potential risk of 
reviving distrust in the future and the potential failure of reconciliation, which has been 
discussed by some of the literature. 
 
Although literature has discussed the two aspects of successful and unsuccessful 
interactions, it has not provided enough discussion on the divisions between positive 
relations and trust. That is to say, it is necessary to dig deeper on how events have led to 
trust/distrust and had an impact on Sino-Japanese relations. For example, unsuccessful 
reconciliation might leave the potential risk that certain postponed disputes could 
re-emerge in the future—which actually has happened, in the case of the Diaoyu/Senkaku 
dispute, to name but one. This thesis, therefore, will try to develop discussions on these 
issues beyond the existing literature. 
 
3.3 Frictions and revive of distrust: the 1990s to the beginning of 21st 
century  
 
Time Events Cooperative or not 
07/1990 Prime Minister Kaifu Toshiki declared the 
restoration of ODA toward China 
Yes 
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08/1991 Prime Minister Kaifu Toshiki visited China as 
the first Western head of state after the 
Tiananmen Incident 
Yes 
04/1992 General Secretary Jiang Zemin visited Japan Yes 
10/1992 Emperor Akihito visited China as the first one 
in Sino-Japanese history 
Yes 
03/1994 Prime Minister Hosokawa Morihiro visited 
China 
Yes 
09/1994 Japan permitted the attendance on Hiroshima 
Asian Games of Taiwan vice Primer Xu Lide 
and led to protests from China 
No 
04/1994 Agreement on the fourth round of ODA Yes 
05/1995 Prime Minister Murayama Tomiichi visited 
China and visited the Anti-Japanese War 
Memorial as the first Prime Minister ever 
Yes 
08/1995 Murayama Danwa: an apology on the war made 
by Prime Minister Murayama Tomiichi 
Yes 
08/1995 Japan protested against China’s nuclear test No 
07/1996 Japanese right-wing groups landed on 
Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands and led to China’s 
protests 
No 
07/1996 Prime Minister Hashimoto Ryutaro visited the 
Yasukuni Shrine 
No 
09/1997 Prime Minister Hashimoto Ryutaro visited 
China 
Yes 
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11/1997 Prime Minister Li Peng visited Japan Yes 
11/1998 President Jiang Zemin visited Japan as the first 
Chinese head of state ever 
Yes 
07/1999 Prime Minister Obuchi Keizo visited China Yes 
10/2000 Prime Minister Zhu Rongji visited Japan Yes 
 
Table 3. 3: Main interactions from 1990 to 2000 
 
3.3.1 An evaluation: the rise of problems of distrust without an overall 
subversion 
Described as “a period of frictions”, this period could be seen as having taken a negative 
turn, to a certain extent. This research provides a general judgement that a crisis of 
distrust had emerged, but this did not become an insurmountable problem between the 
two countries, according to the discussion in the literature. 
 
In order to explain the structural fluctuations of this period, the existing literature 
provides an interpretation, that the end of the Cold War was the most significant change 
of this period. The absence of the common strategic threat posed by the Soviet Union led 
to the re-evaluation of the strategies of both China and Japan towards each other. Hence, 
a series of problems might occur on issues such as wartime apology, Taiwan, textbooks, 
security, and so on. It is possible that these problems remerged due to a lack of a priori 
concerns, or they were newly raised. In general, the shifts in the background led to the 
main problems in the bilateral relations. 
 
However, greater explanation is needed for these negative changes. In a more critical way, 
it was not inevitable that the collapse of the Soviet Union would inevitably lead to a 
worsened Sino-Japanese relationship. The collapse of the Soviet Union could have 
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impacts on the strategic arrangement (but was not necessary for an overall turnaround of 
policies), but not on historical disputes. In this way, it might be reasonable to come to the 
conclusion that the shift in the level of trust caused the other changes affecting bilateral 
relations, thereby explaining the rise in friction/tension.  
 
It seemed that the routine, mutual visits by the two leaderships in the 1990s suggested 
that cooperation was not weakened, or at least that existing literature recognised the trend 
that the “larger issues” would be focused on instead of problems from a Chinese 
perspective (Soeya, Wang & Welch, 2003, p.187). However, to be labelled as “friction”, 
“the emergence of security dilemma” (Choi, 2003, p.79) or even the “coming 
confrontation” (Segal, 1993), this period certainly experienced changes away from the 
former harmony. Zhang Tuosheng (2002) acknowledged that, “beginning in the 
mid-1990s, bilateral relations suffered major frustrations, even setbacks”, which included 
“issues such as the interpretation of history, Japan-Taiwan relations, and the U.S.-Japan 
military alliance” (Zhang, 2002, p.192). To better understand the characteristics of this 
period, one could conclude that the two states began to recognize that there was a 
problem of mistrust, especially in some specific cases. Though these cases – such as the 
disputed Diaoyu/Senkaku Islands, textbook issues, and other historical legacies – were 
not new in this era, the situation was much fiercer than during the “honeymoon” period. 
 
Mori Kazuko (2007) understands the changes in the following way:  
“…from the late 1990s to 2004 was a time of ‘structural fluctuation’, during 
which the Cold War ended, Taiwan demanded national independence, the 
US-Japan security system was destructed and China grew into an economic super 
power. During this time, the Japanese public began to feel that the ‘postwar’ era 
of apologizing to China over what had happened in the past had come to an end.” 
(Mori, 2007, p.3)  
It seems clear that some observers tend to believe that, due to internal desires and 
external pressures—as Mori Kazuko mentioned above, about Japan’s change in 
apologizing—both China and Japan would have to adjust their attitudes toward each 
other, which brought changes to the bilateral relationship that allowed for the problem of 
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mistrust in certain areas. Michael J. Green and Benjamin L. Self (1996) listed a series of 
“signs of change in the relationship” in the 1990s:  
“Evidence of the recent changes in Japan’s China policy is growing. 
• In 1994, successive Prime Ministers Morihiro Hosokawa and Tsutomu Hata 
both took a harder line with Beijing on military transparency and nuclear tests 
than their predecessors ever had. 
•Japan provoked China’s wrath by inviting Lee Yuan-tsu, vice-president of 
Taiwan, to the Hiroshima Asian Games in October of the same year 
• In June 1995, Chairman of the Joint Staff General Tetsuya Nishimoto ended 
the Japan Self-Defense Force’s (JSDF) long-standing exclusive focus on the 
Soviet/Russian threat by announcing that he would express Japan’s concern to 
China over the missiles launched in the direction of Taiwan that same summer. 
• In August 1995, the Japanese government informed China’s ambassador to 
Tokyo, Xu Dunxin, that Japan would suspend grant assistance to Beijing as a 
protest against continued nuclear weapons testing (a loss of $75 million). 
• Japanese Air Self-Defense Force fighter jets scrambled in response to 
threatening moves by Chinese jets in Japanese airspace for the first time ever in 
autumn 1995. 
• In October 1995, Foreign Minister Kono Yohei made front-page news in Japan 
by mentioning in the National Diet that Chinese military modernization and 
territorial policies could be a source of instability in Asia 
• In early 1996, Japan responded to Chinese activities in the East China Sea (and 
in effect to Beijing’s 1992 law reaffirming Beijing’s claim to the Senkaku 
Islands) by deciding to formally extend its Exclusive Economic Zone in the area. 
• And in March 1996, Prime Minister Ryutaro Hashimoto summed up Tokyo’s 
new attitude towards China when he expressed his concern that Chinese policies 
in the region ‘might be heading in the wrong direction’.” (Green & Self, 1996, 
pp.36-37) 
 
As Green and Self (1996) concluded, “Beneath the surface of overt policy changes a 
more fundamental shift has taken place in the dynamics of Japan’s China policy; a shift 
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resulting not from short-term tensions but from changes in the structures that underpinned 
Japanese policy towards China for four decades.” (Green & Self, 1996, p.37) This 
fractious period of time was not just a kind of “honeymoon burnout”. Whether it was 
because of the absence of the common strategic threat Soviet Union, or new 
considerations due to a shift in national power, or different attitudes towards history, the 
tensions were more than the normal debates between states, which might indicate a 
qualitative change. Both China and Japan would re-evaluate the actions of the other, to 
ascertain whether they had a comparatively accurate understanding of the political and 
strategic goals of the other, which had led to different views towards each other (Harris, 
1997, p.127). This process of re-evaluation were affected by different kinds of cases, 
most of which were quite negative. For example, although China had a long way to catch 
up to the modernised world in the 1990s, the growth in defence expenditure still worried 
in Japan (Lee, 1997). The mistrust would be further enhanced by activities in relation to 
disputes, regarded as a challenges to each other. If the theoretical starting point of the 
vicious cycle of mistrust is failing to achieve genuine reconciliation and settlement of war 
(which will be discussed in the next chapters), the significant deterioration was in this 
period of friction.  
 
3.3.2 Typical examples 
The apology issue 
One crucial achievement of the mutual reconciliation in the 1990s was supposed to be the 
1995 “Murayama Danwa”: an apology for the war made by Prime Minister Murayama 
Tomiichi. Though there have been dissenting Japanese voices on the “weakness” of 
Murayama’s diplomacy, the spirit of the speech no doubt helped to mitigate the rivalry 
between China and Japan over historical disputes. Murayama’s speech was accepted and 
highly praised by the Chinese government, which could have helped to increase the 
moralistic trust between the two states. However, despite the progress made by 
Murayama, Japanese official government statements appear more conservative (Wu J., 
1998, pp.61-65) considering the domestic politics or for other reasons. This led to the 
apology becoming an issue between the two states. 
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Reputation is so important in Chinese culture that the failure to express enough apologies 
and respect to the victims of war might have caused problems for Sino-Japanese relations. 
Indeed, Japan has made official apologies to the Asian countries it once invaded. 
However, the Chinese government is not satisfied with Japan’s statements, which often 
use words such as “regret” instead of emotionally stronger words, and the lack of a 
written apology expected by China. Caroline Rose (2005) has concluded that,  
 
“The main problem surrounding the apparent failure of the Japanese to come to terms 
with the past is, from the Chinese point of view, the refusal of successive Japanese 
governments to offer genuine, sincere apologies to the Chinese government and 
people, backed up by actions to reinforce the apologies. This view is at odds with 
that held by a number of Japanese prime ministers, politicians, the media, and, 
increasingly, the public who feel that apologies have been offered on a number of 
occasions, and that China uses the ‘history card’ when it is politically beneficial.” 
(Rose, 2005, pp.100-102) 
 
Lind has argued that failing to follow the German way of apology could lead to problems 
and distrust (Lind, 2009). There are several assumptions worth considering: whether 
Japan has expressed essential regret to China; whether the use of language to express 
regret from the Japanese is not considered “sincere” by the Chinese—in many cases, this 
would be described as the German approach; and whether China really cares about 
receiving an emotionally satisfactory apology, or is just playing the history card. 
However, even if one presumes that Japan is sincere in its apologies, while China focuses 
more on the victims’ emotion as opposed to the political benefits, the differences in 
language and culture could still result in misunderstandings on this issue. Not to mention 
the other two possibilities, which might also lead to mutual mistrust.  
 
In terms of cultural factors and interstate trust issues, the focus basically lies originally 
with the notion of trust. If the interpretations of political issues were different from the 
other culture, there could be misunderstandings and mistrust between China and Japan. 
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Meanwhile, the culture might also be used as an excuse, which brings further 
complexities when seeking solutions .  
 
The Taiwan Issue in the 1990s 
The main dispute in this decade was over the Taiwan Issue. In 1994, Japan permitted 
Taiwan vice Primer Xu Lide to attend the Hiroshima Asian Games, which led to protests 
from China. The reunification of China and Taiwan is one of the most crucial and explicit 
national interests of the Chinese government. Though the Taiwan issue is a fundamental 
determinant for the political relations between China and other states, the special 
historical relationship between Japan and Taiwan complicates the issue. 
 
China is concerned about the fifty-year post-colonial relationship between Japan on 
Taiwan, and so see any contacts between Japan and Taiwan as potentially suspicious. 
Some scholars, including Austin and Harris (1999), suggest that there are three elements 
to the Chinese perspective: Japan’s position on “Taiwan independence”, the closer 
political and economic partnership (than either country’s with China), and the strategic 
goal of Japan regarding Taiwan. (Austin & Harris, 1999, p.134; Zha, 2001) For the 
Japanese, although Japan does share similar values with Taiwan, it is unlikely to take 
risks and conduct activities that question the status quo. Phil Deans (in Marie Söderberg, 
2001) indicates that “Tokyo’s preferred option for cross-Straits relations remains the 
continuation of the status quo.” (Söderberg, 2001, p.95) Following this guideline, Japan 
avoids getting involved in the Taiwan issue, except by acting comparatively weak by 
asking for self-restraint from China between 1995 and 1996, when the US upgraded its 
relations with Taiwan during the crisis (NODA, 1997, p.124)—Japan clearly understands 
that more active and negative reactions would cause distrust from China. Dean also 
suggests that “Reconciliation between Beijing and Tokyo over the Taiwan question may 
not be possible, but there has been an admirable degree of compromise, from all three 
sides, over the maintenance of different levels of relationship” (Söderberg, 2001, p.100), 
and the situation generally progresses smoothly in recent decades. However, there could 
be hidden dangers, such as the disputes over the Diaoyu/Senkaku Islands between 
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mainland China, Japan and Taiwan. If a cooperative relationship between Japan and 
Taiwan were established, the trust between China and Japan would be shaken. 
 
3.3.3 A sectional conclusion 
Similar with the previous period, the literature has successfully indicated that the general 
situation remained stable, while some problems persisted for the two countries. It could 
be argued that, considering the ongoing interactions, mutual trust and bilateral relations 
between China and Japan should have been enhanced even though more problems arose 
during this period than during the 1970s. This contradiction could be interpreted from an 
analysis of the impact of trust/distrust on interstate relations. As argued above, the 
leftover disputes would contribute to distrust as they were not completely solved. 
Therefore, it is still a problem that the literature has not effectively built a connection 
between the events and trust, as well as relationship. 
 
3.4 Deterioration: from 2001 till the present 
 
Time Events Cooperative or not 
04/2001 2001 Textbook Issue No 
04/2001 Japan permitted the visit of former Taiwan 
President Lee Teng-hui which led to a 
series of problems in Sino-Japanese 
relations 
No 
08/2001 Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi visited 
the Yasukuni Shrine 
No 
10/2001 Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi visited 
China and expressed apologies for the war
Yes 
04/2002 Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi visited 
the Yasukuni Shrine 
No 
01/2003 Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi visited 
the Yasukuni Shrine 
No 
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2005 Great number of protests in China against 
Japanese attempt to join the United 
Nations Security Council as a permanent 
member 
No 
04/2005 2005 Textbook Issue No 
08/2005 Defense White Paper of Japan claimed a 
great concern on the “China threats” 
No 
10/2005 Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi visited 
the Yasukuni Shrine 
No 
15/08/2006 Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi visited 
the Yasukuni Shrine on the surrender day 
of World War II 
No 
10/2006 Prime Minister Abe Shinzo visited China, 
regarded as the ‘ice-breaking’ trip and 
agreed on building a mutually beneficial 
relationship 
Yes 
04/2007 Prime Minister Wen Jiabao visited Japan Yes 
12/2007 Prime Minister Fukuda Yasuo visited 
China 
Yes 
05/2008 President Hu Jintao visited Japan, declared 
wish to enhance the mutually beneficial 
relationship 
Yes 
05/2008 Wenchuan Earthquake in China, Japan 
offered assistance and sent a rescue team 
to China 
Yes 
04/2009 Prime Minister Aso Taro visited China Yes 
05/2010 Prime Minister Wen Jiabao visited Japan Yes 
09/2010 Japan arrested Chinese fishermen on the 
sea around the Diaoyu/Senkaku Islands 
No 
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03/2011 Japanese Northeast Earthquake, China 
offered assistance and sent a rescue team
Yes 
12/2011 Prime Minister Noda Yoshihiko visited 
China 
Yes 
02/2012 Japanese Mayor of Nagoya City, Takashi 
Kawamura denied the ‘Nanjing Massacre’, 
which led to serious problems in the 
bilateral relations 
No 
04/2012 Tokyo Governor Ishihara Shintaro 
declared a plan to purchase the 
Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands 
No 
08/2012 Hong Kong ‘Baodiao’ (protecting Diaoyu 
Islands) group landed on Diaoyu/Senkaku 
Islands and then arrested by Japan 
No 
09/2012 Japanese government nationalized 
Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands and led to fierce 
protests in China 
No 
09/2013 China started regular cruise near 
Diaoyu/Senkaku Islands 
No 
05/2014-06/2
014 
Chinese and Japanese military airplanes 
engaged in a dangerous distance over the 
East China Sea 
No 
07/2014 The Cabinet of Japan lifted collective 
self-defence 
No 
11/2014 China and Japan reached four principles of 
consensus on improving bilateral relations
Yes 
11/2014 President Xi and Prime Minister Abe met 
during the APEC summit in Beijing 
Yes 
04/2015 President Xi and Prime Minister Abe met 
in Jakarta, Indonesia 
Yes 
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08/2015 Prime Minister Abe delivered the speech 
on the 70th anniversary of World War II 
Debatable 
08/2015 China held the parade on 70th anniversary 
of “anti-Japanese war and anti-fascist war”
Debatable 
 
Table 3. 4: Main interactions the 21st century 
 
3.4.1 The overall situation: distrust as crisis and the absence of effective 
trust-building interactions 
Distrust as a phenomenon in Sino-Japanese relations has been a subject of debate in the 
21st century. The start of the first decade was not purely negative,5 considering the VIP 
visits and the positive speeches. However, the situation significantly worsened in the 
following years. The literature provides some possible explanations for this turn. Firstly, 
one of the most significant changes in this period would be the apparent growth of 
China’s comprehensive national power. It would be the first time for China since the 
decline of its empire when this country could become a major actor in terms of its hard 
power. Considering its more important position in the international economy, the demand 
for resources and security for import/export and development could in turn require 
potential military development or even expansion. Accompanied by the growth of 
national power, China would have significantly more say in world politics and on 
regional affairs, which could urge other actors, including Japan, to adjust to the new 
situation. Secondly, for the Japanese, an attempt by Japan to redefine its national identity 
in the world might lead to both strategic and moral tension with China, which could 
therefore cause more problems in their bilateral relations. 
 
The situation would be similar if the literature had accurately identified the “variable 
factors” as the new trends in this era. However, the existing problems might be more 
significant and the direct links between “incidents” and “status of relations” would be 
stronger. This would be reasonable because the greater of incidents are, the stronger the 
                                                 
5 See interview on Xingyu WANG in Chapter 7 of this thesis, question 1. 
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impacts on the bilateral relations would be. Therefore, observers should focus on how the 
issues in certain fields lead to improvements or deterioration in Sino-Japanese relations. 
 
It needs to be reemphasised that this research will try to look at bilateral relations as a 
whole, in a dynamic way, and this is why doubts are raised that “point to point” 
connections are not sufficient for interpreting the overall changes to bilateral 
relations—even certain “strategic” issues cannot explain the deterioration of strategic 
relations in other specific areas. Hence, the status of strategic and moral trust/distrust is 
necessary under this circumstance.  
 
“The year 2002 marked the fiftieth anniversary of the normalization of Sino-Japanese 
relations… The positive tone of speeches, policy reviews, and the numerous 
celebratory activities of 2002 were, however, overshadowed by a series of issues that 
suggested a slightly different picture of the state of affairs. The main indication that 
something was awry in 2002 was the absence of Prime Minister Koizumi from the 
celebration in China in September to celebrate the anniversary of the signing of the 
1972 Joint Statement. Although there had been plans for him to attend the 
celebrations, a number of diplomatic incidents put a strain on the relationship and 
rendered the visit inappropriate as far as the Chinese and Japanese foreign ministries 
were concerned. Although no specific reasons were offered for his absence, China’s 
dissatisfaction with Koizumi’s visit to the Yasukuni Shrine in April could have been 
a contributory factor, in addition to the row over the Shenyang consulate issue, which 
also threatened to stall the celebration plans.” (Rose, 2005, p.1)  
 
What Rose describes are the unpleasant issues of 2002, an important anniversary for 
Sino-Japanese relations. Moreover, similar things keep happening at the beginning of the 
21st century, causing a new kind of “Cold War” between the two countries, which shows 
a significant level of mistrust (Hagström, 2008/2009).  
 
The ups and downs China and Japan experienced in their bilateral relationship during the 
first decade of the 21st Century had not been seen since the 1972 normalization, and both 
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security and history have re-emerged as problems and disputes in Sino-Japanese relations 
(Hook, Gilson, Hughes, & Dobson, 2005; Gilson, 2007). Compared to the political and 
strategic environments before, the main changes are: the apparent growth of Chinese 
national power both in economics and military capabilities, which makes China one of 
the strongest regional powers, exacerbating Japan’s concern and worry over a potential 
China threat; and the attempt by Japan to redefine its national position in the world, to 
that of a normal state without historical burdens. China’s rise might be a challenge to 
strategic trust between the two states, while Japan’s attitude to history is seen as 
moralistically untrustworthy by the Chinese.  
 
In terms of the main interactions in this period, three main findings can be observed: 
(1). the mutual visits at the highest levels of leadership have been interrupted for a long 
time since the outbreak of the crisis. 
(2). the main causes of the disputes are historical issues, while the strategic factors also 
an issue. 
(3). the political interactions after the crises were more likely to be “ice-breaking” 
remedies, rather than the creative construction of mutual trust.  
 
Though there should be many more opportunities for cooperation now, because of the 
improved and close economic and trade ties between the two states, which are not so 
easily jettisoned, they do not confer much benefit to political and diplomatic relations. 
There are arguments in academia, such as put forward by Rose (2005) and Heazle (2007), 
that assume that the future of the Sino-Japanese relationship will actually be based on its 
history. Moreover, a pessimistic view of the Sino-Japanese relationship in the 21st century 
is evident in the literature; for example in descriptions of “an emerging rivalry” by Wan 
(2005), and Mori Kazuko’s description of “a gloomy, frail rivalry” (Mori, 2007, p.1), and 
the “Sino-Japanese interdependence and rivalry” (Buszynski, 2009, p.143). 
 
The changes in the 21st century are a direct reflection of the internal and external 
influencing factors on the two states. The inevitable rise of Chinese national power, the 
development of disputes over history, territory and resource-related issues, the strategic 
90 
 
and security situation in the East Asian region, and the involvement of the U.S. are all 
elements that affect the interactions between China and Japan.  
 
3.4.2 Strategic distrust  
The literature points to the rise of China, including the realities of military growth and the 
assumptions of potential expansion and the strengthening of the US-Japan alliance, as a 
strategic hot button issue. 
 
For instance, when confronting the rise of China, Japan distrusts China because, first, 
there is the fact of growth in Chinese military expenditure, the large scale of naval actions, 
and the air defence identification zone, and so on. In this way, Japan feels its national 
interests are threatened, and as a result adjusts its foreign policies towards a stronger 
defence, which could lead to confrontation. Or, put another way, the relationship could be 
damaged due to a lack of Chinese transparency of intent, from the Japanese perspective. 
These two issues are what could lead to distrust, in theoretical discussions.  
 
Compared to the “point to point” approach to understanding Sino-Japanese relations, it 
might be more suitable to use the “snowball effect” to describe the influences on the 
accumulation of distrust. With long-term negative impact from key problem areas of 
clear information and uncertainty, distrust could be deepened, and therefore give rise to 
negative impacts on bilateral relations. The significance of trust/distrust is that it can 
explain the influence of the “independent incidents” on the “whole field” of bilateral 
relations. For example, it would be reasonable to understand the purchase of the 
Senkaku/Diaoyu islands by the Japanese government, in order to deal with the growing 
pressure of China’s naval activity in nearby waters. However, it would be problematic to 
directly interpret the quest for collective defence as a result of a collision incident near 
the islands. Therefore, it might be more reasonable to introduce the notion of continually 
growing distrust, resulting from the incidents, and as a source of negative interactions in 
respective foreign policies. In this way, trust/distrust acts as a credibility of 
trustworthiness of an actor in its relationship with the other. 
 
91 
 
On the other hand, one could debate the understanding of certain regional strategic issues. 
For example, it is doubtful whether the rise of China could inevitably lead to China being 
the challenger of current orders and then cause potential conflicts. However, there are 
different opinions that, first, the regional order and overall situation have not experienced 
dramatic changes. Second, in terms of Sino-Japanese relations, “whether China has 
already overturned the regional orders” might not be the only decisive factor. Since Japan 
tends to believe that there is the possibility for China to act in a way to challenge the 
status quo, distrust and policies reflecting this distrust would be devised, therefore 
affecting the bilateral relations. That is, distrust could be enough to lead to changes in 
foreign policy affecting international relations. In this way, it must be emphasised that 
Sino-Japanese relations should be understood through a comprehensive and dynamic 
perspective, instead of focusing just on results and outcomes. 
 
Though China consistently declares its development strategy a “peaceful rise”, in the 21st 
century many scholars, such as Zheng Bijian (2005), argue that there have always been 
worries from Japan of the potential “threat” of a stronger China. Offensive Realism 
would also suggest a possible future of Chinese expansion after its rise (Mearsheimer, 
2001; 2006). Japan’s concerns are about China’s strategic goals and military expansion, 
rather than its economic boom which actually offers Japan more opportunities—the 
co-existence of potential cooperation and risk (Hughes, 2009; Heng, 2007) would 
determine the attitude of trust/distrust. Huang Dahui indicates that Japan’s China policy 
in the post-Cold War era is linked to China’s “political, economic and social stability”, 
while being vigilant of the “military threat” (Huang, 2000, p.58). The asymmetry 
between the growth of China and Japan’s calls for more transparency has generated 
mistrust in the policy-making procedures. Meanwhile, as the U.S. pivots back to Asia, 
and strengthens its alliance with Japan, an emerging struggle might appear in the regional 
security and strategy situations. (Wu X., 2000; Soeya, Wang, & Welch, 2003; Davis, 
1997)  
 
The grand strategies and security concerns are more complex than the debates of the 
“paper based” history issues. The general situation is that both states have been the 
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economic, political and military giants in the East Asian region, so they could possibly 
compete for regional leadership (NABERS, 2010; Morrison & Petri, 2008). Scholars 
debate the importance that each actor has for the other, in terms of geopolitics and 
population, economic ties and geographic distance; and even with the Soviet threat 
during the 1970s and 1980s, both Japan and China never neglected the existence of the 
other (Iklé & Nakanishi, 1990). The feelings towards each other are quite complicated, 
due to the coexistence of deep interdependence and growing potential threats. As Masaru 
Tamamoto (2005/2006) argues, Japan can see “two Chinas” (Tamamoto, 2006, p.55): it 
can benefit from economic relations, while security relations are an evident concern or 
threat from “another” China. To a large extent, the foreign policies of the two countries 
are affected or even shaped by each other’s, especially with regards to security and grand 
strategies (Heng, 2007; Harris, 1997). 
 
The territorial disputes 
The Sino-Japanese territorial disputes—mainly regarding maritime disputes (Lee J.-H., 
2013)—connect to historical legacies, and mistrust over security and strategy. Issues such 
as the Diaoyu/Senkaku Islands have been left unsettled since the end of World War II, 
and they have gained new backgrounds as the competition over resources between China 
and Japan has grown fiercer in the East China Sea. As M. Taylor Fravel (2010) argued, 
there are “four reasons help explain the absence of violent conflict in the Senkaku dispute 
since 1972: deterrence, de facto control, regional rivalry, and active dispute management.” 
(Fravel, 2010, p.150) However, both sides’ efforts to control the disputes might have 
been ruined due to new strategies, such as the normalization of the islands by Japan, and 
the Chinese government’s indulgence of domestic nationalism. In terms of international 
relations theories, Yee Andy (2011) would suggests, “Never in the course of history have 
China and Japan both emerged as major geopolitical players at the same time. This power 
balance is one characterised by uncertainty and mistrust.” (Yee, 2011, p.188) As the two 
states have avoided settling the territorial disputes, which are difficult to resolve due to 
strategic considerations, the Diaoyu/Senkaku and other similar problems in the East 
China Sea will continue to be sources of mistrust between China and Japan. 
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The security concern  
According to Jian Yang (in Heazle, 2007), Japan has been China’s major security 
concern instead of the Soviet Union since the end of the Cold War, while the rise of 
China has left Japan with a security dilemma (Jain, 2009; Lee , 1997). Japan’s military 
power, the existence of the U.S.-Japan alliance, and the Taiwan Issue are the main 
reasons for increased distrust from China (Wang J., 2011; Wu J., 2005; Roy, 2004) of 
Japan, which might seek “full military freedom” as a result (Chang, 2009, p.49). Scholars 
have observed the dilemma for China, that the strengthening of the US-Japan alliance 
troubles China in terms of comparative power; but on the other hand, a US absence could 
lead to the remilitarization of Japan (Wasi, 2001)—therefore, distrust may be an 
inevitable result from the Chinese perspective. China’s naval build-up has the potential to 
challenge the regional order from the Japanese perspective (Wiegand, 2008; Kaplan, 
2010). Though, as Austin and Harris argue, “in recent years, neither Japan nor China has 
felt directly threatened by the other despite Japan’s technological superiority in 
conventional arms and China’s efforts at military modernization” (Austin & Harris, 1999, 
p.117). Both states cannot pay any less attention to the other’s potential security threat. 
Conflicts might result from China’s strategy of development with national security, and 
Japan’s expanding need to become a major political power. China is more concerned with 
the enhancement of the U.S. role in the East Asia, and Japan is worried about the rise of 
China—that is a source of mutual distrust between the two states. 
 
According to Japan’s security strategy toward China – Integration, Balancing, and 
Deterrence in the Era of Power Shift by the Tokyo Foundation (2011):6 
 
“Japan’s security strategy toward China must be based on an assessment of the 
dynamism of China’s changing status in the power distribution in the Asia-Pacific, 
China’s approach and strategy for Asian security order, and how much Japan, the 
US-Japan alliance, and other regional partners can shape the strategic choice of 
China.”7 
                                                 
6 See http://www.tokyofoundation.org/en/additional_info/security_strategy_toward_china.pdf, accessed 16/05/2013 
7 Ibid, p.5 
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It would not be surprising if Japan doubted China’s concept of peaceful rise. Therefore, a 
contradiction exists in Sino-Japanese security relations: Japan distrusts China for a lack 
of transparency regarding its security strategy, while China distrusts Japan for its 
transparent strategy to bring the U.S. into the regional game as a deterrent against China. 
 
3.4.3 Historical legacies in this era 
The literature has recognised the moral interactions between Japan and China as a crucial 
issue and direct cause of some disputes. Hence, the problems of history, ideology, 
nationalism and values have received considerable discussion among scholars. Taking the 
historical disputes as the example, some literature identified that the gap between China’s 
historical vigilance and Japan’s rising historical revisionism is a source of confrontation. 
This is a reasonable assumption, and verifies the assumptions of this research of the 
influences of mutual distrust on interstate relations.  
 
Originally, the historical disputes between China and Japan were comprised of different 
interpretations of the Second World War, which emerged as a problem in Sino-Japanese 
relations after normalization. The essence of the historical battles might have dozens of 
reasons.. Caroline Rose (1998 & 2005), Laura Newby (1988) and Lu Yi (2002) indicate 
clearly the gap between China’s historical vigilance and Japan’s rising historical 
revisionism, which can be seen in a number of different cases. In other words, there are 
arguments that history is used as a tool, such as the claim that “history has remained 
surprisingly effective keeping the Japanese psychologically intimidated and politically 
subordinate” (Horner, 1996/97, p.28). Despite the different understandings of the essence 
of history, it remains an inevitable issue between Japan and China, which could lead to 
mistrust and therefore cause regional instability (Kim, 2008; Berger, 2000; Christensen, 
1999; Kristof, 1998). 
 
It is not surprising that China and Japan are still trapped by historical disputes. Since the 
beginning of the 21st Century, there have been new manifestations of the issue on 
textbook controversies, territorial disputes over the Diaoyu/Senkaku Islands and East 
95 
 
China Sea, Yasukuni Shrine, and the Nanjing Massacre. Moreover, as James Reilly (2012) 
suggests, the growth of Chinese civil society and public opinion towards Japan beyond 
the traditional control of the government will bring new elements into the Sino-Japanese 
mutual policy-making arena. There has been stronger negative public opinion towards 
each other in both China and Japan, which will affect intergovernmental activities and 
diplomatic measures to resolve disputes. If not well settled, future Sino-Japanese trust 
and maybe the overall relationship will confront difficulties, and a “rivalry” might seen in 
a predictable future. 
 
The Textbook Issue 
Regarding the history of war in the region, scholars have indicated the significance of 
historical memory in China and other East Asian countries (Fukuoka, 2011; Ducke, 2002; 
Lind, 2009; Rose, 1998; Nozaki, 2005). This leads to related issues in other fields, 
including education. The education of a country is not supposed to be a serious problem 
in a relationship with another state, as it is an internal affair of a sovereign state. However, 
textbooks about history are different, as they are symbols of how a state interprets history 
and even its attitudes towards other states. Due to different positions and different 
national interests in history, states probably develop diverse interpretations and 
conclusions of historical events, even when they view the same period of time objectively. 
Hence, it could possibly reflect and lead to the level of reconciliation or even distrust 
between countries, which can been observed in the protests in China and South Korea of 
Japan during the 2000s (Wang Z., 2009).  
 
The general cause of the Textbook Issue was the modification of some Japanese history 
textbooks, which replaced words such as “aggression against China” with comparatively 
neutral ones such as “advance into China”. The Textbook Issue between China and Japan 
has at least twice caused larger problems in the bilateral relationship, in 1982 and 2005, 
after normalization. One undeniable fact in the post-war period is that the need for 
relinquishing the moral burden of the war did indeed exist, which included not only 
demands from right-wing politicians but also many of the Japanese people. Due to the 
extreme sensitivity and importance of history education, which affects the views of 
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generations of history and long-term international relations between states, the issue of 
textbooks soon attracted the attentions of other Asian states, including China. In the 
Chinese government’s view, if the compilation of the history textbook could be explained 
as freedom of speech and publishing under the influence of right-wing politicians, then 
the acquiescence of Japan’s Education Ministry would suggest a Japanese attitude, maybe 
even governmental strategy on the “prettification of war”. There would be a trust problem 
between Japan and China, as Japan could appear not to have apologised enough for the 
invasions during the war. However, there are other aspects to consider in the Textbook 
Issue than just what Chinese government claims in public. Hidenori Ijiri (in Howe, 1996) 
took the 1982 Textbook Issue as an example to analyse the actions of the Chinese 
government. In his argument, Ijiri connects the Textbook Issue with “China’s view on 
world order”, using the points of Nakajima Mineo (1982): 
 
“In his view, the ‘revival of Japanese militarism’ is a code-word for the Chinese 
leadership which needs to make Japan a ‘scapegoat’ when making a dramatic change 
of stance in its foreign policy: when China shifts her strategy from a close 
relationship with western countries to closer relations with the Soviet Union, it is 
necessary for China to open criticism against the ‘imperialism’ or ‘militarism’ of 
western nations (such as Japan) in order to educate and persuade the people within 
the country.” (Howe, 1996, p.68) 
 
One way to understand the Textbook Issue and other disputes is their relation to 
“nationalism”, rather than purely being different interpretations of history, which the 
governments can use as tools to achieve other goals – for example, in domestic politics. 
Caroline Rose (1998) largely agrees with the role of nationalism in the Textbook Issue, 
claiming that, “by placing it (the Textbook Issue) in the boarder context of general 
‘ideological’ and political trends in China and Japan, then the actions and reactions of 
both governments and people are better understood” (Rose, 1998, p.79). The key element 
that leads to the Textbook Issue is likely the growing nationalism in both China and 
Japan, together with their rising national power. Yet this consideration cannot fully 
explain why the Textbook Issue still exists more than 20 years after the issue first arose, 
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and it may overstate the Chinese government’s power to control public opinion. China 
now has few reasons to subjectively worsen its relations with Japan: the regime’s 
governance is quite stable, the economy is much better compared to most states in the 
world, the socio-economic ties with Japan are fairly important, and there are no global 
political or ideological camps that China must choose to side with. 
 
However, the essence of the issue might not be that simple. As Rose (1998) argues, “the 
Textbook Issue in fact raises many questions which cannot be explained merely in terms 
of a gap in historical interpretation” (Rose, 1998, p.20). It has not changed that the 
Chinese government continually calls for treating history as “a mirror for the future”, 
which seems to be less aggressive. Even if the governments try to control the dispute 
within a certain scope, things would not easily follow the “strategic concern”. Claudia 
Schneider (2008), citing Reilly (2006), argues that, 
 
“This even concerns authoritarian China, where the state no longer holds a complete 
definitional monopoly on many historical narratives. Apart from relying on 
anti-Japanese sentiments for its own legitimization, it cannot entirely ignore—or 
suppress—‘popular will’ in history-related affairs, and populist ‘history activism’ has 
turned into a force that can mobilize popular resentments and potentially exacerbate 
bilateral relations (Reilly 2006).” (Schneider, 2008, p.112)  
 
No matter whether the Textbook Issue is that simple or not, the issue itself is a serious, 
hidden danger in the bilateral relationship. Japan’s intentions to change the post-war 
mood might be connected with a revival of militarism, in China interpretation. As China 
is growing into a strong power in this region, it becomes ever-more dissatisfied with the 
non-apologist attitude of Japan. Because the Cold War prevented the states from properly 
reconciling, it was possible that both China and Japan would see themselves as victims 
and leave the controversies unsettled. At the intergovernmental level, the two states are 
paranoid about the other. Japan distrusts China, because it thinks China is playing the 
history card to take advantage of Japan. On the other hand, China is angry with Japan, 
because Japan’s attitude to history is quite different from “the direction of the German 
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model of teaching national introspection and learning from past mistakes” (Schneider, 
2008, p.118). It is worth noting that Japan is also dissatisfied with China’s “anti-Japanese” 
education, which makes the education issue a bilateral problem. Meanwhile, public 
opinion could deteriorate due to the influence of the media and propaganda. The textbook 
controversy is one of the elements that leads to, or enhances mutual mistrust between the 
two states. 
 
The Yasukuni Shrine issue 
What makes the Yasukuni Shrine an extremely sensitive issue is that it enshrines Japan’s 
war-dead, including class-A war criminals from World War Two. Moreover, the Japanese 
Emperor, prime ministers and other Cabinet members have visited the Shrine—not 
privately, but in their political capacities. The visits to Yasukuni Shrine obviously ignite 
anger in China. Besides the official and diplomatic actions regarding the Textbook Issue, 
the Yasukuni case has caused large-scale demonstrations and protests by Chinese 
students and citizens. Ijiri (in Howe, 1996) indicates that “the student demonstrations this 
time were distinct from the anti-Japanese campaign officially made by the Chinese 
Government” (Howe, 1996, p.71). It should be understood that the Yasukuni Issue is not 
only a concerns between governments, but also a challenge to the trust in civil society, 
which means the governments have to control the protests. The negative effects of the 
visits to the Yasukuni Shrine by Japanese government officials have been discussed by 
researchers. The Prime Ministers’ visits to Yasukuni Shrine, especially on 15 August 
every year—the anniversary of Japan’s surrender in World War II—evidently changed 
the bilateral interactions into a pattern of confrontation. Lu Yi (2002) points out the 
contradiction between the Japanese claim of paying homage to the souls of the dead, and 
Chinese anger towards the “Japanese Devils”. Wan (2006) analysed the annual visits of 
former Prime Minister Koizumi and identifies both sides position thus: 
 
“Koizumi’s annual visits to the Yasukuni Shrine have challenged what the Chinese 
government considers to be the core political understanding between the two nations, 
namely, that the Japanese should acknowledge what their nation did to the Chinese 
people before and during World War II; without such an acknowledgement, China 
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believes, it is virtually impossible for Chinese to trust Japan. By contrast, Koizumi 
represents the postwar generation, which believes that the war ended a long time ago 
and that the two nations cannot be friends if the Chinese keep raising the history 
issue.” (Wan, 2006, p.260) 
 
How the two cultures treat the dead are quite different, which might lead to serious 
misunderstandings in disputes, especially the Yasukuni Shrine Issue. Kang Youjin (2009) 
indicates that Japanese culture accepts the Western idea of “death settles all scores”, and 
the dead are not guilty; meanwhile, Chinese culture believes that the dead are guilty for 
crimes committed in life. This is a problem that cannot be easily solved, as the values are 
divergent. It could also be argued that the interpretation of culture serves political goals, 
the gap between understandings is undeniable. Though there have been suggestions that 
the Japanese government could move the tablets of the class-A war criminals out of the 
Yasukuni Shrine, to appease the complaints from China and Korea, no effective action on 
this draft proposal has been adopted until recently. 
 
In terms of historical disputes, there are two patterns of problems which might worsen the 
trust crisis between China and Japan. The first is the basic attitudes on recognition of 
historical facts. From the Chinese viewpoint, Japan’s apologies about the war apparently 
infuriate China; while Japan believe they have done enough to take responsibility, which 
might be closely connected with Japanese nationalism and possibly US influence (Selden, 
2008). The other pattern could be described as “taking advantage of” historical issues. 
Japan believes that China utilizes historical disputes to play the history card, while China 
is concerned about Japan’s intensions on education by including fewer memories of the 
war for younger generations. If the disputes could be settled properly, the trust crisis 
might be resolved. Yet, the two states’ worries lead them to distrust each other, which 
forms one of the most important and serious dangers for the bilateral relations. 
 
“Nanjing Massacre” 
As with the Textbook Issue, the “Nanjing Massacre” is one of the historical legacies of 
Sino-Japanese war. However, the disputes over Nanjing go much beyond the 
100 
 
“interpretation” of history, and are more about whether the massacre actually happened 
or not. The dispute over the Nanjing Issue, as Yoshida Takashi (2006) argues, can be 
described thus:  
 
“It is apparent that tens of thousands of Chinese were killed during and after the 
battle of Nanjing. Why, then, do revisionists continue to deny the massacre the status 
of a historical fact? They tend to believe that Imperial Japan and its history have been 
unfairly demonized in the postwar period and that post-war history education has 
deprived Japanese youth of national pride. The Nanjing Massacre has been taught as 
one of the symbols of Japan’s wartime evil in post-war Japan, and revisionists, 
responding to an impulse that they look upon as patriotic pride, feel obliged to 
liberate the Japanese from the illusion fabricated after the end of the war.” (Takashi, 
2006, p.180) 
 
There are different voices inside Japan concerning the “Nanjing Massacre”, or “Nanjing 
Incident”. However, both the ambiguous attitude of the Japanese government and the 
total denial of the massacre are in opposition to the Chinese government’s insistence that 
approximately 300,000 victims were killed in Nanjing.  
 
Unlike the issue with the history textbooks, declarations on the Nanjing Massace by 
Japanese politicians, for example Shintaro Ishihara and Takashi Kawamura, have a strong 
“official” colour. What increases China’s mistrust of Japan is that more Japanese 
politicians get involved in the disputes, which could present a more serious political 
problem between the two states. A very recent case, in 2012, showed the frustration in 
Sino-Japanese relations, on the 30-year anniversary of normalisation. The mayor of 
Nagoya, the sister city of Nanjing, Takashi Kawamura openly denied the Nanjing 
Massacre in a meeting with the visiting government officials from Nanjing. Then, a series 
of activities to celebrate the 30-year anniversary were cancelled or postponed, and a 
period of tough tensions in bilateral relations began.  
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3.4.4 Nationalism in the 21st century 
It is clear that nationalism is on the rise in Japan and China, because both “want to play a 
larger role in world councils” (Harris, 1997, p.144). Che-po Chan and Brian Bridges 
(2006) define the nationalism between the two countries as “reactive nationalism”, 
although “both peoples see each other as expressing assertive nationalism” (Chan & 
Bridges, 2006, p.130). The role nationalism plays is extremely crucial in Sino-Japanese 
relations, and attracts ever-more attention. Nationalism can be seen as an ostensible cause 
for a series of disputes.  
 
China’s nationalism 
There is a fundamental argument about the background to China’s nationalism against 
Japan: that the legitimacy of the CCP government is constructed on its former “role as the 
stalwart defender of national interests during the war with Japan” (Calder, 2006, p.133). 
For the Chinese, the aim of nationalism is “to clear humiliation” (Chan & Bridges, 2006, 
p.135), or “nation building” and the “attainment of great power status” (Bhattacharya, 
2007). However, as Daqing Yang (in Marie Söderberg, 2001) and Jian Zhang (in Michael 
Heazle, 2007) indicate, there is a possibility that the Chinese government would use 
“state-led nationalism” (Heazle & Knight, 2007, p.23) to achieve its goals. As Jian Zhang 
explains: “the fact that the Chinese government has been actively promoting nationalism 
is undisputed”, nationalism might be regarded to be used to either take advantage of 
Japan or “largely as part of patriotic education for domestic consumption” (Söderberg, 
2001, p.16). In terms of domestic politics, many critics might argue that consolidating 
legitimacy is the real goal of the Chinese government, or more likely the Chinese 
Communist Party. However, while admitting the existence of impure nationalism, it is 
still quite doubtful that China—a state which highly values the social stability—would 
risk losing control of nationalism. Scholars such as Austin and Harris (1999) have also 
observed that, while the Chinese government has “generally tried to control expressions 
of anti-Japanese feelings, it has not always found this totally feasible.” (Austin & Harris, 
1999, p.62) In this way, Japan’s concern over China’s history card is reasonable, but not 
feasible due to the facts and realities of today’s China. However, despite the deep roots of 
nationalism in China, foreign policy would be significantly affected by and also reflect 
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nationalism (Shih, 1995). Hence, stronger nationalism against Japan would be regarded 
as being accompanied by distrust. 
 
Japan’s new nationalism 
Despite China’s possible use of the “history card”, nationalism or patriotism also exists in 
Japan’s post war period—not only inside the “right wing”, but it is also becoming more 
widespread (Matthews, 2003; Penney & Wakefield, 2008/2009). The change in Japan, 
led by the Liberal Democratic Party, has garnered much more attention. Caroline Rose 
(2005), citing Tawara (2001), summarized the patterns of Japanese nationalism: 
 
“The summary had four main points: that the Greater East Asia War (GEAW) was 
one of the self-defence and liberation; that the Nanjing Massacre and stories about 
comfort women were fabrications; that a new textbook battle was necessary in light 
of the emphasis on damage and invasion in recent textbooks; and that a national 
movement was needed to disseminate the historical view put forward in the first two 
points (Tawara 2001: 50-1)” (Rose, 2005, p.53). 
 
Japanese nationalism, different from the Chinese version, could be described as “being 
driven by a desire to preserve its pride as a powerful nation in the global system” (Chan 
& Bridges, 2006, p.136), and might have a roots in Japan’s culture and also the Shinto 
religion (Wu J. , 2005). The “Neo-Nationalism”, as described by Mori Kazuko (2007), 
was initiated in the post-war era in the minds of Japanese, and hoped to turn Japan into a 
normal state in international politics. However, it might turn to revisionism in many cases 
that are offensive to the Chinese. Japan greatly desires to move beyond the memory of 
war, however, as Kazuko argues, the post war era will not come to an end without “a 
minimum degree of consensus of War and responsibility” (Mori , 2007, p.63). The reason 
why China distrusts Japan about historical issues is the lack of responsibility 
demonstrated by Japan’s post-war generations. What Masaru Tamamoto (2005/2006) 
suggests is the confrontation, shown as the controversy between Japan’s search for a new 
identity and normal statehood, and China’s worry about the revival of Japanese 
nationalism. 
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3.5 Conclusion  
Considering the ongoing academic discussions of Sino-Japanese relations, and especially 
their positive/negative interactions, there is an inevitable challenge for a literature review 
on how to bring particulars into the research. The literature review tries to examine 
whether the existing literature provides evidence to explain the significance of 
trust/distrust in Sino-Japanese relations. Since the different incidents/disputes in 
Sino-Japanese relations will always draw the attention of scholars, it is highly likely that 
the discussions would be based on the certain issues. 
 
Moreover, the Sino-Japanese relationship in different periods has been closely linked to 
the characteristics of the conditions in the international politics. Hence, the literature 
might have offer different topics and judgements on bilateral relations, considering 
internal and external factors. In terms of the mutual trust between the two states—which 
began from scratch after normalization—it has been declining for decades. However, the 
emergence of the trust crisis was not only the result of negative political interactions, but 
also a fundamental question of whether there has ever been trust between the two states. 
Some literature has argued that it was the end of the Cold War and the rise of China in 
the 1990s and early 21st century that ruined the positive political relationship and mutual 
trust after 1972. It has also been argued that the “trust” after normalization was actually 
fake—politically manufactured without a basis of reconciliation—and only achieved in 
order to deal with common strategic and security goals. The crisis would arise, without 
external threats, in the post-Cold War era. Even though China and Japan have tried to 
build trust and enhance mutual understandings – through joint research on historical 
issues and intergovernmental activities – long-term reconciliation has not been in sight. 
As competition grows fiercer, there are more obstacles for the two states to clear to 
achieve a relationship characterised by trust.  
 
The existing literature discusses the important elements affecting the bilateral relationship, 
and frequently mentions the word “mistrust” in different cases. However, the logic of the 
literature might be different from this research in terms of the formation of positive and 
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negative bilateral relations. It is understandable that the literature would pick a hot spot in 
Sino-Japanese relations to analyse for its origins and impact. Or, it can go the other way, 
by identifying a period of bilateral relations with certain characteristics and then analyse 
its roots. In this way, the literature can build a connection between the overall 
relationship and independent influencing factors and determinants between China and 
Japan.  
 
It is reasonable that certain issues would be regarded as the sources of improvement and 
deterioration in Sino-Japanese relations. However, several decades have witnessed the 
dynamic status of bilateral relations, with hidden risks and problems that might be hard to 
explain by merely listing the “incidents”. For example, military growth might lead to 
worsened bilateral military relations. However, whether the postponement of the events 
for the 40th anniversary was the direct result of potential military confrontation would 
need further analysis—at least the two countries did not conduct actions that directly 
damaged the ceremony. This research does not deny the contributions of the existing 
literature, but values them for another approach, by introducing the notion of trust as a 
critical supplement. It is possible that the status of trust/distrust could be adopted to help 
explain the contradictions between the two countries, and why disputes have not been 
fundamentally resolved in the past, and how growing mutual distrust could lead to the 
emergence of deepening strategic and moral confrontations. 
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Chapter 4: Determinants of trust and distrust in 
Sino-Japanese relations 
 
4.1 Particular characteristics in Sino-Japanese relations 
Beyond studying the impact of trust and distrust on international relations in relation to 
IR theories, a series of factors on the current state of reality should be taken into 
consideration. The particulars of Sino-Japanese relations are to a great extent crucial to 
trust and distrust. Due to a variety of factors, the issues of trust between China and Japan 
differ from those of other states. It is crucial to ascertain why the problems in bilateral 
relations are so difficult to address, by interpreting the particulars brought by the two 
countries. 
 
The significance of the study of the particular characteristics is its contribution to the 
understanding of why certain fields of issues are worthy of being studied. These 
characteristics have close connections with the bilateral relationship, as well as the 
mutual trust/distrust between China and Japan. It has been discussed how trust/distrust 
play their roles in affecting interstate relations. Hence, it is necessary to understand how 
the theoretical framework can be applied in specific cases in Sino-Japanese relations. The 
political culture, tradition and the special conditions between the two countries greatly 
affects the policies towards each other. Therefore, the task of connecting these factors is 
crucial for assessing the assumptions and hypothesis about the structure of asymmetric 
distrust. In conclusion, the determinants and how they work in Sino-Japanese relations 
will provide a methodological supplement to why certain cases are selected and why 
these cases are analysed in certain ways, including taking a look at governmental 
documents and public opinion. 
 
4.1.1 Particularities brought by China 
The domestic political traditions and political culture of China have always been one of 
the origins of diversity in international society. Peter Gries has indicated that “Chinese 
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national identity evolves in dynamic relationship with other nations and the past.” (Gries, 
2004, p.19) It has been argued that factors such as “long history”, “Han people”, 
“Chinese empire”, “language”, “philosophy”, and other kinds of everyday culture 
(Meissner, 2006) have shaped the common feelings for the Chinese. Developed over 
thousands of years, combined with the capitalist and communist revolutions, a unique 
political entity has been created. In terms of historical concepts, the leadership of the 
Empire will always regard China as the “Celestial Empire” and the “Central Kingdom”, 
which is generally the national identity of the country, which even affects the 
neo-nationalism in China seeking international prestige today (He, 2009). Based on the 
strongest national power and most advanced ancient culture, a tributary system around 
China was established in the East Asia. Neighbouring small countries wanted the 
recognition and protection of the Chinese government, as well as the advanced 
technologies, which they acquired through the tributary system (Wan, 2006) Even though 
Japan was not a vassal state of China, it also could not totally break with the system, so 
interactions between the two states initially motivated Japan to send envoys and students 
to China. However, sudden changes occurred in the mid-19th century, with the rise of the 
Western states, and the decline of China gradually ruined the system and the traditional 
acknowledgement of China. The pain of the Chinese people, caused by invasion, 
especially felt by the elites and leadership, and the “one hundred years of humiliation” 
(Callahan, 2004; Wang, 2008) has become the nationalism which informs foreign policy.  
 
Callahan’s   research significantly points to the special feature of Chinese perspective 
on international relations  within the notion of being The Pessoptimist Nation (Callahan, 
2012). The word  pessoptimist conveys the ambiguous characteristics of China for even  
now, although China has made great achievements in nation building especially on 
economy, the country and its people still have a mixed feeling  about themselves. On 
one hand, they are optimistic on their revival as a strong state. On the other hand, they 
lack the sense of confidence and safety, fearing to be beaten or ignored or even 
un-recognised at the same time. China always reminds itself of past humiliation  when 
there were many countries which brought the humiliation to China and Japan is the most 
special and prominent one among these. What could not be tolerated was that Japan, 
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historically the weaker neighbour, could become the powerful enemy that almost beat 
China. This type of psychological impact of history has come to affect every aspect in 
Chinese domestic and international politics, especially considering the fact that China is 
not regarded as upholding a different ideology and values to many Western countries 
(Pang, 2004). 
 
For the current status of Chinese politics, the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) plays an 
important role. The CCP’s source of legitimacy is quite different from that of modern 
democracies and highly institutionalized states – elections. It could be argued that the 
legitimacy of the CCP is based on governmental performance, and the two political 
sources of nationalism and stability led by the CCP (Downs & Saunders, 1998-1999; 
Hwang & Schneider, 2011; Schoenhals, 1999; Cai , 2008; Chu, 2013; Esteban, 2006). 
One of the most important commitments is to avoid invasion and bully by other states, 
just as Mao Zedong declared in Tiananmen Square: “the Chinese people has stood up”. 
The territorial disputes and issues of dignity are great concerns of even the common 
citizens of China, so no failures by the CCP are accepted when dealing with other states 
over these problems, and especially with Japan. With the growth of social media and 
networks, deepening emotions might be decisive for Chinese foreign policy in the future. 
Therefore, the Chinese government has to be tough on and vigilant of Japan before the 
disputes are settled. 
 
4.1.2 Particularities brought by Japan 
For the Japanese, even though Japan has gradually turned to the West and accepted a 
series of modern Western ideologies and institutions – including democracy, a multiparty 
system and capitalism – a basic Asian view of politics still exists in its political values, 
and historical legacies affect Japanese politics in different ways from China. As the 
vanquished of the World War II, Japan was once occupied by the US. Meanwhile, with 
the restrictions of the ‘peaceful constitution’, Japan almost lost the majority of its military 
forces, and was banned from launching wars. Therefore, Japan is actually a non-normal 
state, which relies on the US-Japan alliance – a fundamental component of Japan’s 
national security strategy and a policy premise (Green & Szechenyi, 2006; Vogel, 2002; 
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Yoda, 2006; Lee, 2014; Packard, 2010). Japan has always tried to change this situation in 
order to become a normal state, with a stronger political position and military capacity in 
accordance with its economy, population and the technology. (Soeya, Tadokoro, & 
Welch, 2011; Johnson, 1992; Inoguchi, 2003) Since the end of the Cold war, Japan has 
taken a variety of steps to achieve this goal, including applying for a permanent member 
position on the UN Security Council, sending the Self-Defence Forces overseas for 
logistical purposes in the Iraq War, and other peacekeeping actions. Also, changes in 
domestic politics, such as attempts to amend the constitution, upgrading the Self-Defence 
Forces to an army, and replacing “masochistic” views of history with the “victimhood” 
also characterise the general trend in recent years. (Bukh, 2007) As these demands to 
some extent conflict with the Chinese view of Japan’s potential for “remilitarization” 
(Arase, 2007; Hughes, 2009; McCormack, 2004; Pyle, 2007; Samuels, 2007; Tadokoro, 
2011; Tanter, 2005; Tsuchiyama, 2007; Hagström, 2014), the attempts by the Japanese 
government have been obstructed in these fields, which could be a source of Japanese 
distrust of China, as its interests could not be supported and understood. 
 
In terms of Japanese party politics, the competition between the Liber Democratic Party 
and the Democratic Party is also a factor that brings the Chinese elements into the issues. 
On the one hand, the “historical defeat” (Maeda, 2010) of the LDP, which is regarded as 
having a “conservative stream” (Jin, 2008), did not bring about an overall positive turn in 
policies towards China, as some observers had expectated. On the other hand, the 
changes in Japanese governments and Premier Ministers are comparatively frequent, 
compared to other states. However, the Prime Minister who was in office the longest 
since the beginning of the 21st century was Junichiro Koizumi, whose visits to the 
Yasukuni Shrine directly contributed to the deterioration of Sino-Japanese relations. It 
cannot be denied that there is a market for being tough towards China in Japanese foreign 
policy. Even though the connections with China cannot be severed, diplomacy might 
obey the voters and could affect the bilateral relations. One could expect that the two 
states could control the scope of diplomatic disputes, yet the long-term influences of 
tough strategies could enhance mutual distrust. 
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In general, the particulars of the two states present difficulties for the Sino-Japanese 
trust-building process. It has been the political tradition in East Asia states that problems 
and disputes between states have historical roots. Both China and Japan cannot easily 
trust each other, considering factors of policy-making and the other’s levels of 
trustworthiness. The war between the states is crucial because its legacies still influence 
opinions today. However, the war cannot be the only determinant, because the military 
confrontations and conflicts between China and the US in the Korea War, and Japan and 
the US in the World War II did not give rise to such long-term distrust and anti-American, 
anti-Chinese, or anti-Japanese sentiments between these states. Based on the “unsettled 
historical disputes”, “failure in reconciliation on both governmental and social levels”, as 
well as factors of domestic political culture, party politics and legitimacy, the two states 
have not reached a level of mutual trust even of the France-Germany or Japan-US 
relationships. Compared to other interstate relations, Sino-Japanese mutual trust seems to 
be more difficult to achieve. 
 
4.2 The determinants of trust and distrust  
It could be argued that there are two approaches in which trust can have an impact on 
international relations. One, it could play a direct role at the governmental level to affect 
relationships with other states as the important reference of foreign policy making 
process. Meanwhile, trust at the civic level is influenced by international relations and 
becomes a considerable factor in governmental policy-making as public opinion. Trust 
could be seen as a kind of capital, or credit in a relationship between states. Rathbun 
claims that it is “a resource of individuals, groups or societies that serves to promote 
more optimal levels of cooperation that leave all better off” (Rathbun, 2012, p.26). The 
process of generating trust between states is actually dynamic. More trust would be 
generated if the actions of one state correspond with the expectations and confidence of 
another state. On the contrary, if one state’s national interests are harmed by these actions, 
the incident would not only call into question the trustworthiness of the other state, but 
also accumulate as empirical evidence that would have a negative impact on future 
judgements. Under these two circumstances, a bilateral relationship could diverge 
significantly. In a situation with comparatively high levels of mutual trust, it would be 
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easier to conduct positive and cooperative activities between states, which could be a 
symbol of positive bilateral relations. As mentioned above, when there is a comparatively 
better status of trust, countries will spend less on preparing for potential danger from the 
other actor. States would be more focused on protecting their interests and even more 
aggressive with lower levels of trust towards others, due to fears brought about by a lack 
of information and confidence. Therefore, the foreign policies of governments indeed 
have become an intermediary for transferring trust in international relations, and policies 
could change based on whether one state trusts (strategically or morally) another, and the 
confidence it has of others. To conclude, the following determinants can’t be ignored, as 
they are the most common in the bilateral relationship, which can also affect the method 
of trust.  
 
4.2.1 The making of foreign policies of China and Japan 
To understand the foreign policies of the two states and the impacts that trust and distrust 
have on them, two breakthrough points should be identified. The first is what are the 
contents of the foreign policies of the two states towards each other, and how trust or 
distrust can affect them at the micro level. The second is the way in which the foreign 
policies are produced, and how the process is influenced by trust. 
 
The contents of foreign policies of the two states 
In terms of China’s foreign policy, Robert G. Sutter (2012) suggests that scholars have 
different opinions on whether China has a firm strategy in current foreign policy. 
However, even though there are arguments over whether a clear strategy exists, it can be 
observed through actions and statements that the Chinese government has several 
priorities. Thomas Christensen (2001) “summed up China’s strategic goals along lines 
widely accepted by other particularities and commentators to include (1) regime security; 
(2) preserving territorial integrity; and (3) gaining prestige, power, and respect on the 
international stage.” (Sutter, 2012) Wu Xinbo also identified “four contradictions 
constraining China’s foreign policy behaviour (which are) a great power and a poor 
country, ‘open-door’ incentive and sovereignty concerns, principle and pragmatism, and 
bilateralism and multilateralism” (Wu, 2004). These could be regarded as China’s core 
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interests even without detailed explanation from official channels. The three points that 
Sutter raises are actually interconnected. The guarantee of regime security includes not 
only traditional national security, but also domestic legitimacy, which has been already 
been mentioned. It would, to a certain extent, come from the performance of the 
government on the other two core interests.  
 
With the common threat of the Soviet Union, China and Japan could locate the source of 
regional danger on the Soviet Union, as opposed to each other. After the collapse of the 
USSR, Japan became the main threat to China in the region, and vice versa. Even though 
Japan has been restricted from developing its military since the end of World War II, 
China still distrusts Japan due to the potential revival of Japanese militarism, and Japan’s 
strategic support from the United States. The shift from trust to distrust, or the change in 
level of trust between China and Japan, could be seen during these different eras. 
 
“Thus, though Chinese elite and popular opinion often showed angst over alleged 
Japanese militarism, Chinese leaders generally supported Japan’s military efforts to 
offset Soviet power in eastern Asia. Beijing also generally supported a strong 
US-Japan security relationship aimed at countering the Soviet Union.” (Sutter, 2012, 
p.182) 
 
The status and the policy orientations differ greatly from those of today. China’s 
increasing worry of Japan is rooted not only in the changes to strategic status, but also the 
intensification of nationalism. One of the most significant examples, as well as a core 
manifestation of China’s focus on territorial integrity, would be the dispute over the 
Diaoyu/Senkaku Islands. The dispute has existed for a long time, and can be dated back 
to the 19th century. However, the current outbreak of disputes as activists from mainland 
China, Hong Kong and Taiwan landed on Diaoyu/Senkaku Island in August 2012 is quite 
different from the former ones. China is of the opinion that the two states held a tacit 
agreement on these kinds of disputes to put them aside, while both the actions and 
statements of the Japanese government denied such agreements. Besides, the so-called 
right-wing politicians, such as Shintaro Ishihara, seem to get stronger support from 
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Japanese society, so the trend in Japan might be towards a more aggressive stance on 
China. Therefore, in the Chinese view regime security, international respect and Chinese 
territorial integrity could be threatened. China could forecast facing off against a more 
conservative Japan, and therefore distrust Japan’s claims of never turning back to 
militarism. As Jianwei Wang (in Takashi Inoguchi, 2002) argues, China insists on 
declaring a peaceful rise to comfort its neighbours over the “China threat”,  
 
“But China obviously does not apply the same logic to its analysis of Japan. Japan’s 
increasing military capability seems to arouse Beijing’s anxiety about Japan’s 
foreign policy intentions in the region… a peaceful country or once again a militarily 
offensive country?” (Wang J., 2002, p.110) 
 
The situation is the same when it comes to historical concerns over why Japan would be 
so eager to get rid of its history of invading China. Considering these areas of distrust, 
and also the background of growing national power, China has become tougher, 
including sending military aircrafts and naval ships to patrol the waters around the 
Diaoyu/Senkaku Islands. This could be an impact of distrust in Sino-Japanese relations, 
which is obviously negative.  
 
For Japan, as Yutaka Kawashima argues, the “key parameters of Japan’s China policy” 
include “values, nationalism and political systems, China’s posture toward the rest of the 
world, the military equation and Taiwan” (Kawashima, 2005, pp.104-107). The author 
indicates that the priority of Japanese foreign policy towards China is how it should face 
a rising China when it views China as following an “assertive foreign policy” 
(Bhattacharya, 2007; Christensen, 2011). A Sino-Japanese relationship with two strong 
nations has not been realised until recent years, with China and Japan as the 2nd and 3rd 
largest economy in the world (respectively), with comparable military force and other 
branches of national power. Under the circumstances of a strong China and weaker Japan, 
or a strong Japan with a weak China, the two states have experienced different relations, 
including friendly communications, hostility and even war. However, China and Japan do 
not have experience of dealing with co-existence when the two are both great powers in 
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the region and also worldwide. For Japan, the most practical issue it faces today is how to 
strategically survive in a system with a more powerful China. Even though Japan is a 
giant in East Asia, it would still be stressful, as its opponent is growing in every field of 
national power. Japan overall strategically distrusts China, and prefers to regard China as 
a potential threat. The sources of distrust are discussed in the other sections and chapters, 
and it can be concluded that there is a distrust of Chinese intentions with regards to its 
“peaceful rise” (Yi, 2005). With stronger economic and military forces, China could be 
on its way to expansion—that is what Japan worries about.  
 
Due to this type of distrust on strategic issues as well as the restrictions on its own 
military capacity, Japan tries to break the limits of its power to become a normal state, 
one powerful enough to counter the perceived China threat; while also seeking the 
involvement of other powers in Sino-Japanese relations, including attempts to engage 
ASEAN on the sea issues against China, as well as its most important support – the 
US-Japan alliance. The reactions based on a distrust of China are rational choices by 
Japan, which could have an impact on Sino-Japanese relations, but Japan’s actions in turn 
lead to Chinese worry and greater distrust, thereby creating a vicious cycle. Distrust plays 
such a crucial role in interstate relations, and owes much to the different interpretations 
and viewpoints of the same issues, filtered through the lens of each state’s national 
interests. It is the same in the example of the nationalization of the Diaoyu/Senkaku 
Islands by Japan: the basic concern behind the action is a worry that China treats the 
territorial issue as a starting point for the strategic expansion of its position; while from 
the Chinese perspective, the incident is a sign of the revival of Japanese militarism and a 
shift towards conservatism. When the influences expand to other fields, such as moral 
values, distrust might guide Japan to treat China’s nationalism and its attitude towards 
history as being tools for ensuring domestic stability and pursuing regional interests 
(Bhattacharya, 2007). 
 
The foreign policy making process of China and Japan 
In terms of the influences of trust and distrust on the Chinese foreign policy-making 
procedure, the role of the Chinese Communist Party is significant, and brings with it three 
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characteristics that make Chinese policy-making different to that in Western states. The 
first one is the difference in the ‘programme’ of policy making. The second is the 
complexity of the process, which includes potential factionalism. The third is a 
combination of pragmatism and flexibility in Chinese foreign policy.  
 
“The CPC is the core decision-making organization in China with the dominant 
functions of ‘framing the strategic and macro-level guidelines, principles, and 
policies on the basis of the ideology and political theories’ (Hao & Hou, 2009, 
p.s137). However, most routine decisions are made by professionals working in 
specialized sectorial government organizations.” (Paltiel , 2010, p.2)  
 
Therefore, Chinese foreign policy-making is a two-way process which is not only 
delivers information from the bottom-up, from think tanks, local officials and 
professionals, to the central government and party; but also a top-down process of 
collective command from the centre to all other departments. As Jeremy Paltiel (2010) 
argues, the government departments actually have limited impact on the policies unless 
the senior leadership gets involved in the process:  
 
“Typically, in China, reports flow up and are commented on by top leaders. The 
comments made by top leaders on reports submitted by lower levels and 
officially distributed through formal Party communications channels have a 
status similar to that of a Cabinet minute. Only those reports authorized by top 
leaders get circulated outside the departments that originated them.” (Paltiel , 
2010, p.1) 
 
It could be argued that the Chinese case is, to some extent, similar to elite politics, as 
Carol Lee Hamrin argues: “in the case of PRC, one must speak of the party-state or even 
the central leadership or specific leaders alone, as the single actor—the national authority 
structure—whose behaviour we are analysing” (Hamrin, 1994, p.79). The Chinese style 
differs from that of the Western modes of parliaments or the separation of powers, and it 
is not directly responsible to the voters (Hao & Hou, 2009). As the Chinese leadership 
115 
 
plays a determining role in the foreign policy-making process, the flexibility needed in 
order to achieve strategic goals is a possible factor for the characteristics of the leadership. 
Chih-yu Shih offered Nixon’s visit to China, and Sino-Japanese re-engagement as 
examples (Hamrin, 1994, p.138), explaining how flexibility actually has worked well in 
the history of Chinese diplomacy, which appears different from the political reality today 
between China and Japan. In this way, whether the process is scientific is debateable. 
Zhiyu Shi argues in his book that factionalism exists in the foreign policy-making process, 
though it has always been denied by China (Shi, 2000, p.177). This is reasonable, 
however, because as the largest political party in the world, and in the human history, the 
CCP has more than 800 million members. At the individual level, judgements on the 
same issues might be distinct from each other due to different restrictions. The final 
decision for a foreign policy might be the result of considering grand strategy and 
interests from different perspectives.  
 
Regardless of whether is assumed to be the result of compromise between different 
factions or not, foreign policies are a direct reflection of the national interest, which 
should be scientific for decision-makers. China is not a state concentrated on exporting 
ideology, as it was in the Mao era. However, China is still very wary of Japan, and take 
policy-precautions against Japan, which could prove the existence of broad distrust at 
both the leadership level and lower levels in the policy-making process. Specifically, the 
leadership’s distrust of Japan directly leads to negative changes in Sino-Japanese 
relations. There are diverse sources of distrust among the Chinese leadership. On the one 
hand, as the highest and direct defender of Chinese national interests, the leadership has 
to be responsible for the state; otherwise both interests and legitimacy could be harmed. 
On the other hand, in its interactions with the Japanese leadership, a series of influencing 
factors – such as the frequent changes in Japanese leadership – the incoherent Japanese 
policies related to disputes with China lead to distrust between the two countries. These 
are all reasons for the negative trends in foreign policy and bilateral relations. 
 
In Japan, there are a variety of different “schools of Japanese policy-making” (Hagström, 
2005, p.69), for example “elitist” and “pluralist”, terms used to interpret the Japanese 
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policy-making procedure. Due to its political culture, the Japanese policy-making process 
has some similarities with the Chinese process, when it comes to the crucial role of senior 
leaders and elites. In Japan, it is politicians’ families and their impacts on Japanese 
politics. Through political events such as the establishment of Sino-Japanese diplomatic 
relationship, the determining influences on foreign policy are observable. Party politics is 
also an important component of Japanese policy. Yet, the multiparty system is another 
difference from the CCP’s rule in China. Though the Liberal Democratic Party had been 
in power for a long time, it was out of office from 2009-2012. Therefore, in the foreign 
policy-making process, despite the bureaucracy of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the 
party would have to consider competing for political positions. Since the beginning of the 
21st century, the LDP has generally shown a tougher attitude towards China over disputes, 
compared to the Democratic Party which was in power from 2009-2012. In the 
environment of overall distrust of China, the ruling party has to consider the possibility of 
acceptance of its policies. After the open disputes over the Diaoyu/Senkaku Islands in 
2012, the Democratic Party-controlled Japanese government launched a project for 
nationalization of the islands under domestic pressure, such as a plan of “purchasing the 
islands” proposed by the right-wing politician Ishihara Shintaro, even if the Democratic 
Party was considered to be pro-China. Both the parties and other political groups were 
affected by distrust and worry about China over the disputes, which then led to a serious 
crisis in Sino-Japanese relations. In addition, interest groups – especially financial groups 
– also play an important role in Japanese foreign policy-making process. Sino-Japanese 
relations have been described as “politically cold and economically hot” for a long time. 
Due to considerable economic interests and investments in China, Japanese financial 
groups play a dual role of persuading the Japanese government, as well as being 
messengers to the Chinese government whenever bilateral relations meet difficulties. 
However, if their trust of Chinese government to protect their interests in China was 
shaken, the situation could change. The best example of this was in 2012, when 
large-scale demonstrations in China surprisingly turned violent, resulting in the damage 
of Japanese brands and businesses, and the investment environment in China seemed to 
become worse for Japanese enterprises. It took a long time for Japanese financial groups 
to reconsider whether or not to continue mediating under the circumstance, and their 
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enthusiasm for inhabiting this role was obviously weaker as a result of growing distrust. It could 
be concluded that all decision-makers in Japanese foreign policy, including the 
bureaucracy, parties and financial groups are influenced by the trust and distrust of China, 
and the decisions they make decide the direction of Sino-Japanese relations. 
 
4.2.2 Public opinion in the bilateral relations  
Public opinion is a direct reflection of international relations at the civic level, as well as 
a basis for policy-making and conducting interstate relations by governments. It could be 
argued that democratic states are more focused on public opinion because the 
governments care about the public and the voters. Therefore, there is still a question of 
the source of power and legitimacy. Japan is a traditional democracy, and the Japanese 
government is responsible to the voters or it would face the risk of losing office. In this 
way, the activities of the Japanese government to a great extent follow public opinion. 
The situation is not much different in China, even though it is not a democracy. If the 
Chinese government does not answer to the demands of public opinion, the 
dissatisfaction with the government, as well as the CCP would increase, especially in a 
society of transition. The Chinese government and the Party cannot risk creating trouble 
for themselves over the sensitive Japan issues, in conditions where contradictions in 
domestic issues have been dominating the daily affairs of the government. In fact, it 
might be argued that both states have certain ways to ‘guide’ or even ‘control’ their 
public’s opinion of the other. The Japanese media have a secure place in the society, so 
political opinions from different political elites, factions and groups can gain traction 
across the society via the media. Some Western commentators believe the CCP use the 
state-owned media, censorship and education to lead the public opinion to suit its own 
agenda. This is difficult to prove one way or the other, due to a lack of an effective source 
of information from the centre of government, yet while these suppositions might true to 
some extent, the influence and independence of public opinion has been underestimated.  
 
The surveys of public opinion between China and Japan are conducted annually, by 
professional agents, the media and academic institutions. The 11th Japan-China Public 
Opinion Poll, conducted by the Genron NPO (Representative Yasushi Kudo) and China 
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Daily in 2015, has clearly shown the status of public opinion between the two states. 
According to Chart 4.1,8 the public’s opinion of each other in 2015 was amongst the 
worst since 2005. Generally, the trend of public opinion follows the contemporary status 
of bilateral relations, so that between 2005 and 2006 the two states were experiencing a 
period of crisis in their relationship. It is not only a reflection of bilateral relations, but 
also a bellwether of the states’ foreign policy, which can further affect bilateral relations. 
For example, the demonstrations in China could drive the Sino-Japanese relationship into 
such a state of tension that the possible summit meeting of the two leaderships might not 
be achievable due to the demands of “domestic public opinion”.  
 
Public opinion can also highlight the real concerns about issues between the two states at 
the civic level. Charts 4.2 and 4.3 represent the reasons for negative impressions between 
the two states in 2013. Despite the confrontation over the Diaoyu/Senkaku Islands, 
Japanese citizens viewed “China’s criticism on Japan over history issues”, “food security” 
and “China’s action incompatible with international rules” as the most common reasons 
for negative opinions. For China, the focuses were on the Diaoyu/Senkaku Islands, 
Japanese attitude to historical issues, as well as their activities countering and Japan’s 
attempts to “besiege China”. These concerns were more than hot-button news, but rather 
already-existing sources of mutual distrust, which have formed asymmetries in the 
“locked” bilateral relationship.  
 
                                                 
8 Source: see http://www.genron-npo.net/en/pp/archives/5217.html, accessed 11/04/16, the same citations in the 
following charts 
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Chart 4. 1: Impressions of Each Other’s Country 
 
 
Chart 4. 2: Reasons for Unfavourable Impression, Japanese public 
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Chart 4. 3: Reasons for Unfavourable Impression, Chinese public 
 
4.3 Asymmetries in Sino-Japanese trust and distrust 
The determinants in Sino-Japanese relations indeed have a great impact on the bilateral 
relationship. However, any interstate relationship would have its own characteristics, and 
the “locked” Sino-Japanese relationship seems to be unique. In this case, the 
“determinants” could be considered to be the source of problems, while the “asymmetries” 
are a structural issue exacerbating the problems. Together, these factors lead to a bilateral 
distrust which is difficult to resolve.  
 
 
 China Japan 
Strategic issues Blocking China, US-Japan 
alliance 
The Rise of China as a 
potential threat 
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Moralistic trustworthiness History recognition Playing the history card 
 
Table 4. 1: Different countries and different fields of mutual distrust 
 
In the hypothesis of “asymmetries”, there are four pieces of evidence, which are shown in 
the chart above. The four are based on the two states (Japan and China) and trust/distrust 
over strategic issues and moralistic trustworthiness. The strategic distrust refers to a 
state’s decision to trust another actor or not, by analysing available information about 
strategic issues. The broad notion of strategic trust includes the following components: 
the demands of other states’ national interests, comprehensive national power (economic, 
military, and so on), strategic plans and trends, territorial issues, and maritime interests. 
The standard of judgement would be a comparison between the two countries’ strategic 
plans and national power, as well as specific actions. One state might be less vigilant of 
another if no serious conflicts of national interest exist between them, while distrust 
would exist when a state believes the other could become a strategic threat. On the other 
hand, the moral issues, mentioned earlier, are defined as the issue of a country’s 
moralistic trustworthiness in international society. Whether a state acts in a way that 
follows international laws and international principles, and whether national dignity at a 
basic moral level is harmed by others are the main concerns on moral issues of trust. In 
Sino-Japanese relations today, there are serious problems of distrust between the two 
states, in both of these areas. Meanwhile, the different interests of the two states form the 
“asymmetries”. This is the structure of the hypothesis.  
 
The determinants of trust and distrust in Sino-Japanese relations represent “what the 
problems and disputes are”, while the asymmetries stand for “why and how the problems 
become so serious” in Sino-Japanese relations. The existence of determinants can show 
where distrust exists, and therefore could affect bilateral relations. The asymmetric 
structure is based on the determinants. Considering the importance of the different 
determinants, there are also priorities and less important issues of distrust. Hence, an 
asymmetric structure is created, and can lead to the locked Sino-Japanese relationship. 
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4.3.1 Japan’s strategic distrust of China 
In terms of Japan’s distrust of China on strategic issues, it could be argued that it is based 
on distrust of the rise of China. In general, the two states have approximately the same 
level of hard power, and both are the greatest powers of the East Asian region, and even 
in the world. China has always been big, and it is not the first time that Japan faces a 
powerful China. For a long period of history, China was more advanced in national 
power than its neighbours, including Japan. However, without a willingness to expand its 
direct governance to the East Asian region, and a lack of a mature international society, 
interstate communications were mainly accidental and peaceful. Therefore, there were 
mainly positive interactions and no large scale wars between Japan and China. The 
turning point came in the late 19th Century, when Japan seized the chance to open up and 
take advantage of the Industrial Revolution. The result was a strong Japan and a weak 
China for the first time in history, and this lasted for the whole of the 20th Century. Under 
these circumstances, Japan invaded China after the the Second World War began. 
However, since the beginning of the 21st Century, China has recovered greatly from the 
pain of more than one hundred years since. It can be seen from the table below, “GDP 
and Military expenditure of Japan and China, 2000 and 2011”, that China has acquired a 
considerable amount of economic and military power, which now surpasses Japan. In 
addition, as a permanent member of the UN Security Council, and a nuclear-armed 
country, China could be a strategic challenger of Japan. It is the first time in the modern 
era that the bilateral relationship has been between two strong nations. Japan is not 
experienced enough to deal with this kind of relationship. The rise of China has become 
the main pressure and threat to Japan, and the “peaceful rise” is not trusted. 
 
 Japan China 
2000 2011 2000 2011 
GDP (billion 
USD) 
4731 5896 1198 7321 
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Military 
expenditure 
(million USD) 
54,785 54,529 33,496 129,272 
 
Table 4. 2: GDP and Military expenditure of Japan and China, 2000 and 20119 
 
To be specific, there are two sources for this kind of distrust. The first is the “worry”, and 
the other is “a lack of information”. The “worry” here refers to the prediction that China 
might challenge the existing status quo in the East Asian region, and in the world as its 
national power grows. It includes the possible challenges of the Japan’s leading position 
in Asia, unification of Taiwan through either peaceful or military methods, raising 
questions over the sovereignty of disputed islands and seas with Japan, developing a blue 
water navy to acquire enough power to cover mainland Japan, balancing the US-Japan 
alliance, and other strategic restraining activities. The other source is the distrust caused 
by a lack of information. Japan has always berated China over its low level of 
transparency on strategy and military expenditures. Due to the lack of information on 
both China’s strategies and ongoing activities, Japan can’t produce timely and 
appropriate responses and reactions. As the potential risks mentioned above seem to be 
dangerous for Japan, it would prefer to distrust China and prepare for the worst. The two 
sources of Japan’s distrust of China could be interpreted in other ways. There are both 
“explicit” and “hidden” strategic challenges posed by China. China has its clear goals, 
such as acquiring more national power, reviving the nation, and unifying with Taiwan. 
Japan understands these goals, but is still worried because attempts to achieve these goals 
might threaten Japanese interests. The problem with this is that Japan should clearly 
understand the potential challenges, which lead to distrust of China. On the other hand, 
China might also have hidden strategies. Japan has to consider that China will ask for 
more rights in the region, expand its imperialism, or even directly damage the national 
security of Japan. These are identified as the “hidden” goals of China in the worst-case 
predictions of Japan. Japan distrusts China because these hidden strategic challenges 
                                                 
9 Source: GDP, see http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GDP.MKTP.CD; Military expenditure, see 
http://milexdata.sipri.org/ 
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might come true through China’s actions. These two categories form an overall level of 
strategic distrust. 
 
It is reasonable that one state might be strategically alarming to its neighbours. However, 
there are other reasons for why China and Japan’s strategic distrust has become one of 
the most important factors in the relationship. In terms of Japan’s “worries”, as 
mentioned above, Japan is not only worried about the geographical scale of China, as this 
situation has been the case for centuries. Instead, “power” is what concerns Japan. The 
trends of international relations seemed to be alleviated after the Cold War. International 
society became more interdependent than ever before, and different states had more 
opportunities to communicate with each other. As a result, the national interests of one 
state can be influenced by the strategies and actions of other actors in a more direct and 
significant way. However, Japan not only benefits from China’s economic growth, but 
also feels threatened by it. China’s power is the basis to realize its strategic goals. Japan 
is worried that the interests of China will expand alongside its power. If the conflicts over 
national interests occur between the two states, Japan is not confident that it could defend 
itself due to the shift in the balance of power.  
 
There are examples to explain the sources of Japan’s worry. Firstly, Japan pays great 
attention to the growth of China’s military forces, especially the construction of a blue 
sea navy, and development of high-technology with military applications. One of the 
most representative incidents in recent years, was when China completed its first aircraft 
carrier, the shell of which was bought from Ukraine, and refitted by China in 2012. Even 
though the aircraft carrier Liaoning could hardly bring evolutionary changes to the 
Chinese navy, and the fact that it would mainly be used for training and research 
purposes (as reported by official Chinese channels) and as a ‘symbol’, rather than an 
active military asset, Japan was no doubt displeased with the situation. The strategy to 
transfer the offshore defence to the ocean is Japan’s primary concern. Due to the 
geographic connections, it is inevitable that China would be able to engage with Japan at 
sea, on islands and the mainland, if China wanted to approach via the Pacific Ocean. As 
the status quo means they are blocked by the ‘Island Chains’, China could go beyond the 
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barriers and might threaten the security of Japan. Besides, China is more and more 
concerned with its marine interests, and is paying much attention to the sovereignty of 
islands, territorial seas and the rights of exclusive economic zones. The disputes over the 
East China Sea oil and gas fields and the Diaoyu/Senkaku Islands are the best examples 
of these changes. For Japan, these are not only economic rights, but also issues of 
national security. The East China Sea between China and Japan bears rich resources, 
including oil and gas, which is crucial to the two countries. Japan has few resources in its 
mainland and is highly dependent on imports. Therefore, it is more focused on the issues 
of developing the marine resources, and the safety of sailing in related areas to secure 
resources. The issues is more crucial after Japan shut down a number of nuclear power 
plants, whose safety came into question after the 2011 earthquake in east Japan. Japan 
worried that China might take further steps – such as requesting sovereignty of more 
islands – which could place the Japanese lifeline in the sea into China’s control. This is 
unacceptable for Japanese strategy. Due to the higher frequency and stronger actions 
China takes to protect its interests in the surrounding seas in recent years, Japan’s 
concerns seem to be justified. In this way, Japan distrusts China’s “peaceful rise”, and 
would rather believe that China is in an imperialist manner.  
 
Regarding China’s lack of transparency, the author would suggest that the political 
culture indeed plays an important role on this issue. In traditional Chinese political 
culture, national strategies and power are top secret, and this might include many things 
Western states now publically acknowledge. China has always been concerned with 
self-defence in its political philosophy, and “transparency” actually is crucial in guiding 
ideology. Though China is becoming a more “modern” state in politics and diplomacy 
over recent years, the process of change has not been fully accomplished, and certain 
“Chinese characteristics” are still evident. From the strategic viewpoint, China also 
distrusts Japan (which will be discussed in the next section). This means China is not that 
interested in promoting transparency following requests from Japan and the US. Without 
enough information, as well as effective high level communication, Japan cannot 
accurately identify China’s strategic intentions. What are the strategic goals of China? Is 
it what the Chinese government describes as a “peaceful rise”, or is it the unification of 
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Taiwan through military force, or occupying more islands in disputed areas, or even 
challenging the US-Japan alliance and seeking Chinese hegemony in East Asia and in the 
world? It is a problem that China is not transparent enough for Japan. The direct negative 
impact is that, due to the lack of necessary information, Japan has to make decisions 
based on existing empirical evidence—most of which is not from cooperative but 
potentially threatening actions. Therefore, Japan is trapped, again distrusting Chinese 
national power and strategic goals. 
 
4.3.2 China’s strategic distrust on Japan 
China also distrusts Japan for strategic reasons. What is similar is that Japan wants to 
remain the main and strongest strategic competitor in the region. Japan possesses strong 
economic, military and scientific power, which is generally equivalent to China. Besides, 
Japan is also an outpost for restricting China in regional politics, in China’s view. There 
is a crucial reason for China to distrust Japan, different tor Japan’s concern of “a lack of 
transparency”, and that is that Japan has clearly identified its strategy of dealing with a 
potential threat by enhancing the US-Japan alliance. If Japan distrusts China because of 
“unknown” strategies, China distrusts Japan because of “already known” strategies. 
China might not be happy with a stronger US-Japan alliance in East Asia, because it 
would feel restricted developmentally in such an environment. China tends to believe that 
Japan’s purpose of making the US closer to and more connected with the region is to 
balance China, rather than maintaining the peace. With no doubt, there are other detailed 
concerns and distrust of Japan’s strategy, such as the potential revival of Japanese 
militarism and the expansion. However, these problems are, to some extent, moral 
distrust, which is discussed below. China’s most direct and crucial strategic distrust of 
Japan is the distrust over the definition of Japanese strategy of besieging and restricting 
China. Japanese attempts to agitate the ASEAN states to confront China together over 
marine disputes are evidence on which China can base its distrust of Japan. 
 
4.3.3 China’s distrust on moralistic trustworthiness of Japan 
Japan and China both evince more serious confrontation and mutual distrust in the field 
of moralistic trustworthiness. A country’s moralistic trustworthiness refers to a 
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judgement of whether its actions follow the widely recognized rules and principles of 
international society, and therefore can be trusted (or not) as a responsible actor. It is not 
uncommon in the modern international relations for “moralistic trustworthiness” being an 
obstacles and problem between states. If one country’s moral trustworthiness is 
questioned, there might be specific reasons for its relationship with others. For instance, 
the North Korea nuclear crisis, human rights issues in Syria, and the Iran nuclear issue 
are all examples of states which are regarded as violating international principles and 
universal ethics. For Sino-Japanese relations, the moral distrust mainly lies with specific 
historical legacies between the two states. In terms China’s moral distrust of Japan, the 
core concern is how Japan treats its history of invading China in the 20th Century, 
especially in the 1930s and 1940s. Dozens of issues in this field have become problems 
between the two states – including the Japanese history textbook issue, the Yasukuni 
Shrine issue, the apology issue, the comfort women issue and the Diaoyu/Senkaku island 
dispute. It could be reasonable that China is anti-Japanese in its national emotions 
because it was invaded by Japan. This type of moral distrust is actually comprised of two 
main components. The first is whether Japan would admit to and reflect on its history, 
and the second would be whether Japan might gradually change its attitude towards and 
recognition of history to realize its goals, which harm the interests of China. 
 
A basic issue with the moralistic trustworthiness between the two states is that China 
believes Japan is trying to avoid its responsibilities on history, and even to deny or 
whitewash it. This is offensive to the dignity and emotions of the Chinese people from 
the perspective of the Chinese government. Therefore, Japan can hardly be trusted by 
China on moral issues. In fact, Japan has made several official pronouncements to 
express its regret for the war. However, a series of actions in Japan’s politics, such as the 
Prime Ministers’ visits to the Yasukuni Shrine, and the modification of the history 
textbooks to delete many mentions of invasion from history, which China sees as a denial 
of history. Despite the demand of national dignity and domestic public opinion, the 
Chinese government is vigilant of Japan’s further steps. It has been proven that, though 
the two governments once tried to improve bilateral relations, the distrust grew fiercer as 
soon as Japan made these shifts on history, and the relationship grew worse.  
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On the other hand, China also distrusts Japan because it worries about the “deep 
meanings” of the activities of whitewashing or scrubbing its history of invasion, and its 
related moves. The “deep meanings” are a worry of China because of Japan’s possible 
intensions of changing the status quo. To be specific, China is concerned about the 
possibility of Japan modifying its “peace constitution”, regaining a regular army, 
developing nuclear weapons, reaching for the position of a global political power, and 
other activities to challenge the world order after World War II. China neither believes 
that Japan would respect history, nor thinks that Japan would restrict itself by the shadow 
of the war due to the empirical evidence of recent years. There has been a trend to go 
beyond the masochistic view of history in Japanese society, as well as efforts by the 
Japanese government to regain its place in the world as a “normal” state. In general, the 
moralistic distrust of Japan comes from not only the judgement of a lack of 
trustworthiness, but also the worry of an uncertain future. If not well settled, these moral 
issues might transform into more serious problems, and the distrust and confrontation 
between China and Japan would become both strategic and moralistic. 
 
4.3.4 Japan’s distrust on moralistic trustworthiness of China 
In fact, Japan has certain reasons to distrust China on moral grounds. There are two 
categories. The first is the objection to blamed for the historical legacies (described 
above), and the second is the literally-moral issues. As China has continually criticised 
Japan over historical issues for several decades, Japan tends to believe that China is 
actually playing the history card to take advantage of Japan in different areas, as opposed 
to being genuinely concerned with the history itself. This is why Japan does not see 
China as trustworthy. Japan believes that it has made enough apologies for the damage it 
caused China, and the two states had already achieved a normalization of bilateral 
relations in the 1970s. As as result, the historical disputes should be settled, and from 
Japan’s perspective no more apologies on the same issues are needed. China’s criticisms 
are therefore unreasonable, and neither correspond with its position as a global power nor 
are they suitable as international principles. China’s purpose is to suppress Japan 
worldwide, prevent Japan from playing a more important role in the world, and then to 
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take advantage of Japan for its own benefit. For example, China rarely directly expressed 
its objection on different occasions when Japan tried to compete to become a permanent 
member of the UN Security Council in 2005. China’s reason was that Japan had not fully 
reflected on its history of invading other states, and it therefore could not be responsible 
for the security of the world without first addressing its history in a proper way. The 
result of China’s opposition was that Japan failed to achieve its goal in the UN, and no 
doubt Japan’s distrust of China in relation to its moralistic trustworthiness increased.  
 
In terms of other moral issues of distrust, there are problems in the fields of international 
relations non-political areas that affect bilateral trust. The issues related to international 
relations include China’s loss of trustworthiness for cancelling scheduled activities for a 
variety of reasons, the ideology of communism, human rights, and other unilateral 
activities that offend the rights and interests of Japan. The non-political elements include 
food safety, environmental pollution, intellectual property rights, and crimes against 
immigrants, and so on. For example, the “poisoned dumplings” incident of 2008-2009 
shocked the Japan’s confidence in China’s trustworthiness. Even though these types of 
issue do not directly have an impact on overall Sino-Japanese political and strategic 
relations, it objectively reduced the willingness to cooperate, and this spread to other 
fields. Therefore, both the moralistic issues of distrust in the political fields and others are 
inter-connected and influence interstate relations. 
 
4.3.5 The conformation of asymmetries 
China and Japan have formed a mutual distrust on both strategic and moral issues. It is 
not uncommon in the practice of international relations that two states distrust each other. 
However, the “locked relationship” between China and Japan in the author’s hypothesis 
indeed proves that the situation between the two countries is more complicated. The 
source of the ‘locked’ status is the asymmetries in bilateral distrust, which have formed a 
vicious cycle. Though both states have their specific issues of distrust, they have different 
focuses and emphases. From the Chinese perspective, the distrust on the moralistic issues 
of Japan are the main concern, while strategic issues are considered secondary. For Japan, 
the situation is the opposite. The most significant trust crisis is the distrust over strategic 
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issues, while still holding on to moral distrust. Under this circumstance, the logical 
conclusion of the asymmetries is that both states treat their own top concern as the key 
issue in bilateral relations, and they could hardly trust the other for a number of reasons 
(caused by the other), which means the demands of their priorities have not been satisfied. 
Meanwhile, the main concern of the other (Country B) seems to be quite “normal” in its 
own perspective (Country A), which does not need to be modified to satisfy Country B’s 
request. Besides, the main foci of the two states are not at the same level, while the issues 
at the same level differ from each other. It is better understood with the table above. 
 
It could be expected that, if the areas of distrust were at the same level and received the 
same attention, the two states might be more able to solve the problem of mutual distrust. 
However, the fact that issues are of varying importance to each country means there can 
be a lack of motivation to resolve them. Both countries might end up in a situation like 
this: Country A thinks that the requests and distrust of the other state (B) are 
“unreasonable”, while its own (A) “reasonable” distrust is not being paid enough 
attention by the other (B) – or vice versa. In this complicated model, compromise from 
one side is necessary to break the deadlock. This situation might result from awareness of 
the primary concerns of the other party and cooperating to seek a resolution in multiple 
areas of distrust, through a comparatively high mutual-political understanding. However, 
as the defender of national interests, a government would find it hard to make unilateral 
compromises without considering domestic pressures and public opinion. Even worse, a 
state might refuse to take action on the areas of distrust of others until its own distrust 
was eliminated by the other’s actions. If both states insist on working on the principle of 
“the other should act first” as a condition for action, then a “locked” relationship will be 
formed. A recent case might prove the seriousness of the vicious cycle. Japanese Prime 
Minister Abe Shinzō visited the Yasukuni Shrine on 26th December, 2013. Then, on 30th 
December, Chinese Foreign Ministry spokesman Qin Gang claimed in a press conference 
that, “Abe is not welcomed by the Chinese people and the Chinese leaders would never 
have communications with him in any occasions.” This incident inevitably has created 
more problems for the Sino-Japanese relationship. In this case, the visit to the Yasukuni 
Shrine by a Japanese leader is a moral issue of bilateral trust, and a top concern of China. 
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However, it is not unacceptable in Japan, so the protests from China did not work and 
instead caused serious consequences by destroying the bridge of high-level 
communication. Due to dissatisfactory over the distrust of historical issues, China could 
in turn ease the pressure on Japan’s main concerns of military rise and territorial disputes. 
This is a way in which the vicious cycle of asymmetries works to bring about a “locked” 
situation in Sino-Japanese relations. 
 
4.4 Conclusion 
The particular characteristics of the two countries could be regarded as determinants of 
mutual trust and distrust, which would also have a great impact on Sino-Japanese 
relations. There is a fundamental issue with the research, which needs to build a 
connection between the theoretical analysis of trust/distrust in international relations and 
specific cases in Sino-Japanese relations. This chapter tries to answer the following 
questions: 
1) Why has this research chosen to analyse the specific cases as typical examples of 
mutual distrust? 
2) Why are these cases analysed in certain ways with certain measures? To be exact, 
why would the research focus on governmental documents and public opinion? 
3) How do these determinants contribute to the formation of asymmetric mutual distrust 
between the two countries? 
 
In order to explain these issues, the chapter has drawn some conclusions. Firstly, 
considering the characteristics of the two countries, it can’t be denied that both China and 
Japan have special considerations in their interactions with each other. Ancient links, the 
traditional Chinese-centre national identity, the memories of 20th Century war, and 
domestic politics contribute to the two states’ complex concerns. Among these 
determinants, the strategies of the two countries and the moral issues regarding history, 
ideology and values might be regarded as having the greatest influence on contemporary 
bilateral relations. Therefore, the choice of these issues as cases to be analysed is 
reasonable and persuasive. 
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Secondly, it has been argued that trust and distrust influence interstate relations in the 
foreign policy-making process, as led by governments and supplemented by public 
opinion. The attitudes of trust and distrust are significant when actions and the pressure to 
take action are observable. Hence, analysis of these materials could help identify the 
situations of mutual trust/distrust between China and Japan. 
 
Thirdly, Japan’s and China’s different characteristics can be identified after the factors of 
determinants have been codified. The differences exist in the distinctive ways of 
understanding the disputes and differences in national interest. In this way, there are 
asymmetries between the two countries in terms of their levels of distrust, which informs 
the basic hypothesis of the research as the source of locked Sino-Japanese relations.  
 
All three questions help to link the theoretical design to the empirical cases. If the 
assumptions and hypothesis can be verified, both the universality of the theories of 
trust/distrust and the particulars for adaptation for analysing Sino-Japanese relations can 
therefore come together. 
 
Chapter 5: Japan’s distrust on China 
 
5.1 Japan’s distrust of China and bilateral relations 
5.1.1 Introduction 
The aim of the case study 
The primary aim of this case study of Japan’s distrust of China will be to test one of the 
hypotheses of the thesis. The hypothesis indicates that Japan’s distrust of China has both 
strategic and moral determinants and expressions. Strategic distrust is the predominant 
determinant for Japan; moral distrust is secondary and is primarily reinforcing. Therefore, 
explaining the status of Japan’s strategic and moral trust/distrust of China and its impact 
on Japan-China relations is also a focus of this chapter. 
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The structure of the chapter 
The structure of this chapter is as follows. Firstly, an introduction will help explain how 
this chapter is constructed. It will describe the theoretical-case interactions, 
methodological framework, and the significance of the research questions of the case 
study. Then, a section of the background and description on current Japan-China relations 
is provided. This is to build the connection between the theoretical framework of 
normative vs. rationality in international relations and the current situation of Japan’s 
view of its relations with China in terms of strategic and moral issues. Thirdly, there will 
be two separate sections of discussion of Japan’s strategic and moral distrust of China, 
how Chinese strategic and moral behaviour shapes the current Japanese distrust. Finally, 
an evaluation and test will be constructed in terms of how this strategic and moral distrust 
interacts with bilateral relations. The basic hypothesis of the existence of both Japan’s 
strategic and moral distrust prioritising strategic calculations will be verified.  
 
5.1.2 An overall logic of the case study 
A methodological framework 
The methodology will be applied to both case study chapters, because the chapters are 
equally important for explaining trust and distrust between the actors. In general, multiple 
methodologies with both qualitative analysis and quantitative calculation will be used in 
the case studies. For the qualitative portion, the basic methodology is to analyse certain 
content – such as official documents, the trends in public opinion, and so on – in order to 
figure out how these materials might reflect trust and distrust between Japan and China, 
and then form the asymmetries in bilateral distrust. The detailed analysis will rely on 
analysis of the usage of certain words, sentences, and so on, in order to judge whether 
they contain evidence of trust or distrust, according to the different situations in which 
the discourse is used. For the quantitative study, there are tasks to calculate the related 
data to support the qualitative research, as well as develop particular arguments. One 
basic quantitative method is to calculate the frequency in use of certain discourse of the 
nature of trust or distrust in the documents, and to analyse the information provided by 
the data of public opinion surveys. Therefore, the explicit and hidden trends of trust or 
distrust could be observed.  
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The significance of these cases on the research questions 
The thesis is intended to explain three main research questions, including: defining the 
concept of trust and distrust in international relations, and especially in Sino-Japanese 
relations; exploring why Sino-Japanese relations are locked, based on the hypothesis of 
asymmetries in bilateral distrust; and how to unlock the relationship by solving the trust 
crisis. In order to answer these questions, the first case study will try to collect data from 
Japanese official sources (such as the MOFA website) and public sources, in order to 
verify the argument that there is both Japanese strategic and moral distrust of China, and 
that strategic distrust is the primary focus of Japan. 
 
Therefore, certain methods should be applied to the research. The quantitative study of 
the analysis of selected documents, public opinion and interviews will be the main 
approaches to understand the empirical evidence from the bilateral relationship. By 
analysing the contents, certain data outcomes can be obtained for further qualitative 
research. There are basic standards for analysing the data in at least two dimensions. The 
first is the qualitative judgment of whether the content stands for an attitude of trust or 
distrust. According to the discussion in the theoretical framework, Hoffman (2002) and 
Möllering (2006) have developed their own standards for measuring trust in international 
relations, which include “cooperation” and other forms of behaviour. Combining these 
behaviours with official documents and speeches will offer a more objective assessment 
of the position and attitude of the actor in terms of trust and distrust. Secondly, we should 
examine if the existing evidence of trust and distrust has different levels. Strong 
emotional discourses with trust or distrust characteristics will, to a large extent, support 
the effectiveness of the cases in identifying trust and distrust in bilateral relations. At the 
same time, an overall comparison between the data in strategic and moral distrust will 
prove an asymmetry within Japan, that strategic distrust is more important than moral 
distrust. 
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The cases based on the theoretical framework 
Conceptualizing trust and distrust in relations between countries is one of the main tasks 
of this thesis. As mentioned in the theoretical framework, it will be difficult to measure 
interstate trust in a quantitative way. To be specific, on strategic distrust issues, this thesis 
has identified two main sources. Firstly, countries will distrust others based on 
already-known intelligence, which suggest that it will damage its national interests, such 
as others’ known national strategies. The second category is distrust caused by 
uncertainty due to a lack of information and transparency. It can be argued that fear and 
uncertainty are among the main sources of distrust between states, which could also be 
interpreted as the result of certain clear, damaging activities (or potential activities) and 
the lack of strategic transparency. Distrust in these two categories will likely be visible in 
the evaluations of official statements on the actions of other actors in certain fields or on 
certain issues. In short, the rationality of Japan’s distrust of China turns out to be that 
strategic calculations are the primary determinants. At the same time, the normative 
interpretation of Japan’s perspective is that China is not regarded as an accepted member 
of international society, which reinforces the trend of strategic distrust. 
 
The theoretical framework of the thesis is based on the debate over the “normative 
relationship” and “rationality” (Amadae, 2007; Dowding, 2001; Florini, 1996; Goldsmith 
& Posner, 2000; Hindmoor, 2006; Hurrell, 2012; Kacowicz, 2005; Opp, 2013; Thomson, 
1993). Though different approaches of International Relations Theories accept the 
existence of the notion of trust, they espouse different types and different explanations. 
There are two basic theoretical frameworks. The first, in terms of the normative 
relationship of trust and distrust between states, focuses on the norms in international 
relations. Specifically, it refers to the moral norms in the thesis, and reflects the attitudes 
of states towards moral trust and distrust. The other is rationality, and its influences on 
trust and distrust between countries. States tend to make rational choices in their 
interactions, which can also be interpreted as following the “incentive norms” (Boone, 
Declerck, & Kiyonari, 2010; Larson, 1997; Opp, 2013; Lebow, 2013). Different to moral 
norms, the trust and distrust status of strategic issues between states highlights the 
significance of rationality in foreign policy. The maritime disputes would have a directly 
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influence on national interests – including national security, resources and regional order. 
If states are regarded as rational actors, they will take actions with no doubt of facing 
challenges and potential threats to national interests. 
 
Therefore, once there are threats to national interests, states will tend to protect their 
interests, or treating the options of trusting or distrusting others as “incentive norms”, 
instead of continuing to follow moral norms of trusting other actors without conditions. 
According to the thesis’s hypothesis, Japan should strongly distrust China on strategic 
issues. In this way, whether the analysis of the case study data reflects the connections 
between “threats to interests—strategic distrust” is a major task. 
 
5.1.3 Case study—maritime disputes and ideology/being a responsible 
of international society: background 
 
Why were these cases selected? 
Why these cases were selected is a fundamental issue in understanding strategic trust and 
distrust issues. We should first ask, what can be regarded as “strategic” issues in 
Sino-Japanese relations? It needs to be stressed again that the notion of strategic distrust 
in this thesis differs from the usage defined as “distrust according to the information 
owned”. It is “strategic distrust on strategic issues”, including those of national interests 
and strategy; national power including economic, military and political impacts; and 
international hierarchies and order, and so on. The maritime disputes include cases of 
territory, military confrontation, and natural resources – which are all typical strategic 
disputes between Japan and China in recent years. These cases, as the most significant 
issues in bilateral relations, were selected because they offer plentiful empirical materials, 
as well as academic discussions for further analysis. 
 
In terms of moral distrust, the core issues might be that Japan distrusts China because 
China has a different ideology, which contradicts many of Japan’s core values. At the 
same time, China might be regarded as not being responsible in terms of its international 
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behaviour, especially in China-Japan relations. Therefore, these cases were selected to 
test how Chinese behaviour could lead to Japan’s moral distrust.   
 
Background of Japan-China relations and bilateral trust/distrust 
One of the most significant political realities in the international relations of East Asia 
post-Cold War, especially since the beginning of the 21st century, is that there have been 
great changes in comparative national power and strategic goals of the states in the region. 
In terms of Sino-Japanese relations, the main manifestation is a fiercer atmosphere of 
strategic confrontation. There are several deep-seated reasons for this trend. Firstly, the 
collapse of the Soviet Union significantly changed the targets of national strategies. The 
USSR was the primary national security threat during the Cold War period for both China 
and Japan. Therefore, the strategic focus of both states was to balance against the Soviet 
Union. After losing the USSR as a common threat, Japan and China struggled to maintain 
a cooperative partnership for dealing with regional strategic issues as they had between 
the 1970s and 1980s. As the two states are the strongest powers in this region, they might 
be more likely to become strategic competitors. Moreover, without another clear external 
threat, both Japan and China will focus on effectively realizing their own strategic goals 
with their growing national power, rather than surviving alongside another dominant 
regional threat. Japan has paid great attention to reshaping its national identity as a major 
political power and a “normal” state. China values its goals of securing its core national 
interests, including domestic stability, sovereignty and national development. As the two 
states lack mutual strategic trust, these goals present conflicts with the the other’s. Moteki 
(2010) has argued that, 
 
“The biggest impact of the Senkaku Islands/East China Sea issue is a decidedly negative 
Japanese public perception of China. To a majority of the Japanese public, China is a 
country that not only causes disruption in their daily lives but also abuses its economic 
power and conveniently uses historical incidents to its own advantage. Such a sentiment 
has created an atmosphere within Japan that makes it very difficult for Japanese political 
leaders and government officials to pursue a pragmatic approach with China.” 
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Zhu (2011) suggests that China’s position in this region has greatly changed since the 
international financial crisis. The rapid change in the comparative national power 
between the major regional actors might be problematic. 
 
There will be detailed qualitative and quantitative research on the status of trust and 
distrust over incidents in bilateral relations in the following sections. Therefore, a general 
introduction is provided in the background section. It has to be reemphasized that this 
thesis focuses on the issue of trust/distrust between Japan and China after the official 
reconciliation of bilateral relations in 1972. Specifically, bilateral relations and the status 
of bilateral trust/distrust in the 21st century are the core focus of the research. The two 
periods of “honeymoon” and “fluctuation” will mostly be used as background in order to 
ascertain the historical sources of current disputes. Based on these particular aspects, the 
thesis divides the research of Japan’s distrust of China into four periods, including the 
April 2001-September 2006 Koizumi administration; September 2006-June 2009 Liberal 
Democratic Party (LDP) administration; June 2009-December 2012 Democratic Party of 
Japan administration; and December 2012 to the present Abe administration. The 
explanation for choosing these periods is that the domestic politics of Japan have an 
impact on its foreign policies, and especially on its relationship with China. Although one 
must admit that there can hardly be substantial changes to policies during different 
administrations, due to the comprehensive consideration of national interests, the 
different political stances of the LDP and Democratic Party of Japan. Even the individual 
styles and personal experiences of VIPs or politicians will, to a certain extent, influence 
foreign policy, and then bilateral relations and the status of trust. In fact, the most 
significant difference would be the different choices of whether or not to visit the 
Yasukuni Shrine. Basically, the multiple visits by Prime Minister Koizumi caused serious 
problems between Japan and China. Subsequent Prime Ministers, from both the LDP and 
Democratic Party, avoided visiting the Shrine until Shinzo Abe’s visit in his second term.  
 
The following table will briefly list the important incidents in Japan-China relations 
during the different periods: 
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Period Date/time incident 
2001-2006 
Koizumi period 
13/08/2001 Prime Minister Junichiro 
Koizumi visited the 
Yasukuni Shrine 
21/04/2002 
01/01/2003 
01/01/2004 
17/10/2005 
15/08/2006 
10/2001 Prime Minister Junichiro 
Koizumi visited China, 
apologises for the invasion 
03/2005 Huge anti-Japanese 
demonstrations take place in 
China over history 
textbooks, and Japan 
seeking for UN permanent 
member status 
04/2005 President Hu Jindao met 
Prime Minister Junichiro 
Koizumi during the 2nd 
Asia-Africa summit in 
Jakarta 
15/08/2005 Prime Minister Junichiro 
Koizumi gave a speech on 
the Memorial Day of 
Japan’s surrender in the 
World War II, admitting the 
invasion and expressed 
apology 
2006-2009 
Post-Koizumi period with 
LDP government 
  
10/2006 Prime Minister Shinzo Abe 
visited China. The trip of 
‘icebreaking’; Raised the 
notion of Japan-China 
140 
 
Mutual Beneficial 
Relationship 
12/2007 Prime Minister Yasuo 
Fukuda visited China 
12/2007 Japan raised the notion of 
‘arc of freedom and 
prosperity’, which excludes 
China 
01/2008 Poisoned dumpling incident 
05/2008 President Hu Jintao visited 
Japan 
04/2009 Prime Minister Taro Aso 
visited China 
2009-2012 
Democratic Party period 
  
10/10/2009 President Hu Jintao met 
Yukio Hatoyama in Beijing 
10/12/2009 Democratic Party 
Secretary-General Ichiro 
Ozawa visited China 
12/2009 Vice President Xi Jinping 
visited Japan 
07/09/2010 Diaoyu/Senkaku Islands 
boat collision incident 
21/05/2011 Prime Minister Wen Jiabao 
visited Japan 
12/2011 Prime Minister Yoshihiko 
Noda visited China 
02/2012 Mayor Takashi Kawamura 
of Nagoya denied the 
Nanjing Massacre when 
meeting with officials from 
Nanjing, causes a series of 
governmental problems 
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05/2012 Prime Minister Yoshihiko 
Noda visited China 
09/2012 Japan nationalized 
Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands, 
and caused great 
demonstrations in China 
17/10/2012 President of LDP Shinzo 
Abe visited Yasukuni Shrine 
2012-now 
Shinzo Abe’s second term 
as Prime Minister 
  
01/2013 China’s aircraft and vessels 
start to sail near the 
Diaoyu/Senkaku Islands 
30/01/2013 Incident of Chinese vessel’s 
radar locking on Japan’s 
battleship 
09/2013 China start regular cruising 
near Diaoyu/Senkaku Islands 
05/2014-06/2014 Chinese and Japanese military 
airplanes involved in a 
dangerously close incident 
over the East China Sea 
07/2014 The Cabinet of Japan lifted 
collective self-defence 
11/2014 China and Japan reached four 
principles of consensus on 
improving bilateral relations 
11/2014 President Xi and Prime 
Minister Abe met during the 
APEC summit in Beijing 
04/2015 President Xi and Prime 
Minister Abe met in Jakarta, 
Indonesia 
08/2015 Prime Minister Abe delivered 
the speech on the 70th 
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anniversary of World War II 
08/2015 China held the parade on 70th 
anniversary of “anti-Japanese 
war and anti-fascist war” 
 
Table 5. 1: Important incidents in Japan-China relations in the 21st century10 
 
 
 
Chart 5. 1: Positive/negative events in Sino-Japanese relations and strategic distrust 
discourse 
 
Above is a table outlining the relationship between the crucial events between Japan and 
China bilateral relations and the appearance of distrust discourse in the four periods from 
2001 to now. Here is what we can observe from the data:  
1) Firstly, bilateral relations reflect the significant events or incidents between Japan 
and China that have specific characteristics. In the Koizumi period, at the beginning 
of the 21st Century, there were many negative incidents between the two 
                                                 
10 The standard of selected events: highest level summits of two leaderships, incidents which draw and hold attention 
of the two states, things which cause problems at governmental or significant civil society levels. 
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states—mainly related to Koizumi’s visits to the Yasukuni Shrine. In this period, the 
two leaderships had some interactions, for example meetings. However, it was not 
frequent. At the same time, very limited amounts of distrust discourse could be 
observed. One reason for this could be that China, at the time, did not have the 
capacity or intention to challenge or threaten Japan’s regional interests from the 
Japanese perspective. Therefore, there were fewer maritime disputes during this time. 
2) The bilateral relationship had a trend of improvement during the post-Koizumi 
period. One characteristic of the LDP period, from 2006-2009, is that fewer negative 
incidents took place. This might be the result of more frequent visits by VIPs, which 
could enhance the exchange of information between the two states, and reduce 
distrust caused by a lack of transparency.  Therefore, the level of distrust would be 
lower than before. 
3) One of the major changes in modern Japanese politics is that the Democratic Party 
came into power in 2009. There were expectations from both Japan and China that 
the new government could do well in international relations with China. However, 
although the Democratic Party was considered to be not that conservative, Japan’s 
relations with China still experienced ups and downs. It can be seen in the above 
table that the two governments took action to hold summits and other mutual events, 
and the number of negative events between the two states was higher than during the 
previous LDP administration—mainly involving the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands. A 
trend of increased distrust discourse used in Japanese diplomatic scenes can also be 
observed. One explanation might be that, after the 2008-2009 global financial crisis, 
the Chinese strategic position in this region and the world has greatly changed. 
Chinese military forces, especially its navy, were also growing stronger. For example, 
China’s first aircraft carrier was launched in 2012, a year in which the territorial 
disputes over the islands between Japan and China were fierce. Therefore, the 
appearance of distrust discourse rose in frequency. 
4) Shinzo Abe’s second term started with his visit to the Yasukuni Shrine, and 
immediately led to problems in Japan-China relations. It wasn’t until November 
2014 that the two leaders met for the first time since 2011. Since 2013, the two states 
have had more disputes over the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands, with indirect military 
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confrontations, and even dangerous incidents like radar lock-on incident in January 
2013. From the Japanese perspective, China is trying to use its national power to 
challenge the existing regional order, and is seeking maritime hegemony, which 
would be a major problem between the two states. Therefore, it is reasonable that the 
frequency of distrust discourse grew considerably. 
 
The status of trust/distrust and the status of bilateral relations have close connections. The 
thesis has concentrated on the fact that distrust between states has very negative 
influences on the relationship and might lead to a ‘locked’ status. Specific to this case 
study, the core issue of Japan’s distrust of China is strategic distrust caused by maritime 
disputes. The logic is as follows: 
1) How to define the related cases as being “maritime disputes between Japan and 
China”? This will not be a problem, as the section discussing why these cases 
were selected has explained the essence of the maritime disputes between the two 
states. 
2) How to define the cases as being “strategic issues”, as mentioned in the 
theoretical discussion. This is related to the definition of strategic distrust, and 
how to interpret these cases in terms of strategic distrust. Strategic issues in this 
thesis are those that are related to the states’ grand strategies and goals, as well as 
the activities towards achieving these goals. Therefore, the maritime disputes 
could be regarded as one of the most crucial parts of national strategy in the 21st 
Century for both Japan and China would be included in the strategic calculations. 
3) Building the connections between “cases”, “strategic distrust” and “bilateral 
relations”. Specifically, there are questions and doubts about the following:  
i. What is the current status of Japan-China relations, especially at the 
strategic level; why are there disputes? 
ii. According to the theoretical framework, what are the strategic behaviours 
that cause the deterioration of bilateral relations? 
iii. How does the status of strategic distrust connect strategic behaviours and 
bilateral relations? Or to be specific, how would certain strategic 
behaviour lead to strategic distrust and then cause a deterioration in 
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relations?  
 
Japan’s moral distrust of China will be analysed in a similar way. In general, the aim is to 
confirm the existence of Japan’s moral distrust of China, and figure out what moral 
behaviours are the source of distrust that lead to moral distrust, and then to negative 
bilateral relations. 
 
4) The last step is testing the hypothesis, mentioned above – that is, that Japan’s 
distrust of China has both strategic and moral determinants and expressions. 
Strategic distrust is currently predominant in Japan-China relations, and moral 
distrust is secondary. 
 
Strategic calculations 
The current status of Japan-China relations could be described as being in a negative 
situation, and may be on course to deteriorate further in the future. In terms of strategic 
calculations, Japan’s primary concerns are the potential strategic challenges to Japanese 
national interests and the existing international order brought about by China’s growing 
national power. Among the strategic issues, the most representative cases of the status 
quo are the maritime disputes between the two states, including the disputes over territory, 
resources, military expansion, and so on. Both the Japanese government and the civil 
society have expressed their distrust in their discourse. 
 
According to the rationality of states, Japan’s strategic consideration of China should 
focus on the doubts about what Chinese maritime strategies actually are. It could be 
argued that, from the Japanese perspective, the main reason for the deterioration of 
Japan-China relations at the strategic level originate from the fact that China is acting 
more and more aggressively in international relations (Bhattacharya, 2007; Swaine, 2011). 
Chinese activities might threaten Japan’s national security, territorial integrity and other 
national interests. Based on the rational considerations of strategic calculations, Japan 
will have strategic distrust of China. 
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There are several detailed cases of the Japan-China maritime disputes, which clearly 
show a series of problems of Japan’s strategic distrust on China. To be specific, the 
disputes include the contradictions over territorial issues (especially the disputes over 
islands such as the Diaoyu/Senkaku Islands), and the impact on Japan of Chinese 
attempts to develop a blue sea navy (Zhu J. , 2011). It is necessary to understand the deep 
roots of these disputes, and why they have become the most important component of 
Japanese strategic distrust of China. From a geopolitical viewpoint, the islands around the 
two states have great strategic significance to both Japan and China. Whether for Japan, 
which has very limited resources on its mainland territory, or for China, which is eager to 
acquire any new resource to satisfy the demands of its economic boom, these islands are 
extremely important. Despite the concerns over territory and resources, military and 
national grand strategy factors also have an impact (Austin & Harris, 1999; Sasaki, 2010; 
Zhu F. , An emerging trend in East Asia: military budget increases and their impact, 
2009). It is a fact that China has never been a strong maritime power, and does not 
conduct consistent ocean activities. China has not acquired a navy strong enough to 
match its rising national power. The scope of its maritime actions are limited to a certain 
extent—generally only covering seas immediately offshore, such as parts of the South 
and East China Sea. In this area, surrounded by Japan and other South East Asian states, 
there is a chain of islands, and it could be argued that the projection of Chinese strategic 
power has been restricted by this natural chain. The reason why the maritime disputes 
have become a hot spot in recent years is that, on the one hand, Japan’s maritime force 
(Maritime Self-Defense Force, or MSDF) is also limited due to the restrictions of the 
Japanese constitution. Japan would rely more on the US-Japan alliance to maintain its 
national security; on the other hand, China is developing its maritime forces in order to 
protect its growing marine interests outside its offshore area. From the Japanese 
perspective, the Chinese strategy challenges the status quo, and could even contribute to 
the China threat theories (Ross, 2005; Roy, 1996). Therefore, Japan would have to take it 
seriously on a strategic level. For example, Japan has been continually flagged the issues 
of the Chinese military in its Defense of Japan white papers (Callahan, 2005, p. 702). 
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Besides, another detailed focus of Sino-Japanese maritime disputes is the growth of 
Chinese naval forces, which have become a concern for many countries (Chen & Feffer, 
2009; Glaser & Szerlip, 2011; Ross, 2009). Despite the continued upgrade of military 
equipment, one of the most conspicuous actions of China in recent years was building its 
first aircraft carrier, Liaoning, which entered active service on September 25th, 2012. 
Though this aircraft carrier is reconstructed from the incomplete body of a Kuznetsov 
Marshal aircraft carrier, bought from Ukraine, rather than an original design, it still has 
great strategic influence on the Chinese navy. There have been official Chinese 
statements that express the attitude of the People’s Liberty Army, that the Liaoning is a 
training and experimental ship and not one to be deployed for battle. China has never 
owned an aircraft carrier, so the new training platform will have a great impact on its 
future capacity and battle capabilities. For Japan, the fact that China owns one aircraft 
carrier (and might have more in the future) is without doubt a regional strategic challenge. 
The significance of the aircraft carrier is not only in strengthening offshore defence, but 
also providing a way to step forward and project global power. As the geographic 
neighbour of China, Japan will be within the operational radius of the Chinese aircraft 
carrier. This has never happened before. The existence of Chinese aircraft carriers (both 
the Liaoning and new ones in the planning stage) is without doubt a strategic threat to 
Japan. At the same time, considering the cases in recent years of Chinese battleships and 
submarines entering the Pacific Ocean through the waterways near Japan, it is reasonable 
that Japan is worried about the development of Chinese maritime forces. 
 
Moral issues 
At the same time, Japan’s moral distrust of China offers another interpretation for the 
deterioration of Japan-China relations. The thesis hypothesis would suggest that Japan’s 
strategic distrust is a more important concern compared to moral distrust. Therefore, there 
are two main tasks when discussing Japan’s moral distrust: to discover the status of 
Japan’s moral distrust of China, and to understand how important it is to Japan-China 
relations. Though moral distrust does not hold a dominant position in Japan’s overall 
distrust of China, it could hardly be denied that it is observable in the affairs between the 
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two countries, and that it has a significant impact on strategic distrust as well as the 
overall Japan-China relationship. 
 
Broadly speaking, moral distrust stands for the distrust towards another actor over its 
“nature of being a state”. In terms of the conception of moral norms, mentioned in the 
theoretical discussions, it is a kind of “good will” or “oughtness” in interstate behaviour 
(Uslaner, 2002; Finnemore & Sikkink, 1998, p. 891). If a certain country acts in a way 
that follows international norms or rules, the other actor might tend to trust that both 
might benefit from norm-following activities. However, if one actor is believed not to 
follow the moral norms of international relations, it might not be trusted by other states. 
Compared with strategic distrust, which is based on judgements of information or 
predictions because of a lack of intelligence, moral distrust seems to be more irrational. 
However, it reflects the sources of distrust apart from those of strategic issues.  
 
As a result of China’s actions, Japan treats China as not being a responsible actor in the 
international community. In fact, the moral distrust includes the following aspects: firstly, 
Japan distrusts China because of its communist ideology and non-democratic, 
single-party political system; secondly, Japan distrusts China due to its irresponsible 
behaviours and activities in interactions related to the bilateral relationship; thirdly, Japan 
might distrust China on moral issues due to of the concern that China would use 
historical legacies as a tool to achieve its own goals by taking advantage of Japan. 
 
Some may doubt the suggestion that Japan’s moral distrust of China’s ideology and 
political system would have a negative impact on bilateral relations. Some might argue 
that this kind of Cold War legacy should have vanished in the practice of international 
relations, especially because China consciously has tried to dilute its communist 
influences after the end of Cold War. However, there are explanations for how this could 
happen in the 21st century. Although there might be debates and criticism, both 
democratic peace theory and Fukuyama’s argument regarding the “end of history” have 
significant influence on the practice of international relations. Therefore, as China 
remains a one-party system, which is different from the Western mainstream liberal 
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democracy (including Japan), it is questioned by Japan. The main reasons Japan distrusts 
China in this field include, but are not limited to the following:  
i. Whether the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) represents the will of the Chinese 
people. One possible argument is that the authoritarian Chinese government could 
harm Japanese national interests through foreign policies designed to maintain its 
domestic legitimacy.  
ii. China does not agree with the “universal values”, which are generally based on 
Western traditions. The universal values include, for example, democracy and 
human rights which have become sensitive issues in Chinese politics. If China 
does not accept the basic norms that Japan follows, it is reasonable that Japan 
would distrust China on these moral issues. 
 
Besides, whether China is a responsible actor in international society, in a way that would 
match its national power is doubted by Japan. Any offence to international laws or 
principles would deepen Japan’s existing doubts that China might become a 
trouble-maker due to its growing power, rather than a partner. For instance, there are 
cases when negative incidents have taken place in the Japan-China relations, China might 
unilaterally postpone or halt normal bilateral events—possibly as punishments (such as 
the events of 40th Anniversary of Normalization in 2012).11  
 
Another core moral issue would be the long-term disputes between Japan and China over 
historical legacies. China has always requested that Japan face up to its responsibilities 
for war crimes. However, Japan doubts China’s purpose for continually focusing on 
history. First, Japan believes it has expressed apologies, so there should be no reason for 
China to stick with the history issues. Second, China might try to direct the domestic 
dissatisfaction of civil society into strong nationalism directed at Japan. This type of 
argument arose in 2005 and 2012, when large-scale anti-Japan protests took place in 
China. Third, China could use history issues as a barrier to Japan’s revival as a critical 
political power in international relations. The successful Chinese attempt to block Japan 
                                                 
11 See Press Conference of Ministry of Foreign Affairs of People’s Republic of China on 28/09/12. 
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from becoming a permanent member of the UN Security Council due to Japan’s lack of 
introspection over its war history, is a typical incident. 
 
There is direct and indirect empirical evidence, and academic discussions with which one 
can test and verify these categories of Japan’s moral distrust of China, which is 
articulated in the following section of this chapter. A general description and an 
evaluation of the tendencies is also provided. This thesis argues that Japan’s current 
distrust of China on moral issues can be regarded as one crucial source of and component 
to the overall level of distrust. However, moral distrust is the secondary part, as opposed 
to the current priority of strategic issues in bilateral distrust. For these moral issues, Japan 
is indeed concerned and might use discourse from official channels or foreign policies to 
react to or deal with the incidents. Yet, compared to strategic issues, Japan has paid less 
attention to moral issues in bilateral relations. Besides, when expressing its concerns over 
moral issues, Japan tends to take indirect actions, including statements that do not name a 
specific state, using more moderate wording, or claiming that activities such as military 
exercises would not focus on a specific country. Therefore, moral distrust is treated as an 
important part in Japan’s distrust of China, but is not the core concern. 
 
In terms of Japan’s moral distrust of China, one could predict that moral issues might 
become more important in bilateral relations, but will not surpass strategic distrust as the 
main concentration, in the foreseeable future. The reason for reinforcing its importance is 
that doubts of China’s morals would grow alongside continued disputes over strategic 
issues. Moreover, there might even be critics who argue that Japan distrusts China 
because China does not belong to the Western moral group that shares universal values. 
This might be regarded as a method to balance against China’s aggressive activities with 
strategic calculations. However, it has to be mentioned again that strategic distrust 
remains its dominant focus as the strategic disputes with China are the direct threats to 
Japanese national interests based on theories of state rationality. This overall situation 
will set the context for the Japan-China bilateral relationship in the long term. If there 
would be a prediction of when both the strategic and moral distrust could be eased, a 
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possible answer might be that it could only be achieved alongside with a reconciliation 
between the two states. 
 
 
5.2 The tests of strategic and moral distrust 
5.2.1 Japan’s strategic distrust of China 
The core question to answer is how to define the Chinese strategic doctrines which shape 
Japan’s current strategic distrust. The case analysis combines the empirical evidence of 
Chinese strategic behaviour and Japanese reactions with an interpretation of strategic 
distrust in the form of both discourse and foreign policy.  
 
At the governmental level: 
Content Type Trust or distrust Frequency 
Topple/change/challenge the 
status quo/ existing order (by 
force) 
Description of 
China’s activity 
distrust 31 
Escalation/escalate Description of 
China’s activity 
distrust 21 
(profoundly/extremely) 
dangerous 
Description of 
China’s activity 
distrust 18 
Unilateral/unilaterally Description of 
China’s activity 
distrust 17 
(extremely) provocative 
actions 
Description of 
China’s activity 
distrust 14 
(extremely) regrettable Description of 
China’s activity 
distrust 9 
(unduly) infringe the 
freedom 
Description of 
China’s activity 
distrust 5 
have serious impacts/ serious 
problem 
Description of 
China’s activity 
distrust 3 
cause unintended 
consequences 
Description of 
China’s activity 
distrust 3 
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Not transparent/ lacking 
transparency 
Description of 
China’s activity 
distrust 3 
have no validity Description of 
China’s activity 
distrust 2 
does not follow the 
instructed procedures 
Description of 
China’s activity 
distrust 2 
intrusions Description of 
China’s activity 
distrust 2 
extremely damaging Description of 
China’s activity 
distrust 1 
lead to an unexpected 
occurrence of accidents 
Description of 
China’s activity 
distrust 1 
deeply deplorable Description of 
China’s activity 
distrust 1 
incorrect and entirely 
irrelevant 
Description of 
China’s activity 
distrust 1 
Added up Description of 
China’s activity 
distrust 134 
  trust 0 
    
Cannot/could not accept/ 
unacceptable 
Japan’s attitude/ 
Description of 
China’s activity 
distrust 18 
Added up Japan’s attitude/ 
Description of 
China’s activity 
distrust 18 
  trust 0 
    
(strong) protest Japan’s attitude distrust 28 
(deep) concern Japan’s attitude distrust 22 
enhance this relationship Japan’s attitude trust 7 
Urge China to revoke Japan’s attitude distrust 9 
Request China to fulfill its Japan’s attitude distrust 5 
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responsibility/ request a 
sincere response 
one of the most important 
bilateral relationships 
Japan’s attitude trust 4 
(strongly) demand the 
prevention 
Japan’s attitude distrust 4 
will not tolerate Japan’s attitude distrust 1 
Have strong doubts Japan’s attitude distrust 1 
we would like China to 
provide thorough 
explanations 
Japan’s attitude distrust 1 
cannot at all accept China’s 
assertion 
Japan’s attitude distrust 1 
overreaction Japan’s attitude distrust 1 
Japan is ready to maintain 
close communications with 
China in an effort to ease 
tensions. 
Japan’s attitude trust 1 
Added up Japan’s attitude distrust 73 
  trust 12 
    
Total  distrust 225 
  trust 12 
 
Table 5. 2: Frequency of trust/distrust discourse of Japanese government on strategic 
issues 
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Chart 5. 2: Bar chart of Table 5.2 
 
In the case of Japan-China maritime disputes, five specific issues are identified as 
significant examples, including: Air defence identification zone, Chinese defence 
spending, Chinese aircraft incidents, Chinese naval vessel’s weapon-guiding radar 
lock-on incident, and the Diaoyu/Senkaku islands disputes. A search of files published on 
the website of Japan’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MOFA), uncovers about 26 files12 
(some of these files could be re-used in different specific issues). As shown in the above 
table, words/sentences that show Japanese distrust of China are found 225 times in these 
files and documents. At the same time, the words or sentences showing an attitude of 
relative trust appear only about 12 times. Linguistically, the words and sentences are 
divided into three categories of “Japan’s attitude”, “Description of China’s activity”, and 
a combination of the two. The significance of this division is that the difference between 
“how could one actor judge the essence of the activities of another” (description of 
China’s activity) and “how would one actor view the issues and react under these 
circumstances” (Japan’s attitude) can be identified.  
                                                 
12 For the list of files, see appendix at the end of the thesis.  
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In terms of the overall statistics, the 225 appearances of “distrustful” discourse consisted 
of 134 “descriptions of China’s activity”, 73 of “Japan’s attitude”, and 18 combinations 
of the two. The 12 appearances of “trusting” words and sentences are all 12 about 
“Japan’s attitude”. In general, Japan’s overall strategic trust/distrust of China from the 
official Japanese government perspective has the following characteristics: 
 
1. The appearance of “distrust” is much more than of “trust”. (225-12) 
2. “Description of China’s activity” is more present than its own attitude (“Japan’s 
attitude”). (134-73) 
3. No evidence of trust could be identified within the “description of China’s 
activity”. On the contrary, most of the appearances of “trust” discourse exist 
regarding “Japan’s attitude”. 
4. However, even within the “Japan’s attitude” category, distrust still remains 
dominant compared to trust. (73-12)  
 
The first characteristics concluded from the statistics would fit the hypothesis that Japan 
has a strong distrust of China on strategic issues. Even though the case of Japan-China 
maritime disputes cannot cover all strategic disputes between the two countries, it has 
proven to be the hottest topic and attracted the most strategic attention from Japan and 
China in this region in recent years. According to the statistics, the most commonly used 
discourse to show Japan’s attitude of distrust is: “Topple/change/challenge the status 
quo/existing order (by force)” (31 times), “Escalation/escalate” (21 times), 
“(profoundly/extremely) dangerous” (18 times), “Unilateral/unilaterally” (17 times), 
“(extremely) provocative actions” (14 times) in the category of “description of China’s 
activity”; “(strong) protest” (28 times), “deep concerns” (22 times), “(Urge China to) 
revoke” (6 times), “Request China to fulfill its responsibility/request a sincere response” 
(5 times), and “(strongly) demand the prevention” (4 times) in the category of “Japanese 
attitude”; and “Cannot/could not accept/ unacceptable” (18 times) in the combination of 
the two categories.  
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One could conclude from the statistics that “description of China’s activity” is more 
about showing Japan’s own attitude (134-73). It is important to understand why there is 
such a gap between the two approaches and how it contributes to the hypothesis. The 
description of the activities of another actor will directly show how “unacceptable” the 
actions are, from a “fair” or “neutral” position. Therefore, distrust of the other actor 
might be regarded as reasonable. On the other hand, a direct expression of Japan’s own 
attitude would have been a better approach to show distrust of China. However, in terms 
of the strategic issues in this region, Japan insists that it is China which is challenging the 
status quo. Therefore, a description of China’s actions would work better than a unilateral 
claim.  
 
At the same time, little evidence of trust of China could be discovered in the descriptions 
of China’s activities, most of which could be found in “Japan’s attitude”. There is an 
explanation that, to a certain extent, Japan still wants to maintain a constructive bilateral 
relationship with China so that it can argue that “Japan has made every effort to further 
develop the bilateral relations with China”. On the other hand, it might also be explained 
as pointing out China’s responsibilities rather than Japan’s regarding the disputes; that 
Japan has made an effort to ease tensions, while China has taken different actions that 
have escalated them. 
 
However, it cannot be ignored that even within the scale of “Japan’s attitude”, distrust 
still holds the dominant position compared to trust (48-12). This shows that the 
mainstream trend in Sino-Japanese relations is undoubtedly that of distrust. Though 
directly indicating its own attitude could be regarded as a gentler and softer approach on 
certain occasions, Japan still clearly shows its distrust of China. In this way, it is 
reasonable that no discourse of trust is identified in the description of China’s activities. 
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At the public level: 
In terms of public opinion between Japan and China, the “Japan-China Public Opinion 
Survey”,13 which is organised by the Public Opinion Research Institute Corporation 
(Japan) and China Daily, Horizon Research Consultancy Group (China) is an 
authoritative survey to analyse. The significance of the survey for researching trust and 
distrust between Japan and China is as follows: First, there might be survey questions 
directly related to the status of trust between the two countries. Second, the status of trust 
and distrust could be analysed through indirect data, such as national images, 
positive/negative images, and so on. Third, specific to strategic issues, the survey 
questions related to bilateral cooperation/disputes would help discover which of the 
issues resulted in strategic trust and distrust.  
 
Both the qualitative and quantitative methods will be applied to the analysis, as with the 
previous section on the governmental level. However, there is a different arrangement to 
the structure of the analysis, with a more mixed analysis.  
 
Question 1: Barriers to Development of Bilateral Relations 
                                                 
13 Available at: http://www.genron-npo.net/en/pp/archives/5217.html, accessed 10/04/16 
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Figure 5. 1: Barriers to Development of Bilateral Relations 
 
Despite the specific cases which could show bilateral disputes, there are some data that 
directly reflects the trust and distrust issue between Japan and China, both at the 
governmental and civil society levels. According to the survey, 25.9% of the Japanese 
public in the survey thinks the “lack of trustful relations between Japanese and Chinese 
peoples” is a barrier to the development of bilateral relations. At the same time, 38.2% 
think the “lack of trust between Japanese and Chinese governments” is a barrier. There 
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are two conclusions one can draw from these data. Firstly, the Japanese public has clearly 
recognised that the lack of mutual trust has become one of the most important issues 
between Japan and China, despite of the problems in the detailed cases. To be accurate, 
distrust has become a crucial barrier to the bilateral relations. Secondly, the lack of trust 
at both governmental and civil society levels has been identified. An overall trend is that 
both categories of distrust are at a comparatively high level, or at least should have 
received enough attention to be well dealt with. The fact that 25.9% focused on the “lack 
of trust between peoples” and 38.2% focused on the “lack of trust between governments” 
means that a large portion of the public has pointed out the problems of distrust, no 
matter on what level. Another fact is that the data shows that more interviewees believed 
there is a trust crisis between the governments, more so than between the people. 
Therefore, the two governments should take more responsibility for the problems of 
distrust. 
 
More specific options arose, related to strategic concerns: “Territorial issue 
(Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands)” (56.0%), “Disputes over marine resources (gas field 
development in East China Sea)” (26.6%) and “China’s military buildup” (14.3%). These 
answers stress the existence of Chinese distrust, especially over the maritime disputes. 
 
Question 2: Impressions of Each Other’s Country 
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Figure 5. 2: Impressions of Each Other’s Country 
 
There is a clear trend in Japanese public opinion that the percentage of those who hold a 
favourable or relatively-favourable impression of China is in decline over recent years, 
while unfavourable or relatively-unfavourable opinions are on the rise. In the data from 
2015, the favourable/relatively-favourable accounted for only 10.6%. At the same time, 
88.8% of the interviewees indicated an unfavourable or relatively-unfavourable attitude. 
It is difficult to imagine that Japanese civil society would trust China with such a low 
level of favourable attitudes. While it cannot be directly concluded from these statistics, 
distrust is a better interpretation of the current status between the two countries. 
Moreover, the conclusion is not accidental, as the data of the most recent decade in the 
table has shown a clear trend of rise in the percentage of “unfavourable” and a declining 
trend in “favourable” options.  
 
Question 3: Countries and Regions That Are Military Threats 
According to the survey, 68.1% of Japanese interviewees indicated that they regard China 
as a military threat. China is second in this category to North Korea (at 75.0%), but it is 
still a clear symbol that the Japanese public seriously considers China to be a security and 
strategic problem. Hence, the mixed emotions of worry, uncertainty and fear could reflect 
distrust from the Japanese perspective.  
 
Question 4: Sources of Information on Each Other's Country 
It is important to understand why the civil society of a country might have certain 
impressions of other states. Despite the detailed affairs between countries, the sources of 
information for the public are a crucial determinant. The data show that the main sources 
of information on China for the Japanese public are domestic Japanese news media 
(95.8%). A large majority (75.8%) cite TV as their main source of information. It is 
reasonable and understandable that most ordinary citizens would not actively seek 
external sources of information to understand the bilateral relations with another country. 
However, it is inevitable that a lack of direct civil interactions might lead to different 
types of misunderstanding, which might weaken the trust of another country. It is not 
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absolute, however, that the influence of the mass media would be a determinant of trust 
and distrust. Under the circumstance of comparatively bad bilateral relations, most 
citizens would receive negative information from the media (and other sources) about the 
other state. Therefore, there is the potential for greater distrust of the other country. 
 
The correspondence between incidents and discourse/foreign policies 
This section will try to interpret the evidence of strategic trust/distrust in each of the 
chosen cases, in order to find out how different issues between the two countries lead to 
reactions which have great impact on bilateral relations. It could highlight which 
incidents have led to more serious mutual distrust than others, as well as the contrary. 
 
In terms of the Japan-China maritime disputes, the most significant incidents are related 
to the problem caused by the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands. There are specific, individual 
incidents as well as continual, existing problems. The 2010 Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands 
collision, the 2013 incident when China’s Weapons-Guiding Radar locked incident, and 
the Chinese government’s establishment of the East China Sea Air Defence Identification 
Zone in 2013 are the cases that will be analysed. The analysis will focus on Chinese 
strategic behaviour in these instances; Japan’s reactions – including discourse, related 
foreign policies, as well as voices from public opinion; and try to interpret how these 
strategic doctrines lead to Japan’s distrust. 
 
1) 2010 Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands boat collision incident 
This incident took place on September 7th, 2010. A Chinese fishing trawler collided with 
a Japanese Coast Guard boat near the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands. The Chinese captain was 
detained and was followed by a series of disputes between Japan and China. 
 
The Chinese strategic behaviour in this case: the Chinese government repeatedly claimed 
its sovereignty over the Diaoyu Islands, and argued that it was illegal for Japan to take 
administrative actions in the area; after the collision, China started regular cruises by 
official ocean surveillance ships and sometimes flybys with their aircraft, which they had 
never done before. In general, the Chinese actions included both territorial claims on 
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paper and actual strategic behaviour of securing some kind of territorial claim through the 
use of national power. 
 
The Japanese reactions: The thesis will collect and examine the discourse of the Japanese 
government and public opinion, and foreign policies to deal with the disputes. It should 
be mentioned that the official documents include not only the ones related to the collision 
itself, but also those discussing the issues of cruises – excluding the incident over the 
radar lock, which will be analysed separately. 
 
The main Japanese reactions and policies: 
The main reaction by the Japanese government was that, on September 23rd, 2010, 
Japanese Minister of Foreign Affairs Seiji Maehara met with United States Secretary of 
State Hillary Clinton. It was reported by the Japanese media that the US would confirm 
that the Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security between the United States and Japan 
should cover the Senkaku Islands. Japan and the US also reemphasised the significance 
of the US-Japan alliance for regional peace. 
 
Japanese official discourse: 
Through official statements, position papers and other sources from the Japanese 
government, a variety of different discourse can be discovered. A table of general 
statistics of the discourse and the interpretation is provided as follows.  
 
Words or sentences Nature Trust or distrust Times of 
appearance 
Provocative (actions) Description of 
China’s activity 
distrust 8 
(extremely) regrettable Description of 
China’s activity 
distrust 4 
protest Japan’s attitude Distrust 4 
Strongly urge Japan’s attitude Distrust 2 
(deep) concern Japan’s attitude Distrust 11 
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Escalation/escalate Description of 
China’s activity 
distrust 7 
unilateral Description of 
China’s activity 
distrust 6 
Topple/change/challenge the 
status quo/ existing order 
Description of 
China’s activity 
distrust 11 
Use force Description of 
China’s activity 
distrust 5 
unacceptable Description of 
China’s activity 
distrust 1 
Japan attaches great 
importance to its relationship 
with neighboring China. 
Japan’s attitude trust 1 
Japan has continuously and 
consistently supported the 
reform and door-opening 
policies that China has 
undertaken and has offered 
cooperation so that China 
can play a significant role in 
the international community. 
Japan’s attitude trust 1 
Japan has made every effort 
to further develop the 
bilateral relations with 
China. 
Japan’s attitude trust 1 
overreaction Japan’s attitude Distrust 1 
incorrect and entirely 
irrelevant 
Description of 
China’s activity 
distrust 1 
(extremely) dangerous Description of 
China’s activity 
distrust 3 
Japan’s relationship with 
neighboring China 
represents one of Japan’s 
Japan’s attitude trust 1 
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most important bilateral 
relationships. The 
government of Japan hopes 
to enhance its relations with 
China’s new leadership. 
We will continue to promote 
the “mutually beneficial 
relationship based on 
common strategic interests” 
between Japan and China 
from a broad perspective. 
Japan’s attitude trust 1 
Added up  distrust 64 
 Japan’s attitude  18 
 Description of 
China’s activity 
 46 
  trust 5 
 Japan’s attitude  5 
    
 
Table 5. 3: Frequency of trust/distrust discourse on 2010 Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands boat 
collision incident14 
 
                                                 
14 For the list of files on every specific incident, see the appendix at the end of the thesis 
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Chart 5. 3: Bar chart of Table 5.3 
 
2) 2013 Chinese vessel’s Weapons-guiding Radar Lock-on incident 
Japan claimed that, on January 30th, 2013, a Chinese military ship directed its 
weapons-guiding radar to lock on to a Japanese naval ship near the disputed area in the 
East China Sea. From the Japanese description, it can be observed that Japan treated the 
incident as very serious and dangerous, that the Japanese military force was directly 
threatened, and might lead to open conflict if things were not effectively controlled 
immediately. The reason why this case is analysed separately is that, although there have 
been other cases regarding territorial issues around the Diaoyu/Senkaku islands, they 
have been controlled by the two governments and did not lead to serious problems. Even 
in the cases when “aircraft engaged abnormally”, there was comparatively little chance 
that direct military actions would be taken. However, this case of a Chinese vessel’s 
weapon-guiding radar lock is essentially different. In general, this kind of incident is 
obviously more dangerous and might directly lead to military activities between the two 
forces.  
 
Japanese reactions and foreign policies: 
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One of the significant pieces of evidence for Japan’s reaction to deal with the potential 
military threat from China was the growth of its defence budget. The 2013 budget grew 
from ¥46.453 billion in 2012 to ¥46.8 billion.15 It was the first time that the defence 
budget of Japan rose since 2002, and the main growth was in its air and naval forces.  
 
Japanese official discourse: 
 
Content Type Trust or distrust Frequency 
protest Japan’s attitude Distrust 7 
Cannot/could not accept/ 
unacceptable 
Japan’s attitude/ 
Description of 
China’s activity 
distrust 6 
extremely damaging Description of 
China’s activity 
distrust 1 
Request China to fulfill its 
responsibility/request a 
sincere response 
Japan’s attitude Distrust 5 
intrusions Description of 
China’s activity 
distrust 2 
It is our recognition that 
Japan-China relations are 
one of the most important 
bilateral relations, and that 
Japan-China relations are of 
the utmost importance not 
merely for the people of both 
countries but also for the 
peace and prosperity of the 
Asia-Pacific region. We 
must return to our original 
point of mutually beneficial 
Japan’s attitude trust 1 
                                                 
15 http://www.mod.go.jp/e/d_budget/pdf/250516.pdf 
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relationship based on 
common strategic interests 
and address Japan-China 
relations calmly and based 
on a broad perspective. 
an (extremely) provocative 
act 
Description of 
China’s activity 
distrust 6 
(extremely) regrettable Description of 
China’s activity 
distrust 5 
unilateral Description of 
China’s activity 
distrust 2 
attempting to change the 
existing order/ topple the 
status quo (through coercion 
and intimidation) 
Description of 
China’s activity 
distrust 2 
Escalating (the situation) Description of 
China’s activity 
distrust 3 
Deeply concerned Japan’s attitude Distrust 2 
Urges China to exercise 
self-restraint 
Japan’s attitude Distrust 1 
Japan is ready to maintain 
close communications with 
China in an effort to ease 
tensions. 
Japan’s attitude trust 1 
Added up  distrust 42 
 Japan’s attitude  15 
 Description of 
China’s activity 
 21 
 Japan’s attitude/ 
Description of 
China’s activity 
 6 
  trust 2 
 Japan’s attitude  2 
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Table 5. 4: Frequency of trust/distrust discourse on 2013 Chinese vessel’s 
Weapons-guiding Radar Lock-on incident 
 
 
 
Chart 5. 4: Bar chart of Table 5.4 
 
3) The establishment of East China Sea Air Defence Identification Zone by the Chinese 
government in 2013 
On November 23rd, 2010, China announced the establishment of its East China Sea Air 
Defence Identification Zone (ADIZ). The Chinese ADIZ covered the disputed 
Diaoyu/Senkaku area, and overlapped in areas with the Japanese ADIZ. The ADIZ 
requests that aircraft from other states report their flying plans, otherwise they might be 
monitored (or more) by the Chinese authorities. As soon as the Chinese ADIZ 
announcement was published, it was greatly criticised and rejected by some of the 
regional powers, including Japan and its ally, the US. 
 
Japanese reactions and foreign policies: 
Despite the growth of its defence budget, Japan took different actions to balance the 
establishment of a Chinese AIDZ. The Japanese government refused to acknowledge the 
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Chinese ADIZ, and persuaded its commercial airlines to not submit their flight plans to 
China. In addition, Japanese military jets entered the Chinese ADIZ near the disputed 
areas to monitor the Chinese aircrafts entering ‘Japanese airspace’.  
 
Japanese official discourse: 
 
Content Type Trust or distrust Frequency 
Deep concern Japan’s attitude distrust 5 
Profoundly/extremely 
dangerous 
Description of 
China’s activity 
distrust 8 
Unilaterally (change the 
status quo/ unilaterally alter 
the status quo)/ unilateral 
action/ unilateral 
establishment 
Description of 
China’s activity 
distrust 9 
Escalate the situation Description of 
China’s activity 
distrust 4 
does not follow the 
instructed procedures 
Description of 
China’s activity 
distrust 2 
(unduly) infringe the 
freedom 
Description of 
China’s activity 
distrust 5 
have serious impacts/ serious 
problem 
Description of 
China’s activity 
distrust 3 
have no validity Description of 
China’s activity 
distrust 2 
cannot accept Japan’s attitude distrust 2 
could not be accepted at all/ 
totally unacceptable 
Description of 
China’s activity 
distrust 2 
(Urge China to) revoke Japan’s attitude distrust 6 
Protest Japan’s attitude distrust 10 
lead to an unexpected 
occurrence of accidents 
Description of 
China’s activity 
distrust 1 
one of the most important Japan’s attitude trust 1 
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bilateral relationships 
enhance this relationship Japan’s attitude trust 1 
will not tolerate Japan’s attitude distrust 1 
Change the status quo by 
force 
Description of 
China’s activity 
distrust 2 
cause unintended 
consequences 
Description of 
China’s activity 
distrust 3 
Added up  distrust 65 
 Description of 
China’s activity 
 41 
 Japan’s attitude  24 
  trust 2 
 Japan’s attitude  2 
 
Table 5. 5: Frequency of trust/distrust discourse on the establishment of East China Sea 
Air Defence Identification Zone by the Chinese government in 2013 
 
 
 
Chart 5. 5: Bar chart of Table 5.5 
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Qualitative analysis as interpretation  
The quantitative calculation of the appearances of trust/distrust discourse will help verify 
the existence of trust and distrust in the selected cases, with the view that the discourse 
was not accidental. At the same time, it is also necessary to verify whether the discourse 
had the essence of trust or distrust. Considering the characteristics of strategic issues, the 
standards are whether certain discourse reflects the acknowledgement or lack of 
information, which is the source of trust and distrust. Hence, it is possible that the impact 
of trust and distrust on bilateral relations could also be verified by interpreting these 
incidents. 
 
1) 2010 Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands boat collision incident 
Japan’s reactions and policies 
The basic dispute between Japan and China is an overlapping claim on the territory. From 
the Japanese perspective, the Chinese claim is part of its strategic planning. Japan insists 
that China had kept silent until the last decades in the 20th century about the 
Diaoyu/Senkaku sovereignty. There are at least two reasons for why the Chinese might 
concentrate on this issue. Firstly, Chinese national power has grown to a certain level 
which makes it strong enough to support Chinese overseas strategies. Secondly, there 
were reports that rich oil resources were discovered near the Diaoyu/Senkaku Islands 
(Pan, 2007; Maincom, 2008). Based on state rationality, Japan would distrust China’s 
strategies, either because of opaque goals as long-term blueprints or the clear goal of 
acquiring the sovereignty of the Diaoyu/Senkaku Islands. At the same time, the national 
interests of territory and resources of the Diaoyu/Senkaku Islands, which are currently 
under Japanese control, might be harmed (Valencia, 2007). Therefore, the Japanese 
reactions could be interpreted as a policy to address Chinese strategic behaviour, which 
reflects its distrust.  
 
One of the main policies was strengthening the US-Japan alliance (Garrett & Glaser, 
1997; Vogel, 2002; Zhang, 2006; 2012). The logic was that Japan believes the having the 
US as a strategic partner could help secure its national interests and regional order, while 
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China could not be trusted. Considering that China’s national power is greater than ever 
before, it is a rational choice for Japan to cooperate with the US to confront/address the 
distrusted nation.  
 
Japanese official discourse 
This is a definite dispute which includes issues of territory, natural resources, military 
engagement and national dignity. In this way, most significant trends of Japanese 
strategic distrust of China can be identified in the facts. The dominance of distrust 
discourse, more description of China’s activities than Japan’s own attitudes, the 
considerable usage of “strong-distrust” combinations, and the trust-discourse of 
strengthening the importance of the Sino-Japanese relationship instead of any essential 
cooperative interactions could all be evidence of Japan’s strategic distrust of China, 
which is a serious problem. 
 
Japanese public opinion 
Although civil society is not the main executor of international affairs, it has the potential 
to greatly influence the overall level of trust and distrust between countries. At the same 
time, the attitudes of the public are affected by a wide range of factors. Theoretically, the 
uncertainty caused by a lack of information, the fear of interests being harmed based on 
predictions of already-known information, and a lack of confidence of other actors’ 
nature are regarded as the general sources. In order to discern trust and distrust, the 
analysis of the indirect questions and the detailed questions of strategic issues are based 
on the “standard of measuring distrust”, mentioned above. Therefore, the qualitative 
framework could be interpreted as--whether the question and the given options could 
reflect uncertainties, a lack of confidence, and a fear which might lead to distrust.  
 
For the quantitative portion, the data should be analysed in order to judge whether certain 
options could be representative of the public’s attitudes. Since most questions received 
different majorities and minorities, a comparatively accurate conclusion could be 
reached.  
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In terms of the detailed sections and data, the overall trend is that there is a clear strategic 
distrust of China among the Japanese public. The one-sided results directly reflect a 
universal distrust of China among the Japanese public. Secondly, in terms of “the barriers 
to development of bilateral relations”, the Japanese public clearly recognises that distrust 
between the two governments and the peoples has become an obstacle between Japan and 
China.  
 
The trend of distrust among the Japanese public can also be seen in the questions about 
China’s national image, the future of bilateral relations, Japan-China cooperation issues, 
sources of information, and so on. In fact, the impressions of China and the related 
questions reflect the attitudes on whether to trust China or not. The overall negative 
impression (88.8% unfavourable or comparatively unfavourable) shows that, due to 
certain issues (whether uncertainties, lack of confidence, or fear), the Japanese public 
holds a very negative attitude towards China. Therefore, it is reasonable to interpret the 
data as showing distrust. 
 
There are survey questions which show the specific strategic issues of Japan’s distrust of 
China. The data on “reasons of negative impression” indicate that Chinese activities 
including “securing the resources”, “military build-up without transparency”, “being 
hegemonic” and “being incompatible with International rules” are considered the main 
reasons for negative impressions. The situation is similar when the Japanese public are 
asked about possible Chinese military threats, and other detailed reasons that are barriers 
to the development of bilateral relations, such as the Senkaku/Diaoyu disputes. The data 
shows that the Japanese public lacks confidence in a long-term constructive relationship 
with China, with fears of non-transparency as well as already-available information on 
existing confrontations. Therefore, these issues could be regarded as the sources of 
Japan’s strategic distrust of China at the public level. 
 
2) 2013 Chinese vessel’s Weapons-guiding Radar Lock-on incident 
Japanese reactions and policies 
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Considering the fact that the Japanese defence budget had been dropping for about ten 
years before 2013, the reversal could show that the strong strategic distrust was directly 
reflected in Japanese policies. As has been mentioned, the weapons-guiding radar lock 
incident was regarded as extremely dangerous by Japan, so based on rational calculations, 
Japan would have to use its defence budget to deal with potential threats. In a peaceful 
era, increasing military expenditure would bring more costs and burdens for a state. In 
this instance, Japan increased its defence budget because it distrusted its strategic future 
with China to very large degree. Therefore, Japan’s strategic distrust of China is not only 
real, but becoming an emergency for Japan. 
 
Japanese official discourse 
From official Japanese discourse, much evidence of distrust is observable. This thesis has 
examined 26 official documents, which are listed on the MOFA website by specific issue. 
(A list of these documents can be found in the reference list.) A primary task for 
analysing the documents was to define whether Japan’s trust or distrust of China on 
strategic issues was reflected in the texts. This section takes an analysis of the document 
“Position Paper: Japan-China Relations Surrounding the Situation of the Senkaku Islands 
– In response to China’s Weapons-guiding Radar Lock-on”16 as an example to explore 
how Chinese behaviour has led to Japanese distrust. 
 
The position paper is an official explanation of the maritime disputes between Japan and 
China, focusing on the specific incident of the radar lock, which is a typical case in 
Sino-Japanese bilateral relations in recent years. The document includes four sections: an 
introduction of the incident; an analysis of the further development of the incident; a 
claim of Japanese official response and attitude to the incident, as well as to overall 
bilateral relations; and the “facts” of the incident as a reference.  
 
In the introduction to the incident, the Japanese official attitude is to define it as a 
provocative action by China, which might cause further escalation in the future. 
                                                 
16 http://www.mofa.go.jp/region/asia-paci/senkaku/position_paper3_en.html, accessed 30/12/14 
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According to the theoretical discussion of the notion of distrust and the standard for 
measuring distrust, this type of description could be classified as distrust. One reason is 
that the phrase provocative act has the subtext that it was the national interest of Japan 
that might have be damaged by this Chinese provocation. Therefore, it would be 
reasonable to assume that China damaging Japan’s national interests would lead to 
distrust. 
 
In terms of the Japanese analysis of the further development of the incident, such a 
provocative action by China could possibly take place again. It is understandable that, 
according to theoretical rationality of countries in international relations, governments 
should be prepared for the worst. The judgement that the Chinese are continuing to 
pursue unilateral, aggressive manoeuvres shows a lack of confidence in China’s attitude 
towards cooperative relations for this dispute, which is a basic source of distrust in theory. 
At the same time, Japan emphasised that China’s activities could be regarded as an 
attempt to challenge the status quo (which could be interpreted as Japanese control of the 
seas). In this way, facing a strategic future with further aggression, Japan would with no 
doubt distrust China. 
 
Japan also mentioned its position as a peace-keeping actor in international relations. To 
strengthen itself as a responsible, norm-following actor in international affairs, Japan’s 
discourse tries to surreptitiously indicate that China does not respect basic international 
norms. As it has argued, an actor who does not follow widely accepted international 
norms would be regarded as being untrustworthy by other actors—which is another 
source of distrust aside from characteristics of state rationality. 
 
Therefore, there is a large amount of empirical evidence from the Japanese government’s 
official discourse in relation to certain cases of maritime disputes with China. The 
frequently-appearing words and sentences clearly identify Japan’s strategic distrust of 
China originates from different sources. At the same time, the frequency of 
distrust-related discourse in the documents should also be analysed. To identify distrust 
in the documents, it is necessary to prove that the use of distrust discourse is not 
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occasional but inevitable, with specific intentions. In this way, the qualitative research of 
the theoretical definition and quantitative data analysis should uncover the distrust hidden 
in the discourse of Japanese official documents. 
 
 
3) The establishment of East China Sea Air Defence Identification Zone by the Chinese 
government in 2013 
Japanese reactions and policies 
The establishment of the East China Sea ADIZ was regarded by many regional powers, 
including Japan, as a symbol of China trying to challenge the current regional order 
through the use of hard power (Hsu, 2014). If increasing ones defence budget is a method 
for address distrusted Chinese strategic behaviours, directly sending military aircrafts 
over the Chinese ADIZ is evidence that shows Japan distrusts China, because Japan’s 
national interests do not benefit from Chinese strategic doctrines – in fact, they are 
harmed. The Chinese ADIZ is different from other incidents, and could be regarded as a 
great change in international system or order. Hence, stronger reactions can be explained 
as the reflection of strategic distrust. 
 
Japanese official discourse 
The overall statistics show a clear division in the comparison between distrust and trust 
(65-2). The Chinese Air Defense Identification Zone is closely related to Japan’s air 
security. Therefore, Japan uses lots of discourse both on the description of China’s 
activities (41) and its own attitudes (26). Within its descriptive section, Japan uses 
different discourse, including “unilateral”, “escalation” and “dangerous” to indicate 
China’s responsibility for worsening the existing regional order. For the Japanese attitude, 
the most significant part is the official protest against the Chinese government, which 
shows a clear attitude of distrust (protesting because of certain available information, 
which shows a potential threat to Japan’s national interests). Though there are examples 
of “trust” discourse used in this case, they are generally of an attitude of common claims 
of willingness to strengthen bilateral relations because Japan and China are the most 
important regional powers. 
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A sectional conclusion 
In terms of the debate between normative relations and the rationality of states, strategic 
trust and distrust are present in rational choice and the following foreign policies and 
actions. As rational actors, countries have to consider existing political realities and make 
predictions in response to its national interests, including national security (Opp, 2013). 
Therefore, if there is a lack of transparency, or clear rivalry, or other related elements 
from the other actor, uncertainty would lead to distrust and resultant reactions. On the 
other hand, it is necessary that states pursue actions with lower risks and costs to solve 
the problems and disputes. Even if a country values normative actions in international 
relations, the other actors’ norm-breaking would lead to judgments of distrust. Therefore, 
the trend of trust and distrust is identified in official and governmental documents, 
including statements, records of press meetings, speeches, and so on, because they reflect 
the open stance of a country.  
 
There are several questions that need to be answered: Whether there is Japanese strategic 
distrust of China; how to identify this distrust; and whether Japanese strategic distrust of 
China is its core concern. Despite the latter, which will be addressed in other sections, the 
first two questions are core issues under discussion in this part. In terms of whether 
Japanese strategic distrust of China exists, certain evidence in support of the theoretical 
judgments is needed. The statistics show that the use of distrust discourse in the selected 
cases has an absolute dominant position compared to trusting discourse. Therefore, a 
significant attitude of distrust of China can be identified in the Japanese official 
documents. 
 
How to identify trust and distrust in these cases would be a methodological question. It is 
extremely difficult to identify the content and procedures behind-the-scenes of the 
foreign policy-making processes. Therefore, analysing both the explicit attitudes and 
behaviour of countries is the way to ascertain the level of trust and distrust. The 
discourse—whether governmental statements or VIP speeches—is meaningful as the 
official position of and guidance for foreign policy. The question is what the standards 
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are for identifying trust and distrust in the discourse. There have been debates on the 
relationship between cooperation and trust, and while it has been proven that one does 
not always equal the other, in many cases cooperation can still be regarded as an 
important sign of trust (Das & Teng, 1998; Kydd, 2001; 2000; 2005; McGillivray & 
Smith, 2000). In terms of distrust between states, most negative discourse and behaviours 
can be regarded as distrust between states. What should be carefully taken into 
consideration is the difference between “not to trust” and “distrust”. There is a significant 
difference: distrust refers to a prediction of potential damage to national interest or 
dignity. At the same time, not to trust might have not reached such a negative level that 
actors have no positive interactions, and neither trust nor distrust defines the relationship. 
Therefore, a qualitative judgment of trust and distrust would rely on the discourse with 
certain attributes. On the other hand, there are strong or weak levels trust and distrust. 
Whether certain discourse is emotionally strong or weak will without doubt help us to 
understand the levels of trust and distrust between states.  
 
The appearance of examples of “distrust” terminology is far more than of “trust” 
terminology (225-12). “Description of China’s activity” is more common than Japan’s 
own attitude (“Japan’s attitude”) (134-73), which shows that Japan insists that China’s 
strategic actions are the main causes of a worse bilateral relationship and increase in 
distrust. No evidence of trust could be identified within the “description of China’s 
activity” category. In contrast, most of the appearances of “trust” discourse exists in 
“Japan’s attitude”. However, even within “Japan’s attitude”, distrust still remains in a 
dominant position compared to trust (73-12). It is a negative sign of bilateral interactions 
that Japan might have less motivation to build trust than manage risk. Without doubt, 
Japan has a strong strategic distrust of China at the governmental level.   
 
5.2.2 Japan’s moral distrust of China 
The hypothesis of the thesis would indicate that Japan’s strategic distrust is a more 
important concern compared to moral distrust. Therefore, there are two main tasks in the 
discussion of Japan’s moral distrust: to discover the status of Japan’s moral distrust of 
China, and to understand how important it is in Japan-China relations. Although moral 
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distrust does not hold a dominant position in Japan’s overall distrust of China, it can’t be 
denied that it is evident in the affairs between the two countries, and has significant 
impact on strategic distrust, as well as overall Japan-China relations. 
 
Broadly speaking, moral distrust stands for a distrust towards another actor based on its 
“nature of being a state”. In terms of the conception of moral norms mentioned in the 
theoretical discussion, it is a kind of “good will” or “oughtness” (Finnemore & Sikkink, 
1998) of interstate behaviour. If a certain country acts in a way that follows grand 
international norms or rules, the other actor would be inclined to trust that both actors 
might benefit from norm-following activities. In contrast, if one actor is viewed as not 
following moral norms in international relations, it might not be trusted by other states. 
Compared to strategic distrust, which is based on judgements on information or 
predictions due to a lack of intelligence, moral distrust seems to be more irrational. 
However, it will reflect the sources of distrust apart from those on strategic issues. In 
terms of Japan’s moral distrust of China, it can be concluded that it is a kind of distrust 
based on two assumptions: that, on one hand, China is building (or rebuilding) a moral 
hierarchy over Japan; while on the other hand, Japan continues to distrust China because 
of its one-party ruled political system and human rights issues, which could be referred to 
as issues of ideology and values. Therefore, this case study is research of a general case, 
rather than a specific incident. 
 
The structure of the analysis of Japan’s moral distrust of China will, to a certain extent, 
be similar to the previous section on strategic distrust. The selected cases are analysed in 
two categories—at the governmental level and the civil society level. There are also 
differences in the qualitative and quantitative analysis of the cases. According to the 
primary hypothesis of the thesis, Japan’s core concern is a focus on strategic distrust, 
rather than moral distrust. The analysis of the official Japanese government documents is 
based mainly on qualitative research, and the quantitative methods will be applied to 
section on public opinion. 
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A comparative study must also be conducted of Japan’s strategic and moral distrust of 
China. The aim of the comparative study is to explain the hypothesis that Japan’s 
strategic distrust of China is a core concern, and that moral distrust is comparatively less 
significant.  
 
Background and the theoretical framework 
One of the basic characteristics of Japan’s moral distrust of China at the governmental 
level is that, although there are moral issues in bilateral relationship which might even 
garner much attention, the Japanese government does not issue many official comments 
or criticisms of China in its statements and documents, compared to strategic issues. This 
is understandable for multiple reasons. Firstly, moral issues might not have significant 
impact on the most important national interests, including national security and defence. 
Secondly, the influence of some moral issues – such as ideological debates – have been 
weakening in international relations since the end of the Cold War. Thirdly, considering 
the negative influence of potential Chinese reactions, Japan might choose not to touch 
this field, which is extremely sensitive to China. Fourthly, the characteristics of 
geopolitics and other factors, including the political culture determine that Japan will not 
address many of the moral issues as priorities in its interactions with China. 
 
The definition of moral trust and distrust in international relations is somewhat similar to 
that of strategic trust and distrust. The basic principle is the same that some interests are 
regarded as potentially harmful or might face potential threats if distrust is identified in 
certain cases. As discussed in the theoretical framework, moral trust and distrust are 
based on whether moral norms are respected. Moral norms in international relations 
represent the good will of interstate behaviour. According to Kacowicz (2005, p. 18), 
citing McElroy (1992, p. 31), “a moral norm can be defined as a behavioural prescription 
that is universal in the claims it makes and that involves a view of the actors’ own interest, 
but from the point of view of the others’ interests.” Therefore, if the expectation of one 
actor is that its moral interests will be respected is not met, or threatened, or damaged, 
then moral distrust is generated. Based on this theoretical framework, the standard for 
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judging moralistic trust and distrust is clear that certain discourse should be interpreted in 
terms of the principles of international moral norms.  
 
At the governmental level 
A qualitative analysis of official documents 
This analysis will take two sub-topics as examples to conduct research on whether such 
documents reflect Japan’s moral distrust of China, and to what extent they are significant 
to Japan-China relations. The selected sub-topics are the value issues (regarding Tibet in 
2008) and the poisoned dumpling incident of 2008. The two cases represent different 
focuses within the moral distrust issues between Japan and China. The Tibet issue in 
2008 is actually a problem of international moral norms of human rights, freedom and 
democracy, from Japan’s perspective. On the other hand, the poisoned dumpling incident 
refers to a debate about whether China can be trusted as a responsible actor (as a country) 
and that basic principles are being respected.  
 
In terms of moral values, highlighting the Tibet riots in 2008 between Japan and China, 
the documents sampled are the six records of press conferences by Japanese Foreign 
Ministers in 2008. There are also supporting documents, including one speech by and one 
interview with former Japanese Prime Minister Taro Aso (see Appendix 1). There is the 
basic background that China is not considered to be an actor who accepts Western 
democracy, and remains a communist regime from the perspective of many Western 
states, including Japan. Democracy, human rights and freedom are regarded as basic 
international principles, values, and norms by these actors. While China does not totally 
accept these values in its domestic politics, it is criticised by Western countries. The Tibet 
riot in 2008 is considered to be a collision over these different values. After the riot, 
Japan expressed its official attitude on a number of the occasions, including the press 
conferences. 
 
The first press conference was on March 18th, 2008, just four days after the Tibet riot 
began. The Japanese Foreign Minister indicated that, although the Tibet issue was a 
Chinese domestic issue, it is also a concern of the international community to secure 
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human rights. At the same time, he also asked for more transparency from China on the 
incident. Therefore Japan would disagree with China’s claims whenever ‘the situation is 
not made open’.17 It could be regarded as a typical example of distrust, because the lack 
of transparency from China might lead to a judgement on China according to existing 
evidence, which actually would be negative for the Chinese image. The use of discourse 
that “there are some people who cannot come to the conclusion that ‘Yes, that’s true’” 
could be regarded as Japan’s attitude that the Japanese government distrusts China unless 
convincing evidence is provided. 
 
The next document is the record of the Foreign Minister’s press conference on March 
25th, 2008. When asked about whether he would mention the Tibet issue to Chinese 
Minister of Foreign Affairs Yang Jiechi during his visit to Japan, the Japanese Foreign 
Minister replied, “This is necessary due to the fact that in the world at large, there is 
concern regarding human rights and at the same time, it is in the interests of China itself 
to do so.” Although the discourse does not clearly state that Japan urges China to address 
human rights, the subtext is that, while the human rights have been widely accepted in the 
world, China fails to do so. As China does not follow this international moral norm, 
Japan has reason to distrust China on this issue. However, it must be pointed out that 
Japan’s official discourse does not express strong emotions or criticisms, which has 
weakened the possible level of moral distrust. 
 
The third press conference in which distrust discourse is evident is the one on April 11th, 
2008. The Japanese Foreign Minister again asked for more transparency from China on 
the incident. Different from the previous descriptive discourse indicating the importance 
of transparency, the Minister made it clear that although the Chinese government might 
have acted in some way, “I do not think that it can be described as sufficient.” This kind 
of expression could be interpreted as distrust of Chinese activities related to moral issues, 
and that the Chinese government might not follow norms in this case. 
 
                                                 
17 http://www.mofa.go.jp/announce/fm_press/2008/3/0318.html, accessed 04/01/15 
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The final press conference with a record of distrust discourse is from April 18th, 2008. 
Despite strongly indicating again the international community’s concerns about human 
rights and asking for more transparency from China, the Japanese Foreign Minister also 
suggested that “China should, for its own good, lend an ear to those opinions.”18 After a 
month, Japanese official attitude was still trying to persuade China to listen to the 
opinions of the Western states, which might mean that Chinese actions did not satisfy the 
other actors, including Japan, which would lead to distrust of China as an irresponsible 
actor in the international community. 
 
Meanwhile, there were also two press conference (on April 1st and April 8th, 2008) during 
which little evidence of distrust was observed through the discourse. When asked about 
the knock-on effect of the Tibet riot on the 2008 Beijing Olympic Torch Relay, the 
Minister clearly denied the possibility of an official boycott of the Olympics. This 
attitude could be interpreted as an attempt to reduce the negative impact on bilateral 
relations caused by the distrust discourse or Japan’s call for more progress on human 
rights in other areas. However, no significant evidence of trust could be identified in the 
discourse. 
 
In conclusion, the moral distrust of China at the governmental level has several crucial 
characteristics. Firstly, moral distrust indeed exists at the governmental level. The moral 
distrust issues include those concerning international moral norms such as human rights, 
democracy and political freedom. The discourse used by the Japanese Foreign Minister 
during the press conferences shows that the Chinese government is not regarded as a 
responsible actor in terms of these norms, from the view of many Western states 
including Japan, to a certain extent. The two existing theoretical pillars of information 
(transparency) and trust, as well as norm-following and trust, clearly present a link 
between certain discourse and attitudes of distrust. 
 
                                                 
18 http://www.mofa.go.jp/announce/fm_press/2008/4/0418.html, accessed 04/01/15 
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Secondly, compared to the distrust over strategic issues, Japan’s moral distrust of China 
at the governmental level is regarded as weaker, through both qualitative and quantitative 
analysis. Regarding issues of strategic distrust, Japan uses clearly defined distrust 
discourse, and even very strong emotional expressions such as “extremely dangerous”, 
“unilaterally challenge to the status quo” and “provocative actions”. However, similar 
discourse was not observed in relation to moral issues. The most common use of distrust 
discourse in moral issues is to mention to China the concerns of other actors in the 
international community about human rights in relation to Tibet. One interpretation is 
that Japan tries not to directly challenge China on the sensitive topic, although the failure 
to follow norms does not fit with Japan’s values, and indeed leads to distrust. On the 
other hand, the frequency that strategic distrust discourse appeared in official documents 
is much higher than that of moral distrust. According to the quantitative calculation in the 
previous analysis, more than 200 pieces of distrust discourse were identified in the 26 
related documents. In comparison, fewer documents and less discourse could be found in 
the case of moral issues.  
 
The overall logic and interpretation of Japan’s moral distrust of China at the 
governmental level is as follows: based on the theoretical framework of following 
international norms as the standard for judging whether an actor can be trusted, it would 
be reasonable for Japan to distrust China. There is empirical evidence in governmental 
documents which show an official attitude of distrust from the Japanese government. In 
the case of human rights and the Tibet riot in 2008, Chinese actions did not totally satisfy 
Japan’s concerns over following the international moral norm of respecting human rights, 
due to the lack of transparency and information. Therefore, the discourse of pushing for 
human rights and transparency reflects that Japan distrusts China because of China’s 
failure to meet these conditions. However, the expressions of moral distrust are not as 
strong as those of strategic distrust. A reason for this might be that moral distrust is not 
considered to be important enough to be raised to comparably high level at the cost of 
bilateral relations (while strategic distrust shows the opposite trend). Both the qualitative 
and quantitative evidence reflects less-frequent and weaker discourse is discovered 
related to moral issues than to strategic issues. This situation fits the basic hypothesis of 
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the thesis, that in terms of Japan’s distrust of China, the main concern is strategic distrust. 
Although moral distrust does indeed exist in the bilateral relationship, it is not the main 
focus of Japan at the governmental level. 
 
At the public level 
In order to compare with the analysis of strategic distrust at the governmental level, the 
research at the public level will rely on the data from the same public opinion survey (the 
11th Japan-China Public Opinion Poll). One contradiction of moral distrust at the 
governmental level might be that, due to the high cost of negative influences on bilateral 
relations, governments might have reservations about expressing moral distrust through 
official channels, including in the case of Japan’s moral distrust of China. Whether public 
opinion reflects different levels of moral distrust is an expectable outcome of the analysis. 
In terms of the methods that have been applied, the quantitative calculation and the 
qualitative interpretation are determinants. 
 
Question 1: Reasons for Unfavourable Impression 
 
 
Figure 5. 3: Reasons for Unfavourable Impression 
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Despite the choices mentioned in the section about strategic distrust issues, there are also 
some relevant responses related to moral issues in Japan-China moral relations: “China’s 
action incompatible with international rules” (47.9%), “Criticism of Japan over historical 
issues” (55.1%), “Chinese media’s anti-Japan coverage” (41.7%), “Can’t understand 
Chinese people’s patriotic acts and views” (29.6%),  “Different Political System” 
(26.8%) and “Chinese people’s entrenched nationalism” (17.1%).  
 
It has been argued that the negative impression of another actor in public opinion are 
highly connected, with negative impressions of distrust are the results of failing to satisfy 
the expectation of the civil society, so that confidence that another actor would be in a 
cooperative relationship would be low. According to the results of the public opinion 
survey, there are several different categories of moral issues with distrust in Japanese 
public opinion. The first is the concern for international rules and norms, which can be 
seen in the expression that “China’s action incompatible with international rules” option. 
The fact that more than half of the interviewees think that China fails to follow 
international rules could lead to the judgment that China does not respect international 
moral norms, so it could not be trusted by the Japanese. Moreover, nationalism and 
anti-Japan emotions in China are another problematic issue. This kind of moral issue 
could be interpreted easily, that the Japanese public distrust China because the Chinese 
(both at the governmental and civil society levels) have strong anti-Japanese emotions, so 
China cannot be an actor in favour of building a positive, mutually trusting relationship 
with Japan. Besides, the traditional ideological issue remains as a component of moral 
distrust issues, so 25.7% still regard the communist political system in China as a source 
of negative impressions. Since democratic peace theory indicates that wars seldom break 
out between democracies, and because China is an authoritarian state, it is reasonable that 
the Japanese public generally accepts the theory, at least in part, which therefore 
determines the comparatively dangerous and untrustworthy image of China. 
 
Question 2: Historical Disputes That Should Be Resolved 
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Figure 5. 4: Historical Disputes that should be resolved 
 
This question is similar to the previous one, that both strategy-related answers and moral 
concerns were mentioned as answers. The most significant expressions of the Japanese 
public on moral issues are: “Anti-Japan education and the depictions of history in 
textbooks in Chinese schools” (56.1%), “The Chinese media’s news coverage of Japan” 
(37.9%) and “Chinese politicians’ remarks on Japan” (28.5%). 
 
It is interesting, but not surprising, that these answers arose. The significance of these 
answers is that, when discussing the resolution of historical disputes, Japanese 
interviewees concentrate more on issues related to current bilateral relations instead of 
the historical disputes themselves. Compared to the answers such as “Japan’s perception 
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of its invasions of China in the 20th century” (32.2%) and “the lack of reparations by 
Japan on WWII, comfort women, and forced labour” (23.2%), the former attracted more 
attention. Hence, it could be interpreted that the Japanese are indirectly indicating that 
China’s use of history, rather than historical disputes, is the main problem. Japan distrusts 
China on these moral issues because it does not believe they actually matter so much. 
 
‘Political correctness’ issue as an evaluation of Japan’s moral distrust 
The notion of political correctness could be adapted to explain moral distrust between 
Japan and China. Firstly, the notion of political correctness has to be discussed as it has 
different significance in different occasions. The typical academic explanations for 
political correctness are as follows: Norman Fairclough (2003) indicates the significance 
of values and identities in the notion of political correctness. Peter Augustine Lawler 
strengthens the connection between political correctness and the argument of “the end of 
history” (Lawler, 1996): 
 
“History comes to an end when human beings reach definitive, rational agreement on 
true political principles or justice, and, therefore, no further revolutions in thought or 
deed seem possible. The politically correct believe that they know the truth about 
justice, and that their knowledge is the whole of higher, liberating education.”  
 
Stephen Morris (2001) cites Glenn Loury (1994, p. 437), who summarizes political 
correctness in a syllogism that:  
 
(a) within a given community, the people who are most faithful to communal values 
are, by-and-large, also those who want most to remain in good standing with their 
fellows and; 
(b) the practice is well established in this community that those speaking in ways that 
offend community values are excluded from good standing. Then, 
(c) when a speaker is observed to express himself offensively the odds that the 
speaker is not in fact faithful to communal values, as estimated by a listener 
otherwise uninformed about his views, are increased. 
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There are arguments of political correctness from different academic sources. A widely 
accepted example for this definition is that political correctness can interpreted as, one 
actor accepts and follows the values which are accepted by other actors in a certain 
community (Loury, 1994; Lawler, 1996; Fairclough, 2003; Hillman, 1998; Butterbaugh, 
Jackson, & Branner, 1994; Burch, 1994; Morris S. , 2001). To conclude, the notion of 
political correctness as used in domestic politics has similarities as well as differences to 
the situation in international politics. The division generally comes from the topics of 
political correctness. A current domestic political agenda related to political correctness 
in international society would include issues like gender equality, racial equality, and so 
on. It is a judgement that, within a certain group or community, a certain value holds 
absolute moral correctness, or occupies the high ground, so that any rejection to this 
value might be criticised or even have serious consequences. However, it would not be 
normal to observe political correctness in international relations, as states might be 
concerned with their own interests. If the affairs of other states do not affect one’s own 
interests, there is less chance that one state is going to have a say on the actions of others. 
That is to say, the existence of issues related to political correctness would absolutely 
verify their significance in certain interstate relations. 
 
From the Japanese perspective, political correctness is an issue about the so-called 
universal values. We have already argued that political correctness is a kind of value in 
certain communities or relations. In Japan-China relations, Japan’s values of democracy, 
human rights, freedom, and other similar issues, are the ones Japan believes China does 
not accept. Some might argue that this does not make sense, because ideological and 
political system issues seem to be out of date, because the end of the Cold War basically 
ended these debates. There are reasons for why political correctness issues remain 
important for Japan in its relations with China. 
 
Firstly, the reality is that China maintains its communist political system even after the 
end of the Cold War. Some mainstream Western ideologies see Communism as a 
nondemocratic system, characterised by a lack of human rights and freedom. There are 
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also arguments like Professor Fukuyama’s End of History that suggest that universal 
values are actually the only choice for human rights in the future. While China insists on 
keeping its own system, Japan feels strong doubts about China’s identity as a responsible 
actor in international society. Democratic peace theory is another reason, as it suggests 
that no wars could break out between democracies. Therefore, it is reasonable for Japan 
to consider it politically wrong to keep an undemocratic state as a partner. Secondly, 
there are arguments that interpret this issue from a different perspective. In 2007, Japan 
launched a program named “The Arc of Freedom and Prosperity” (Hosoya, 2011) in Asia 
Pacific, including most of the regional actors, except for China and Russia. If we only 
concern ourselves with the theme of prosperity, there is no reason to exclude the second 
largest economy in the world. Therefore, the problem is freedom. It is reasonable to argue 
that Japan strengthened the notion of freedom in this program because the two states 
excluded, China and Russia, are not regarded by Japan as ‘free’ states. Also, when China 
was preparing the Asia Infrastructure Investment Bank, Japan refused to join the program, 
explaining that Japan was uncertain about whether this institution would be transparent 
and reasonable under the leadership of China. In this way, it is possible that others would 
argue the essential reason for Japan’s actions was its concern for and distrust of the rise 
of China as a potential threat. Therefore, political correctness on ideology and other 
universal value issues are a kind of judgement of distrust of China. 
 
There is also empirical evidence to verify Japan’s political correctness issues. 
Governmental expressions on the arc of freedom and prosperity and AIIB have been 
mentioned. Therefore, we again examine public opinion data on Japan’s political 
correctness. One direct answer to this question is that, in response to “Reasons for 
negative images”, 26.8% said that the “different political system” was a reason. This 
verifies the hypothesis that Japan is still concerned with ideological issue, even after the 
long-ago end of the Cold War. In addition, anti-Japanese education and nationalism 
controlled by the Chinese government was also a frequent response from interviewees to 
the question of “barriers to development of bilateral relations” (26.3% and 24.7%). For 
Japan, political correctness might either be a concern for its own national interests and 
values, or it might be used as an excuse to develop the rhetoric of potential threat from 
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China. As China keeps its own system and values, Japan would have its explanation for 
any uncooperative activities in bilateral relations. As political correctness on values has 
become a controversy between Japan and China, it would be reasonable to observe that 
bilateral relations are affected by these issues. When China continues to respect certain 
values, Japan’s distrust of China deepens. 
 
An interpretation of how China’s moral behaviours shape Japan’s moral distrust 
Two cases typify how China’s moral behaviour is connected to Japan’s existing moral 
distrust. As a state, Japan concentrates on the possibility that China might not be a 
responsible member of the international community, who holds different values to other 
members. Japanese Foreign Minister Taro Aso introduced the concept of “Arc of 
Freedom and Prosperity” in November 2006, which excludes China. Japan has claimed 
that, “In particular, Japan will strengthen its cooperation with the Republic of Korea and 
Australia, which are allies of the United States and share basic values…”19 This kind of 
value-oriented diplomacy could be interpreted as a symbol that Japan is trying to alienate 
China from the other states in the Arc of Freedom and Prosperity (Hosoya, 2011). Due to 
the fact that China rejects universal values, including Western democracy and human 
rights, Japan morally distrusts China and makes value-based judgements in its foreign 
policy strategies. 
 
In terms of the consideration of China not following international norms and principles, 
which could lead to Japan’s moral distrust, there is empirical evidence to support the 
Japanese conclusion. Taking the 2010 boat collision incident as an example, while the 
incident was regarded as a strategic issue between Japan and China, there were 
components which reflected the connections between moral behaviour and distrust. The 
most controversial aspect of the incident was that China arrested four Japanese citizens in 
China and accused them of entering a military zone without authorization, on September 
23rd, 2010—not long after the collision incident, and Japan’s arrest of the Chinese captain. 
Although China would insist that it was an unrelated case, there were doubts about 
                                                 
19 The Cabinet Secretariat, National Defense Program Guidelines for FY 2011 and beyond (provisional translation), 
available at http://www.tr.emb-japan.go.jp/T_06/files/National_Defense_Program_FY2011.PDF, accessed 12/04/15. 
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whether this was a retaliation or threat against the Japanese government to produce the 
release of the Chinese captain. It is difficult to ascertain whether it was a simple case of 
“entering a military zone”. However, it would be reasonable for the Japanese government 
to doubt the reason for the arrest, as the occasion was extremely sensitive, not to mention 
conveniently coincidental. Without doubt, threatening another state by arresting its 
citizens is not be an international principle. Therefore, Japan would distrust China for not 
following international norms.   
 
A sectional conclusion 
There are three trends identified through the Japan’s public opinion data regarding moral 
trust or distrust of China. Firstly, moral distrust can be observed at the civil society level 
by analysing the public opinion data. The Japanese public has identified different kinds of 
moral issues between Japan and China – including nationalism, following international 
rules, and ideological problems – as obstacles to improving bilateral relations.  
 
Secondly, compared to the expressions of the Japanese government, the Japanese public 
offers a clearer voice on expressing attitudes of distrust on moral issues. This situation is 
reasonable, as the government has more concerns over the overall bilateral relationship 
when trying to express distrust through official channels. As most moral issues are quite 
sensitive in Japan-China relations, the Japanese government must carefully consider 
negative responses from China, and therefore control the situation within certain 
parameters. This is also the result of the hypothesis that moral distrust issues are not a 
core concern for Japan, so that comparatively weaker actions can be observed at the 
governmental level. However, the Japanese public have fewer restrictions, as public 
opinion should be free to reflect the true attitudes of common citizens, and should not 
directly inspire negative reactions from the Chinese government. In fact, negative 
impressions of moral distrust at the Japanese public level might even force China to 
reconsider its policies, as a result of Japanese public demands. Therefore, stronger moral 
distrust can be found at the Japanese public level, as opposed to the governmental level. 
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The third characteristic is that, although the distrust discourse and data is clearly defined 
at the public level in Japan, it is still not the core focus compared to strategic distrust. 
One significant piece of evidence is that only two of the questions generally discuss the 
content and influence of moral distrust issues in bilateral relations. Comparing the results 
of moral distrust with the four questions on strategic distrust issues, as well as the most 
popular responses for each question, it could be interpreted that the Japanese public still 
considers threats from strategic distrust as a main focus in recent years. 
 
 
 
5.3 A comparative study between Japan’s strategic and moral distrust 
of China 
One of the hypotheses of the thesis is that both strategic distrust and moralistic distrust 
exists between Japan and China. For the Japanese, strategic distrust is the a priori focus, 
and moral distrust is comparatively less of a concern. In contrast, China treats moral 
distrust as more crucial in bilateral relations. Therefore, this asymmetry leads to a locked 
relationship. The case study of Japan’s distrust of China supports the basic asymmetry 
within Japan’s attitude that strategic distrust is the core focus rather than moral distrust. 
 
The primary task is to define the division between strategic and moral distrust in 
Japan-China relations, as well as in the discourse and data of the cases. The thesis has 
explicitly defined the notion of strategic trust/distrust and moral trust/distrust. According 
to the different fields of affairs in bilateral relations, states pay different levels of 
attention, because the core focuses of their national interests might not be the same. In the 
case of Japan-China relations, the two states are experiencing this dilemma, because both 
actors cannot satisfy the other because their core concerns are not the same.  
 
There have been certain standards or criteria for judging trust and distrust in the discourse 
at both the governmental and the public levels. At the governmental level—mostly shown 
through documents like VIP speeches, press conferences, diplomatic policy documents, 
and so on—the basic standard is whether the discourse reflects the attitude of distrust 
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caused by a lack of information, predictions of external threats, or clearly damaging 
actions from other actors. At the civil society level, the discourse of common citizens is 
discovered by interpreting data in public opinion surveys. As the public opinion does not 
face the risk of negative impacts on bilateral relationship between the actors when 
expressing concerns, more explicit and direct opinions of trust and distrust on different 
issues can be found in their responses.  
 
On the other hand, the theoretical framework provided different potential sources of trust 
and distrust on strategic and moral issues between countries. The significant evidence is 
the debate between rationality of states and moral norms following actions in relations. In 
terms of strategic distrust, as countries face potential threats to their national interests, 
they tend to distrust other actors for rational reasons. Therefore, the result of distrust 
might originate from rational choice. For moral issues between states, which mainly 
cover the moral norms accepted by many actors in the international community, such as 
certain international rules and international laws, whether they are followed and respected 
by an actor is the standard for judging if a country could be trusted. The two basic 
standards do not conflict with each other, and can co-exist in international relations. Both 
strategic-rationality and moral-normative relations comprise part of the concerns of an 
actor, which might differ in terms of the focus for different countries. 
 
For Japan’s specific distrust of China in Japan-China relations, Japan’s core concern is 
strategic issues, because how to survive and secure its national interests in relation to the 
rise of China has become its top priority. At the same time, moral distrust exists as well 
in relation to certain issues. For strategic distrust (specifically, regarding Japan-China 
maritime disputes), more than 20 related documents were found on the official website of 
MOFA, and therein 225 appearances of distrust discourse were discovered compared to 
only 12 instances of trust discourse. For moral distrust at the governmental level, only a 
few official documents, with a minimal amount of distrust discourse were found on the 
MOFA website. Therefore, the quantitative calculation has, to a certain extent, shown the 
focus on strategic distrust at the governmental level.  
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There is also qualitative evidence to support the asymmetry between strategic distrust and 
moral distrust. Although the discourse of distrust can be identified in both strategic and 
moral distrust from Japanese official channels, the discourse is presented in very different 
forms. When discussing the strategic issues of maritime disputes between the two states, 
the Japanese government uses very explicit terms to describe China’s activities as 
offensive to Japan’s national interests, or to indicate Japan’s dissatisfaction. For example, 
the Japanese government uses the term “(extremely) provocative actions” 14 times in the 
selected documents to describe China’s actions, which can be interpreted as distrust 
discourse through two approaches. First, for the essence of the phrase, the provocative 
actions might threaten Japan’s national interests so that the rationality of the Japanese 
government would drive itself to distrust China. Secondly, the use of words like 
“extremely” could also reflect distrust. Due to the sensitivity of diplomatic manners in the 
official documents, countries tend not to use strong negative emotional expressions, when 
it is not necessary. However, the existing usage of such discourse would in turn prove 
that Japan strongly distrusts China on specific issues, so it directly expresses its worry 
and dissatisfaction. On the other hand, few pieces of “strongly emotional distrusting” 
discourse could be found in the Japanese official publicities. The Japanese government 
tends to use weaker discourse to discuss moral issues with China, and tries to express its 
concerns through the lens of the whole international community (for example, on human 
rights issues) instead of directly stating its own objections. At the same time, Japan 
seldom uses any strongly emotional words or phrases in such distrust-related discourse. 
The significant difference between official Japanese discourse on strategic and moral 
issues shows that moral distrust is not as important as strategic distrust, from the 
perspective that Japan would not risk worsening Japan-China relations over moral issues. 
Therefore, an asymmetry of stronger strategic distrust and weaker moral distrust is 
observable. 
 
For distrust at the public level, it can be observed that the Japanese public expresses their 
distrust of China without the restrictions of cost to bilateral relations, which does exist at 
the governmental level. However, comparing moral distrust at the governmental and 
public levels shows a similar outcome – that strategic distrust remains of primary concern 
196 
 
to the Japanese public. Despite the indirect data on trust and distrust between the two 
states in the public opinion survey, the responses show that strategic issues receive more 
attention and discussion from the Japanese interviewees. A simple calculation shows that, 
in the same survey, there are four direct questions discussing trust and distrust in terms of 
strategic issues (two common ones with moral issues, and two independent ones on 
strategic issues), while there are only two questions on moral issues (and they are the 
common ones with strategic issues). For a detailed outcome of the survey, strategic 
distrust is still of great concern to the Japanese public. For example, in the survey 
question about “Barriers to Development of Bilateral Relations”, 56.0% of Japanese 
interviewees choose “Territorial Issue (Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands)” as their main concern, 
which could be interpreted as a part of strategic distrust, while the largest percentage on 
moral distrust is the 26.3% who chose “China’s anti-Japanese education”.  
 
In conclusion, one of the basic hypothesis of the thesis can be observed through this case 
study, that Japan has both strategic and moral distrust of China, and that strategic distrust 
is the main concern for Japan both at the governmental and the public levels. The 
influence of Japan’s strategic distrust on China is that Japan’s reactions to facing the 
pressure of a rising China might turn into strategic preparations affecting regional affairs. 
Since Japan distrusts China strategically, there are two potential approaches for Japan to 
deal with the problems. On the one hand, Japan could take steps to address the possible 
challenges and threats to Japanese national strategic interests, including territorial 
disputes, regional order, securing resources, and so on. Therefore, Japan is seeking 
domestic arrangements, including a revision of its constitution for collective security, as 
well as external agenda like strengthening the US-Japan alliance, and developing new 
relationships with other regional actors. On the other hand, Japan urges China to explain 
certain issues, and take other actions such as increasing transparency to eliminate the 
sources of distrust. It is reasonable that, due to the fact that the Japanese regard certain 
strategic issues as top concerns, Japan expects China to act in certain ways to solve the 
problems, and therefore to improve bilateral relations. However, there is a dilemma that 
is at the core of the hypothesis, that there are asymmetries between the core concerns of 
Japan and China. While Japan prioritises the resolution of strategic distrust problems, 
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China expects the moral distrust issues in Sino-Japanese relations to be dealt with 
properly. The current status of the two states represents the fact that both are not satisfied 
with the other’s agenda, and as a result a “locked” relationship between Japan and China 
exists. 
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Chapter 6: China’s distrust of Japan 
 
The second case study will analyse China’s moral and strategic distrust of Japan. The 
fundamental aim of this case study is similar to that of the previous one on Japan’s 
distrust of China. Based on the analysis of the selected cases, the chapter explores 
whether China’s strategic and moral distrust can be identified in the empirical evidence. 
At the same time, the chapter will address the hypothesis that the asymmetric distrust of 
China concentrated on moral distrust, rather than strategic distrust, which will be verified 
through both qualitative and quantitative methods. 
The chapter is divided into three sections, on China’s moral and strategic distrust of 
Japan and a comparative study of the two. The first two sections analyse the 
governmental and public levels as empirical sources, which have different origins and 
might reflect different situations of trust/distrust in different areas. As has been 
mentioned, the methodological structure is similar to the case study of Japan’s distrust of 
China – qualitative research of the government documents and records, media, as well as 
academic literature. The quantitative analysis is based on the calculation of appearances 
of distrust discourse and the data from a public opinion survey. Further, an overall 
combination of different data/tables of the status of trust/distrust, bilateral relations and 
certain incidents between the two states will be compiled in order to show whether the 
hypothesis works in this case. Hence, it will be possible to conduct a comparative study 
in the third section, looking at the status of moral and strategic trust/distrust, which could 
help verify another hypothesis, on the existence of an asymmetric structure.  
 
6.1 China’s moral distrust of Japan 
6.1.1 Introduction 
One of the thesis hypotheses is that asymmetries in mutual distrust between Japan and 
China have led to a “locked” bilateral relationship. While Japan’s core concern is 
reflected in its strategic distrust of China, moral issues are the most important factor for 
China. According to the theoretical framework, one state’s moral distrust of another is 
explained as distrusting that another state is a responsible actor. Alternatively, to be more 
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accurate, moral trust and distrust focus on the issues of moral and normative values, 
which are related to political trustworthiness, basic principles of acting in international 
relations, international ethics, and so on. Strategic trust and distrust are considered to be 
the results of certain strategic issues or incidents. They might lead to fierce debates and 
even confrontation, and also might receive less attention due to the shifts in strategic 
hotspots in international relations. Moral trust and distrust issues are to some extent 
different, as this kind of trust and distrust is not only closely connected to specific 
hotspots, but also are long-lasting in international relations – working just like credibility 
in risk management and other disciplines (Wiener & Mowen, 1986; Peters, Covello, & 
McCallum, 1997; Renn & Levine, 1991). Distrusting one state’s nature is not easily 
eliminated, even when certain disputes are resolved. The accumulated influences have 
considerable, long-term impacts on public opinion, civil relations, and also overall 
interstate relations. 
 
To be specific, in terms of China’s moral distrust of Japan, generally distrust is based on 
the Japanese government’s attitudes over historical issues, especially that of the legacies 
of the Japanese invasions of China, from the end of 19th Century to World War II. On the 
one hand, China believes that Japan is trying to avoid its responsibilities and guilt over 
the war (Motofumi, 2005; Rose, Interpreting History in Sino-Japanese Relations: A case 
study in political decision-making, 1998). This assumption no doubt makes China angry, 
because it regards “gaining international reputation” as an important goal for its revival. 
At the same time, there is also pressure from the Chinese public, urging stronger 
reactions to Japan. (Rose, 1998; Bhattacharya, 2007) From China’s perspective, Japan’s 
activities are dangerous when compared to what it did in the 1970s for the normalization 
of bilateral relations. Avoiding the international moral responsibility, which is evident in 
the words and activities Japanese politicians like Shinzo Abe (Hu & Gao, 2015), leads to 
moral distrust. On the other hand, China also distrusts Japan’s “hidden” agenda of 
eliminating the influential legacies of World War II. From Japan’s perspective, the 
attempt to get rid of the burden of history is a method for become a normal state 
(Hagström, 2014; Inoguchi, 2003; Soeya, Tadokoro, & Welch, 2011; Johnson, 1992; 
Tadokoro, 2011), because World War II is long over. However, these related activities 
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could be interpreted as different goals by China: that they go beyond the aim of easing 
the historical burden. The revision of basic education and the reinterpretation of the 
constitution would have such long-term effects on future generations of Japanese that a 
lack of historical responsibility would lead to the possibility of a revival of Japanese 
militarism. This concerns the Chinese government, and has become the source of China’s 
moral distrust on Japan.  
At the same time, it must be mentioned that, according to the basic hypothesis of the 
thesis, moral distrust is China’s core concern, as opposed to strategic distrust. There is 
plenty of empirical evidence that China tends to understand and interpret many of the 
disputes between the two states as problems caused by Japan’s attitude to history. For the 
Chinese, most of the existing disputes have roots in historical problems left unresolved. 
While the Japanese do not think the historical legacies should be continually referred to, 
China’s moral distrust of Japan cannot be easily resolved.   
 
6.1.2 Background 
In fact, the historical issues have always been determinant factors in bilateral relations, 
and have been reflected in different issues and at different levels. There are multiple 
reasons for these disputes, and one of the most significant elements is the wars between 
Japan and China since the rise of Japan and the decline of China, in the late-19th Century; 
including the war between Japan and the Chinese Qing Dynasty in 1895, and the invasion 
and occupation of China in 1930s until the end of World War II. The former has led to a 
negative legacy in Sino-Japanese relations, due to a series of “unequal treaties”, which 
have extended territorial (for example, over the Diaoyu/Senkaku islands) and other 
disputes to the present day. The latter directly created a moral shock in China, and it 
strongly believes that Japan should be held responsible for the war and sincerely express 
an apology. Many of the existing disputes were created by the war legacy and the 
apology disputes, the Yasukuni Shrine issue, the history textbook issue, and the 
constitution issue. At the same time, these disputes bring even more difficulties to 
resolving the problems due to the legacies that cannot be easily resolved when new 
problems continually emerge. 
 
201 
 
Among these disputes, the Yasukuni Shrine issue could be regarded as a typical case of 
China’s moral distrust of Japan, as it can be regarded as a “spiritual stimulus” by Japan, 
from the Chinese perspective (Rose, 2005; Zhu, 2014a; Zhu, 2014b). This dispute reflects 
the confrontations between the two countries over historical issues and the deep root of 
Chinese moral distrust. Expressing respect to the dead is almost a universal value. 
Worshipping souls at shrines is part of Japanese tradition and culture. However, there are 
special characteristics for memorialising the dead, which make this common 
phenomenon become a flashpoint in Sino-Japanese relations. On the one hand, the Shrine 
was built in 1869 by the Meiji government. It could be argued that the essence of the 
Yasukuni Shrine is as the official memorial for the Japanese soldiers who died in both 
domestic and foreign wars. Its official and overseas-relevant nature are the sources of the 
problems. The official nature is weakened by the increased secularism after World War II. 
However, it remains a symbolic place in Japanese domestic politics. The fact that it is 
connected with foreign-relations means one cannot be avoid that the memorial of soldiers 
as national heroes might be unaccepted to a formerly-hostile country. One determinant in 
the Yasukuni case is be that Class A war criminals including Hideki Tojo were registered 
at the Yasukuni Shrine after 1978 for memorialisation. As the Yasukuni Shrine has 
always been closely connected with the Japanese government and domestic politics, it 
has received great opposition from China and other states. The Japanese government 
denies that the aim was to memorialise war criminals, but rather to pray for long-lasting 
peace (Lu, 2005). China obviously distrusts this claim. 
 
The basic logic of this kind of distrust is that the Chinese government thinks that war 
criminals should not be regarded as the same as common soldiers—they were criminals 
judged by international tribunals under international law to have caused horrors and 
damage to their victims. As many of Japanese politicians, including the Prime Ministers, 
continue to visit the Shrine in their official capacity, a source of moral distrust is formed. 
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6.1.3 Case Analysis: the origins of moral distrust from historical disputes 
Why were these cases selected? 
The basic rule for choosing suitable cases is how can they reflect the international 
relations practices defined by normative relations as moral trust/distrust, and rational 
calculations as strategic trust/distrust. In terms of morals, the logic is that a state tends to 
trust another if it follows international norms and principles and/or it has trustworthy 
moral values. Separate opinions from academic discussions might argue that moral 
trust/distrust is “rational” or “irrational”.  However, no matter whether there are 
incentives for moral trust/distrust, failing to accept norms and values might lead to 
concern and distrust from the perspective of another actor. In Sino-Japanese relations, it 
could be seen that China continually focuses on historical issues, which mainly include 
the war legacies between the two states. China argues that Japan fails to face up to its 
history and tries to get avoid its responsibility for war crimes. Based on a widely accepted 
value that states should take responsibility for their actions, especially in relation to war, 
China believes that Japan does not follow normative principles in international relations. 
Therefore, China distrusts Japan over moral issues, including the disputes about historical 
issues. China would indicate that Japan has a “right-deviation tendency” (Soeya, 
Tadokoro, & Welch, 2011; Inoguchi, 2003; Yang, 2007; Ding, 2006) in its politics. 
Through the efforts of a right wing faction, Japan is moving in a direction opposed to its 
“introspection way” (Samuels, 1990). The Japanese right-wing politicians mainly focus 
on three topics: visits to the Yasukuni Shrine, reversing historical facts, and actively 
promoting a history textbook that denies Japan’s history of invasion. (Shi Y. , 2013b) To 
be specific, one of the most suitable cases is the Yasukuni Shrine issue. The essence of 
the Yasukuni Shrine is controversial and typical to Sino-Japanese relations. Showing 
respect for dead soldiers is not a serious problem in international relations. However, it is 
reasonable to protest and criticise the governmental memorialisation of war criminals 
who launched a war and committed heinous crimes, which is why China calls for a 
German-style approach to apology. From China’s perspective, Japan cannot be trusted 
due to the gap between its rhetoric (apologizing for the war) and actions (VIPs visiting 
the Yasukuni Shrine, the textbook issue, and so on). Therefore, China distrusts Japan on 
moral issues. 
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For the strategic trust/distrust of Japan, the general concern is on whether Japan could be 
a regional threat to China’s national interests (Swaine, 2011). The detailed concerns are 
related to Japan’s revival as a strong political and military power, which might be 
achieved through either Japan’s attempts to reconstruct its national identity, or by 
reinterpreting its constitution which restricts Japan’s military capacity, or by 
strengthening the US-Japan alliance (Hara, 1987; George Mulgan, 1997). Therefore, 
Japan’s attempts to revise its defence laws and policies could be regarded as an origin of 
strategic distrust. 
 
Background to China-Japan relations and bilateral trust/distrust 
One of the significant characteristics of the mutual influences between bilateral relations 
and the status of trust/distrust is that the moral issues of historical disputes have formed 
the political foundations, from the Chinese perspective. At the same time, strategic 
concerns are important to Sino-Japanese relations. 
Taking the period between 1972 and 2000 – between the successful normalization of 
bilateral relations and the tremendous rise in Chinese national power – as an example, 
there are several turning points that led to the deterioration of relations. The most 
significant ones include the disputes over the history textbook issue, the Nanjing 
Massacre, the Yasukuni Shrine, and the apology issue. A similarity between these cases 
is that they are all issues related to moral trust/distrust instead of strategic calculations. 
The territorial dispute over the Diaoyu / Senkaku Islands also exists, but is not regarded 
as a priority in bilateral relations. It might be argued that the two governments have 
intentionally controlled the dispute within certain boundaries in order to clear obstacles 
for improving bilateral relations in the wake of the Cold War. However, even if people 
admit that there are concessions for leaving this disputes to one side, China clearly 
showed its opposition to Japan over historical disputes, while strategic concerns did not 
draw more attention.  
 
After 2000, with a growing trend of more disputes in Sino-Japanese than during the 
honeymoon period, moral and strategic problems started to play a more important role in 
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bilateral relations. China’s core focus remains the normative values of the Japanese 
attitude towards history, and Japan’s motivations/activities that could potentially lead to a 
revival of militarism, which are continually monitored by the Chinese government (Lu & 
Tian, 2014; Bhattacharya, 2007).  On one hand, the disputes in bilateral relations could 
reflect problems of distrust at the moral and strategic levels. On the other hand, the moral 
and strategic distrust could in turn lead to problematic bilateral relations. One possible 
argument is that China tends to view many of the problems in bilateral relations through 
the lens of normative values and historical legacies.   
 
Moral distrust 
The two main tasks of this section in discussing current Sino-Japanese relations and 
moral concerns is similar to those in Japan’s distrust of China: firstly, it is necessary to 
discover the existence of moral distrust issues in bilateral relations; secondly, it is crucial 
to understand how moral distrust could influence bilateral relations. A significant 
difference between the Chinese situation from that of Japan is that moral distrust is 
dominant, and strategic calculations are less important. 
 
It has been argued that moral trust in international relations can be interpreted as trusting 
another actor because the normative principles (or values/standards) of one actor are 
accepted or followed by another one. It might be argued that this kind of “good will” or 
“oughtness” (Finnemore & Sikkink, 1998, p. 891) in international relations cannot always 
be satisfied, because the normative values in different backgrounds cannot be judged as 
being absolutely right or wrong. Therefore, moral distrust could be a common 
phenomenon considering different cultures, ideologies, and other factors. It is reasonable 
that some academics would indicate that strategic trust/distrust is comparatively more 
rational, as it would generally be based on calculations of power and interests, while 
moral trust/distrust in normative activities/relations are comparatively “irrational” 
( Gralnick, 1988; Amadae, 2007). 
 
Japan’s activities and attitudes are a source of China’s moral distrust. To be specific, 
respecting history – especially the history of Japanese invasion – is a basic normative 
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value in international relations. Since China believes Japan has failed to do so, suspicion 
(Calder, 2006) and moral distrust is created (Yang, 2007). China worries about Japan’s 
attitudes toward the historical issues, with the assumption that Japan is intentionally 
avoiding them and the Japanese government’s rhetoric on historical responsibility is 
becoming ever-more ambiguous. Although Japan has repeatedly expressed its 
introspection on many occasions, its actions contradict the sentiment in China’s eyes. As 
it has been argued, China might understand that Japan’s friendly attitude during the 
“honeymoon” period might only have been a combination of guilt, fear, and other 
feelings (Rose, 1998, pp. 22-23). On the one hand, the actions of politicians, including 
Prime Ministerial visits to the Yasukuni Shrine, and the possibility of abandoning the past 
Murayama Statement will increase Chinese worries that Japan is trying to regain its 
former Imperial “glory” (Liang, 2014; Bhattacharya, 2007). It is reasonable that this 
possibility is unacceptable, because China has always treated itself as a victim in the war. 
On the other hand, despite concerns about the Japanese government, the influences of 
civil society are also crucial. The key issue is that future generations might not have a 
clear understanding of the history of the war. This concern comes from the Chinese 
perspective of Japan’s attempts at “cleaning” history, including the history textbook issue. 
This could cause strong doubts in China, and that Japan’s actions are an attempt to 
expand its international influence by denying its history of invasion (Liang, 2014; Lu & 
Tian, 2014), which would call into question Japan’s trustworthiness as an international 
actor. Therefore, China’s moral distrust of Japan can be understood as a distrust of 
Japan’s claims of introspection and a possible future in which Japan revives its militarism 
with no memory of its historical responsibility. By weakening bilateral relations through 
history issues, Japan could possibly expand its military forces with enough legitimacy in 
domestic politics. (Li B. , 2015) 
 
There has been evidence that could prove that Sino-Japanese relations have always been 
influenced by bilateral distrust and related issues. For China, its moral distrust of Japan is 
reflected in the historical disputes. The bilateral relationship between China and Japan 
suffers great damage every time the two states get stuck on historical disputes. At the 
same time, this process is accompanied by the following characteristics: 
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1) Distrust is a crucial cause of deterioration in bilateral relations. Distrust leads the 
countries to interpret or understand only the worst assumptions about incidents. 
For example, in terms of China’s moral distrust of Japan, the history textbook 
issue is a major concern. The history textbook dispute, which has a very limited 
audience (Rose, 1998), might not directly have an impacts on the values of entire 
future Japanese generations. However, with its moral distrust of Japan, China 
takes this incident very seriously as a problem, focusing on why the Japanese 
government adopted this version of history textbook draft. Therefore, the 
possibility that the Japanese government might try to cover up its history of 
invasion would be a shock to China’s normative values. Considering the fact that 
China treats history issues as a priority in its current relations with Japan, a 
deterioration of bilateral relations is inevitable and might be instantaneous 
(Dreyer, 2006, p. 540).  
2) At the same time, worsening bilateral relations would in turn enhance the existing 
distrust. With negative bilateral relations caused by distrust, the related disputes 
would be extremely difficult to resolve in a quick and smooth manner. (As 
discussed in the previous chapters, based on the framework of the thesis 
hypothesis, China and Japan would have their own a priori concerns. The 
asymmetric structure leads to a situation in which both states cannot compromise 
on concerns of the other state without first resolving its own concerns. The actions 
of resolving problems are based on the other state taking a first step towards 
resolving its own concern.) Under this circumstance, the situation would get 
worse in bilateral relations if the other does not take action. Therefore, the 
interactions between ‘distrust’ and ‘relations’ are also bilateral rather than 
unilateral. Distrust is reflected in the disputes between states, and it is a source for 
deterioration in bilateral relations. At the same time, worsening bilateral relations 
lead to deeper distrust, which remains difficult to resolve. 
 
Strategic distrust 
There are also explanations of the deterioration of Sino-Japanese relations from the 
perspective of China’s strategic distrust of Japan. In the thesis hypothesis, strategic 
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distrust is currently not China’s priority. Therefore, exploring its significance in bilateral 
relations and verifying why it is China’s secondary concern should be examined. In terms 
of how strategic issues and distrust about strategic issues affect interstate relations, there 
have been discussions under the theoretical framework. To be specific, China’s strategic 
calculations related to Japan are based on assumptions of whether Japan is reviving its 
military power and/or will balance against China with the US-Japan alliance. 
(Christensen, China, the US- Japan Alliance, and the Security Dilemma in East Asia, 
1999; Garrett & Glaser, 1997; Zhang, 2006; Zhang, 2012) For instance, in terms of the 
idea of a “Proactive Contribution to Peace”, raised by Japan, the Chinese interpret it as 
having the essence of military expansion and preparation for potential wars. (Hu & Gao, 
2015) 
 
For a long time after the normalization of bilateral relations in 1972, especially from the 
1970s to 1990s, the strategic concerns were not a core focus of China in its relationship 
with Japan. Although the Cold War caused tensions between the two former rivalries, the 
common external threat posed by the Soviet Union was regarded as the main problem in 
regional affairs. Therefore, the two states have experienced a ‘honeymoon’ and stable 
periods in bilateral relations. At the same time, based on the rationality of states, strategic 
trust/distrust relies upon the rational calculation of whether another state could be a 
strategic threat to its one’s national interests. In this way, it is reasonable for China to 
have few strategic disputes with Japan during that period, because there were fewer 
conflicts over national interests due to the considerable gap between the states’ 
comprehensive national power and goals. 
 
However, the situation has been quite different in recent years. Firstly, with the collapse 
of the Soviet Union, there are no common threats to China and Japan, so they might pay 
more attention to each other—as they are the two most powerful regional actors (Yahuda, 
2014). Moreover, the rise of China has greatly changed the comparative national powers 
in the region. China will settle the strategic goals that match its national power, while 
Japan will modify its foreign policies to deal with the rise of China. In this way, the main 
strategies of Japan, include seeking the status of a normal state and strengthening its 
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alliance with the US, which Japan thinks will provide security for itself (Oros, 2008), 
could cause distrust from China. (Li C. , 2014; Zhang, 2012) 
 
In fact, similar to the situation with moral distrust, the distrust on strategic issues is also 
connect to bilateral relations. The cases of strategic distrust are reflected in Sino-Japanese 
relations: as Japan’s strategies have become China’s concern, the Chinese believe they 
might threaten national interests or grand strategies. It is widely recognised that the rise 
of China has become one of the most significant characteristics of regional strategic 
concern. With the growth of its economy, China has to secure its expanding national 
interests, including the territorial integrity and the maritime security. As Japan inevitably 
occupies a geographic position which is between China and the oceans, its strategic 
activities would directly affect China’s national strategies. The reality is that, as 
mentioned in the previous chapter, Japan distrusts China’s strategic goals and actions. 
Because Japan has calculated that China’s strategies might damage Japan’s interests, it 
has to take action. On the other hand, in order to avoid offering unilateral explanations 
for Japan’s motivations, another possibility of Japan’s plans to become a normal state 
should also be explained. Japan’s attempts to modify its constitution for the right of 
collective defence is a typical example. Therefore, both the passive reactions to the rise of 
China and the active calculations for itself would lead to Japan’s strategies of 
strengthening the US-Japan alliance, which is fundamental “in all sectors including 
balance of power, economy, paradigms, domestic politics, media, international 
organizations, finance, technology” (Vogel, 2002; Garrett & Glaser, 1997; Zhang, 2006; 
2012) and being tougher in its strategic disputes with China. Japan’s strategic movements 
have drawn China’s attention because, from their perspective, Japan has two potential 
strategic goals, including: reviving itself as a military power, and blocking China’s rise. 
China is concerns about Japan’s continuing activities to get over the barriers of the 
post-war system. Although the core concern is based on Japan’s attitudes towards history, 
the potential possibility that Japan might remilitarise would lead to other doubts over 
whether Japan would invade again. China also believes that the existence of the US-Japan 
alliance in the region is an obstacle for China: if the US-Japan alliance actively erects 
barriers against the rise of China at strategic levels, or regards China as an imaginary 
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enemy (Lian, 2011), China would no doubt be angry with Japan’s intension of restricting 
China. Even if the US-Japan alliance stays comparatively passive, China would still 
doubt whether Japan and the US would remain passive in the future. In this way, strategic 
distrust is generated (Yuan, 2003). 
 
How strategic distrust affects the China-Japan relations is also a question of three parts: 
bilateral relations—trust/distrust—incidents. When issues/incidents at the strategic level 
take place, the two states have to make judgements about the essence of these incidents. 
If the incidents are proven to be harmful to national interests, distrust will be a problem. 
With deepening distrust, the states would tend to understand and interpret upcoming 
incidents in a more negative way, so relations might worsen. At the same time, worsening 
bilateral relations might lead to more negative incidents between the two states – such as 
confrontations between ships, and so on. The maritime disputes verify this structure of 
distrust and interstate relations. 
 
6.2 The test on China’s strategic and moral distrust on Japan 
6.2.1 China’s moral distrust on Japan 
There are two hypotheses to be verified in this section: that both moral and strategic 
distrust exist from China’s perspective. The case studies include qualitative analysis of 
governmental documents, VIP speeches, academic resources, and other related content, 
and the quantitative calculation of the appearances of related trust/distrust discourse.  
 
The quantitative analysis on official discourse 
The case selected to study China’s moral distrust of Japan is the Yasukuni Shrine issue. 
The last time Japan’s Prime Minister Shinzo Abe visited Yasukuni Shrine was on 
December 26th, 2013. From then until May 2014, there have been at least 14 documents 
recording the speeches of high-level Chinese politicians (including Foreign Minister, 
Foreign Ministry Spokesman, Ambassador to Japan, and so on) and a great number of 
other documents from lower levels discussing the Yasukuni Shrine issue. According to 
the quantitative analysis, the Chinese have expressed their distrust of Japan through the 
use of diplomatic discourse, with strongly emotional language. The 89 times distrust 
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discourse appeared proves that the Yasukuni Shrine issue remains a core concern for 
China. Among these words and sentences, “Deny and even whitewash the history of 
invading others” (ten times), “Challenge international/post-war order” (nine times), 
“Wrong words and deeds” (seven times), “Create obstacles” (six times), “Strongly 
condemn/protest” (five times), “Challenge the historical conclusions” (four times), 
“cause vigilance” (four times), “firmly oppose” (four times), “Damage bilateral relations” 
(four times) were the most frequently used discourse.  
 
There are significant characteristics showing that the discourse from high-level Chinese 
channels could explain attitudes towards the Japanese in relation to historical disputes. 
Firstly, the essence of the historical disputes could be interpreted as a judgement that 
Japan does not follow normative values of respecting history. Secondly, the frequency of 
appearances was considerable. Thirdly, much of the discourse is strongly emotional, 
which is unusual in diplomatic discourse, when no serious problems or consequences 
exist. With these characteristics, distrust could be observed. 
 
Content Type Trust or distrust Frequency 
    
Strongly condemn / 
protest 
China’s attitude distrust 5 
firmly oppose China’s attitude distrust 4 
Cannot accept / be 
accepted 
China’s attitude distrust 2 
Japanese leaders have to 
correct the errors 
China’s attitude distrust 2 
Chinese people do not 
welcome him (Shinzo 
Abe) 
China’s attitude distrust 1 
Added up  distrust 14 
  trust 0 
    
Deny and even Description of distrust 10 
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whitewash the history of 
invading others 
Japan’s activities 
Challenge international / 
post-war order 
Description of 
Japan’s activities 
distrust 9 
Wrong words and deeds Description of 
Japan’s activities 
distrust 7 
Create obstacles Description of 
Japan’s activities 
distrust 6 
Challenge the historical 
conclusions 
Description of 
Japan’s activities 
distrust 4 
Cause vigilance Description of 
Japan’s activities 
distrust 4 
Damage bilateral 
relations 
Description of 
Japan’s activities 
distrust 4 
create provocation / 
tension 
Description of 
Japan’s activities 
distrust 3 
Dangerous trend Description of 
Japan’s activities 
distrust 3 
Harm the feelings (of 
Chinese people) 
Description of 
Japan’s activities 
distrust 3 
Wrong value on history Description of 
Japan’s activities 
distrust 3 
Abandon the principle Description of 
Japan’s activities 
distrust 2 
falseness Description of 
Japan’s activities 
distrust 2 
Lead to dangerous 
consequences / a wrong 
way 
Description of 
Japan’s activities 
distrust 2 
Trample on the human 
conscience and 
arrogantly challenge 
justice 
Description of 
Japan’s activities 
distrust 2 
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The Japanese side must 
take all the 
responsibilities 
Description of 
Japan’s activities 
distrust 2 
Intentionally obstruct 
and sabotage 
Description of 
Japan’s activities 
distrust 1 
Harm the mutual trust Description of 
Japan’s activities 
distrust 1 
Cannot be the excuse Description of 
Japan’s activities 
distrust 1 
Pay homage to the 
fascist war criminals 
Description of 
Japan’s activities 
distrust 1 
Request Japanese 
leaders to admit the 
wrong activities 
Description of 
Japan’s activities 
distrust 1 
Repeatedly make 
mistakes 
Description of 
Japan’s activities 
distrust 1 
Avoid (mentioning) the 
history of militarism 
Description of 
Japan’s activities 
distrust 1 
Will be abandoned by 
history 
Description of 
Japan’s activities 
distrust 1 
He (Shinzo Abe) lacks 
the sincerity to face the 
history 
Description of 
Japan’s activities 
distrust 1 
Added up  distrust 75 
  trust 0 
Total  distrust 89 
  trust 0 
 
Table 6. 1: Frequency of trust/distrust discourse of Chinese government on moral issues 
 
By assessing this quantitative data on the discourse, several characteristics are visible. 
Firstly, it verifies the existence of a large amount of distrust discourse. Shinzo Abe’s visit 
to the Yasukuni Shrine in 2013 (as the selected case) was only one of many visits to the 
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Shrine that all Prime Ministers have made. As a single case, it led to the 14 documents 
and 89 appearances of distrust discourse. Therefore, it could be assumed that the larger 
issue of the Yasukuni dispute could be regarded as a serious problem, generating and 
reflecting distrust between China and Japan. Secondly, the seriousness of the Yasukuni 
issue can be seen through the different types of discourse in the documents. In the 
previous chapter on Japan’s strategic distrust (as the main concern), both trust and 
distrust discourse were identified in the documents. Although the appearances of distrust 
discourse dominate in comparison to trust (225-12), the existing signs for a more positive 
possibility cannot be ignored. However, in the case of China’s moral distrust of Japan 
over the Yasukuni disputes, the documents collected from the Chinese Foreign Ministry’s 
official channel show a different situation: that of 14 documents filled with negative and 
distrust discourse, and no discernible discourse of trust. This reflects China’s 
dissatisfaction on this issue, and the fact that existing distrust is at a very negative level.  
 
China’s public opinion 
In addition to governmental channels, distrust over history issues as a serious problem in 
Sino-Japanese relations is also identifiable in Chinese public opinion. One of the images 
that Chinese people present to the world is that they care much about the history of 
Western and (especially) Japanese invasion. As a result, the answers from Chinese people 
in a public opinion survey on related issues would be meaningful for verifying the 
hypothesis. The significance of China’s public opinion is that it is so strong that the 
Chinese leadership might try to downplay nationalism in its interactions with Japan. 
(Forrest, 2009) 
 
Related question 1: Reasons behind the Negative Impressions between the Two 
Countries 
The obvious negative impressions of Japan are reasonable in recent years. The Chinese 
interviewees offered some explanations for their answers. Among the answers, there were 
several options related to history issues: Japan’s lack of a proper apology and remorse 
over its history of invading China (70.5%); some Japanese politicians’ careless remarks 
(33.4%); Japanese entrenched nationalism (19.8%). The Chinese public believe that 
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rising nationalism in Japan is a problem which has been reflected in both the Japanese 
government and Japanese civil society. By avoiding mentions of history, or even 
glorifying the invasion would lead to strong reactions in Chinese society. As they have 
information that Japan’s activities do not respect history and their feelings, distrust is 
generated.  
 
Related question 2: Name Recognition of Politicians in One Another's Countries 
This question is more indirect in its connection to moral distrust over history issues. The 
core findings in this question are that the two most distinctive answers of ‘Shinzo Abe 
(83.6%)’ and ‘Junichiro Koizumi (53.3%)’ have a crucial similarity, because these two 
Japanese Prime Ministers are the ones who have visited the Yasukuni Shrine in recent 
years (since Koizumi came into power, in 2001). To ensure that the Yasukuni Shrine is 
indeed a significant factor, one must compare another answer to this question—“Yukio 
Hatoyama” (23.8%)—which is far less popular as a response than the previous two. Of 
these important Japanese politicians, the two most recent Prime Ministers who visited 
Yasukuni Shrine became the most famous in China. This shows that the Yasukuni Shrine, 
as a typical case, has a great (negative) impact on Chinese society and bilateral relations. 
 
Related question 3: Barriers to Development of Bilateral Relations 
This question identifies the problems in Sino-Japanese relations more directly. As a result, 
it would be reasonable that there were answers such as “Japan’s historical understanding 
and historical education” (31.5%) and “Japanese politicians’ inappropriate statements and 
actions” (17.4%). As with the problems in bilateral relations, the Chinese public does not 
trust Japan on related issues (of which a large amount remain unsettled since World War 
II). 
 
Related question 4: Views on Japanese Prime Ministers' Visits to Yasukuni Shrine 
Chinese public attitudes towards the Prime Ministerial visits to the Yasukuni Shrine 
could directly test the acceptance of the Yasukuni issue in bilateral relations. It is not 
surprising that the Chinese public answered as follows: No problem with visit as a Prime 
Minister (5.6%), No problem if the visit is made as a private citizen (20.1%), Not 
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acceptable even if the visit is made as a private citizen (60.2%), Don’t know (13.6%), No 
response (0.6%). The results show that a considerable majority of the interviewees do not 
accept any form of visit to the Yasukuni Shrine by Japanese Prime Ministers. Therefore, 
the previous visits by Prime Minister Koizumi and Abe would damage bilateral relations 
and create distrust between the two states.  
 
There is another important and interesting factor to this question of the answers from the 
Japanese public, as follows: No problem with visit as a Prime Minister (33.5%), No 
problem if the visit is made as a private citizen (32.5%), Not acceptable even if the visit 
is made as a private citizen (15.7%), Don’t know (18.2%), No response (0.1%). The 
fundamental difference between the Japanese and Chinese results are that 66% of 
Japanese interviewees believed that their Prime Minister could visit the Shrine (in 
different capacities). This would fit the hypothesis that, on the issue of distrust between 
China and Japan, the problem might originate from the asymmetric structure, that one 
state regards some of the issues as core concerns, while the other state sees them as 
mundane. In this way, distrust will increase between states if the concerns cannot be 
resolved due to a lack of motivation. 
 
The qualitative analysis of the Yasukuni Shrine issue 
The quantitative data can provide empirical evidence for the existence and significance of 
China’s moral distrust of Japan. At the same time, the qualitative analysis of typical 
discourse and/or activities at governmental, public and academic levels will be helpful in 
proving the reliability of judgements of distrust.  
 
China’s policies on and reactions to the Yasukuni Shrine issue 
After Abe’s visit to the Yasukuni Shrine, the Chinese government immediately had 
different kinds of reactions. One of the most important action was stopping the 
highest-level mutual interactions. It was not until late 2014 when the two leaders finally 
met in Beijing, during the APEC summit – and the facial expressions of Chinese 
President Xi Jinping showed that it was not be a very pleasant meeting. The significance 
of this was that, for the two geographic neighbours and the two most powerful and 
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important regional or even global actors, it is unusual and problematic that no high-level 
summits were conducted. It is reasonable to regard China’s refusal to talk with Abe as a 
kind of punishment for his visit to the Shrine. 
 
China’s official discourse 
As has been mentioned, there have been dozens of instances of distrust discourse from 
the Chinese. The two key questions are: how does the discourse reflect China’s moral 
distrust of Japan? And, does distrust discourse reflect/have an impact on Sino-Japanese 
relations? 
 
In the qualitative analysis of Japan’s distrust of China, discourse of distrust is evident. 
They are identified as “distrust” because, first, they could reflect Japan’s worry about the 
issues in its relationship with China; second, much of the discourse is strongly emotional 
and negative, which is not normal in diplomatic situations. For example, “Deny and even 
whitewash the history of invading others” is the most frequently used language (ten times) 
in these documents. It could be argued that the Chinese government has already linked 
the issue of the “Japanese Prime Minister visiting Yasukuni Shrine” with the judgement 
that “Japan is trying to get rid of its historical responsibility”. On the one hand, it reflects 
that China distrusts Japan for its activities based on normative values, as the visits to the 
Shrine damage China’s dignity, as a part of its national interests. On the other hand, the 
deepening distrust reflected by the growing amount of negative discourse damages the 
bilateral relationship. It works in a three-stage structure of incidents—distrust—relations. 
When the negative incidents took place in interstate relations, distrust was created and 
evident, and therefore had negative impacts on the bilateral relationship. At the same time, 
a bad bilateral relationship might in turn strengthen mutual distrust. When new incidents 
take place between the states, they might interpret the incident in a more negative way, 
and therefore distrust would be further enhanced. This vicious cycle in China’s moral 
distrust of Japan is clear when the Japanese Prime Minister visits the Yasukuni Shrine, 
which leads to increased Chinese distrust and a long-time refusal to meet with Prime 
Minister Abe. Therefore, it is reasonable to see a worsening Sino-Japanese relationship 
caused by distrust resulting from negative confrontations and without reconciliation at the 
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VIP level. The comparatively bad relationship in recent years has created an atmosphere 
that exacerbates the problems, disputes and debates, because of China’s and Japan’s 
priorities. The status of mutual distrust has brought problems for the two countries in 
different areas—and they might even have nothing to do with the disputes.  
 
At the same time, the nature of discourse should be analysed. It has been argued that the 
discourse might be either ‘trust-positive’ or ‘distrust-negative’ (or neutral, but this is not 
collected for analysis), and the expression of the discourse either ‘emotionally strong’, 
‘emotionally weak’, or ‘neutral’. In the previous analysis of Japan’s discourse on 
strategic distrust of China, many of the emotionally strong and negative distrust discourse 
verify the existence of distrust in the cases. In the case of China’s moral distrust of Japan, 
more aggressive discourse was evident in the documents. For example, there are frequent 
appearances of discourse like “wrong words/deeds/values”, “Trample on the human 
conscience and arrogantly challenge justice”, “lacks the sincerity to face the history”, and 
even “Chinese people do not welcome him (Shinzo Abe)”. This is more serious than the 
Japanese responses, because the Chinese government does not hide its disgust of a 
specific foreign politician who is the head of Japanese government. As this activity would 
weaken China’s position in future communications with Japan, one possible explanation 
is that the Chinese government is concerned about the visits to the Yasukuni Shrine, and 
seriously distrusts Japan. 
 
China’s public opinion 
Public opinion has a great impact on the interstate relationship, by affecting foreign 
policies. It might be argued that, in democracies like Japan, citizens could use elections to 
affect the strategies of the state (Hao & Hou, 2009) and to show their influences on 
foreign policies (Hughes, 2005). While China is not a Western democratic state, there are 
voices that doubt the autonomy or independence of Chinese civil society (Rose, 2005; 
Bhattacharya, 2007). Considering its history in the Cold War, many critics still regard 
Chinese civil society as under the surveillance or even control of the Chinese government. 
As some of the government-owned media has considerable influence over the Chinese 
public, nationalism in China is seen by some Western (and Japanese) observers as a kind 
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of strategy of the Chinese Communist Party to direct internal pressure against external 
competitors such as Japan, to secure its own legitimacy. 
 
However, the reality is that having influence over society does not mean that public 
opinion is fully under control. (Forrest, 2009) With the growth of different types of social 
media and social networks such as Weibo, Weixin and Renren in China, the Chinese 
public are receiving more information than ever before. Although some other global 
platforms – including Facebook, Twitter and YouTube – are blocked, it is not possible to 
hide every incident that takes place. Another argument for the reliability of Chinese 
public opinion is that there were cases showing that the Chinese public opinion is not 
independent, because during 1970s and 1980s China and Japan experienced a honeymoon 
period, during which no significant incidents damaged the bilateral relationship, even 
though historical issues remained unresolved. If the Chinese people were so concerned 
about history, there would be no reason for them to hold protests only in recent years. 
The counter argument to this judgement is that the background is different. Firstly, during 
the Cold War, China was still a traditional communist country, with an absolutely 
dominant central government. Current Chinese society is different in that the government 
is withdrawing from many sectors of society so that the civil society has gained more 
independent power. Secondly, it was not until the end of the honeymoon period that the 
historical legacies changed. For example, regarding the Yasukuni Shrine issue, it was not 
until 1978 that the World War II Class-A War Criminals were moved into the Shrine and 
Japanese government VIPs started to visit, that the Chinese (the government and civil 
society) got angry. Therefore, Chinese public opinion still needs to be analysed. 
 
It would not be surprising to find that, through different questions, the Chinese public 
believe that history is a crucial problem between the two states. The detailed analysis of 
each related question has been discussed in previous sections. One conclusive 
characteristic of the Chinese public is that they care much more about the history issues 
than does the Japanese public. At the same time, denying its history of invading China 
might even be connected to the assumption that the Japanese right wing seeks the revival 
of militarism. Considering the recent attempts to modify the Japanese constitution for 
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collective defence, it is reasonable that the Chinese public distrusts Japan on these moral 
issues. 
A selection of China’s semi-official discourse 
It could be argued that China’s politics are different to many others’ based on its systems 
and institutional settings. Although others might also have institutions or organizations 
with governmental connections, the normal behaviour of semi-official actors taking part 
in crafting China’s foreign policy agenda is still a characteristic of this country. For 
example, the China Institute of International Studies (CIIS) is a typical example of these 
semi-official organizations. While it is not a part of the government system, it is a think 
tank under the leadership of China’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Therefore, the opinions 
and words from the CIIS are to certain extent representative of the Chinese government 
and, in some cases, can deliver more direct and radical ideas which could hardly be 
issued through diplomatic channels. There are many other institutions and organizations 
like this, such as the People’s Daily, and so on. In this way, discourse by semi-official 
organizations is valuable for identifying the Chinese government’s status of trust/distrust. 
 
In terms of the moral distrust issues between China and Japan, there has been a collection 
of various academic documents and editorials related to certain incidents. Taking the 
Yasukuni Shrine issue as an example, three typical ‘research outcomes’ are provided by 
the official website of the CIIS, entitled “The impact of right-deviation of Japanese 
politics on Sino-Japanese relations” (Ding, 2006; Shi Y. , 2013b), “Japan cannot separate 
history from the realities” (Jia, 2015), and “The impact of Japan’s strategic orientation on 
Sino-Japanese relations” (Shi Y. , 2013a) (It needs to be mentioned that these documents 
are originally in Chinese and have been translated by the author of this thesis.) Within 
these articles, there are arguments that might indicate how China views this moral issue, 
and how it affects Sino-Japanese relations. The main arguments include: 
 
 Japan’ right-wing politics is becoming stronger, which is shown in the history 
issues.  
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 The history issues are comprised of three main topics: visiting the Yasukuni 
Shrine, reversing historical facts, and actively promoting the history textbook that 
denies the history of invasion. (Shi Y. , 2013b)  
 The logic of Japan’s activities on history issues is that by “whitewashing” history 
issues, Japan can revive itself as a major power. (Ibid.) 
 Abe’s ultimate goal is to bring Japan back to a “normal” state by separating 
history and the current realities in its relations with China. (Jia, 2015) 
 
In short, the arguments from this think tank leave the audience with the impression that 
the history disputes originate from attempts by Japan to sever ties with the darker aspects 
of its past. This tendency harms China’s current and future interests. For the status quo, 
the Chinese government’s prestige and public opinion in the Chinese society could be 
shocked by Japan’s attitude towards history, because of a lack of a social foundation for 
reconciliation. Chinese public opinion towards Japan cannot be fully controlled 
(Harnzawi, 2013), and might in turn urge China to emphasise issues of reputation. China 
also worries that future Japanese generations will not have knowledge of its wartime 
invasions, which could be a potential threat to China if a similar conflict takes place. 
Therefore, China’s moral distrust of Japan plays a very big part in current Sino-Japanese 
relations. 
 
A brief discussion of Chinese academic debates on moral issues 
Chinese academic discussions and debates also provide interpretations of how Chinese 
scholars understand the current moral issues between the two countries. It would not be 
surprising if the Yasukuni Shrine issue was regarded as a typical example of Japan’s 
‘wrong’ understanding of history (He C. , 2015; Hu J. , 2014), and China’s impression of 
the rightward shift of Abe’s Cabinet (Ding, 2006; Liang, 2014). The seriousness of the 
Yasukuni Shrine case is that the problem seems to get more dangerous since Abe’s 2013 
visit, with at least two new factors that enhance China’s moral distrust. First, the previous 
Prime Ministers would always visit the Shrine as a private citizen, to weaken the political 
impact. However, Abe visited the Shrine as the Prime Minister, and emphasised that he 
would report his work from the second term of the Cabinet of Japan to the ‘souls’ in the 
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Shrine. Secondly, the visits by former Prime Ministers were followed by speeches 
including introspection about invasion wars. However, Abe’s 2013 visit bore no signs of 
this, except his self-defence. (Zhu, 2014) Therefore, the information China got from the 
visit was that Japan might be more active in reversing history to become a normal state 
(Lu & Tian, 2014). In this way, both sources of uncertainty and clear information 
contributed to the empirical evidence, and lead to a deepening moral distrust. 
 
Political correctness issues in China’s moral distrust of Japan 
The notion of political correctness can be interpreted as one actor accepting and 
following values that are accepted by other actors within a certain community (Morris, 
2001). As was mentioned in the previous chapter about Japan’s distrust of China, 
political correctness remains significant in international relations especially for the two 
most important actors in the region, China and Japan.  
 
For China, the political correctness issue is connected to history issues. Political 
correctness would respect the history of war, and have appropriate attitudes towards the 
victims—as well as prevent a future war of invasion. There are reasons why the history 
disputes still exist as a problem, decades after the war ended. Firstly, the reality is that 
Japan should be responsible for its war crimes in the 20th Century. It is undeniable that 
Japan launched a war on China, and there were a great number of victims. In this way, 
the request of Japan to take responsibility is reasonable. Secondly, especially in relations 
with Japan, successful diplomacy is directly related to the legitimacy or domestic support 
from the Chinese civil society. Relying on good performance, every government should 
focus on balancing public opinion and national interests. As the mainstream opinion in 
the Chinese civil society still regards Japan as irresponsible about its history, the Chinese 
government should take action. Thirdly, Japan’s actions related to history can be 
interpreted as an obstacle to political correctness; including Prime Ministers visiting the 
Yasukuni Shrine, the textbook issues, and so on. These existing facts are significant in 
bilateral relations, so China considers the history issues as serious problems in 
Sino-Japanese relations.  
 
222 
 
In short, it would be politically correct for the Japanese government to stay away from 
controversial historical issues, and maintain a sincere attitude of introspection about 
history—this is what the Chinese government always argues as a ‘basic principle’ in 
international society, and what is called ‘learning from the past, facing the future’. It 
would be politically wrong for the Japanese to exhibit an dismissive attitude toward the 
history of war between Japan and China, or to take any actions that the Chinese deem 
sensitive.  
 
There is evidence to verify the argument that the Chinese treat the issues of historical 
disputes as problems of political correctness. Let’s take the Yasukuni Shrine case as an 
example. At the governmental level, the last time Japan’s Prime Minister Shinzo Abe 
visited the Yasukuni Shrine was on December 26th, 2013. From then until May 2014, 
there were at least 14 records of speeches given by Chinese high level politicians 
(including Foreign Minister, Foreign Ministry Spokesman, and Ambassador to Japan, and 
more), and a great number of other documents from lower levels discussing the Yasukuni 
Shrine issue. According to a quantitative calculation, the Chinese expressed its distrust of 
Japan through its diplomatic discourse with very strong, emotional expressions. Very 
negative discourse appeared 79 times, which proves that the Yasukuni Shrine issue 
remains a core concern for China. Among these words and sentences, “Deny and even 
whitewash the history of invading others” (ten times), “Challenge international/post-war 
order” (nine times), “Wrong words and deeds” (six times), “Create obstacles” (five times), 
“Strongly condemn/protest” (five times), “Challenge the historical conclusions” (four 
times), “Cause vigilance” (four times), “firmly oppose” (four times), “Damage bilateral 
relations” (four times) were the most frequently used discourse. There is significant 
evidence that shows that discourse from high-level Chinese channels can explain the 
attitudes towards the Japanese side over historical disputes. Firstly, the history disputes 
could be interpreted as China’s judgement that Japan will not follow the normative value 
of respecting history. Secondly, the frequency of appearances was considerable. Thirdly, 
much of the discourse is emotionally strong, which is unusual in diplomatic 
communications, when no serious problems exist. Therefore, we can clearly see that the 
Chinese government views the actions not respecting history as politically wrong. 
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At the civil society level, the Chinese citizens also express their understanding of political 
correctness. I use the data from the 11th Japan-China Public Opinion Poll Analysis 
Report to verify this. According to this public opinion survey, there is a question about 
the “Reasons for negative impression”. For the Chinese people who took this survey, the 
answer “Japan’s lack of a proper apology and remorse over the history of invasion of 
China” received 70.5%, and for the question regarding “Barriers to development of 
bilateral relations”, the answer “Japan’s historical understanding and historical education” 
received 31.5%. These two facts verify that the historical issues between Japan and China 
have become issues of political correctness, as they are factors at both the governmental 
and civil society levels, which would greatly affect Sino-Japanese relations.  
 
The significance of understanding political correctness for the Chinese related to 
historical issues is that we can understand why China would distrust and be angry at 
Japan when related incidents take place. These are questions of political right or 
wrong—they affect China’s national interests, reputation and its judgement of whether 
Japan is a state which can be trusted. We can also predict future trends of bilateral 
relations: when historical disputes occur, they would have a negative impact on bilateral 
relations. 
 
 
A Sectional Conclusion 
The theoretical discussions related to the hypothesis that China holds a strong moral 
distrust of Japan is based on the existing empirical evidence that the bilateral relationship 
has always been greatly affected by moral issues between the two states in a negative 
way. There are arguments that moral trust has hardly any value to prove significant. The 
core reason is that moral issues in international relations might not be regarded as rational 
factors in international relations, so countries are not directed in certain ways of behaving, 
with normative values as the main standard for making judgements. However, this kind 
of argument does not fundamentally conflict with this research. Firstly, moral values 
could indeed be a source of trust and distrust. One typical example would be on issues 
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between different ideologies. Since the confrontations between the communist camp and 
capitalist camp throughout the Cold War period has left significant impressions on the 
people from different states, there might still be beliefs that other states from the opposite 
camp might damage their national interests. Democratic peace theory also verifies this 
assumption, that the states and people would treat normative values and moral issues as a 
kind of standard for making judgements in international relation. The claim of democratic 
peace theory, that wars would be less likely to take place between democracies and 
promotion of democracy by some states is reasonable under this circumstance. On the 
other hand, this thesis specifically focuses on the hypothesis that distrust is a problem 
between China and Japan. Therefore, although there are debates over the significance of 
moral trust, the negative influences of moral distrust cannot be denied.  
 
In terms of the case study of Japanese Prime Minister Abe’s visits to the Yasukuni Shrine, 
the logic is constructed in the following way:  
 Firstly, it has been hypothesised that China’s moral distrust of Japan needs to be 
confirmed in in the Sino-Japanese relations. In addition, it needs to be proven that 
moral distrust is China’s primary concern in the bilateral relationship (compared to 
strategic distrust). 
 Secondly, qualitative work in this section will verify the hypotheses. It will be done 
by analysing the existing empirical evidence, including policies/actions in reaction to 
visits to the Yasukuni Shrine, official discourse from Chinese governmental channels, 
Chinese public opinion, and academic discussions from Chinese institutions. 
According to the existing materials, it is reasonable to regard moral distrust of Japan 
as the crucial concern of China; because the evidence clearly shows that the Chinese 
use every methods to firmly oppose the visits at very high diplomatic cost. 
 Thirdly, there are quantitative calculations based on the data collected from the 
appearances of distrust discourse discovered in official documents and public 
opinion. The results from data collection show that, on the one hand, a large amount 
of distrust discourse appeared when the Yasukuni dispute took place. On the other 
hand, much of the discourse proved to be emotionally strong and negative, with 
distrust caused either by a lack of information or already known incidents. 
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 Moreover, a different approach to the analysis of political correctness will also be 
provided. Similar to the Japanese case, China also has a political correctness problem 
when dealing with its relationship with Japan. To be specific, political correctness 
would ensure that Japan had an attitude of deep introspection towards the history 
issues. Whenever Japan fails to follow or meet China’s demands, moral distrust is 
generated. Therefore, it is reasonable that the Yasukuni issue could easily lead to 
distrust, as it has gone beyond political correctness in China. 
In general, it needs to be mentioned that the Yasukuni Shrine is only one part of the 
historical disputes between China and Japan. For this issue, China expresses strong 
protest at the governmental level, halting bilateral interactions and even encourages its 
ambassadors in other states around the world to have their voices heard in local societies 
to express its serious concerns. If the research case studies could be extended to more 
historical disputes between the two states, more empirical evidence could be observed as 
supporting materials to verify China’s moral distrust of Japan. 
 
 
6.2.2 China’s strategic distrust of Japan 
An introduction and theoretical framework of China’s strategic distrust 
There are also explanations for the deterioration of Sino-Japanese relations from the 
perspective of China’s strategic distrust of Japan. Although strategic distrust is not 
China’s priority, it “remains as a problem” (Yahuda, 2014). To be specific, China’s 
strategic concerns about Japan are assumptions about whether Japan is reviving as a 
military power and/or will balance against China via the US-Japan alliance (He C. , 2015; 
Wan, 2006; Bhattacharya, 2007). The typical argument is, “although Japan cannot name 
its military force as the army, it is still one of the most powerful forces in Asia.” (Chu, 
2014) 
 
For a long time after the normalization of bilateral relations in 1972, especially before the 
21st Century, potential strategic confrontations were not China’s core focus in its 
relationship with Japan. Although the Cold War might have caused tensions between the 
two former rivals, the common external threat of the Soviet Union was regarded as the 
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main problem in regional relations. Therefore, the two states experienced a stable, 
“honeymoon” period in bilateral relations. At the same time, based on the rationality of 
states, strategic trust/distrust relies on the rational calculation of whether another state 
could be a strategic threat to one’s national interests (Amadae, 2007; Dowding, 2001; 
Hindmoor, 2006; Opp, 2013). Hence, it is reasonable that China had fewer strategic 
disputes with Japan in this period because there were fewer conflicts over national 
interests, considering the huge gap between the comprehensive national power and goals 
of the two states. Although there are predictions for the dominant role between Japan and 
China in Asia in the post-Cold War era, there is not much evidences from the 1980s and 
1990s in academic discussions. (Hayes, 2001) 
 
However, the situation is quite different in the recent years. Firstly, with the collapse of 
the Soviet Union, there are no common threats for China and Japan, so they might pay 
more attention to each other—as they are the two most powerful regional actors. 
Moreover, the rise of China has greatly changed comparative national powers in this 
region. China has settled its strategic goals to match its national power, while Japan 
modified its foreign policy to address the rise of China. In this way, the main strategies of 
Japan, including seeking stronger political influences/military capacity and strengthening 
its alliance with the US, could cause distrust in China (Yahuda, 2014). 
 
There is also empirical evidence showing that strategic distrust is China’s secondary 
concern. On one hand, there is China’s discourse and activities showing distrust, such as 
refusing to accept Japan as a permanent member of UN Security Council in 2005. On the 
other hand, it has to be admitted that the direct and indirect discourse from the Chinese is 
less than for moral distrust.   
 
Before analysing the empirical evidence, it is important to explain the theoretical 
framework for strategic trust/distrust in international relations, to justify the case study 
through the connection between theories and empirical content. It has to be 
re-emphasised that the notion of ‘strategic trust/distrust’ is not the same as what Uslaner 
and Rathbun (Rathbun B. C., 2012; 2009; Uslaner, 2000; 2001; 2002;2013) have 
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described as “trust/distrust based on already owned information”, but rather as “strategic 
and moral trust/distrust on strategic issues”. The significance of the research of strategic 
trust/distrust in this thesis, from the perspective of International Relations theories, is that 
the arguments and claims of state rationality fits the assumption that both strategic trust 
and distrust play a role in interstate relations. As states are regarded as rational actors, 
they have to consider whether their national interests could be harmed or not by others 
when making foreign policy. Therefore, if the activities of one state could damage or 
even have the potential to damage the national interests of other states, distrust is 
generated due to states’ rational need to secure themselves.  
 
Typical cases of China distrusting Japan over strategic issues include issues such as 
Japan’s attempts to strengthen the US-Japan alliance, promoting stronger military or 
strategic relationships with other regional actors, attempts to circumvent the existing 
restrictions of its peace constitution to become a ‘normal state’ (Ding, 2006; Hughes, 
2005; Inoguchi, 2003), and the activities to enhance its global status, such as trying to 
become a permanent member of the UN security council. To conduct the case study, 
some work needs to be done, including specifying the related incidents/issues in the cases, 
collecting Chinese reactions to the incidents, giving a qualitative interpretation of the 
activities/discourse, and a quantitative calculation of the data of appearances of distrust 
discourse. 
 
Nine documents have been collected on the topic of China’s strategic distrust of Japan. 
These documents are related to the issue of Japan’s attempts to become a normal state 
and expanding its international influence. These documents include records of the 
Foreign Ministry’s Press Meetings, important speeches by Chinese officials responsible 
for China-Japan relations, and other statements.  
 
The quantitative analysis:  
Discourse Type Trust or distrust Frequency 
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Japan should not damage 
(the interests/regional 
stability) 
China’s attitude Distrust 7 
Have (serious) concerns 
on Japan 
China’s attitude Distrust 7 
Japan should respect the 
security concerns of its 
neighbouring Asian states. 
China’s attitude Distrust 3 
doubt China’s attitude Distrust 2 
(firmly) oppose China’s attitude Distrust 2 
China has expressed its 
solemn stance 
China’s attitude Distrust 2 
Should be alert on Japan’s 
activities 
China’s attitude Distrust 2 
Hope Japan be cautious 
on security issues 
China’s attitude Distrust 1 
Solemnly urging Japan (to 
remain the peaceful 
development) 
China’s attitude Distrust 1 
(Japan’s activities) should 
not be against the third 
party (China) 
China’s attitude Distrust 1 
Added up  Distrust 28 
  Trust 0 
    
Deliberately creating 
China Threats for 
domestic political agenda 
Description of Japan’s 
activities 
Distrust 4 
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Deviating from the 
direction of development 
of China-Japan relations 
Description of Japan’s 
activities 
Distrust 1 
Shaking the foundation of 
Japan's post war peaceful 
development 
Description of Japan’s 
activities 
Distrust 1 
Might cause dangerous 
consequences 
Description of Japan’s 
activities 
Distrust 1 
Do not fit the current 
trend of the world 
Description of Japan’s 
activities 
Distrust 1 
Added up  Distrust 8 
  Trust 0 
    
Total  Distrust 36 
  Trust 0 
 
Table 6. 2: Frequency of trust/distrust discourse of Chinese government on strategic issues 
 
Qualitative methods are used to verify two kinds of questions. Firstly, the fundamental 
questions s whether there is evidence of Chinese distrust of Japan. Moreover, it is 
necessary to provide interpretations of how trust/distrust can be reflected. At the same 
time, quantitative methods are needed. For example, distrust might not be identified even 
if there is qualitative evidence—a certain amount of discourse and activities could help 
exclude unexpected issues, or at least minimize the possibility of making mistakes.  
 
In the nine documents collected from the official website, 36 instances of distrust 
discourse were identified. This could be regarded as a high amount, considering the fact 
that the documents recorded on the Ministry of Foreign Affairs’s website are not 
complete. Contrary to the case of Japan’s strategic distrust of China, the evidence of 
discourse with trust can barely be found in official Chinese documents. In this way, there 
230 
 
is no need to produce a table for a comparison of trust and distrust discourse—basically, 
it would be 36-0.  
 
As has been mentioned above, there are two types of discourse: that stating China’s own 
attitudes (as reactions or active voices), and that describing Japan’s activities. The 
significance of having these two categories of discourse is that they can help analyse the 
origins of trust/distrust reflected in the documents. In terms of China’s strategic distrust 
of Japan, the comparison of appearances between “China’s attitudes” and “Description of 
Japan’s activities” is 8-8. There are only eight instances of “Description of Japan’s 
activities”. The reason for there be less might be that there is less empirical evidence, or 
fewer instances of strategic issues for China to voice objections. Or, put a different way, 
these activities are within the scope of Japan’s sovereignty. China could not interfere 
unless it is directly related to China’s national interests. At the same time, there is more 
discourse related to “China’s attitudes” (twenty-eight pieces). Although there is not 
enough evidence, China still has many concerns about strategic issues in its relationship 
with Japan. Due to a lack of information for the future, China tends to keep repeating 
words as reminders or alerts, in case Japan goes further on strategic issues. 
 
China’s public opinion 
The source and significance of Chinese public opinion has already been discussed in 
previous sections, and that Chinese public opinion is necessary for case analysis. 
Therefore, this thesis picks several questions related to strategic issues, as follows. 
 
Question 1: Barriers to Development of Bilateral Relations 
It has to be mentioned that this question is mentioned and used in other cases. However, 
this question also provides answers from Chinese interviewees about whether distrust is a 
barrier to the development of bilateral relations. Specifically, 20.8% of Chinese 
interviewees claim that a “lack of trustful relationships between Chinese and Japanese 
peoples” is a barrier to development of bilateral relations. At the same time, 25.5% claim 
that a “lack of trust between Chinese and Japanese government” is a barrier. As has been 
argued, the results show that, on one hand, the Chinese public understands that a lack of 
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trust is a problem in Sino-Japanese relations. On the other hand, the interviewees mention 
both a lack of trust at both the civil society and governmental levels. To understand the 
significance of the data, there are more-detailed options, in terms of specific incidents 
between China and Japan, as opposed to these two more-abstract conclusions; these 
might be more ‘attractive’ to the public rather than researchers. That being said, there are 
only three options (from 17 in total) which got higher than 25.5%, including “territorial 
issue”, “Japan’s historical understanding and historical education” and “disputes over 
marine resources”.  
 
There are several other questions related to potential strategic issues between China and 
Japan, including “Disputes over marine resources (gas field development in the East 
China Sea)” (25.0%), “Territorial Issue (Diaoyu/Senkaku Islands)” (66.4%), “Change in 
Japan’s security policy and military build-up” (14.6%). The significance of these 
questions is that the ‘barriers’ to bilateral relations should be past incidents, or at least 
have some empirical evidence to back up assumptions. Therefore, as these existing 
problems have left damaging impressions on the interstate relationship, they can be 
regarded as a source of distrust from the Chinese public’s perspective. In fact, the 
disputes in the East China Sea, Japanese security policy, and the territorial disputes 
indeed exist to verify the hypothesis of strategic distrust.  
 
Question 2: Reasons for Unfavourable Impression 
This question is significant for both states, for strategic and moral trust/distrust issues, 
because the negative impressions are created by either the negative incidents caused by a 
lack of transparency (Hook, Gilson, Hughes, & Dobson, 2005, p. 198) or clear evidence. 
They are more likely to transform into distrust in an easy way. There are options such as 
“Japan’s attempt to besiege China on military, economic and ideological fronts in 
cooperation with the United States” (41.1%) and “Japanese purchase of the Diaoyu 
Islands for the nation and fuelling the confrontation” (68.1%). Although there were not 
many different answers, the focused choices still show that the Chinese people recognize 
the existence of strategic challenges from Japan. In other words, the Chinese public might 
interpret issues or actions of Japan as strategic threats. It would be reasonable for the 
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Chinese public to have this kind of negative interpretation, because distrust has become 
the dominant impression when they talk about Sino-Japanese relations.  
 
Question 3: Social/Political systems of One Another’s Countries 
This question is mentioned for the first time in the two cases studies. The question is one 
with comparatively neutral answers; however, the results from the Chinese public are 
interesting, and are significant for explaining the Chinese public’s strategic distrust. 
Among the answers to this question, the Chinese public picked the following factors: 
“Nationalism” (25.6%), “Militarism” (46.0%), “Great Power Favouritism” (12.2%) and 
“Hegemonism” (40.1%). According to the answers, the Chinese public seem to see Japan 
as a regional military threat. While the peaceful constitution restricts Japan, these answers 
might only be the assumptions and worries of people who do not have the most 
up-to-date information about bilateral relations. As Japan tries to overcome obstacles, the 
Chinese public have enough reasons to believe that their assumptions are closer to reality. 
Therefore, they tend to interpret Japan’s actions as strategic threats of “militarism”, 
“hegemonism”, and so on, with serious distrust. 
 
Question 4: Countries and Regions That Pose a Military Threat 
It is not surprising that the Chinese interviewees choose the US (73.8%) and Japan 
(81.8%) as military threats. Therefore, it is easy to imagine how the Chinese public views 
Japan and the US-Japan alliance in this region. If one state is regarded as a military threat 
by another actor, it could hardly be trusted.  
 
Question 5: Answers to the Question, “Will there be a Military Conflict between 
Japan and China in the Future?” 
Here, 10.2% Chinese interviewees believe that there will be conflict within a few years, 
and 31.1% believe that there will be conflict in the future. Therefore, 41.3% of Chinese 
interviewees were pessimistic about future peace between China and Japan. Considering 
that only a very small number of Chinese think that the origins of bilateral disputes are 
China’s fault, Japan could easily be treated as an unstrustworthy state.  
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The qualitative analysis 
These official documents were collected from the PRC’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs 
website. At the same time, it needs to be mentioned that these nine documents are the 
most recent, and the only ones to be found on the website, from 2013-2015. There are not 
many new strategic issues from the Japanese in recent years. Meanwhile, the long-lasting 
issue of attempts to change its peace constitution has experienced some breakthroughs in 
2014-2015, and the newly-approved security act might enable Japan to play a more 
significant role in collective security. From the Chinese perspective, this change might be 
threatening, due to doubts over whether Japan is attempting to revive its military power. 
Therefore, qualitative analysis of the existing evidence is needed, including the reactions 
and policies of the Chinese government, official discourse and public opinion. 
 
China’s reactions and foreign policies 
The strategic issues between states, especially those issues which have not become 
immediate problems, might not lead to direct responses because of the rationality of 
states. If the strategic issues were proven to be purely assumptions rather than reflections 
of reality, the states would have to pay a cost, and might suffer losses on positive 
activities in bilateral relations, and also damage to their national images. Under this 
circumstance, the reactions and foreign policies can be viewed in a conservative way, 
unless the problems have already caused disputes between states. In the case of China’s 
strategic distrust of Japan, there are similar consequences. Many of the related issues take 
place without direct confrontations. When Japan continually strengthens its alliance with 
the US, conducts joint military exercises or organises/constructs regional organisations, it 
can easily explain that these activities are not aimed at any third party. Due to the basic 
diplomatic principle of respecting the sovereignty of other states, China has no reason to 
directly oppose these activities through governmental channels. 
 
However, countries do not wait for their assumption to become reality. China, as a state 
with growing national comprehensive power, would take actions to prepare 
counter-actions. In China’s Military Strategy document, published on China’s Ministry of 
National Defence website, it has been stated that, 
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“As the economic and strategic focus of the world transfer to the region of Pacific 
Asia, the US would continually promote its rebalancing strategy, strengthening its 
military presence and the system of military alliance. Japan has been active on 
seeking for getting rid of the post war system with the substantial adjustment on 
its military and security policies. Its national development direction has drawn 
great attentions of the regional actors.”20 
 
So the Chinese government has already identified the potential strategic challenge from 
Japan, and produced policies to deal with these issues. Specifically, it could be argued 
that the rise of China as a military force is partly aimed at addressing the potential revival 
of Japanese military force (Lu & Tian, 2014). Since the beginning of the 21st Century, 
China has greatly increased its military force to protect its growing national interests, 
especially in relation to maritime issues: including building its first aircraft carrier, 
Liaoning, and setting up the air defence identification zone in the East China Sea—which 
overlaps with Japan, and China also sends its navy and air force to cruise near disputed 
areas. 
 
All the policies and activities could be interpreted as the result of growing strategic 
distrust because, first, China does not have enough information to make a judgement of 
whether Japan’s activities – such as removing the limitation of collective defence – could 
ultimately turn into direct threats to China’s national security. On the other hand, 
according to the existing evidence of Japan strengthening its alliance with the US, 
expanding its influence on the Southeast Asian states by offering economic and military 
assistance, China judges that Japan’s strategies could threaten China as an imaginary 
enemy. The reality is that no other state in the region could prevent Japan from taking 
these actions—a comparatively pessimistic opinion.  
 
China’s official discourse 
                                                 
20  http://www.mod.gov.cn/affair/2015-05/26/content_4588132.htm, accessed 18/08/2015, originally Chinese and 
translated by the author. 
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This part of analysis focuses on the discourse collected from the nine documents, on the 
words and sentences themselves, rather than the quantitative calculation. There are 
different kinds of discourse in the documents. The standard for judging whether discourse 
is “trusting” or “distrusting” has been discussed in the previous chapter and sections. 
Basically, it has to be identified if the discourse reflects an attitude of distrust caused by a 
lack of information, predictions of external threats, or clearly damaging activities from 
other actors.  
 
For the first kind of discourse, showing a lack of information, there are examples; for 
example, “doubt”, “should be alert on Japan’s activities”, and so on. In this discourse, 
China obviously has doubts about whether Japan has the strategic goal of rivalling China, 
or protecting its own interests by harming China’s. However, the existing evidence is not 
enough to verify these assumptions. Therefore, China can only express its doubts and 
distrust by using this language. There is another kind of discourse showing that China 
distrusts Japan, as there is evidence that shows existing damage to China’s interests. This 
discourse can also be observed in the selected documents, through phrases like “firmly 
oppose”, “shaking the foundation of Japan’s post war peaceful development”, and so on. 
Since Japan has already taken essential steps towards modifying its domestic law for 
collective defence and becoming a normal state with more influence on this region and 
globally, potential threats become more immediate. Therefore, it is reasonable that China 
expresses its distrust in these diplomatic documents. 
 
Moreover, the combination of emotional qualifiers and essential contents could also 
verify the existence of distrust in the discourse. As has been argued, rational actors would 
not freely use emotionally charged and negative discourse on the diplomatic stage. 
Otherwise, it would contradict that actors act rationally. Therefore, the explanation for 
this kind of discourse is that the state would be extremely dissatisfied, worried or angry 
about another actor. Consequently, distrust would be generated. In the documents 
collected, there are examples of this, including “firmly oppose”, “serious concerns”, 
“dangerous consequences”, and so on. 
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The interpretation on how Japan’s strategic behaviours shape China’s strategic 
distrust 
The previous sections show how strategic distrust can be interpreted from discourse, 
policies and public opinion in China. At the same time, it should be remembered that it is 
Japan’s strategic behaviour that shapes China’s trust and distrust. To be specific, whether 
there has been behaviour that damages or could damage China’s national interests is the 
core question. This thesis would like to provide analysis of a typical case of strategic 
issues: the Talisman Sabre 2015 Military Exercise. The Talisman Sabre military exercise 
is a US-Australia joint military exercise. However, Japan took part in the 2015 exercise. 
According to the principles after the World War II, Japan can only maintain a 
Self-Defence Force, rather than a regular military force—this brings a sense of security to 
China. When Japan takes part in any military exercise, China experiences doubts, based 
on three factors. First, participating in any military exercise is itself a problem for China. 
With Japan’s history invasion, and China’s history of being nationally weak for a long 
period of time, China has reason to doubt whether Japan’s militarism might be revived – 
this generates distrust. Second, the reality is that many of Japan’s military exercises are 
conducted with the US. The US-Japan alliance is dominant in this region due to its 
economic, political and military influences. China might assume that the US and Japan 
intend to restrict China’s growth and, therefore, Japan’s behaviour could be regarded as a 
potential challenge to China’s strategic interests. Moreover, the Talisman Sabre exercises 
in 2015 went beyond the US-Japan alliance. The original US-Australia military exercises, 
with Japan and other members’ participation, could present China with an impression of 
multiple countries uniting—that they could unite against China is a potential threat.  
 
In conclusion, Japanese behaviour on strategic issues might lead to possible Chinese 
doubts about whether Japan is trying to seek to revive itself as a great power, and acquire 
external assistance in order to balance against China. There are academic arguments from 
China that indicate Japan’s attempts include goals such as seeking an equal position in 
the US-Japan alliance, getting rid of the restrictions from World War II, and changing the 
political agenda and order in the region. (He X. , 2013, p.95) These doubts strongly drive 
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China’s strategic concerns to be more conservative towards Japan, and could lead to 
strategic distrust. 
 
A sectional conclusion 
It has to be admitted that there have been fewer strategic confrontations, compared to 
moral disputes, from the Chinese perspective. Although there have been issues and 
incidents between the two states, China does not interpret most of the problems as 
strategic distrust, as does Japan. Therefore, compared to moral distrust, far less evidence 
can be identified on strategic distrust. However, it cannot be denied that strategic distrust 
issues still exist, even though states in most cases would tend not to directly blame others 
if issues would not damage their interests. The overall logic of this section of China’s 
strategic distrust on Japan is as follows: 
 First, there is the hypothesis that China has strategic distrust of Japan. At the same 
time, as argued above, it has to be understood that the hypothesis also indicates that 
strategic distrust is secondary compared to moral distrust. 
 Secondly, the qualitative research to verify the hypothesis focuses on the essence of 
the strategic issues. There are key questions on how to identify strategic disputes 
between China and Japan, how to identify distrust in these issues, and how Japanese 
strategic behaviour shapes China’s strategic distrust. According to the materials, the 
selected case studies of strategic issues between the two states leads to worries in 
China about whether Japan will rise again as a military power and damage China’s 
strategic interests. With these uncertainties and Japan’s more active expansion of its 
strategic and military influence, strategic distrust is deeper than ever before. Similar 
to other sections, public opinion questions also contribute to the analysis that the 
opinions from civil society could explain the possible reasons for foreign policies to 
be affected by the public. It is not surprising that the Chinese public holds an attitude 
of distrust according to the survey questions. 
 Third, the quantitative study could help support the qualitative findings. According to 
the quantitative calculation, there have been 36 instances of distrust discourse 
regarding strategic issues in the nine official documents examined. Moreover, a 
comparison between distrust and trust turns up an absolute dominance of distrust 
238 
 
(36-0). At the same time, discourse showing “China’s attitudes” are more prominent 
than “descriptions of Japan’s activities” (28-8), indicating a possible trend that, 
although empirical evidence is not plentiful, China still feels threatened. In 
conclusion, a large amount of discourse, with the essence of distrust caused either by 
a lack of information or empirical evidence of causing damage to interests, as well as 
strongly emotional and negative expressions, could help verify the hypothesis of 
China’s strategic distrust. 
 
In general, the strategic distrust of Japan reflects many issues, so the selected case studies 
offer only a select impression. Considering past incidents, Japan’s more active defence 
policy, and so on, China’s strategic distrust of Japan may become even more important in 
the bilateral relationship in the future. 
 
As has been argued in the previous sections, the hypotheses include different questions. 
On one hand, the existence of China’s moral and strategic distrust needs to be verified, 
and this has been done in the previous two sections. On the other hand, another key issue 
here is that China’s moral distrust is a priori, and strategic distrust is a secondary concern. 
This forms an asymmetric structure of mutual distrust between China and Japan, which is 
the theme of this thesis. 
 
6.3 A comparative study between China’s moral distrust and strategic 
distrust of Japan 
As mentioned above, the level of importance given to moral distrust and strategic distrust 
are relative and dynamic, depending on the development of the two states and their 
bilateral relations. Based on current Sino-Japanese relations, this thesis suggests that 
moral distrust is the a priori issue for China, and strategic distrust remains secondary, 
though it does suggest a rising trend. Therefore, an internal asymmetry can be observed 
in China’s overall distrust of Japan. 
 
As theoretical support, the definition of moral and strategic trust/distrust and the 
distinction between them is provided. This is significant as these notions might lead to 
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debates under different circumstances. It has been argued that this research does not 
follow Rathbun’s and Uslaner’s definitions, who defined strategic trust as trusting with 
information, and moral trust as trusting others to follow positive values. This thesis 
focuses on specific issues in international relations including the strategic and moral 
fields. Moral trust and distrust are different to strategic trust and distrust. Despite the 
different origins of issues, moral trust/distrust might have a longer term influence on the 
mutual trust and bilateral relations, compared to strategic trust/distrust, as it might 
identify other states as “not trustworthy”. By comparison, strategic trust and distrust 
might vary with changes in regional strategic situations, national power, and other factors. 
Therefore, China’s level of moral distrust and strategic distrust of Japan is different. 
 
This research uses multiple methods for judging whether trust/distrust exists in 
China-Japan relations, and how positive/negative is the situation. The general 
methodology is based on characteristic difficulty of identifying trust/distrust in 
international relations, and so they need to be analysed by interpreting discourse or state 
activities. Therefore, collecting documents on certain issues and cases, to discover the 
pieces of discourse reflecting trust/distrust is the first step to identifying trust/distrust. It 
has to be mentioned that there are two aspects to this method. First, qualitative analysis of 
the discourse is important to confirm the nature of distrust as it reflects a judgement that 
there is certain information that harms or might harm one’s interests. At the same time, 
quantitative analysis is helpful to understand whether the trust/distrust is strong or weak 
between the two states. The repeated appearance of certain discourse can be treated as 
evidence of trust/distrust.  
 
Another key reason for the case study is because strategic/moral trust and distrust can be 
interpreted as state rationality and normative values in international relations. The 
strategic issues between states might lead to trust/distrust when judged through the 
rationality of states. In other words, the judgement of whether another actor is 
trustworthy is based on certain information or incidents that have happened in interstate 
relations, instead of on impressions of whether another state is trustworthy or not. In short, 
it cannot be denied that strategic trust and distrust have some similar characteristics to the 
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realistic approach in international relations theory, that acting rationally by securing 
national interests is one of the basic rules for state actors. On the other hand, normative 
values emphases a different type of trust/distrust, focusing on the nature of another 
country. Moral norms and values in international relations might suggest that, in an ideal 
situation, states should tend to trust others. However, the real world is not ideal. 
Normative values of moral trust/distrust judge whether another actor is trustworthy in 
nature. As opposed to strategic trust/distrust, this kind of moral trust/distrust not only 
relies on every independent event in the relationship. It is also generated by the long term 
interactions and, therefore, moral trust and distrust concern both categories of issues.  
 
There is a basic hypothesis which could form the structure of the whole thesis, that China 
has both moral and strategic distrust of Japan, that moral distrust is dominant, and 
strategic distrust is secondary. This is a three-stage argument, and the following 
assumptions need to be verified. First, both moral and strategic distrust should exist from 
China’s perspective of Japan. Second, compared to moral trust and strategic trust, distrust 
can be identified as more significant in Sino-Japanese relations today. Third, within the 
status of China’s distrust of Japan, moral distrust is asymmetrically more crucial than 
strategic distrust, and clear through certain quantitative and empirical evidence. The 
existence of both moral and strategic distrust is verifiable by examining discourse and 
activities of distrust, and shows that China is worried that its national interests will be 
harmed. Moreover, the other two assumptions can be verified through detailed qualitative 
and quantitative analysis. 
 
6.3.1 The comparative study by qualitative analysis 
The qualitative analysis is mainly helpful for the first two stages of verifying the 
assumptions mentioned above. On one hand, empirical evidence (discourse, activities, 
policies, and so on) indicate the existence of China’s moral and strategic distrust of Japan. 
For example, Chinese respondents provided the answer of “Deny and even whitewash the 
history of invading others” when asked about the moral issues related to Abe’s visits to 
the Yasukuni Shrine. Distrust identifiable, because China has accurate information that 
the Japanese government will continue with these activities, which damages China’s 
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reputation (related to national interest of legitimacy, and so on), and the uncertainty about 
whether Japan will take further actions on moral issues. On the strategic front, there is 
plenty of evidence of Chinese distrust discourse, such as “Japan should respect the 
security concerns of its neighbouring Asian states”. As China doubts that Japan’s 
activities have negative effects on its own security arrangements, it could be argued that 
China distrusts Japan on these strategic issues. 
 
Moreover, it can be verified that the qualitative essence of the evidence of moral distrust 
issues is more significant from the Chinese perspective than are strategic distrust issues. 
As argued in previous chapters, the discourse of trust and distrust is composed of two 
parts – “emotional expression” and “positive/negative essence”. For the emotional 
expression, there might be strongly emotionally as well as weak examples depending on 
the incident. The “positive/negative essence” is the key standard for judging whether it 
could be evidence of trust or distrust. Therefore, there are different combinations of 
discourse, within which the level of trust/distrust will no doubt be different. In terms of 
the discourse on moral distrust issues, China tends to use more emotionally strong and 
negative language. For example, the Chinese government used phrases such as “Will be 
abandoned by history”, “He (Shinzo Abe) lacks the sincerity to face the history” and 
“Chinese people do not welcome him (Shinzo Abe)”, issued through diplomatic channels. 
It is unusual for countries to actively create problems by directly criticising another 
state’s head of government if there are no serious problems or disputes between them. In 
this case, it cannot be denied that this emotionally strong and essentially negative 
discourse is evidence of very strong moral distrust. 
By comparison, the discourse on strategic issues has both similarities and differences. 
There is existing discourse describing Japan’s actions in a negative way, such as 
“Shaking the foundation of Japan's post war peaceful development”. However, the level 
of emotion in the expressions is not as strong as those for moral distrust issues. Besides, 
China focuses more on expressing its own attitudes, such as “firmly oppose”, “cannot 
accept”. There is a gap between the two ways of describing the other’s activities, and 
expressing one’s own attitude: the latter is comparatively weaker on many occasions. 
Expressing one’s attitude causes fewer problems at the diplomatic level, and so it is the 
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right of sovereign countries to do so—no matter if it is positive or negative. However, 
describing the activities or policies of other states might lead to suspicion of interfering, 
or even libel, which have higher risks of damaging bilateral relations. Moreover, 
expressing one’s own attitudes might only be based on uncertainties and concerns from 
predictions, instead of empirical evidence. For instance, what China stressed on strategic 
issues is that “Japan should not damage (the interests/regional stability)”. As far as it was 
concerned, Japan has not caused a serious regional security crisis. However, China has its 
worries, rather than information, that Japan could possibly become a threat in the future, 
so that discourse is expressed and distrust is identifiable. Therefore, the qualitative 
analysis of official discourse verifies the assumptions that both moral and strategic 
distrust exist, and moral distrust is currently dominant for the Chinese. 
 
The public opinion survey offers a different way to verify the assumption. The public 
opinion survey can help in different ways. Firstly, there are direct questions asking 
whether the interviewees feel distrust towards another state. Secondly, by asking 
questions about the reasons for current negative bilateral relations, it is possible that the 
public would offer answers that link with the assumptions of strategic and moral 
trust/distrust. This could be interpreted as qualitative evidence. At the same time, the 
detailed results of the survey could provide quantitative resources for the research that, 
for instance, if the public opinion recognises the Yasukuni Shrine as a major problem 
between the two states, a qualitative judgement of China’s moral distrust could then be 
verified. It would not only be a question of whether there is a certain source of 
trust/distrust, but if a certain issue is important to bilateral trust/distrust or not. 
 
For the detailed results of the qualitative analysis, Chinese public opinion clearly 
suggests both moral issues and strategic issues lead to the problem of distrust between the 
two countries. In terms of the reasons for negative impressions towards Japan, the 
Chinese public offer “Japan’s lack of a proper apology and remorse over the history of 
invasion of China”, “Some Japanese politicians’ careless remarks” and “Japanese 
people’s entrenched nationalism”, which are generally moral issues. Besides, there are 
also answers including “Japan’s attempt to besiege China on military, economic and 
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ideological fronts in cooperation with the United States”, and “Japanese purchase of the 
Diaoyu Islands for the nation and fuelling the confrontation”, which are strategic issues. 
The results are quite similar in many other survey questions. Moreover, as has been 
argued, the gap between distrust and so-called negative issues/incidents is based on 
whether these issues could lead to worries and concerns of further damage to national 
interests, based on either accurate information or just uncertainty.  
 
6.3.2 The comparative study by quantitative analysis 
The logic of using quantitative analysis to verify the assumption of China’s moral distrust 
remaining dominant rather than strategic distrust generally includes the following two 
parts. First, the quantitative calculation of appearances of discourse on moral and 
strategic distrust issues is used for comparison. This is straightforward for analysing 
which one could possibly stand for the more significant concern. Second, another 
approach within the two sections of moral distrust and strategic distrust is crucial. As has 
been mentioned, the thesis has labelled the different pieces of discourse as “description of 
Japan’s activities” and “China’s own attitudes”. While the descriptions could be more 
strongly emotional, and have certain accurate sources, expressions of its own attitude 
might be weaker for assessing levels of distrust. This is not absolute, but still has 
significance. Therefore, the quantitative calculation of the composition of distrust 
discourse could help verify which part—moral or strategic—is stronger. 
 
In terms of the first quantitative approach mentioned above, the appearances of certain 
discourse and activities of distrust are key factors in the asymmetric structure of China’s 
distrust of Japan. Whether trust or distrust stands for a mainstream level is easier to 
identify because no significant evidence of trust could be identified in the selected cases. 
Therefore, as has been mentioned in the case of Abe’s visit to the Yasukuni Shrine in 
December 2013, the Chinese government published 14 documents (at the level of Foreign 
Ministry or higher), and many more speeches by its diplomats worldwide, over five 
months. According to the quantitative calculation, distrust discourse appears at least 89 
times. Among the language used, “Deny and even whitewash the history of invading 
others” (ten times), “Challenge international/post-war order” (nine times), “Wrong words 
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and deeds” (six times), “Create obstacles” (five times), “Strongly condemn/protest” (five 
times), “Challenge the historical conclusions” (four times), “cause vigilance” (four times), 
“firmly oppose” (four times), “Damage bilateral relations” (four times), were the most 
frequently used expressions. This situation could be regarded as exhibiting a very high 
level of moral distrust. 
 
At the same time, the thesis also tries to collect the evidence of strategic distrust in a 
similar way. By comparison, only nine documents could be found on the official website 
of China’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs on the topic of China’s strategic distrust of Japan 
– on Japan’s attempt to expand its military and political influence, and strengthening the 
US-Japan alliance. In these nine documents, 36 pieces of discourse expressing distrust 
were found. “Japan should not damage (the interests/regional stability)” (seven times), 
“have (serious) concerns on Japan” (seven times) and “Deliberately creating China 
Threats for domestic political agenda” (four times) were the most-frequently used 
expressions. It has to be mentioned that these nine documents are the only ones that could 
be found on the official website. In this way, it could be argued that the quantitative 
calculation suggests that China is more concerned with moral issues between the two 
countries. At the governmental level, a single case of moral distrust (Abe’s 2013 visit to 
the Yasukuni Shrine) generated much more empirical evidence (89 pieces of discourse) 
of distrust than broader topics of strategic issues for several years (39, by comparison). 
Therefore, the quantitative data suggests that moral distrust is the main concern for China 
out of the two categories. 
 
In terms of the ‘internal’ comparison between moral distrust and strategic distrust, 
different outcomes can be observed. For moral distrust, the comparison between 
“description of Japan’s activities” and “China’s attitude” is 75-14. This is evidence that 
China pays more attention to existing moral issues. In fact, the discourse is based on 
evaluating Shinzo Abe’s visit to Yasukuni Shrine. As China has directly used many 
pieces of emotionally-charged and essentially negative discourse to describe or even 
criticise Japan’s activities, it can’t be denied that significant moral distrust exists from the 
Chinese perspective. The attitudes of simply opposing or protesting are less effective 
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without pointing to certain facts. Meanwhile, strategic issues appeared at 8-28, in terms 
of “description of Japan’s activities” and “China’s attitudes”. It could be argued that 
China’s expressions on strategic issues are “weaker” than those on moral issues. This 
might be the result of a weaker level of distrust, with less empirical evidence in terms of 
strategic issues. Therefore, it can be seen that the Chinese opinion seems to be less active 
or intended on strategic issues than the moral ones.  
 
Considering the evidence from both the qualitative and quantitative analysis, the three 
stages of the assumptions are verifiable. China distrusts Japan over moral as well as 
strategic issues. Moreover, moral distrust is the current dominant issue of the two, while 
strategic distrust is secondary, but also possibly rising in importance. Concerning this, the 
asymmetric structure of moral and strategic distrust has significant influence on China’s 
foreign policies towards Japan, and might therefore affect Sino-Japanese relations. To be 
specific, as China distrusts Japan over strategic issues – including its attempts to 
strengthen the US-Japan alliance and to seek collective security – China might take 
actions, such as setting up obstacles in the UN against Japan’s rising political and 
military presence in the regional and global arenas. China might also strengthen its own 
military influence to deal with Japan’s strategic issues. On moral issues, China’s distrust 
might lead to a continued demand that Japan behave in an “appropriate” way, from 
China’s perspective. However, considering the political realities in recent years, it is not 
very good that Japan tends to solve problems by taking unilateral concessions. Therefore, 
relations between China and Japan might suffer more from moral distrust in the future. If 
Japan takes any controversial actions, such as VIPs visiting the Yasukuni Shrine, 
promoting a “whitewashed” history, or denying its past invasions, the Chinese could react 
strongly as happened in 2012, when the disputes between the two states led to the 
cancellation of a series of celebrations marking the 40th anniversary of the establishment 
of diplomatic relations. 
 
It has to be emphasised that moral distrust issues and strategic distrust issues from the 
Chinese perspective have certain connections. One simple explanation is that China could 
have interpreted some of the strategic issues as moral ones. For example, in normal cases 
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the Diaoyu/Senkaku Islands territorial disputes should be regarded as strategic issues. 
However, from the Chinese perspective, these issues are not only strategic but also the 
moral. The main reason is that China believes that a very large part of the Sino-Japanese 
disputes is the result of the legacies of a history of war, which have been left unresolved. 
China might argue that it was a problem of post-war arrangements (led by the US) that 
prevented China from taking over its former territories, including the Diaoyu/Senkaku 
Islands. In this way, moral distrust of Japan, or of Japan’s behaviour and rightward-shift 
are also an inevitable result of Japan’s rising concerns and change in approach (Shi Y. , 
2014) to strategic issues between the two states. This characteristic does not mean that 
there is no explicit line between moral and strategic issues of trust/distrust. The basic 
standards of identifying these issues still exist. The significance of the phenomenon 
proves from a different angle how important moral issues and moral trust/distrust are in 
China-Japan relations, from the Chinese perspective.  
 
Under these circumstances, a dilemma is identified considering the status of Japan’s 
distrust of China. As the hypothesis indicates, there are asymmetries in the structures of 
distrust for both China and Japan. They have to face the problem of having different 
priorities in distrust problems to be resolved. Basically, China insists that moral issues 
should be dealt with properly through negotiations. However, Japan does not think there 
is a problem of history between the two states, which makes China angry, and moral 
distrust is deepened. While Japan is very worried about China’s strategic plans, China 
believes that its activities do not break any international laws, nor do they need to seek 
Japan’s consent. Many of the issues might even need to be discussed after its moral 
concerns are responded to, from the Chinese perspective. Otherwise, China treats Japan 
as an untrustworthy actor, so there is no foundation for cooperation on other issues. 
Therefore, it could be argued that the status quo sees an unsatisfactory bilateral situation, 
in terms of mutual distrust. Sino-Japanese relations could be locked in this situation. A 
detailed interstate asymmetric structure of distrust is discussed in the following chapter. 
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Chapter 7: The locked Sino-Japanese relations and the 
unlocking process through trust building 
 
7.1 Asymmetric mutual distrust and the locked Sino-Japanese relations 
As has been articulated, this thesis is constructed around several hypotheses: 
 
 Japan has both moral and strategic distrust of China. Strategic distrust is dominant 
and moral distrust is secondary. 
 China has both moral and strategic distrust of Japan. Moral distrust is dominant 
and strategic distrust is secondary. 
 The asymmetric structure of moral distrust and strategic distrust between China 
and Japan leads to a ‘locked’ bilateral relationship. 
 Rebuilding mutual trust through structural improvements as well as dealing with 
specific issues is important to help unlock bilateral relations. 
 
The previous two case-study chapters discussed the first two hypotheses of the existence 
of Japan’s distrust of China, and China’s distrust of Japan. At the same time, the fact that 
Japan focuses more on strategic issues and China focuses more on moral issues leads to a 
dilemma in which each actor wants it’s a priori concerns to be dealt with first, as opposed 
to working on compromises, which could be explained by rational choice (Amadae, 2007; 
Dowding, 2001; Hindmoor, 2006) and other approaches, such as “working trust” 
(Kelman, 2005, p. 639). In this way, it is extremely difficult to make progress in 
Sino-Japanese relations. 
 
The way in which distrust affects international relations has to be re-emphasised. There 
are two theoretical categories of distrust: when certain information or intelligence 
indicates that another actor could harm one’s national interests (Rathbun, 2009; Uslaner, 
2002; Uslaner, 2001); or lacking explicit empirical evidence, one actor nevertheless is 
worried that its interests are threatened by another (Ibid). In terms of strategic and moral 
distrust per this thesis, the incidents/issues between actors on strategic topics and moral 
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topics are the detailed research targets. Therefore, there are two IR theoretical 
interpretations to examine the essence of the issues. Firstly, countries as actors in 
international relations are considered to be rational actors instead of traditional, 
emotion-based actors (Mercer, 2010). It can’t be denied that, when national interests are 
in danger, states take action to protect them, and this generates negative opinions towards 
the other actor. Trust can be defined as putting one’s national interests under another’s 
control (Hoffman, Building trust : overcoming suspicion in international conflict, 2006, p. 
4). This kind of negative attitude is distrust, which has a great impact on reactions and 
foreign policy making processes. On the other hand, countries also have their normative 
values (Finnemore & Sikkink, 1998; Florini, 1996; Kacowicz, 2005; Opp, 2013) about 
whether another is trustworthy in nature. This judgement is generated through 
long-lasting interstate activities, as described by Hoffman as “strategic trust” (Hoffman, 
2002), and influences the guiding values of one state in dealing with issues related to 
another. If one state is regarded as untrustworthy in nature, other actors might be more 
conservative and careful in the interactions. 
 
7.1.1 How does each part of mutual distrust affect the bilateral relationship? 
If strategic and military cooperation between countries is positive, then the overall 
relationship and level of trust might also be good (Swanström & Kokubun, 2008). Japan 
strongly distrusts the growth in China’s comprehensive national power; and especially its 
military capabilities, with a 9.7% growth in military spending in 2014 (Perlo-Freeman, 
Fleurant, Wezeman, & Wezeman, 2015, p. 7). This distrust could come from existing 
empirical evidence, such as China’s naval modernization and construction of its first 
aircraft carrier and “artificial islands”. The impact of Japan’s strategic distrust is evident 
in different ways. First, when incidents happen between the two states, or as China 
continues its military modernization, Japan might interpret issues as potential strategic 
threat to its national security. Under these more negative assumptions, it is more difficult 
for the two countries to deal with bilateral disputes. On the other hand, Japan takes 
actions, such as seeking to revise its constitution (Yellen, 2014), to prepare for or to 
counter the potential danger, strengthening its own forces as well as the US-Japan 
alliance (Reilly, China's History Activism and Sino-Japanese Relations, 2006), and so on. 
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The different influences on Japan’s strategic distrust of China are discussed in later 
sections. 
 
It is clear that Japan also distrusts China on moral issues—mainly its ideological and 
political values (Wei, 2010). The weaker level of trustworthiness resulting from their 
differences over moral values also reduces the possibility and willingness (Hoffman, 
c2006) to cooperate and interact in a more positive way. Japan’s moral distrust of China 
currently draws less attention. Japan’s focus is discernible through official and civil 
discourse, that strategic issues are the priority. However, the existence of moral distrust 
could still lead to new barriers in bilateral relations. For instance, when China wants to 
deal with its moral concerns with Japan, Japan might wonder if China has an ulterior 
motive, to harm Japan’s national interests instead of caring about the moral issues 
themselves (Yang D. , 2003, p. 68). In this way, Japan’s moral distrust of China could 
also affect bilateral relations. 
 
For China, the a priori concerns are moral issues, which are reflected in many history 
issues. The significance of history in Sino-Japanese relations is that it shapes China’s 
foreign policy, to a certain extent. For example, when the Japanese Mayor of Nagoya, 
Takashi Kawamura, denied the “Nanjing Massacre” when he met visitors from Nanjing’s 
city government, the official interactions and communications between the two cities 
were paused immediately. Currently, Japan believes there are no historical disputes, and 
so distrust of Japan deepens due to the assumption that Japan clearly does not respect 
China’s demands. Therefore, both diplomatic disasters and frictions at different levels 
can lead to worsened Sino-Japanese relations. 
 
China is also concerned by the rise in Japan’s military capabilities, seen through the lens 
of historical invasion and the “century of humiliation” (Callahan, 2004; Wang, 2008). For 
a long time following the normalization of bilateral diplomatic relations, worry about 
Japan’s strategic and military threat was comparatively low (Sutter, 2012). There are two 
key factors which explain this. Firstly, the common strategic threat of Soviet Union was 
the main regional problem (Yoshihide, 2002; Sutter, 2012). Both China and Japan judged 
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that the other was not be a priori issue to deal with under the circumstances of the Cold 
War. Secondly, Japan was strictly restricted militarily by its constitution (Hagström, 2014; 
Inoguchi, 2003; Soeya, Tadokoro, & Welch, 2011). However, these two factors have 
changed significantly, today. On one hand, the Soviet Union collapsed, so there is no 
such a common regional threat for China and Japan. As the two strongest regional powers, 
it is possible that potential threat, including traditional threat and “non-traditional security” 
(Friedrichs, 2012, p. 770), and mutual distrust of each other rises again (Yahuda, 2014). 
On the other hand, there has been a trend in Japanese politics of attempting to remove the 
limitations of its defence policy, by modifying laws or even the constitution (Hagström, 
2014; Inoguchi, 2003; Soeya, Tadokoro, & Welch, 2011). In general, although these 
activities have not resulted in direct conflicts between the two countries, the fact that the 
Japanese military forces are already one of the most powerful in Asia and in the world, as 
well as the strengthening the US-Japan alliance, leads to greater distrust of Japan from 
the Chinese perspective (Li, 2014; Zhang, 2012). 
 
7.1.2 How the asymmetric structure is constructed? 
It can be concluded that there are asymmetric structures of mutual distrust between Japan 
and China, as follows: 
 
 
                          China                        Japan 
 
 
“Levels” 
 
 
“Main concern” 
 
 
 
 
Moral distrust  Strategic distrust 
Strategic distrust  
Moral distrust  
 
“Unacceptable” 
& “dominant” 
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“Secondary concern” 
 
 
 
Despite independent influences from each part of distrust, the overall asymmetric 
structure makes bilateral relations even more complicated. The fundamental argument is 
that, in many cases, strategic distrust and moral distrust are internally connected. At the 
same time, the sources and activities of, and influences on distrust from one actor have an 
impact on those of another state, in the following manner.  
 
Component one of asymmetric structure: 
For Japan’s strategic distrust of China, it has been argued that the rise of China’s strategic 
concentration on regional order and national power have been the major focuses of Japan. 
This causes the following chain-reactions: 
 From the Chinese perspective, Japan’s strategic concerns do not make sense. On 
one hand, China thinks that military modernization should be an inherent right of 
a sovereignty state. To secure its growing economic interests and territorial 
integrity, China is trying to upgrade its antiquated weaponry. However, according 
to China’s explanation, defence spending per capita and as a percentage of GDP 
are both comparatively very low, compared to many other major global powers. 
Therefore, China has reason to see its strategic goals and the activities as being 
appropriate. Japan’s distrust and worry will not directly change China’s ongoing 
strategies. 
 To respond to the continually growing regional strategic impacts, Japan might act 
to prepare for potential threats. A possible result is that, if Japan increases military 
expenditure in the future (although it currently remains stable), or changes its 
defence policies for collective defence (Langdon, 2001; Onoda, 2004), it could in 
turn lead to Chinese strategic distrust of Japan. When there are concerns about a 
revival of Japanese militarism, China’s strategies might be even more aggressive 
in dealing with a potential threat from Japan. Therefore, a vicious cycle of mutual 
distrust is formed. 
“Normal” & 
“secondary” 
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 At the same time, it has been argued in the previous chapter that, from China’s 
perspective, Japan’s activities on whitewashing history are the tool for providing 
the environment in civil society to reinvent itself as a normal military power 
(Inoguchi, 2003). Therefore, Japan’s reactions based on strategic distrust of China 
could strengthen both China’s strategic and moral distrust. In this way, the vicious 
cycle is strengthened. 
 In conclusion, while Japan treats strategic issues as its primary concerns and the a 
priori problems that need to be dealt with first, China will not change its agenda. 
This leads to deepening strategic distrust of Japan. Moreover, Japan’s reactions, 
due to its strategic distrust, could lead to both strategic and moral distrust from 
China. 
 
Component two of asymmetric structure: 
Although Japan’s moral distrust of China is regarded as being secondary, it still exists as 
an issue between the two countries. Basically, if China still holds different moral values 
and acts without considering certain norms accepted by Japan, then moral distrust is 
generated. Similar to Japan’s strategic distrust, moral distrust also presents a problem of 
being asymmetric in structure: 
 While Japan worries about moral issues, China might have even stronger moral 
distrust of Japan. China’s trustworthiness is damaged if China keeps pushing 
Japan over history issues, because Japan does not think there are problems. 
 Japan’s moral distrust in turn strengthens China’s moral distrust. China might 
insist that Japan is not in a position to criticise China over moral issues, because 
Japan avoids its historical responsibilities (Motofumi, 2005). Therefore, there is a 
low possibility that Japan’s moral distrust will be dealt with by China. 
 
Component three of asymmetric structure: 
For the Chinese, the problem of asymmetric distrust is also serious. The moral distrust 
shown by historical issues between the countries has resulted in crucial, significant 
policies in Sino-Japanese relations. The asymmetries are shown in the following ways: 
 China views moral issues as predominant in terms of bilateral relations. It has 
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continued to issue official statements indicating that Japan’s attitude towards 
history is a barrier to a better bilateral relationship. However, for Japan, there are 
no existing historical disputes between the two countries. This huge discrepancy 
between the two countries’ positions leads to completely different attitudes and an 
unwillingness to deal with problems. Because Japan will not satisfy China’s 
requirements, for example by moving the Class A war criminals out of the 
Yasukuni Shrine, China firmly believes that Japan is creating problems to harm 
the national interests of China.  
 When China strongly believes that Japan is untrustworthy on moral issues, it acts 
to deal with the potential negative influences. For example, China might use its 
international influence to organise propaganda attacks all around the world, on 
different international stages. On one hand, China gives the impression that Japan 
is not a responsible global actor, which coulr erect barriers to Japan’s global 
activities. On the other hand, some less-influential countries might follow China’s 
lead, due to their economic interests tied to China. Moreover, China itself could 
pause or halt its political interactions with Japan at certain levels, so that Japan 
finds itself in a dilemma. Japan could suffer either through lack of information 
from China, or from pressure to make concessions. Therefore, bilateral relations 
would suffer from different kinds of counter measures, as well as a lack of mutual 
communication. 
 China’s moral distrust would in turn cause stronger distrust from Japan. Japan 
distrusts China on whether it can be a responsible actor in international politics. 
When China acts to deal with its moral distrust, Japan might interpret differently, 
that China is using moral issues as a tool to direct the domestic pressure of 
political and economic issues towards foreign relations with Japan. This would 
lead to Japan’s distrust of China deepening. 
 
Component four of asymmetric structure: 
China’s strategic distrust keeps a complex position because strategic concerns are 
sometimes closely connected to moral distrust. In general, it is currently China’s 
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secondary concern with much less specific and direct evidence. However, it could also 
form a part of the overall asymmetric mutual distrust. 
 China has strategic concerns about Japan’s potential military revival, and 
strengthening the US-Japan alliance to interfere with China’s regional affairs 
(Christensen, 2003; Langdon, 2001). However, from the Japanese perspective, a 
stronger US-Japan alliance is a fundamental and consistent aspect of security 
policies (Garrett & Glaser, 1997; Vogel, 2002; Zhu F. , 2009). Therefore, China 
does not receive the expected answers from Japan, considering the current 
situation. This problem remains unresolved. 
 At the same time, as Japan has information that China could oppose the 
strengthening of the US-Japan alliance, and Japan’s stronger political and military 
presence, it considers what the reasons behind China’s concerns are. It cannot be 
denied that Japan might assume that China seeks its own military expansion and 
changes to the existing regional order. Therefore, Japan’s strategic distrust of 
China is strengthened as a result. It is possible that Japan, in turn, acts even more 
radically; for example, to pass new bills and policies on national defence.21 This 
again has great impact on China’s attitudes, and so strategic distrust deepens. 
 
A sectional conclusion on the asymmetric structures: 
The asymmetric structure of mutual distrust between Japan and China is present in all 
four aspects of moral and strategic arenas of the two countries. It has the following 
characteristics, which lead to locked bilateral relations. 
 The elements of asymmetric structures exist in all parts of mutual strategic and 
moral distrust. Although both countries distrust each other in the two general 
categories, they have completely different priorities. The impact of these different 
priorities is that both countries cannot be satisfied, because their main concern of 
distrust will not be dealt with as they expect. For example, although Japan keeps 
expressing its concern over the possibility that China might challenge regional 
status quo with its national power, China will not retreat nor make concessions 
                                                 
21 Japanese Diet has passed the related security bills unlocking collective self-defence in 2015. 
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because of Japan’s “concerns”. It could be expected that China’s military 
modernization and presence in more regional and global affairs will continue. The 
situation is similar for the other side, when the Japanese government won’t 
remove the Class A war criminals from the Yasukuni Shrine, nor give orders to 
government officials banning them from visiting the Shrine under Chinese 
pressure. 
 It is easy to understand that, on one hand, they do not trust each other so that 
neither state will unilaterally make concessions to secure their own national 
interests. On the other hand, the two countries have to consider their own public’s 
opinions. If the governments experience diplomatic failures in this special 
relationship, they will have great problems in domestic politics. However, 
Sino-Japanese relations would suffer from this kind of diplomatic confrontation 
because there would be fewer possibilities for one’s own concerns to be dealt with 
by the other nation, because there will be less will to deal with the concerns of the 
other state. Mutual distrust will deepen, and Sino-Japanese relations will be 
locked. 
 There is another argument about whether the two states could solve the problem 
of mutual distrust by focusing on the common fields of strategic issues and moral 
issues. One significant claim is that, although the issues are divided into the two 
general categories of “strategic distrust” and “moral distrust”, the detailed and 
specific issues/incidents are different for China and Japan. For instance, although 
they are categorised as “moral distrust issues”, China’s focus is on the history of 
war, while Japan concentrates more on political values and ideologies. This 
means that even though they have similar categories of issues, it is still extremely 
difficult for the two countries to act jointly to resolve the problems which they 
both view as crucial. 
 One even more problematic issue of mutual distrust is that every single part of 
distrust (Japan’s strategic, Japan’s moral, China’s moral, and China’s strategic 
distrust) could lead to reactions from the other country that would show 
deterioration of the level of trust in the other country. Moreover, the worsening 
distrust and the reactions of the other country would again have negative impacts. 
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The vicious cycle in the asymmetric structure of mutual distrust between Japan 
and China will cause negative Sino-Japanese relations. 
 
 
7.2 Interview of both Japanese and Chinese scholars: several concerning 
questions 
7.2.1 The methodology and background of the interview 
While the thesis collects different kinds of information, including materials from books, 
academic articles and governmental documents, it must be indicated that these documents 
are mostly secondary sources to support certain arguments. Therefore, it is important to 
ask direct questions to ascertain opinions on mutual trust and distrust between Japan and 
China. The author has conducted interviews with six scholars: Akio Takahara (Professor, 
Faculty of Law, University of Tokyo), Yin Jiwu (Associate Professor, School of 
International Relations and Diplomacy, Beijing Foreign Studies University), Zhao Luoxi 
(Lecture, China Foreign Affairs University), Liang Yunxiang (Professor, School of 
International Studies, Peking University), Huang Dahui (Professor, School of 
International Studies, Renmin University of China) and Wang Xingyu (Associate 
professor, School of International Studies, Renmin University of China). 
 
7.2.2 The question design of the interview 
The following questions were asked of the interviewees: 
 
1. Do you think the status of mutual distrust has improved or deteriorated since the 
beginning of the 21st Century? 
2. What are the issues that lead to the improvement or deterioration of bilateral trust? 
3. Are the two states, Japan and China, having problems or doing well on dealing with 
the issues of bilateral trust/distrust? 
4. What is the prospect of the development of Japan-China mutual trust? Will the two 
states take actions, and what might be the possible actions to deal with these issues? 
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The interview questions are designed for several purposes. Firstly, the questions expect 
answers from scholars in both Japan and China about their opinions on the status of 
trust/distrust. This is significant because direct qualitative judgements cannot easily be 
found through other sources. Secondly, it is important to verify the hypothesis of the 
existence of mutual distrust and the asymmetric structure between the two countries. The 
interviews could help to identify whether scholars from the two states have different 
views on the same topics and issues, or whether they see different priorities as the core 
concerns between the two countries. Thirdly, the scholars answer the question of what 
they see for the future of mutual trust/distrust, and suggest how to solve the problems. 
This is not only a case of “measures to deal with distrust”, but also trends in how the 
scholars from different countries understand where the problems lie. For example, if the 
hypothesis is correct, that Japan distrusts China based on strategic issues, then scholars 
might suggest that China should take action mainly on these issues to solve the problem. 
Therefore, the main hypotheses of this thesis would be proven to be reasonable. 
 
7.2.3 The questions and answers 
1. Do you think the status of mutual trust/distrust has improved or deteriorated 
since the beginning of the 21st century? 
 
Takahara: Once there were many fans of China in Japan. However, they are 
disappointed right now because of the activities of China. So distrust exists in 
Japan-China relations. 
 
Yin: The distrust between China and Japan is a status verified by much empirical 
evidence, according to public opinion surveys and the discourse and interactions between 
the governments. 
 
Zhao: Worsening. 
 
Liang: Worsening. A lack of trust. The deep root lies in the changes in the comparison of 
national power. 
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Huang: Worsening. 
 
Wang: In the late 1990s, the two countries were experiencing fluctuation. The beginning 
of 21st Century witnessed a comparatively good situation in bilateral relations and trust. 
For example, when former Chinese Prime Minister Wen Jiabao visited Japan in 2007, he 
gave a speech admitting that Japan maintains its way of peaceful development after the 
World War II. However, the 2010 boat collision and the 2012 Japan purchase of the 
islands led to stronger distrust. 
 
 
2. What are the issues that lead to the improvement or deterioration of bilateral 
trust? 
 
Takahara: Japan supports the rise of China, but how is China going to use its national 
power? That’s the question that we cannot answer for sure. If China is going to use its 
national power not only for itself but also for others, that’s fine. That’s how responsible 
powers should behave. Up to now, China has given the impression that China would use 
its national power for its own interests but not much for others. This is the main source of 
distrust.  
 
The moral issues (ideology, democracy, and so on) still have influence. This concern is 
important for those who raise these issues (like foreign policy-makers) as they need some 
kind of identity in Japan’s foreign policies. The identity includes democracy, human 
rights, and so on. From their point of view, China will be a target. For others, China’s 
political system has a different meaning. It’s about how the Communist Party will unite 
the nation to fight against Japan on the revisionism, history, and revival of militarism. We 
think that it is necessary because the Chinese Communist Party is losing its legitimacy.  
 
Yin: China has the following sources of distrusting Japan: In terms of strategic issues, 
China worries about Japan’s strategic motivations, and whether it is going to expand and 
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compete with China in this region. At the same time, China is also concerned about the 
US factors, and its alliance with Japan, and the strategic situation as China rises when 
confronting Japan. In terms of moral issues, Japan’s attitude towards the history issues, 
the cultural differences between the two countries over the apology issue, and the 
construction of political emotion in China towards Japan are the main reasons for the 
existing distrust. 
 
Zhao: Security issues. One of the major issues is the strategic judgements of both sides. 
China and Japan doubt whether the other is becoming a country which would threaten 
regional security. The significant reason for the contradictions in security issues is that 
China’s recognition of the disputes is based on history; that is, considering what Japan 
had done in the past, China distrusts its activities now and in the future. At the same time, 
Japan’s doubts about China are based on the Chinese system. As China is not a 
democracy, there is the possibility that China spreads its domestic non-democracy to 
international non-democracy. I am personally pessimistic on the problem, as the two 
countries seem to find no solutions. In terms of strategic issues, Japan cannot give up its 
leadership in Asia. From the Chinese perspective, Japan’s leadership is of the past. This 
is a problem of leadership. 
 
Liang: There are territorial disputes. However, the territorial disputes reflect the issues of 
national power, and which country leads in this region. The reason why China always 
talks about the history is that, firstly, the Chinese have the long-lasting perspective that 
China is strong and Japan is a comparatively weaker actor in this region, who learns from 
China. This situation changed in the recent century, so the shock in China created the 
stronger attention on history. Secondly, what Chinese people accept is to regain China’s 
leading position in the world. The government has to consider the public, so that 
legitimacy can be kept. The question is “whether Japan can accept a rising China”. Japan 
cannot easily accept it because it has been leading for more than a century. It is only the 
Chinese GDP that surpasses Japan, not the overall situation.  
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The Western countries view China as changing the status quo with its power. However, 
the Chinese theory is about history. China was a great country with many rights in the 
past, which were lost in the colonial era, including the issues of the East China Sea and 
South China Sea. Therefore, it is reasonable that China wants it back. The Chinese people 
have been educated in this way, while the Western countries do not think so. This is the 
fundamental contradiction. It is not possible that the Chinese government gives up the 
long-held belief in order to avoid confrontations with Western countries. 
 
The Chinese government has to pick history as an issue between China and Japan. 
Actually, it has a negative effect on younger Japanese generations. They believe that, no 
matter what kind of history the two countries have, it should have ended a long time ago. 
Turning back to history is not accepted by them. 
 
Huang: China has mixed history issues with strategic and reality issues. While Japan 
separates these two fields. China doubts when considering what Japan did in the past, 
where Japan might go in the future as a problem. This is distrust. While Japan believes 
that the past is past. It could not affect the future. 
 
Wang: Except for the issues between China and Japan, the US strategies also have 
significant impact on trust/distrust. Japan considers its position as based on the US-Japan 
alliance, as the lens through which it views other regional issues. 
 
3. Are the two states, Japan and China having problems or doing well on dealing 
with the issues of bilateral trust/distrust? 
 
Takahara: The Japanese suggest that it is primarily military enhancement. We don’t 
have any particular historical problem. Many Japanese have been disappointed in China 
for the past few years. What the Chinese keep saying and what they are doing seems to be 
very different. In other words, the problems come from China’s military enhancement 
and political propaganda about history. This leads to distrust in Japanese society. 
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Yin: The two states are dealing with issues of mutual trust in a comparatively bad way. 
Japan’s distrust of China comes from the competition for leadership of East Asia, cultural 
differences, ideologies, and so on. The situation has continued to worsen for a long time. 
Sometimes the problems are just not recognised or covered by other issues. 
 
Zhao: There are diplomatic interactions. Both sides have the intention to improve. They 
acknowledge that distrust damages the two countries. The diplomacy during the whole of 
2014 was about when and how to make compromises. It is a matter of expediency instead 
of providing essential solutions. 
 
Liang: If there are actions, they are based on the demands of interests, not trust. They 
remain at the lowest level, which is avoiding direct conflicts. This is the common interest 
of the two countries. 
 
Huang: What the two countries do would be the “blur”. They create the space for both 
sides to avoid conflicts. They can explain the blur with their own words, but avoiding 
conflicts is the bottom line. It is a kind of risk management rather than actions to solve 
the problems of distrust. 
 
Wang: From the Chinese perspective, it does not abandon communication with Japan. 
Both sides understand there are common interests, and the necessity to avoid conflicts. 
 
4. What is the prospect of the development of Japan-China mutual trust? Will the 
two states take actions and what might be the possible actions to deal with these 
issues? 
 
Takahara: It will depend on China. If China does not continually strengthen its focus on 
history issues through propaganda, the two countries will not confront as many problems 
on moral issues. China’s growth in national power is not a threat. However, transparency 
is needed for other countries to understand how China will use its power. Japan is happy 
to cooperate. 
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Yin: The problem will not be solved in the short term. With the realities of existing issues, 
the mutual trust between the two countries might be damaged and bilateral relations are 
locked or frozen. Over a longer period, it might be possible that the situation improves 
temporarily with some unilateral or bilateral good will and activities. However, the 
problem will not be completely resolved based only on these things. 
 
Zhao: If China achieves what is described by the Western countries as strategic 
transparency, distrust between the two countries would ease a lot. However, China has a 
very different understanding of the notion of strategic transparency. China thinks that its 
strategies are transparent, as it claims to rise peacefully. However, the Western countries 
think that this is not transparent, which comes from doubts of China’s system/ideology 
and the uncertainty over China’s growth.  
 
The reason why I am pessimistic is that, in the short term, Japan has identified China as 
an opponent/rival. The current competitions or confrontations between the two countries 
over economic and military issues make it less possible to solve the problems of distrust. 
 
Liang: In the short term, the situation could hardly be changed, as the interests would 
remain stable. Further in the future, there are other elements that affect the situation, such 
as whether there are more serious issues, e.g. external threats. There is a possibility that 
trust improves between the two countries 
 
Huang: In the near future, things won’t change much, as the comparison of national 
power and structural disputes will remain much the same. In the longer term, if China’s 
national power essentially surpasses Japan’s, Japan and other Western countries might 
finally accept the rise of China. The current status is that they view China as a country 
with quantity and without quality. The three major factors of China’s rise, Japan 
becoming a normal state, and American strategies in the Asia-Pacific region affect the 
future. Distrust would not disappear if the current factors do not change. The civil 
societies also distrust each other. 
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Wang: In the longer term, the two countries will have to stay at the same platform to 
achieve negotiations. The two countries might gradually turn from fluctuation to a more 
mature situation. The two governments might try to narrow down the disputes within 
certain issues themselves, without bringing stronger influences of the grand bilateral 
relationship, because the space between governments is greater than public opinion. 
Another possibility is that the two governments could coordinate with each other to face 
common problems and issues, such as the economy 
 
7.2.4 The interpretation of the answers 
1. The first question “do you think the status of mutual trust/distrust has been improved 
or deteriorating since the beginning of the 21st Century” aims to help verify the basic 
hypothesis of whether distrust exists as a problem between Japan and China. Although 
there is empirical evidence in public opinion suggesting that the people from both 
countries have recognised it, one might need to seek out more supporting arguments. 
 
According to the scholars’ answers, they have very similar opinions that the current level 
of mutual trust/distrust is deteriorating. There is empirical evidence showing that distrust 
is currently problematic. Therefore, the hypothesis of mutual distrust is supported by 
academic debates, to a certain extent. 
 
2. The second question of “what are the issues which lead to the improvement or 
deterioration of bilateral trust” is aimed at verifying the other hypotheses of the 
asymmetric structure of mutual distrust. If the hypotheses make sense, it is possible that 
the answers from the two scholars might have different interpretations of the same topic 
of Sino-Japanese distrust. 
 
The answers fit the assumption mentioned above. Professor Takahara (Japanese) clearly 
expressed that there is a primary concern for Japan about China’s use of its national 
power. It is the main reason for Japan’s distrust. At the same time, Japan does not think 
that history is a problem. The reason why history remains a hot-spot in Sino-Japanese 
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relations is that the Chinese government uses its propaganda methods to further its own 
interests, using history as a tool. In addition, Professor Takahara also indicates that 
Japanese moral distrust of China about ideology and other issues indeed exists. However, 
it is not a major concern for Japan. Therefore, the answers from a Japanese scholar 
actually fit the assumptions of the hypothesis, that Japan distrusts China on both strategic 
and moral issues, and that strategic distrust is predominant. 
 
From the perspective of Chinese scholars, the answer to the same question is quite 
different. The fact is that they have raised multiple concerns, including issues of both 
strategic status and moral disputes. However, there is a significant argument rooted in 
their answers that a connection exists between history and the status quo. For example, 
Zhao indicated that China’s logic is, 
“the significant reason for the contradictions on the security issues would be that 
China’s recognition on the disputes is based on the history, that is, considering what 
Japan had done in the history, China would distrust its activities for now and in the 
future.” 
 
Moreover, Yin suggested that, despite both Japan’s strategic motivation in this region and 
its attitude towards history, the cultural differences and the political emotions between 
the two countries exist as different sources of mutual distrust, the latter as the moral 
component in interstate relations are identified as the ‘main reasons’. In this way, China 
has both moral and strategic distrust of Japan, with moral distrust being the a priori 
concern, which also fits the hypothesis in the case studies. 
 
3. The third question “are the two states, Japan and China having problems or doing well 
on dealing with the issues of bilateral trust/distrust” mainly seeks opinions of how the 
two states deal with the related issues of mutual trust/distrust. The significance of this 
question is that it might provide information on how scholars from the two countries view 
the responsibility of distrust. It is possible that the scholars would point out that their own 
countries or the other is responsible for the deteriorating situation. Hence, the main focus 
is paid to the different sources.  
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The answer suggests that Professor Takahara believes that Japan itself does not have 
specific problems to be criticised. China’s military enhancement and political propaganda 
about history leads to the current status of distrust.  
 
The Chinese scholars generally agree that, considering common interests and risks, the 
two countries could maintain basic interactions. However, Professor Yin suggests that the 
situation of mutual distrust became worse due to ongoing political realities, such as 
regional distrust of the rise of China (which is unreasonable from the Chinese perspective) 
and is not the responsibility of the Chinese. Wang agrees, and thinks that communication 
has not been abandoned by China.  
 
From the answers it can be concluded that the asymmetric structure is problematic, 
because the two countries do not recognise mutual distrust as their responsibility. Instead, 
they believe that the other country should be responsible for what has transpired.  
 
4. The fourth question, “What is the prospect of the development of Japan-China mutual 
trust” and “Will the two states take actions and what might be the possible actions to deal 
with these issues” is design with a different purpose other than verifying the existing 
hypotheses mentioned in the previous chapters and sections, about the asymmetric 
distrust between Japan and China. It focuses more on the future of mutual distrust and 
bilateral relations. The existence of mutual distrust, the existence of an asymmetric 
structure of distrust between the two countries, and the locked bilateral relations caused 
by asymmetric distrust, have been identified as an important explanation for negative 
Sino-Japanese relations. Therefore, it is important whether the level of mutual distrust 
improves or gets worse, because it has such a strong impact on the relationship between 
the two countries. 
 
In general, both Professor Takahara and Professor Yin hold comparatively negative views 
of prospects for near-future bilateral distrust between Japan and China. Professor 
Takahara suggests that the problem lies with the Chinese, because the political 
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propaganda against Japan over history issues and the non-transparent strategic future 
caused by China’s use of power will remain problems between the two countries. One 
core issue in this situation are the policies of the Chinese Communist Party, which might 
last for a long period of time.  
 
One common characteristic of the Chinese scholars is that they are generally pessimistic 
about the prospect of positive changes in the short term. They also indicate that even 
though there might be possibilities for change in the longer term, there are many different 
conditions for the two countries to meet before any success can be had. Although the two 
countries might achieve some of the goals to ease relations, by making unilateral or 
bilateral arrangements, it is still generally negative for the long term relationship. In this 
way, unlocking Sino-Japanese relations will not be an easy task, because of the countless 
issues left unresolved from history and new issues arising in the 21st Century. 
 
7.2.5 A sectional conclusion 
The purpose of the interviews was to collect the opinions from scholars from the two 
countries, for use in analysing and verifying the hypotheses and to build a connection 
between the asymmetric distrust and the ‘locked’ Sino-Japanese relationship. In addition, 
the interviews also highlighted the concerns over the prospects for mutual distrust 
between Japan and China. Whether it is possible to unlock the bilateral relationship 
through improving mutual trust is another question to be answered. 
 
The questions have certain aims in verifying different hypotheses, including the existence 
of distrust, the asymmetric structure of a priori concerns, and the asymmetric structure of 
mutual distrust. Based on the answers, the arguments from Professor Takahara (Japanese) 
and other scholars (Chinese) met the expected assumptions. In terms of the results, the 
scholars confirmed the mutual distrust between Japan and China. Additionally, they also 
identified the existing sources of distrust, which generally come from specific sources of 
strategic and moral issues. Moreover, scholars from both countries predicted a 
comparatively negative future for Sino-Japanese trust. These similarities indicate that 
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both sides agree that there are problems of mutual distrust between Japan and China and, 
at the same time, the two countries see more problems of mutual distrust in the future. 
 
As it can be seen in the similarities in answers, Japan and China have only a small 
amount of consensus on the structure of mutual distrust. The differences in answers are 
more significant for identifying the sources of distrust. The first important difference is 
that Professor Takahara indicates China’s military enhancement as the main problem 
between the countries; while Chinese scholars suggest that the main reason for distrust 
are moral issues, including Japan’s attitude towards history, cultural differences over the 
apology issue, and the construction of political emotion between the two countries. 
Secondly, there is another big divide between opinions on who bears responsibility for 
the worsening mutual distrust. Professor Takahara believes that the problems come from 
China’s use of its national power to challenge others, and the propaganda targeting Japan 
over its history. However, Chinese scholars think that the moral issues and Japan’s 
potential expansion will be important in the future. The different primary concerns show 
that Japan and China are having problems with moving towards a consensus on the 
sources of mutual distrust, which leads to the ‘locked’ bilateral relationship. Failing to 
reach a consensus means that the two countries are seeking solutions based on their own 
concerns, which might be extremely difficult to achieve because the other country has its 
own, different priorities. This is a structural problem for the two countries. According to 
the interview answers from the scholars, it is possible that the two countries are expecting 
concessions and other activities from the other to first solve their problems, instead of 
taking their own actions. To solve the problem of locked Sino-Japanese relations, this 
asymmetric structure of distrust should be dealt with together with basic trust-building 
activities. 
 
7.3 Unlocking Sino-Japanese relations in two ways: enhancing mutual 
trust and overcoming the asymmetric structure of distrust 
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7.3.1 The significance of trust: will it help improve and unlock Sino-Japanese 
relations? 
Theoretical verification of trust in IR 
As has been argued in previous chapters, the problem of distrust is one of the key sources 
for negative Sino-Japanese relations. The negative and ‘locked’ bilateral relations come 
from not only a lack of mutual trust, but also the structural problem of asymmetric a 
priori concerns. Therefore, to achieve more positive Sino-Japanese relations, both these 
problems should be dealt with. 
 
It cannot be denied that there are debates over whether enhancing mutual trust could help 
improve interstate relations, as it could be seen as only an intermediate variable for other 
political factors. In this way, the significance of a trust-building process for bilateral 
relations is a primary question.  
 
In terms of IR theories, most approaches have evidence supporting the existence of the 
notion of trust, to certain extents, because “trustpolitik” does not mean unconditional or 
one-sided trust without verification (Park, 2011, p. 14). For example, even the 
comparatively conservative approach of realism has room for trust: “why leaders would 
negotiate and sign agreements they have no intention of following?” (Lebow, 2013) 
There are also other arguments discussing the existence of trust within different types of 
realism, such as offensive and defensive realism (Larson, 1997; Kydd, c2005; Kacowicz, 
2005). This is similar in other approaches and arguments of international relations theory, 
such as liberalism, constructivism, security dilemma theory (Christensen, China, the 
U.S.-Japan alliance, and the security dilemma in East Asia, 2003; Herz, Jan., 1950; 
Wheeler, 2012; Jervis, 1978; Larson, 2004), and rational choice theory (Amadae, 2007; 
Dowding, 2001; Hindmoor, 2006), and so on. 
 
There is a different aspect showing the significance of trust in international relations that 
could build connections between many other crucial notions such as cooperation, risk and 
cost. It has to be claimed that there is “cooperation with trust and cooperation without 
trust” (Hoffman, Building trust : overcoming suspicion in international conflict, 2006, p. 
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6), which shows that trust is not equal to cooperation. However, it cannot be denied that 
cooperation is one of the most crucial symbols of the existence of trust between countries. 
Logically, cooperation might be regarded more likely to be a sufficient condition, rather 
than a necessary condition for trust. Therefore, when an actor refuses to cooperate with 
another, distrust is identifiable. The connection between trust and risk in interstate 
relations could show the significance of trust. When trust is treated as “an alternative to 
risk” (Uslaner, Trust as an alternative to risk, 2013, p. 2), it also has a recognisable role. 
 
In general, the significance and importance of the notion of trust in international relations 
is verifiable. When there is strong trust between countries, it is more likely that the actors 
could spend less energy on the cost of risk-prevention and defence. At the same time, 
when incidents take place between countries, they might interpret the problems in a 
comparatively more-positive way than to react immediately in military or radical ways, 
with trust instead of distrust. In addition, enhancing trust can also help with reconciliation 
between countries which have long-term disputes left unresolved (Nets-Zehngut, 2007; 
Lederach, 1997; Montville, 1993; Shriver, 1999; Staub, 1998)—this fits the case of 
Sino-Japanese relations. As has been argued, “the steps that are necessary to build 
trusting relationships both open up and depend on the possibility of new pay-offs as well 
as mutual bonds.” (Ruzicka & Wheeler, 2010, p. 80) 
 
Empirical verification of trust in IR 
Except for the theoretical verification of trust’s presence in international relations, there 
is also empirical evidence showing that trust plays a role in Sino-Japanese relations. It 
has to be emphasised that Sino-Japanese relations, after the normalization of diplomatic 
relations in the 1970s, have not only be characterised by negative interactions. For 
instance, the official normalization of bilateral relations itself was a typical example of 
mutual trust. It was debated whether this kind of normalization was a decision made as a 
way of dealing with the threat from the Soviet Union by “tilting towards China” (Soeya, 
2002, p. 219). Although it can’t be denied that an essential reconciliation was not 
achieved between Japan and China, the normalization of bilateral relations during the 
Cold War was not accidental. As China and Japan still belonged to different ideological 
270 
 
camps, it was risky to cooperate with one another, or trust each other without 
comprehensive analysis. Therefore, the decision to normalize could be regarded as a 
rational choice made by the two countries, which proved that they at least believed that 
the other was not a major threat. Hence, cooperative bilateral relations can help deal with 
other issues of common concern. In this way, if trust at a certain level is achieved, 
interstate relations might improve. 
 
7.3.2 Approach one: dealing with the asymmetric structure 
The asymmetric structure and the vicious cycle 
It is crucial to understand how the asymmetric structure of mutual distrust has negative 
impacts on Sino-Japanese relations. One of the most important influences of the 
asymmetries is that it could lead to locked bilateral relations. There is a dilemma for the 
two countries, which is the lack of motivation or incentives (Boone, Declerck, & 
Kiyonari, 2010) to respond to the concerns of the other country, comes from and leads to 
a lack of motivation of the other actor. If both states refuse to take actions on those 
concerns, the mutual distrust is worsened and bilateral relations suffer in future 
interactions.  
 
The vicious cycle actually has two general categories of issues. Firstly, the willingness to 
deal with the other’s concerns is damaged while the other side has the same problem. In 
this way, the problem of distrust keeps worsening. In turn, the deeper mutual distrust 
reduces the willingness of the two countries to positively respond to the concerns of the 
other. Secondly, the locked bilateral relations keep worsening due to mutual distrust. 
Therefore, the two components of the vicious cycle caused by the asymmetric mutual 
distrust continually have negative impacts on bilateral relations, which should be dealt 
with. 
 
How to deal with the problem of asymmetric structure of mutual distrust 
We can therefore estimate the kinds of changes that would be necessary to deal with the 
asymmetric structure of distrust:  
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1. There is a key argument that, in the case of Sino-Japanese relations, both countries 
are not “not aware of” and “do not understand” the concerns of the other. This is not 
reasonable, as the two actors have already made countless claims in bilateral and 
international occasions. Therefore, it is interpreted as “disagreeing with” or “not 
accepting” the concerns of distrust from the other. In order to persuade the other country 
to accept the need to deal with one’s concern, efficient measures should be taken by the 
two countries to reactivate the motivation of the other. 
 
2. The motivation of a country might come from different sources. As the executor of 
policies to secure national interests, states have to consider whether interactions with 
other actors might benefit or damage its interests. This is one of the most important 
sources of motivation in interstate interactions, if positive outcomes can be expected. 
Another source of motivation for the countries are the normative values in international 
relations (Florini, 1996; Finnemore & Sikkink, 1998; Kacowicz, 2005). If one actor tends 
to follow normative values which are accepted by the other, the motivation to cooperate 
or even trust might grow. Therefore, it is important to take actions in these two ways to 
‘persuade’ the other country to be more active in solving the problems of distrust. 
 
3. In terms of the first approach, it can be achieved by letting another actor know that 
solving the problem of distrust will not damage its national interests, or interests could be 
gained in deals between the two countries. It means that, instead of waiting for the other 
to take the first step as a condition for its own actions, the two countries could launch 
negotiations to produce a package of solutions to their concerns. It is easier because 
unilateral concessions from the other can hardly be expected. In fact, this kind of 
approach would help to break the vicious cycle and asymmetric structure of mutual 
distrust, because the two countries might bring all their concerns to the negotiating table, 
rather than focusing on independent incidents or issues in the same categories (which are 
not at the same level of concern). 
 
4. To conduct this kind of large-scale negotiation, it is of great importance that 
leadership of Japan and China use their political wisdom and courage (Zhu, 2013). 
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Official Chinese governmental channels have stated that the current Japanese Prime 
Minister Shinzo Abe is not “welcomed” by the Chinese people, and they refuse to meet 
with him.22 Although it is difficult for the public to know what happened behind the 
scenes, a lack of mutual interactions between the highest levels of government worsen 
mutual distrust due to a more serious lack of information. The fact is that both sides 
understand that it is unreasonable that interactions have been paused for a very long time 
between the two most important regional actors. Therefore, meetings between President 
Xi Jinping and Prime Minister Shinzo Abe were organized on different occasions in 
recent years. 23  However, the “symbolic meetings” are not enough to resolve the 
problems. If the two leaders can overcome the barriers of potential worries, emergency 
incidents and domestic pressures then it is possible to move towards essential 
negotiations. At the same time, the shape of domestic political emotion and atmosphere 
should also be considered in terms of the methods used and aims of bilateral positive 
interactions, when it is needed. With a successful example in the normalization of 
bilateral relations during the Cold War, efficient measures could be expected between the 
two interdependent powers. 
 
5. To be specific, persuading the other that its strategic concerns will not turn into 
strategic threats, and seeking common moral values or at least issuing memorandums of 
understanding on specific moral issues, should be the tasks for the two countries. 
 
The weakness and troubles of this approach 
We should also evaluate the limits and obstacles behind the above proposals: 
 
1. The vicious circle caused by the asymmetric structure of mutual distrust is a dilemma 
for both sides. Japan and China face the problem of risking potential damage to their own 
national interests, if they decide to cooperate to solve problems. If one’s own distrust 
issues cannot be dealt with in an appropriate way, while the other’s distrust issues are 
                                                 
22 See http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/web/wjdt_674879/fyrbt_674889/t1113124.shtml, accessed 13/05/16. 
23 Such meetings include: meeting in Beijing during APEC on 10/11/2014, meeting in Jakarta during 60th anniversary 
of Bandung Conference on 22/04/2015, and the “greetings” on G20 summit on 15/11/2015. 
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resolved due to concessions, a nation would suffer from great domestic pressure resulting 
from diplomatic failure, and deepen distrust towards the other. Therefore, unlocking the 
asymmetric structure needs great patience and political determination from the beginning. 
 
2. At the same time, the status of mutual trust and distrust is always changing, due to 
different factors. These factors – including emergent incidents, media influences, and 
comparisons between national power, domestic political competition and external 
elements such as the US factors – would affect the recommendations to deal with the 
asymmetric structure in a dynamic process. Therefore, the two countries have to face the 
potential problem of unexpected developments in mutual trust and distrust. 
 
3. There is the potential risk of instability, even if the problem of asymmetric structure 
is resolved. As Professor Yin and Lecturer Zhao indicated in their interviews,24 the two 
countries might reach agreements through bilateral interactions and concessions in order 
to realize a better situation of mutual trust. However, it is not the same as reconciliation 
between the two states. The problems might occur anytime, over a longer period. This is 
similar to the overall status of Sino-Japanese relations: that problems left unresolved after 
the normalization of diplomatic relations in the 1970s have become the main disputes and 
threats today. In this way, other methods are also needed to deal with the problems 
beyond the structural issue of mutual distrust. 
 
7.3.3 Approach two: enhancing mutual trust 
The difference between the two approaches 
The previous approach for dealing with the asymmetric structure of mutual distrust 
between Japan and China might be regarded as a part of “enhancing mutual trust”. It 
cannot be denied that there are internal connections between the two that, when 
constructing mutual trust, some structural problems of mutual distrust can be dealt with. 
At the same time, solving asymmetric distrust need trust-building activities as methods. 
Therefore, clarifying the gap between the two approaches is not the main task. However, 
                                                 
24 See 7.2.3, question 4. 
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it must be emphasised that this approach specifically focuses more on basic trust-building 
activities in terms of the “content of trust”, instead of the “structural problem” in the 
previous one. 
 
The significance of enhancing mutual trust in Sino-Japanese relations 
Enhancing trust is significant to improving interstate relations and reducing costs of 
preparing for potential risks, and so on (Sztompka, 1999, p. 25). These effects and 
outcomes are the result of both strategic trust and moralistic trust; for example, the 
“alternative to risk” (Uslaner, 2013). In common sense, countries with stronger mutual 
trust might enjoy more positive interactions. The vicious cycle of distrust suggests that 
stronger mutual distrust might lead to more negative bilateral relations; and negative 
bilateral relations between countries would in turn lead to an even worse level of mutual 
distrust. In contrast, a positive situation would be when the two countries have 
comparatively stronger mutual trust, they might benefit from it and create better bilateral 
relations. Hence, a positive relationship between countries is helpful for the improvement 
of mutual trust.  
 
In terms of the case of Sino-Japanese relations, the specific aim of “essential 
reconciliation” between the two countries emphases the significance of mutual trust (Shin, 
2010; Chen, 2010). Reconciliation is not only to put an end to conflicts and wars between 
states, but also to help overcome hostility in national emotions and generate forgiveness 
(Kriesberg, 2007) of the states, both at the governmental and civic levels. Reconciliation 
is a milestone for peace building (Lerche, 2000) and trust for those states with lower 
levels of trust, as well as the basis for further progress in trusting relationships. As has 
been argued, the reconciliation between China and Japan after the 1972 normalization 
was neither complete nor wholly successful ( Ijiri, 1990; Johnson, How China and Japan 
See Each Other, 1972; Rose, Sino-Japanese relations: facing the past, looking to the 
future?, 2005). Therefore, enhancing mutual trust between the two countries could create 
an environment for further bilateral interactions. If comparatively successful 
reconciliation could be achieved, China’s and Japan’s governments and civil societies 
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would have fewer barriers to more positive mutual understanding, and therefore better 
relations.  
 
How to enhance mutual trust 
These arguments can be summarised as:  
 
1. One argument in terms of how to enhance the trust of sovereignty states is to 
consider the characteristics of states in international relations; these activities are not 
taken based on unilateral concessions to national interests, as they would produce policies 
based on information (Rathbun, 2012; 2009). For normative values (Florini, 1996; 
Kacowicz, 2005; Opp, 2013), it also needs to be recognised that countries might not 
easily give up their own moral values. 
 
2. Based on this assumption, at the governmental level, the two countries might not 
enhance mutual trust by following the requirements of the other. For example, stopping 
government officials from visiting the Yasukuni Shrine could help build trust between the 
two countries. However, the Japanese government would treat it as an issue of 
sovereignty, and would not act in this way. Therefore, at the governmental level, the two 
countries should at least keep communications open – VIPs at the highest levels of the 
leadership, as well as local government officials should try to maintain an efficient 
exchange of information between the two countries. This is crucial, because without 
adequate communication, emergent incidents could lead to a worse situation of distrust 
and more negative relationship. At the same time, state-led bilateral events, such as 
planned student-exchanges, should be promoted because these kinds of activities need the 
two governments as backups. 
 
3. In terms of the two countries’ civil societies, one of the main issues is that their 
emotions can be affected by many factors, including emergent incidents, continuously 
broadcast information by media, the speeches of politicians, and so on. In this way, when 
the two countries are enjoying comparatively positive interactions, the publics might feel 
more positively about civil exchanges and communications. However, when problems 
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and disputes occur, the public might have negative opinions towards each other, which 
might strongly damage trust so that communications would not be as flexible as during a 
positive situation. In this way, how to enhance mutual trust in civil society and how to 
reduce negative influences from external factors is a concern. To improve civil mutual 
trust, it is necessary to have greater communication on cultural, academic and areas of 
dispute, aside from traditional exchanges on economic and tourism issues. At the same 
time, it is important that these interactions are not only designed to be the “icing on the 
cake”. Civil communications should continue even when the two countries are 
experiencing troubles from disputes, which helps reduce misunderstandings beyond the 
incidents themselves, as distrust could come from suspicion and a lack of information 
(Rathbun, 2012; 2009), especially a lack of information on the other’s public opinion. In 
order to overcome the risks of abandoning communications, existing mechanisms and 
organisations instead of occasional events are helpful, such as the exchange of students in 
universities and the joint research projects. Efficient information exchange could lead to 
fewer worries about each other. 
 
The weakness and troubles of this approach 
The limitations of this approach would be:  
 
1. There might be a fundamental problem with this approach to enhancing mutual trust, 
in that it is a long-term task. As the two countries did not achieve complete reconciliation 
in the past, they have much work to do on the disputes left unresolved. Therefore, it 
cannot be expected that outstanding results will be achieved in a short time. The effects 
might not be seen unless the two governments and civil societies pay continued, patient 
attention to the trust-building process. Moreover, given the current vicious cycle between 
Japan and China, the two countries cannot start with a fresh slate, but also need to 
overcome the barriers of existing distrust. In this way, this is not a shortcut of 
Sino-Japanese trust. 
 
2. To be frank building trust is much more difficult, considering the argument that 
“trust is not, at its root, self-interested; much less is it selfish” (Solomon, 2003, p. 57), 
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and especially in the case of Sino-Japanese relations that have already experienced 
dozens of problems of mutual distrust in different fields. Trust needs to be verified either 
by acquiring enough information on the security of national interests, or through common 
normative values. Both countries need more positive empirical evidence that could prove 
the credibility and trustworthiness of the other in bilateral interactions. If there is 
evidence showing the opposite trend, distrust between Japan and China would grow 
much stronger, due to the vicious cycle caused by the asymmetric structure. It is 
undeniable that there could be many internal and external factors between the two 
countries which have great impact on the relationship, such as emergencies, media effects, 
and US influences in this region (Lim, 2013), and so on. These sources could be 
destabilising factors in Sino-Japanese relations, which could easily result in negative 
influences on the trust-building process. 
 
3. One guiding argument for this approach is that trust-building activities between the 
two countries should cover all fields of disputed issues, instead of avoiding any existing 
problems between Japan and China. They have proved that the strategy of “shelving 
disputes”25 does not always prevent confrontations over the issues. For example, the 
disputes over the Diaoyu/Senkaku Islands seemed not to be very serious for several 
decades after 1970s. However, the dispute has become one of the most problematic 
hotspots between the two countries. The strategy of “shelving disputes and seeking joint 
development”,26 as expressed by Deng Xiaoping, cannot maintain permanent stability. 
Addressing core disputes between the countries is accompanied by risks. It is a question 
of whether the two counties would like to take these risks, and find a balance between 
risk and reward.  
 
 
                                                 
25 The Chinese side believes that this strategy was raised by Deng Xiaoping when he met with Japanese visitors on 
31/05/1979 when they discussed the Diaoyu/Senkaku issues. See 
http://news.ifeng.com/history/zhongguojindaishi/special/diaoyudao/detail_2012_07/24/16266038_0.shtml. 
26 See http://www.mfa.gov.cn/chn//gxh/xsb/wjzs/t8958.htm 
278 
 
7.4 Conclusion 
The two-stage hypotheses of asymmetric mutual distrust between China and Japan 
leading to ‘locked’ Sino-Japanese relations can be verified in different aspects. Basically, 
the asymmetric structure of Sino-Japanese mutual distrust is formed by the two countries’ 
different a priori concerns. Although both countries have strategic and moral distrust 
towards each other, Japan’s a priori concern is based on strategic issues, while China is 
focused on moral issues. The different concerns of distrust form a vicious cycle that both 
countries want their top concerns dealt with properly by the other. Therefore, the two 
countries feel it is difficult to resolve disputes through cooperative interactions, because 
distrust prevents them from making unilateral, rational concessions (Amadae, 2007; 
Dowding, 2001; Hindmoor, 2006; Opp, 2013), and their different normative concerns 
(Finnemore & Sikkink, 1998; Florini, 1996; Kacowicz, 2005). With deeper mutual 
distrust, bilateral relations suffer from disputes being difficult to resolve, which could be 
interpreted as ‘locked’ relations. Moreover, the ‘locked’ bilateral relationship would in 
turn lead to a deepening of mutual distrust, because reduced information exchange and 
more conservative activities are sources of distrust. 
 
The verification of these hypotheses is based on qualitative and quantitative analysis of 
sources including governmental documents and public opinion surveys. In addition, it 
was necessary to interview scholars from the two countries, in order to provide the thesis 
with more information at the academic level. In fact, the results of the interviews match 
the expectations of the hypotheses. The answers show that the scholars do not only claim 
that Japan and China have distrust towards each other, but also provide different opinions 
about the major concerns and sources of distrust. The asymmetric structure was verified, 
as Professor Takahara emphasises the strategic challenges from China, while Chinese 
scholars suggest that moral issues are most important to China. Furthermore, the scholars 
expressed a comparatively pessimistic view of the future of mutual trust. Both China and 
Japan tend to believe that the problem of mutual distrust needs to be dealt with first by 
the other country. However, there is no significant evidence that the two countries would 
take efficient actions on these issues. 
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In terms of solving the problems of asymmetric mutual distrust between Japan and China, 
in order to unlock Sino-Japanese relations, at least two approaches could be adopted. The 
structural problem of mutual distrust should be dealt with, as it could lead to a vicious 
cycle between the two countries – because mutual distrust and negative bilateral relations 
would interact and worsen the situation. One of the core issues in this approach is that the 
two countries should create an environment and motivation (Griffiths & Luck, 2003) for 
the two countries to pursue joint activities, such as negotiations, instead of waiting for 
unilateral concessions from the other. The expected result would be that the two countries 
could overcome the barriers of a lack of will to resolve the problems of concern for the 
other. Therefore, the vicious cycle could turn into a more positive one, in which distrust 
can be dealt with.  
 
Despite the approach focusing more on the specific asymmetric structure in 
Sino-Japanese mutual distrust, there is another one concerning enhancing mutual trust 
between the countries. As has been argued, breaking the vicious cycle resulting from 
asymmetric mutual distrust would be helpful. However, it also has limitations, including 
the potential danger of generating new vicious cycles with new problems of distrust after 
a period of time. Therefore, seeking essential reconciliation as an aim of the 
trust-building process between China and Japan is fundamental. Enhancing bilateral trust 
requires that the two governments and civil societies keep communicating, to exchange 
information and clarify their positions. There should be institutional settings or 
mechanisms arranged beyond the purely economic and tourism-related.  
 
These two approaches would work together with the same goal of reconstructing 
Sino-Japanese mutual trust, and easing the current tensions of distrust. However, their 
characteristics might lead to different difficulties. For instance, the first approach, dealing 
with the structural problem in mutual distrust, might achieve success through attempts by 
both governments; while the trust-building process could only see its impact in the 
longer-term. In this way, the two approaches are interdependent. It is not likely that the 
achievements of a single approach would lead to overall success. 
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It could be expected that the task of unlocking Sino-Japanese relations by rebuilding trust 
between the two countries would face other problems. Despite the issues of time, 
potential emergencies in the areas of distrust, influences from media and external factors, 
such as the US, would greatly affect the status of bilateral trust/distrust, as well as the 
locked Sino-Japanese relations. Therefore, the two countries should treat all these factors 
seriously with great political wisdom, courage and continued efforts under certain 
mechanisms. 
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Chapter 8: Conclusion 
 
8.1 Basic judgements and questions constructing the thesis 
The research set out to explore the significance and impacts of trust and distrust in 
Sino-Japanese relations. The research design was inspired by several factors, including 
the historical legacy of long-lasting disputes between China and Japan, the application of 
the notion of trust in international relations, and the discourse between the two countries 
at both the governmental and civil society levels. Most of these topics are hotly debated 
and contested in the research fields, generating many discussions and debates. Therefore, 
this thesis attempted to figure out whether it is possible to build connections between 
these factors—to be specific, whether trust can explain the “locked” status of 
Sino-Japanese relations. Particularly, it is not only problems of trust/distrust on 
interdependent issues that contribute to the current status of Sino-Japanese relations. The 
definition of different categories of distrust operating at different levels so that they 
constitute a structural problem in relations could be the enlightening contribution of this 
thesis. 
 
The thesis is established around the following judgments: 
1. The notion of trust has a place in international relations. It is doubted, especially by 
realists, whether trust exists in interstate relationships. However, the fact is that the 
thesis focuses on the “dynamic levels” of trust/distrust instead of the “absolute 
existence” of trust. For example, the status of trust between the US and Canada 
might be regarded as better than that between North Korea and South Korea. This 
argument introduces an issue of cost. It could be interpreted as, based on the level of 
trust, one actor’s cost of strategic preparation against another could be expected (as 
being higher or lower compared with different models). Therefore, even the 
staunchest realists might not completely deny the connections between the notion of 
trust and promotion of national interests. 
 
2. Trust might act as a bridge in interstate relations. One simple model is that, when two 
actors have a comparatively high level of trust, their relationship is less affected 
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when negative incidents happen. If the two countries distrust each other, negative 
incidents would have a significant impact on bilateral relations. From another 
viewpoint, the different status of interstate relations also affects the emergence of 
positive/negative incidents as influenced by trust/distrust. 
 
3. It is the asymmetric structure of mutual distrust that leads to the locked 
Sino-Japanese relations. The thesis argues that building trust between countries is 
achieved in the background with comparatively good bilateral relations. At the same 
time, achieving a better relationship between countries also needs mutual trust. On 
the other hand, a worsening level of trust and a deteriorating relationship could easily 
drive each other. Therefore, this is a vicious cycle. Secondly, China and Japan lack 
the motivation to resolve their problems of distrust, because their major concerns are 
not at the same level. As rational actors, there is hardly a possibility for the two 
countries to make unilateral compromises to deal with their concerns about the other, 
instead of focusing on their own priorities. The situation becomes even more difficult 
to handle as current Sino-Japanese relations remain negative, and the different fields 
of strategic and moral issues are extremely difficult to integrate into a grand 
negotiation.    
 
Beyond these basic judgements the thesis seeks to answer the following questions: 
 
1. How can the problem of trust be identified and understood in terms of International 
Relations (IR)? How will trust – or distrust - affect international relations between 
states? 
2. Why are Sino-Japanese relations ‘locked’ in terms of distrust? What is the nature of 
this structural dilemma and what are the asymmetries in the status of trust? 
3. Is it possible to ‘unlock’ the problem of trust between the two countries and improve 
general relations? If yes, how can this be achieved? If no, why not? 
 
The research questions contain several key arguments for discussion. Question one 
focuses on two issues: whether the notion of trust/distrust exists in International Relations 
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and how trust can shape relations between states. This includes consideration of how we 
should measure trust. Question two raises three issues: firstly, its shows that mutual 
distrust in China-Japan relations might have two general categories, in strategic and 
moral fields. Secondly, it shows that there is an asymmetric structure in mutual distrust 
between the two countries. Thirdly, the asymmetric structure of mutual distrust leads to 
“locked” Sino-Japanese relations. Question three asks for an examination of possible 
approaches to “unlocking” bilateral relations, by dealing with the sources of distrust. By 
raising, defining and verifying these factors, the judgements of the thesis are constructed.  
 
8.2 Theoretical implication 
8.2.1 The existence of trust 
There are two main categories of theoretical discussion in this research. Firstly, it has to 
be verified that the notion of trust could have an impact on interstate relations, so that the 
framework could be built. Secondly, how the basic theoretical elements of state 
rationality, moral norms, strategic trust, and moral trust fit Sino-Japanese relations is 
another major concern.  
 
It could be argued that the notion of trust owes its significance in international relations 
to certain academic assumptions. This research does not demonstrate that countries will 
“fully” trust others without reservations. Instead, trust has certain scopes and conditions, 
described as “trust, but verify” (Lebow, 2013, p. 18). There is literature about verifying 
the existence of trust in international relations in different IR theory approaches. As noted 
in this thesis, trust plays a role to a certain extent, even in a comparatively complex and 
dangerous environment such as the Cold War. Besides, the more-positive interactions in 
Sino-Japanese relations after the normalization of diplomatic relations also verify the 
arguments in other theories, such as liberalism and constructivism, that trust can be 
identified and measured in international relations—although with some limitations. 
 
Besides, this research also focuses on distrust as a problem in the current status between 
China and Japan. It has to be mentioned that distrust does not equal a lack of trust under 
all circumstances (Cook, Hardin, & Levi, 2005; Hoffman, Building trust : overcoming 
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suspicion in international conflict, 2006). The conception of “distrust” is not the same as 
“lacking trust”, because there is also the possibility that a condition of “not to trust and 
not to distrust” could also exist. Therefore, there is the task of defining how to measure 
the status of trust and distrust between countries. As “trust” is an abstract concept in 
international relations, empirical evidence is needed in order to understand what the 
status of trust is in a certain relationship. In practice, the approach of measuring 
trust/distrust between countries is based on the analysis of certain materials including 
governmental documents, public opinion and interviews on scholars. The “behaviours” of 
trust and distrust are also included in the analysis, because this evidence is better for 
verifying the level of trust/distrust.  
 
8.2.2 The significance of trust 
The existence of the notion of trust is only one part of the theoretical framework. How 
“trust” affects its impact on Sino-Japanese relations is vital to the other research 
questions. In terms of the issue of significance, the aim and the way trust plays a role is 
the explanation. Trust could act as a bridge between “interactions” and “relationships” in 
international relations. A positive situation might be described as when interactions and 
incidents between countries can be interpreted in a more positive way with trust, and 
could lead to a better relationship. In turn, a better relationship between countries with 
stronger trust could possibly generate more positive interactions. A negative situation 
shows the opposite influences. It could also be described as “positive” or “vicious” cycles. 
There is an argument that better relations between countries need to be supported by 
mutual trust. However, trust could hardly be generated with negative bilateral relations. If 
there is a vicious cycle, the actors have to face the dilemma that both trust and better 
relations are extremely difficult to achieve while distrust and tensions deepen. Therefore, 
“trust” has an important presence in interstate relations. 
 
Moreover, the application of the concepts in specific Sino-Japanese relations is a further 
issue. It has been argued that, despite the universalities of trust and distrust in 
international relations, the characteristics of China and Japan bring certain particularities, 
which could connect trust and bilateral relations. The characteristics include their specific 
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political cultures. For example, the legitimacy of the CCP requires the Chinese 
government to be stronger and more conservative in Sino-Japanese relations, to avoid 
history repeating itself. Japan’s unique political status as an “abnormal” state makes 
Japan even more concerned about the rise of China because Japan’s defence is restricted 
by its constitution and heavily relies on the US-Japan alliance. The importance of these 
characteristics is that, when there are incidents and disputes between the two countries, 
the characteristics have great impact on the issues as “determinants” of consideration. 
These characteristics could be observed through certain methodologies. The most 
important ways are in the foreign policy-making processes of the two countries, the 
academic debates, and public opinion. Hence, it is fundamentally important to analyse the 
status of trust and distrust by examining these determinants. 
 
There is another way to understand the status of trust and distrust in Sino-Japanese 
relations: by establishing different categories for issues. Considering the determinants in 
Sino-Japanese relations and the political realities, “strategic trust” and “moral trust” are 
raised as key concepts. There are two arguments over the two categories. Firstly, the two 
notions focus on the “essences of the issues”, which indicates the status of trust and 
distrust. It is reasonable to apply the notions of rationality and normative perception of 
countries to strategic and moral trust. It is reasonable to understand that countries are 
trying to be rational when dealing with international affairs. At the same time, trust could 
also be identified as a kind of international norm—whether based on the values of 
behaviours, or the judgements of national interests. Therefore, although the existing 
literature includes very similar phrases of strategic and moralistic distrust, their emphases 
are on the “theoretical sources of generating trust”, which are specific to this research.  
 
From this basis the thesis proposes several hypotheses about the asymmetric structure in 
Sino-Japanese mutual distrust. These aim to verify the assumption that it is the mutual 
distrust and the asymmetric structure that leads to the “locked” Sino-Japanese relations. 
The verification of the hypotheses has three parts. Japan distrusts China over strategic 
and moral issues, and strategic issues are predominant. China also has issues in the moral 
and strategic fields, and the moral ones are currently a priori. Moreover, there is another 
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dilemma, or vicious cycle, between China and Japan. The common form of vicious circle 
suggested that distrust leads to negative relations, and negative relations could generate 
more distrust rather than trust. In Sino-Japanese relations, the dilemma of asymmetric 
structure is that the primary concerns of the two countries are at different levels. When 
Japan wants its strategic concerns to be dealt with as a priority, China is more concerned 
with moral issues such as history. As both countries will not make unilateral concessions, 
the situation could be described as another vicious circle, in which distrust towards the 
other leads to distrust from the other. 
 
When reviewing the first two research questions in relation to the theoretical implications 
mentioned above, the notion of “trust” (or, to be more exact, distrust in the case of 
Sino-Japanese relations) would seem to play a vital role in Sino-Japanese relations. The 
way “trust” shows its significance is the concern of research question three, by forming 
two vicious cycles and connecting the characteristics of the two countries and the 
universalities of trust in international relations. When referring to the status of “locked” 
status of bilateral relations, the more difficult situation that goes beyond “negative” status 
resulting from the vicious cycles and dilemmas should be the essence of the problem. A 
general answer to the question is that it is the mutual distrust and its asymmetric structure 
caused by the different characteristics that leads to the “locked” status of Sino-Japanese 
relations.  
 
8.2.3 Trust and the “locked” Sino-Japanese relations 
In order to solve the problem of the “locked” Sino-Japanese relationship, the research 
focuses on whether it is possible to reach breakthroughs on the issues of mutual trust and 
distrust (addressing research question three). It can’t be argued that distrust is the only 
reasons that leads to negative or even locked Sino-Japanese relations. However, as 
distrust has been proven to contribute significantly to the current situation, dealing with 
the problem of Sino-Japanese distrust would help unlock the relationship. According to 
the findings regarding sources of distrust, the main problems are that the two countries 
have many concerns of distrust towards each other, and distrust issues have two vicious 
cycles. In this way, there are at least two approaches to solving the problems: 
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1) Improving mutual trust through continual communication and positive interactions, 
in all the fields including those with disputes. If cooperation and positive interactions 
between countries are easily interrupted as incidents, the communications cannot be 
regarded as effective. Therefore, more mature mechanisms of communication are 
expected. This approach might be a long-term project. 
2) At the same time, the two countries might take steps in the near future to break the 
vicious cycles, and deal with the asymmetric structure. This depends on the political 
strategies and wisdom of the two countries, that areas of dispute can be addressed. If 
this approach can be executed effectively, the status of distrust could be improved 
quickly. 
 
The basic logic and theoretical framework is that, as the vicious cycles and asymmetries 
of distrust lead to “locked” Sino-Japanese relations, it is crucial to replace the 
determinant factors in the vicious cycles to turn them into positive cycles. At the same 
time, trust-building processes in the longer term would help secure the potential progress 
and avoid reversals caused by new incidents. In this way, unlocking Sino-Japanese 
relations by dealing with distrust problems could be expected to be an effective method in 
changing the pattern of relations.   
 
8.3 Empirical evidence 
The main empirical findings are in the literature review and the two case study chapters. 
The literature review is based on existing literature discussing Sino-Japanese relations, 
and the characteristics of the relationship. The chapter is constructed in the form of a 
chronology, offering a comparatively clear trend of interactions between China and Japan, 
mainly after the normalization process. It provides evidence that Sino-Japanese relations 
have experienced at least three different periods after the 1972 normalization: the 
“honeymoon”, from 1972 to the end of the Cold War; “Frictions” from the 1990s to the 
beginning of 21st Century; and “the New Era” with more disputes, from the beginning of 
the 21st Century until now. The three periods have these labels for the following reasons. 
On the one hand, there are symbolic events or trends in the different periods, such as the 
288 
 
collapse of the Soviet Union as a turning point between the first and second period. These 
vital changes reflect great changes in the international environment, which have impacts 
on relations between countries. On the other hand, the empirical evidence of interactions 
could indicate the status of Sino-Japanese relations. For instance, among the 33 important 
mutual interactions between the two countries, only 13 were positive or cooperative. This 
shows an explicit trend of deterioration, compared to the previous two periods. The 
significance of this is that Sino-Japanese relations have been negative in their interactions, 
which could be interpreted as distrust issues.   
 
Hence, the connection between “trust” and “Sino-Japanese” relations is built for the first 
time in the research, by figuring out what was the status of trust/distrust in certain 
positive/negative periods. The preliminary finding is that the performance of trust is 
stronger in a positive relationship, while distrust shows a stronger presence in a negative 
relationship. 
 
In terms of research question two, “is it the asymmetric mutual distrust between Japan 
and China on strategic and moral issues which leads to the ‘locked’ Sino-Japanese 
relations?” the two case study chapters try to synthesize the materials on certain selected, 
typical cases and the three hypotheses of the research question.  
 
 Hypothesis one: Japan distrusts China on strategic and moral issues. Strategic 
distrust is predominant and moral distrust is secondary. This could be verified 
according to the findings that, first, the evidence and materials of “distrust discourse 
and activities” are more plentiful than those of “trust” on the same issues at 
governmental, academic and civil society levels. In terms of the quantitative 
calculation, the research has observed a result of 225-12 appearances of distrust-trust 
discourse identified in the governmental documents about Japan’s strategic distrust. 
Secondly, when incidents take place between the two countries, Japan tends to 
interpret them in a way of strategic distrust, instead of trusting China to cooperate 
without hesitation.  
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Thirdly, there is more evidence related to strategic issues than moral issues, 
showing a tendency towards strategic distrust. For example, the public opinion 
survey indicated two issues that, on one hand, distrust and negative impressions are 
the mainstream images in Japanese society when directly asked about opinions 
towards China: 88.8% of interviewees chose “unfavourable/relatively unfavourable” 
options. On the other hand, strategic issues have drawn more attention among civil 
society, in terms of the general image of China, and the disputes and incidents are 
regarded as the main source of problems between the two countries. For instance, 
68.1% of Japanese see China as a regional military threat, increasing from 64.3% in 
2014. The two aspects show that the existence of Japanese distrust of China, 
especially distrust over strategic issues, has been recognized as a crucial topic, which 
fits the hypothesis. 
 
The interviews of scholars could also verify the argument that, from the 
Japanese perspective, the problems between the two countries mainly come from the 
strategic rise of China instead of historical legacies. The typical arguments are, 
“Japan does not have a problem on the history”, “Japanese concerns of China’s 
purposes for gaining stronger national power”, and so on. The significance of these 
attitudes of distrust is that the tendencies of Japan’s foreign policy-making could 
reflect the distrust behaviour and discourse.    
 
 Hypothesis two: China distrusts Japan on moral and strategic issues. Moral distrust is 
predominant and strategic distrust is rising. Similar to Japan’s case in the analysis 
methods, the empirical findings suggest that China has an asymmetric distrust of 
Japan. For the Chinese case, the comparison in frequency of distrust and trust 
discourse is 89-0 on its moral concerns from the 14 documents, which shows 
distrust’s dominant position. The strategic issues exhibit a similar trend that a 
quantitative comparison in frequency of distrust and trust of 36-0 can verify the 
existence of strategic distrust. Moreover, the frequency and expressions of words of 
the used discourse as well as opinions from public opinion poll and scholars can also 
verify that China concentrate more on the moral distrust issues. 
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 Hypothesis three: Except for the internal asymmetric structure of distrust between the 
two countries, there is another structural asymmetry that, while the problem of 
strategic and moral distrust exists in both countries, they have different a priori 
concerns. Mutual and asymmetric distrust means that the two countries face a 
dilemma. On one hand, the two countries need positive interactions to build trust. 
However, constructing a positive relationship needs bilateral trust. As the two 
countries tend not to make unilateral concessions to break the vicious cycle, the 
mutual asymmetric distrust could be a vital problem in Sino-Japanese relationship in 
a “locked” status.  
 
Therefore the hypotheses are supported by the data and materials achieved by the 
collection and analysis of discourse content. The relationship between the research 
questions, theoretical framework and empirical evidence is as follows. On the one hand, 
the empirical information directly verifies some of the arguments in the research 
questions. For instance, the dozens of examples of distrust behaviour and discourse could 
directly verify the existence of distrust between China and Japan. This distrust evidence 
could also verify the significance of the concept of “trust” and “distrust” in Sino-Japanese 
relations, because they could be regarded as evidence of a trend of future foreign policies. 
On the other hand, the empirical evidence could indirectly answer the research questions, 
by supporting the hypotheses raised in the theoretical framework. The theoretical 
framework raised the concept of rationality-versus-normative activities, measuring trust 
and distrust through certain discourses and behaviours. This is turn suggested the 
hypotheses of examining mutual distrust by means of the asymmetric structure. Hence, 
the empirical evidences should have provided to help verify the arguments and 
hypotheses. The fact is that the empirical material collected could fit the main 
assumptions, that the existing documents, interviews and foreign policies lead to the 
conclusion that the judgements are interconnected. With the very rich content of Japanese 
attention to China’s military rise and comparatively weaker expressions over moral issues, 
and the similar-but-opposite case from the Chinese perspective, could build an 
asymmetric distrust and its connection with “locked” Sino-Japanese relations. While the 
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existing distrust discourse, attitudes and behaviour remain as the structural sources of 
problems between the two countries, it is extremely hard to achieve essential 
reconciliation over their targeted concerns. 
 
In conclusion, the empirical findings answer the research questions in the following 
ways: 
1. In terms of the existence and significance of “trust” and “distrust” in Sino-Japanese 
relations, the qualitative analysis of the materials could identify the discourse and 
behaviours with the essence of “trust” and “distrust”. Regarding the distrust between 
the two countries, the two sources of the potential for damaged national interests and 
uncertainty over potential dangers have occupied the major portion of the content. 
Therefore, distrust has its place in bilateral relations. Moreover, the attitudes of 
distrust could also inform a country’s policies, so it is vital to Sino-Japanese 
relations. 
2. The second question is on the asymmetric structure and the locked Sino-Japanese 
relations. What could be surmised from the empirical evidence is that there are 
distinct expressions on the issues of the two fields from the two countries. While the 
two countries have different predominant concerns between strategic and moral 
issues, which are not at the same levels as the concerns of the other actor, the two 
vicious cycles cause the “locked” status of Sino-Japanese relations.  
3. Although the prediction of the approaches for solving the problems of distrust and 
unlocking relations cannot be purely dependent on the incidents that have already 
happened, the existing experiences are still helpful for future developments. 
Considering the interactions between China and Japan since the normalization of 
bilateral relations, the status of trust and distrust is strongly affected by a series of 
factors, showing a fluctuating trend. With the current background of the rise of China 
and Japan becoming more conservative on the China issues, it could be predicted that 
the two countries will meet difficulties in the near future when rebuilding trust. As 
the research tried to track the previous settlement of mutual disputes, it can be 
observed that the political wisdom between the two leaderships could bring positive 
effects. However, in the longer term, if the two countries want to reach a more stable 
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relationship with trust, trust-building projects require more patience and hard work. 
This kind of reconciliation has not been achieved yet, and should be the goal. 
 
8.4 Limitations of the current research and suggestions for the further 
research 
The research offers several perspectives for looking at the question of trust/distrust in 
Sino-Japanese relations, including “describing” or “explaining” the definitions of trust in 
certain interstate relations; “evaluating” how good or bad the situation is currently; and 
even “predicting” the future of bilateral relationship and mutual trust. To answer the 
research questions, these perspectives are based on certain methods such as the 
qualitative analysis of literature, the quantitative calculation of the pieces of discourse, 
interviews, and so on. The research has tried to detail and cover as much material as 
possible. However, it encountered some limitations, which need to be paid attention to: 
 
1) The research has raised two general categories of issues on distrust, interpreted as 
“strategic” and “moral” trust. To take a detailed analysis, the thesis selected several 
specific cases for study. The cases include “maritime disputes” for Japan’s strategic 
distrust of China, “ideologies and trustworthiness to be a responsible actor” for 
Japan’s moral distrust of China, the “Yasukuni Shrine dispute” for China’s moral 
distrust of Japan, and “Japan’s potential military rise and the US-Japan alliance” for 
China’s strategic distrust of Japan. These issues are representative and vital in the 
fields of strategic and moral issues. However, it still needs to be considered whether 
there are other issues that have great impact on the status of trust/distrust between the 
two countries. Due to the limitation of the words and research window, this thesis 
focused on the selected issues. However, the dynamic interstate relations require 
further research, expanding the research scope in the future. 
2) “Inequality” of materials should be mentioned, because the two countries have 
different characteristics. It has been recognised that the research could not collect the 
same amount of materials from the two countries at the same level. For example, the 
amount of governmental documents from the official MOFA (Japan) website 
covering its top a priori issue of strategic distrust was more than China’s 
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governmental documents from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs official website 
covering its core concern of moral distrust. This is reasonable, because countries 
have different styles of political behaviour, especially for those who have totally 
different political systems. It could be understood that China might not always 
express all of its opinions through fully-authorised institutions, and could allow 
semi-authorised ones to take over this job. Although this kind of issue would not 
challenge the arguments of the thesis, future research should still pay more attention 
to the balance of materials from the two countries. 
3) Aside from the “inequality” issue, the sources of information are still limited. At the 
governmental level, the current research could only focus on the selected cases, and 
the related documents published on the websites of foreign affairs authorities. This 
could be expanded in two ways. Firstly, it is reasonable that more cases could be 
included in the two categories of strategic and moral trust/distrust. Although the 
representative cases offered the most efficient ways to understand the status of 
Sino-Japanese trust/distrust, analysis of more cases would help improve the 
credibility of the research. Secondly, if future research could also collect empirical 
materials from other governmental channels than the website of foreign affairs 
authorities, the content would be enriched as well. A similar issues exists at other 
levels, such as that public opinion data comes from an existing survey instead of one 
conducted by the researcher. The interviews of scholars are restricted by the number 
of interviewees and questions. Future research should also improve these issues.    
4) Another issue is the impact of the research topic. Although it could be proven that 
“trust” plays an important role in Sino-Japanese relations, whether the leadership 
tends to accept its significance is another issue. A longer period of time is needed to 
continuously verify the research, because the Sino-Japanese relationship is in a state 
of continued flux. To increase the impact of the research, analysis of future incidents 
and interactions in Sino-Japanese relations should be carried out. 
 
8.5 Final Conclusions 
The title of the thesis indicates several key elements of the research: distrust, asymmetric 
structure, and “locked” Sino-Japanese relations. In short, the core issue is to interpret 
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Sino-Japanese relations by understanding the issue of trust and distrust between the two 
countries. This is a different approach to explaining why the Sino-Japanese relationship 
keeps deteriorating rather than focusing on every single incident or event. The concept of 
trust and distrust is used as both a criteria to measure bilateral relations and a source of 
both positive and negative status.  
 
The typical and classic way to study Sino-Japanese relations is to take a specific case and 
analyse why it occurred, and what was its impact. By introducing the notions of trust and 
distrust, this research builds a three-stage logic of “incident-trust-relationship” to realise a 
broader picture of Sino-Japanese relations. This logic works with different conditions. If 
a status of “trust” is negative, the incidents between the two countries might be 
interpreted in a more negative way and through distrust, which leads to a negative 
relationship. Moreover, the three factors have other ways to influence each other, so that 
a bad relationship could cause stronger distrust and unpredictable, damaging incidents; 
while the worst incidents could also deepen mutual distrust. In a similar way, a positive 
status could also witness a beneficial influences among the factors. Therefore, the 
interdependent elements are in a dynamic process, showing that Sino-Japanese relations 
are not simply peer-to-peer cases. 
 
The research was initially inspired by the history between the two countries and the 
existing literature. To be specific, it is strange that China and Japan are still struggling 
with disputes that have historical roots. The literature and the calculation of important 
mutual events indicates that there are different periods in the relationship that have been 
either quite positive or disappointing. The bilateral relations could be described as both 
being stable and unstable. Stable, because the general trend has kept moving towards 
deterioration. However, it is also unstable, because exceptions might bring different 
results in a particular political environment, such as the textbook issues during a 
comparatively positive period, and the ice-breaking visits during the stressful years. The 
worsening and chaotic relationship between two former World War II opponents can’t be 
explained purely as a result of historical memories, because, on one hand, most other 
previous rivalries – such as the Germany-France relationship – have managed to move 
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forward and their problems have been dealt with. On the other hand, China and Japan 
achieved official reconciliation of their diplomatic relationship in the 1970s. Therefore, it 
is reasonable to have doubts over the origins of the disputes and negative bilateral 
relations.  
 
Under this circumstance, it is considered that there could be two types of issues. Firstly, 
reconciliation has not been fully achieved, so that while the diplomatic relationship is 
normalized, the two states still show attitudes of distrust towards each other in certain 
cases. Secondly, there are new issues which could cause disputes between the two 
countries and deepen mutual distrust. The reason why the research tried to introduce the 
concept of trust and distrust in interstate relations is because the previously-mentioned 
two types of issues have essential differences which require a link between them, in order 
to acquire a comprehensive understanding of the overall image of Sino-Japanese relations. 
Hence, as a “bridge” between “incidents/cases” and “bilateral relations”, trust and distrust 
have an impact, as both sources and intermediate signals. 
 
It is possible to use “distrust” to describe the current status of China-Japan relations. This 
means that there are tasks of clearing the past and facing the future. Therefore, research 
should be continually updated with any upcoming affairs between the two countries, 
because the mutual interactions could help interpret the status of trust and distrust, and 
then explain how the bilateral relationship works. There should not be any absolute 
judgement, even when there are breakthroughs in the near future, because the foundation 
of mutual trust is still weak. If the trust-building process between the two countries does 
not bring significant achievements over a longer period, efforts should also not be 
ignored or terminated. The “locked” Sino-Japanese relationship needs both short term 
and long term measures to be unlocked. In this way, the effectiveness and contribution of 
this research would be more significant if it could be continued, observing the on-going 
changes in the relationship.  
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Press Conference by Minister for Foreign Affairs Fumio Kishida, 
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Yonghua, Ambassador of the People’s Republic of China to Japan, 
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Courtesy Call on Prime Minister Shinzo Abe by U.S. Vice President Joe Biden, 
http://www.mofa.go.jp/region/page4e_000050.html 
 
311 
 
Telephone Conference between Minister for Foreign Affairs Mr. Fumio Kishida and US 
Ambassador to Japan Ms. Caroline Kennedy, 
http://www.mofa.go.jp/press/release/press4e_000111.html 
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Press Conference by Minister for Foreign Affairs Seiji Maehara, 
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Press Conference by Minister for Foreign Affairs Seiji Maehara, 
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http://www.mofa.go.jp/region/asia-paci/china/consult0509.html 
 
Press Conference by Minister for Foreign Affairs Katsuya Okada, 
http://www.mofa.go.jp/announce/fm_press/2010/7/0727_01.html 
 
Other files which discuss more than one single topic 
Press Conference by Minister for Foreign Affairs Fumio Kishida, 
http://www.mofa.go.jp/announce/fm_press/2013/2/0208_01.html 
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Protest lodged by Mr. Chikao Kawai, Vice-Minister for Foreign Affairs, to H.E. Cheng 
Yonghua, Ambassador of the People's Republic of China to Japan, 
http://www.mofa.go.jp/announce/announce/2013/2/0208_02.html 
 
Press Conference by Minister for Foreign Affairs Fumio Kishida, 
http://www.mofa.go.jp/region/asia-paci/china/pv0704/joint.html 
 
Japan-China Relations at a Crossroads, 
http://www.mofa.go.jp/region/asia-paci/senkaku/pdfs/iht_121121_en.pdf 
 
Statements made by H.E. Mr. Kazuo Kodama, Ambassador Extraordinary and 
Plenipotentiary, Deputy Permanent Representative of Japan to the UN in exercise of the 
right of reply, following the statement made by H.E. Mr. Yang Jiechi, Minister for 
Foreign Affairs of the People's Republic of China at the General Debate of the 67th 
Session of the UN General Assembly on 27 September, 2012, 
http://www.mofa.go.jp/announce/speech/un2012/un_0928.html 
 
Leaflet: The Senkaku Islands, http://www.mofa.go.jp/files/000018519.pdf 
 
Pamphlet: The Senkaku Islands, 
http://www.mofa.go.jp/region/asia-paci/senkaku/pdfs/senkaku_pamphlet.pdf 
 
Moral part: 
Japan Welcomes China's Democratic Future: Contribution by Minister for Foreign 
Affairs Taro Aso to the Asian Wall Street Journal, 
http://www.mofa.go.jp/announce/fm/aso/contribute0603.html 
 
Speech by Mr. Taro Aso, Minister for Foreign Affairs on the Occasion of the Japan 
Institute of International Affairs Seminar: "Arc of Freedom and Prosperity: Japan's 
Expanding Diplomatic Horizons", 
http://www.mofa.go.jp/announce/fm/aso/speech0611.html 
313 
 
 
Press Conference by Minister for Foreign Affairs Masahiko Koumura, 
http://www.mofa.go.jp/announce/fm_press/2008/3/0318.html 
 
Press Conference by Minister for Foreign Affairs Masahiko Koumura, 
http://www.mofa.go.jp/announce/fm_press/2008/4/0411.html 
 
Press Conference by Minister for Foreign Affairs Masahiko Koumura, 
http://www.mofa.go.jp/announce/fm_press/2008/4/0418.html 
 
Japan’s expanding diplomatic horizons, http://www.mofa.go.jp/policy/pillar/horizons.pdf 
 
Appendix 2: governmental documents used in different sections of 
Chapter 6 
 
Moral Part: 
Ambassador to Japan Cheng Yonghua Delivers Speech at Genron NPO of Japan, 
http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/wjb_663304/zwjg_665342/zwbd_665378/t1148677.s
html. 
 
Ambassador to Japan Cheng Yonghua Delivers Speech at Chinese Embassy 
Japan-China Friendship Groups’ New Year Banquet 2014, 
http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_chn/dszlsjt_602260/t1128672.shtml. 
 
Ambassador to Japan Cheng Yonghua Writes to Japan’s Mainichi Shimbun on the Issue 
of Prime Minister Shinzo Abe’s Visit to the Yasukuni Shrine, 
http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/wjb_663304/zwjg_665342/zwbd_665378/t1114404.s
html. 
 
Press Conference by Foreign Ministry Spokeswoman Hua Chunying, 
http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_chn/fyrbt_602243/t1126983.shtml. 
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Press Conference by Foreign Ministry Spokeswoman Hua Chunying, 
http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_chn/fyrbt_602243/t1153069.shtml. 
 
Permanent Representative to United Nations Ambassador Liu Jieyi Delivered the Speech 
"War and its lessons and the search for long lasting peace" on the Open Debate of the UN 
Security Council at the Council, 
http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_chn/dszlsjt_602260/t1124791.shtml. 
 
Press Conference by Foreign Ministry Spokesman Hong Lei, 
http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_chn/fyrbt_602243/t1121139.shtml. 
 
Press Conference by Foreign Ministry Spokesman Hong Lei, 
http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_chn/fyrbt_602243/t1119124.shtml. 
 
Press Conference by Foreign Ministry Spokeswoman Hua Chunying, 
http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_chn/fyrbt_602243/t1115316.shtml. 
 
Foreign Ministry Spokeswoman answers questions from media in terms of the issue of 
Japanese Minister for Internal Affairs and Communications visiting the Yasukuni Shrine, 
http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_chn/fyrbt_602243/dhdw_602249/t1113745.shtml. 
 
Press Conference by Foreign Ministry Spokesman Qin Gang, 
http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_chn/fyrbt_602243/t1113124.shtml. 
 
Yang Jiechi gives a speech on Abe’s visit to the Yasukuni Shrine, 
http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_chn/zyxw_602251/t1112727.shtml. 
 
Wang Yi summoned Japanese Ambassador to China to raise a strong protest against 
Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe’s visit to the Yasukuni Shrine, 
http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_chn/zyxw_602251/t1112220.shtml. 
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Press Conference by Foreign Ministry Spokesman Qin Gang, 
http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_chn/fyrbt_602243/t1112167.shtml. 
 
Foreign Ministry Spokesman Qin Gang gives a speech on Japanese Prime Minister 
Shinzo Abe’s visit to the Yasukuni Shrine, 
http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_chn/zyxw_602251/t1112078.shtml. 
 
Strategic Part: 
Press Conference by Foreign Ministry Spokesman Hong Lei, 
http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_chn/fyrbt_602243/jzhsl_602247/t1170302.shtml. 
 
Press Conference by Foreign Ministry Spokesman Hong Lei, 
http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_chn/fyrbt_602243/jzhsl_602247/t1170767.shtml. 
 
Press Conference by Foreign Ministry Spokesman Hong Lei, 
http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_chn/fyrbt_602243/jzhsl_602247/t1172493.shtml. 
 
Yang Jiechi expressed the solemn stance against the Japanese side on Japanese House of 
Representatives forcibly passing the new security bills, 
http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_chn/zyxw_602251/t1281917.shtml. 
 
Ambassador to Japan Cheng Yonghua gives a speech at ‘Ribenshu’, 
http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_chn/zwbd_602255/t1257564.shtml. 
 
Press Conference by Foreign Ministry Spokeswoman Zhang Qiyue, 
http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_chn/wjdt_611265/fyrbt_611275/t139995.shtml. 
 
Press Conference by Foreign Ministry Spokesman Qin Gang, 
http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_chn/wjb_602314/zzjg_602420/gjs_603130/gjzz_603134/l
hgyffz_603178/fyrth_603186/t1099163.shtml. 
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Ambassador to Japan Cheng Yonghua attended the meeting of Japan-China Friendship 
Association, 
http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_chn/wjdt_611265/zwbd_611281/t1169136.shtml. 
 
The Chinese Embassy held ‘Chinese Embassy Japan-China Friendship Groups’ New 
Year Banquet 2014’, http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_chn/zwbd_602255/t1128679.shtml. 
 
Appendix 3: Public opinion polls 
11th Japan-China Joint Opinion Poll Analysis Report on the Comparative Data (2015), 
http://www.genron-npo.net/en/pp/docs/151020_en.pdf and 
http://www.genron-npo.net/en/pp/archives/5216.html 
 
The 10th Japan-China Public Opinion Poll: Analysis Report on the Comparative Data, 
http://www.genron-npo.net/en/pp/docs/10th_Japan-China_poll.pdf and 
http://www.genron-npo.net/en/pp/archives/5153.html.  
 
 
 
